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In this dissertation I argue that the theory of relativism developed by the sophist Protagoras of 
Abdera served as a rationalization for democracy that was incorporated into the Athenian 
political culture as an integral part of its basic worldview. Using Plato’s Protagoras and 
Theaetetus, as well as the fragments of Protagoras, I first offer a comprehensive reconstruction of 
the sophist’s political thought. Since the human individual is an autarkic and autonomous entity 
whose perceptions and judgments of reality are veridical and incorrigible, the only form of 
government that allows him to live in community with others without violating his basic identity 
is democracy.  
After discussing Protagoras’ political theory, I analyze the evidence concerning his life 
and friendship with Pericles and conclude that Protagoras was in a position that enabled him to 
exert an influence on the Athenian democracy. I then examine the funeral speech composed for 
Pericles by Thucydides in his History and argue that the description Pericles gives of the 
Athenian political system recalls in both concept and language not only Protagoras’ political 
thinking, but his relativist philosophy as well. Turning then to Protagoras’ rhetorical program, 
summed up in the claim “to make the weaker logos the stronger,” I examine it as an integral 
supplement to his political theory and conclude that it was a mechanism for securing genuine 
consensus in the citizen-body. I then examine the rhetorical aspect of Pericles’ funeral speech 
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and find that it enacts this Protagorean rhetorical program in an effort to create greater unanimity 
in the Athenian state after the first year of war.  
Finally, in order to account for this Protagorean dimension in Thucydides’ 
characterization of Pericles, I analyze Thucydides’ description of the plague that struck Athens 
shortly after the war began and attempt to show that it contains conceptual and verbal allusions 
to both Pericles’ speech and Protagoras’ thought. On the basis of these allusions I suggest that 
Thucydides incorporated this Protagorean dimension in his portrait of Pericles in order to 
point to the sophist’s relativism as a crucial step in the eventual espousal of Realist politics by 
the Athenian state. 
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1.0 INTRODUCTION: THE JUSTIFICATION OF DEMOCRACY 
In this dissertation I argue that the theory of relativism developed by the sophist Protagoras of 
Abdera became a significant element in the Athenian democratic political theory and in the 
opinion of Thucydides exerted an influence on the direction the Athenian state took towards 
political Realism shortly after the beginning of the Peloponnesian War. Before I can begin, 
however, I must address two preliminary issues. These issues concern the relationship of theory 
and practice in the history of the Athenian democracy, and the previous scholarship that 
addresses Protagoras as a significant contributor to the theoretical justification of the full, 
participatory democracy that flourished in Athens during the second half of the fifth century BC.  
1.1 A DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL THEORY 
The origin of the Athenian democracy is a good illustration of the complicated relationship 
between theory and practice. One might argue that a theory of popular rule came before, and in 
part caused, the emergence of democracy in Athens in the fifth century BC;1 one could deny 
theory any place at all during the initial stages;2 or in the spirit of compromise one might appeal 
to the complexity of social and political institutions and the formative role of ideology, and 
agree, e.g. with Ober, “that practice and ideology interact to create democracy, and that theory is 
1 Cf. Cartledge 2009: 57-62; Ostwald 1969: 161-173. See also Robinson 1997 & 2007 for a survey of the 
development of popular rule in Greece before the development of democracy in Athens. 
2 So Forrest 1966: 103; Davies 2003: 319-335. Cf. Sealey 1964: 11-22; 1981: 125-134.  
1 
posterior.”3 During the forty-six years between the approval of Cleisthenes’ measures in 508/7 
and the passing of Ephialtes’ bills in 462/1 the Athenian state experienced momentous 
challenges: two invasions by the Persian superpower, the leadership of the Greek cities in and 
around the Aegean and a deterioration in its relations with the major military power of the Greek 
mainland, Sparta. These historical pressures are enough to suggest that in the last analysis 
democracy was a hard, experimental, intuitive process involving the gradual refinement of 
initially innovative, perhaps proto-democratic, ideas. Ober is therefore probably right in 
suggesting a complex, though not theory-driven, origin.  
 On the other hand, whether or not a systematic explanation was ever developed is an 
entirely different question. The scholarly consensus appears to have been that Greek thinkers did 
try, after the emergence of democracy, to explain its success, rationalize its principles and justify 
its continuance. For instance, Ernest Barker pointed to Protagoras’ defense of the Athenian 
Assembly in Plato’s Protagoras as supplying a “fundamental argument for the democratic 
cause.”4 A. H. M. Jones contended that a democratic theory existed, but had not been transmitted 
in the source-material, which was overwhelmingly antidemocratic. He therefore attempted to 
reconstruct its major features by examining the theoretical utterances preserved in the “scattered 
evidence” of orators, historians and philosophers,5 while Eric Havelock pointed to the sophists 
and argued that they, taken as a whole, developed a justification for democracy and worked out 
rules and procedures for free debate and decision-making.6  
3 1989: 20n40. 
4 1918: 152. 
5 1953: 3. 
6 1957: ch. 8-9. 
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Around this same time the idea of a democratic political theory was challenged by M. I. 
Finley, who denied that “an articulated democratic theory ever existed in Athens,”7 but did not 
discuss the matter in any detail and at any rate later modified his view.8 Defending the original 
view, Donald Kagan supplemented Jones’ article with his own examination of fifth and fourth 
century writers, in an effort to reconstruct “the ideas and principles which composed the political 
theory of Greek democracy,”9 while Ellen and Neal Wood (echoing Barker) analyzed the Great 
Speech of Protagoras as evidence for a democratic political theory.10 In the spirit of Finley’s 
denial, Nicole Loraux maintained that there was no “written (her italics) theory of democracy” 
and additionally that none was to be found in the Athenian epitaphioi.11 On the other hand, 
Cynthia Farrar found various versions of a democratic theory in the work of Protagoras, 
Democritus and Thucydides12 and Robin Osborne determined that the development of a 
democratic theory was likely in light of what he interprets as the democratic ideology of 
exclusiveness.13 Most recently, Eric Robinson argued for an historical connection between 
democracy and sophistic thought by pointing out that many of the cities the sophists hailed from 
were experiencing popular changes in the first half of the fifth century.14 Thus all in all, with the 
exception of a few challenges, Classical scholarship has more or less reached a consensus that 
either Greek thinkers or the Athenians themselves, or both, attempted to place democracy in a 
theoretical framework.   
 
 
 
7 1962: 9. 
8 Specifically, he later saw a justification of ἰσηγορία in Protagoras’ Great Speech (1973: 28, 94).   
9 1965: 73-95. 
10 1978: 129. 
11 1986: 179, 172-220. She is however silent as to whether a theory existed at all. 
12 1988. See below, sub-subsection 1.3.2.1.  
13 2010: 33-4. 
14 2007. 
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1.2 EVIDENCE OF THEORETICAL THINKING 
 
 
Is this consensus well-founded? One might argue prima facie that it is, since it simply taxes 
credulity to suppose that no Athenian thinker or politician ever felt compelled to legitimize a 
form of government which through outstanding victories over a foreign aggressor and an 
undisputed Aegean thalassocracy had made Athens, in economic and cultural, if not in military, 
terms, the premier Greek power. One would think that such an elevated status demanded 
legitimization of the political system that made it possible. But, such a priori reasoning aside, 
there are other compelling reasons that suggest a democratic political theory was indeed 
consciously developed.  
 
1.2.1 The Fight for History 
 
 
The first concerns the political “ownership” of Cleisthenes. In a famous passage Herodotus 
identifies Cleisthenes as the founder of the democracy, then proceeds to trace his descendants 
along the line that leads to Pericles (6.131). The suggestion is that there was a close relationship 
between Periclean politics and the revered founder of the democracy. However, this relationship 
did not go unchallenged. Plutarch records how Cimon challenged Ephialtes’ activity and tried to 
restore the judicial powers of the Areopagus and τὴν ἐπὶ Κλεισθένους ἐγείρειν ἀριστοκρατίαν 
(Cim. 15.2). The background to the passages appears to be a dispute between Cimonians and 
Pericleans on the rights to Cleisthenes as the originator of their respective – and opposed – 
platforms. Without discussing which side might have been right (if either), 15 it is more important 
15 The view that Cleisthenes operated on sincerely held principles was defended by Ehrenberg 1950: 537-47; 1973: 
89-103, but was challenged by D. M. Lewis 1963: 287-309, who argued that Cleisthenes was a disinterested 
statesman inasmuch as he saw the need to break old power structures with an innovative arrangement (307-8), but 
was ever the politician in scattering the Alcmaeonids over three tribes (308), and recently by Ober 1993: 260-86, 
who argues that the success and final form of the Cleisthenic arrangement was ultimately due to the self-
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to note that such attempts to claim a founder typically reflect an effort to legitimize one’s 
policies and that legitimizing one’s policies presupposes a party self-consciousness. Thus the 
dispute between the Cimonians and Pericleans over ownership of Cleisthenes suggests that the 
Ephialtean reforms occasioned self-reflection and self-justification in abstract, theoretical terms 
for the major political positions. 
Similarly, dramatic and historical sources dating from the 460s to the 420s offer 
examples of abstract thinking on the democracy.16 What is noteworthy about these passages is 
that they are by and large agonistic. They defend the superiority of democracy over the 
alternatives of monarchy and oligarchy. This agonistic character makes an important point: 
Democracy was the novelty, the cultural aberration. As such, it, not oligarchy or monarchy, bore 
the burden of proof.  
 
1.2.2 Theoretical Terminology 
 
 
Another reason lies in linguistic evidence. The political terminology of the second third of the 
fifth century BC presupposes theoretical discussions on democracy. In an interesting article, R. 
Brock examined the language which both democrats and non-democrats employed in their 
sloganeering and mutual criticism and found that democratic terminology was in general a 
redefinition, re-division or theoretical refutation of pre-existing aristocratic language. These 
findings led him to conclude that “the Athenians were perfectly capable of justifying democracy 
in theoretical terms.”17  
 
mobilization of the people in a “spontaneous riot” (276) against Cleomenes’ and Isagoras’ attempt to dissolve the 
Solonian Council of 400 (278-9).  
16 E. g. A. Supp. 604; Hdt. 3.80-82; Th. 2.36-41, 6.38-40; E. Supp. 403-462. For the democratic elements in 
Aeschylus’ Suppliants, see Robinson 1997: 46-47. 
17 1991: 169. 
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1.2.3 A Cultural Revolution 
 
 
In addition to this political, literary and linguistic evidence, there are also good historical reasons 
for looking for a democratic political theory. During the eleven years from 462/1 to 451/0 Athens 
underwent nothing short of a reformulation of its government. The series of measures Ephialtes 
had passed in 462/1 transferred important powers hitherto exercised by the Areopagus to the 
Council of Five Hundred, the Assembly and the Courts. These included the vetting process for 
officials entering office (dokimasia) and their examination upon leaving office (euthyna).18 As a 
result, city officials were obliged to conduct themselves in a way acceptable to the Demos, not 
the Areopagus. Also, as Wade-Gery argued compellingly, the jury-courts (dikasteria) were 
established around this time.19 His argument is epigraphical. A decree (IG I³10) concerning 
Athenian-Phaselite relations in which the polemarch is spoken of as a true judge is to be dated a 
few years after 469.20 If this is correct, it means another consequence of the Ephialtean reforms 
was that the Heliaea, hitherto an appeals court, became the court of first and last instance, where 
eupatrid and commoner alike submitted to a panel of his peers, drawn from every Solonian 
18 Rhodes 1992: 71. 
19 1958: 192. So, too, Smith 1925: 118-9 (whose arguments are not discussed by Wade-Gery). Cf. Rhodes 1985a: 
168-9, 204n1, 210, who thinks the division of the Heliaea into dikasteries was a result of Ephialtes’ reforms, and that 
it took time for this new practice to replace the personal jurisdiction of the archons. See Hansen 1978: 141-43 for the 
view that the dikasteries go back to the time of Solon.  
20 For recent acceptance of the high chronology, see Meiggs and Lewis 1988: 66-69; Thür 2004: 38-39. The latter, 
however, denies that ll. 9-10 (παρ[ὰ τῶι πο]λεμάρχωι) have any value for dating the establishment of the dikasteries 
because a) the phrase could refer to the introductory phase of a legal action and b) the active καταδικάσ[ει] in ll. 18-
19 is not preferable to Dittenberger’s passive καταδικασ[θῆι]. The second argument, it appears to me, is the crux. 
For, if the active is to be restored, then the polemarch is the one who condemns – a role inconsistent with the later 
ἀνάκρισις. Accordingly, Thür prefers the passive, but unfortunately does not address the restoration [ε]ι μεν which 
Wade-Gery (1958: 181n1) considers “virtually certain” (Dittenberger SIG 57 had read Λ for Μ and restored it as 
[τοῦτο δ’ὀφε]ίλεν). This is an important point, as it would preclude a subjunctive. For the argument for the low 
chronology, see Jameson 2000-03: 23-29. The most significant challenge to Wade-Gery’s argument came from 
Sealey 1964: 17, who cites Pl. Lg. 958c2-6 in order to show that even in jury-courts the presiding magistrate (ἀρχή) 
could be said to καταδικάζειν. However, Plato is after special effect. He uses the word in a polyptoton which 
stresses the audacity of the offender. This special emphasis strongly suggests that Plato is not being here as mindful 
of “legalese” as an inscription would be.  
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property bracket. Wade-Gery aptly calls the change “an experiment of committing justice to the 
unlearned.”21  
Other consequences of the reforms were just as drastic. A rotating committee of fifty 
councilors (prytaneis) drawn from the Five Hundred was appointed, in place of the nine archons, 
to see to the day to day affairs of the Council and preside at meetings of the Assembly.22 As a 
result, the major legislative organ, the Assembly, was managed by a randomly selected cross-
section of three of the four Solonian property brackets. A particularly significant change was 
Ephialtes’ transference of eisangelia, the process whereby a public magistrate or functionary was 
tried for treasonous activity, to the Council and Assembly.23 This innovation not only bestowed a 
large responsibility on the Demos, but was a move that was full of symbolic meaning. In any 
state it is the injured party that has the right to hear cases of treason. As long as the Areopagus 
received eisangeliai, it was tacitly assumed that the Areopagus was the offended party. Once the 
Council and Assembly began to receive eisangeliai, there went along with this change the 
powerful implication that the Council and Assembly were the sovereign institutions of the state, 
that the Demos was the State. Because of both this, as well as the other innovations orchestrated 
by Ephialtes, Plutarch’s words seem particularly apt, when he observed that the Ephialtean 
reforms rendered Athens an “undiluted democracy” (ἄκρατος δημοκρατία) (Cim. 15.2).  
It is to the Athenians’ credit that these reforms did not result in civil war. That is not to 
say, though, that the Athenians were unanimous. On the contrary, these reforms caused serious 
resentment. When Cimon returned from Mt. Ithome, he attempted to block Ephialtes’ plans, but 
21 Ibid. 197.  
22 Rhodes 1992: 79.  
23 See Hignett 1958: 200; Rhodes 1985a: 144-207, 203-5; 1992: 67-75. Sealey 1981: 310-24 challenges the view 
that Ephialtes introduced an innovation and argues that he instead merely ratified a process that had been practiced 
since c. 488/7 (323-4). It is hard to agree with Sealey since that would require accepting a entirely new taxonomy of 
Athenian law (cf. 317-8).  
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having just been disgracefully dismissed by the Spartans, whom he had so ardently advocated 
helping, he not only failed in his attempt, but was himself ostracized.24 Soon followed the 
assassination of Ephialtes. And when in 458 a large Spartan army was tarrying on the Boeotian-
Attic border in the days leading up to the battle of Tanagra, one cause for their delay was the 
prospect of cooperation from an antidemocratic “fifth column” in Athens.25 The “undiluted 
democracy” was far from universally popular.  
 Despite the opposition, the democratic reforms continued. Shortly after 462/1 pay of two 
obols was instituted for the citizen-jurors,26 and pay for councilors and officials might go back to 
this time as well.27 At any rate, once pay was instituted for jurors, it duly became a regular 
feature of the democracy. In 457/6 one Mnesitheides was the first man from the third property 
class (zeugitai) to be selected archon.28 In 453/2 thirty deme justices (dikastai kata demous), a 
Pisistratid invention, were re-established to mitigate the workload of the dikasteries. These 
justices, Farrar suggests, offered litigants in the Attic countryside, in cases involving no more 
than ten drachmae, a hearing from a democratic official instead of an aristocratic arbitrator.29 
Thus, in the 450s the responsibilities and privileges of an Athenian citizen changed drastically. 
The idea of what it meant to be a citizen in Athens likewise changed. Whereas traditionally 
citizenship had various meanings relative to one’s social and economic status in the polis, now it 
was a more uniform idea. Political power was transcending social and economic divides, and 
political opportunity was becoming nearly coterminous and synonymous with citizenship. The 
best evidence for the great premium now placed on citizenship is the law of 451/0, usually 
24 Plu. Cim. 17.3. For the sequence of events, see Rhodes 1992: 69. 
25 Th. 1.107.4. 
26 Hignett 1952: 342-3; Rhodes 1992: 76.  
27 Hignett 1952: 219-221; Rhodes 1981: 13, 330; Ober 1989: 80.  
28 Ath. Pol. 27.2. Therefore the law must have been changed earlier, probably 458/7 (Rhodes 1992: 75). 
29 Ath. Pol. 26.3; Farrar 1988: 24. 
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ascribed to Pericles, which limited Athenian citizenship to the offspring of two Athenian 
parents.30 
 This brief sketch of the years between 462/1 to 451/0 throws into relief the suddenness 
and pervasiveness of the democracy. True, Athens had been going in the direction of democracy 
for the past fifty years. Cleisthenes’ tribal system made it possible for elections and other 
decisions to reflect a cross section of the voting population, and the change in the mode of 
archon-selection from direct election to sortition from an elected short list in 487/6 did much to 
weaken the hold of the traditional elite on the government. But the changes that were 
implemented in Athens during these eleven years amounted to a democratic revolution – a fact 
underscored by the appearance of the term δημοκρατία itself around this time.31 The changes 
redefined the city, and had serious social implications. The wealthy, the middling and the poor 
were put on an equal footing. The judicial process had been drastically altered in “an experiment 
of committing justice to the unlearned.” Zeugitae and thetes could sit on a jury that passed 
judgment on the legal disputes between citizens, even if they were hippeis and 
pentekosiomedimnoi. They could also sit on panels that vetted and examined officials, no matter 
what family or property bracket they belonged to.  Now that the Assembly was in full control of 
state policy, the participation of the zeugitae in the probouleutic duties of the Council, and of 
both the zeugitae and the thetes in the debates and decisions on the Pnyx, increased the odds that 
state decisions would reflect new and more popular interests. And the college of officials in 
charge of carrying out some of those decisions could, and was, now occupied by zeugitae.32 The 
30 Ath. Pol. 26.4; Plu. Per. 37.3.  
31 For the origin of the term demokratia, see Raaflaub 1995: 46-52, who argues for a date in the 460s. For a slightly 
earlier dating, see Hansen 1986a: 35-36. For the view that the word did not become respectable until after 403, see 
Sealey 1973. 
32 This, by the way, is good evidence that the zeugitae and thetes made their presence felt in the Assembly right from 
the beginning. The inclusion of the zeugitae in the college of archons was the natural mechanism to insure that 
decisions made in the Assembly in the interests of the poorer classes would indeed be carried out. 
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government had been opened to the middling and poor classes, and pay was instituted to help 
make service to the state financially possible. 
In other words, the aristocratic principle of self-rule had within a decade been extended to 
the poorer, non-aristocratic citizens. This political equality broke not only with Athenian custom, 
but with Greek tradition as a whole. For centuries political power had been the preserve of the 
well-born and wealthy. That was no longer the case. This break with traditional assumptions – 
social, ethical, intellectual and religious assumptions on the nature of man – certainly outraged 
many an aristocratically minded individual. Witness Ephialtes’ murder and the malcontents who 
in part brought about the defeat of their fellow Athenians at Tanagra. But it must have made even 
the supporter of the reforms feel just as uneasy. The zeugitae and thetes suddenly had to assert 
themselves in an environment that took for granted their fundamental incapacity and innate 
inability.  
In short, democracy was just as much a cultural revolution as a political one. It was 
making grand assumptions on the rights and ability of the ordinary citizen. If these assumptions 
were going to survive in a hostile environment, some proof that they were correct had to be 
offered. The challenges against them were too ingrained in the culture. It is therefore probable 
that a democratic political theory (or theories) was developed; and the fact that most democratic 
institutions were established between 462/1 and 451/0 suggests the 450s and 440s as the most 
fitting period for such activity (cf. section 7.2).  
Many have in fact looked for a democratic political theory in this very period, and 
overwhelmingly they have focused their attention on the sophist Protagoras of Abdera, for 
several reasons. The acme of his life falls around 444 BC. He is also known to have been on 
close terms with Pericles, the major representative of the democracy. And Plato in both the 
10 
 
Protagoras and the Theaetetus discusses his doctrines against the background of democratic 
ideology. But the most compelling connection between Protagoras and the Athenian democracy 
is that in Plato’s Protagoras Protagoras addresses what must have been the fundamental 
antidemocratic criticism. As the brief historical sketch above suggests, the weightiest objection 
the opponents of democracy might raise was: How can it be that men who have neither the 
natural ability nor the proper education to take part in the administration of the polis ought to be 
included in decision-making and leadership to such a high degree as the reforms of the late 460s 
and 450s mandate? Since Protagoras attempts to give an answer to so crucial a question, he has 
been the focal point for many discussions of a theoretical justification of democracy. By and 
large these discussions tend to pay particular attention to the so called “Great Speech” which 
Protagoras delivers in Plato’s Protagoras (320c8-328d2).  
 
 
 
1.3 SCHOLARSHIP: THE TWO APPROACHES EXPLAINED 
 
 
However, the interpretations that scholars in the past one hundred years have offered as to how 
exactly Protagoras managed to place the Athenian democracy on a theoretical footing are 
characterized by significant differences. Be that as it may, while overlapping on several 
significant points, these interpretations can on the whole be divided into two groups: the 
educational and the philosophical. The former, having the greatest number of supporters, argues 
that Protagoras based his justification of democracy on the education offered both deliberately 
and environmentally by the Athenian polis. The latter, on the other hand, comprises 
interpretations which attempt to find a democratic political theory in the logical consequences of 
Protagoras’ philosophy. 
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1.3.1 The Educational Approach 
 
 
The educational approach, first of all, tends to dismiss the lengthy portion (i.e. the mythos) of the 
Great Speech where Zeus bestows Dike and Aidos (Justice and Shame) on humanity as a 
mythical symbol for the basic democratic tenet that all men have equal ability in politics (cf. 
subsections 3.1.1, 5.3.1). It accordingly pays greater attention to the passage (i.e. the logos) in 
which Protagoras describes the educational process current at Athens, and sees in it Protagoras’ 
explanatory proof as to how this equal political ability (ἡ πολιτικὴ ἀρετή) is made possible. 
Protagoras asserts, these scholars contend, that by simply being raised in a democratic polis, the 
citizens learn the skills necessary in decision-making and office-holding. Democracy is thus an 
excellent form of government because it utilizes the intellectual resources of the entire citizenry. 
This approach is represented by Barker, Kagan, Guthrie, Finley, Kerferd, Müller and Schiappa.33 
Regarding Protagoras’ philosophy, the educational group has generally interpreted his 
human-measure dictum (DK 80 B1) as an expression of objective relativism. The discrepant 
qualities perceived by different observers in a single object actually do coexist in the object. A 
consequence of objective relativism is the claim that Protagoras recognized things that were 
objectively beneficial to an organism, and thus made on this point, in the words of Kerferd, “an 
exception to his human-measure dictum.”34 This claim made possible the view that in political 
decision-making Protagoras recommended the calculus of utility. Whatever appears to a city to 
be right and honorable indeed is, but since the citizens will have different views on what is right 
33 Barker 1918: 152; Kagan 1965: 73-95; Guthrie 1971: 63-68; Finley 1973: 28, 94; Kerferd 1967: s.v. Protagoras 
of Abdera and 1981: 142-144; Müller 1986: 179-193; Schiappa 2003: 170.  
34 1967: 91-3.  
12 
 
                                                 
and honorable, the better view must be adopted, and “better” means that which is more 
advantageous.35  
The calculus of utility gave rise to different positions in the educational group regarding 
the leadership of the polis. On the one hand, J. S. Morrison put forward the view that Protagoras 
envisaged a “led democracy.”36 According to this view, one man, such as Pericles, who knew 
what was best for the city, was to “guide, improve, and, presumably, implement the common 
purpose of the city.”37 This view, as Morrison himself recognizes, is quite undemocratic.38 It was 
therefore challenged, most recently by R. Müller, who argues that the role of leaders (note the 
plural) in the democracy is strictly advisory, and their aim “la conformité des normes juridiques 
avec ce qui est effectivement utile à la communauté.”39 
 
1.3.2 The Philosophical Approach 
 
 
The philosophical group represents a variety of approaches which maintain that Protagoras 
justified democracy as a logical consequence of an epistemological and/or ontological position 
he held. Klaus Döring argues that the major consequence of the human-measure claim is that 
human morality and justice is predicated upon a contract.40 Therefore, if any decision is going to 
be binding for the entire community, it must proceed from the collective opinion of the polis. 
“Nur als Kollectivmeinung, an deren Zustandekommen alle beteiligt waren, kann es für alle 
verbindlich sein.”41 Regarding the character of the decisions, he agrees with the educational 
group that utility was the criterion Protagoras used to resolve disagreement. He also agrees with 
35 Kerferd 1949: 25; Müller 1986: 185. This interpretation of “better” ultimately derives from Pl. Tht. 172a1-c1. 
36 1941: 10-14, 16.  
37 Ibid. 11.  
38 Ibid. 12.  
39 1986: 185. For an earlier, but less developed, challenge to Morrison’s “led democracy” see Kerferd 1981: 145.  
40 1981: 111.  
41 Ibid. 115.  
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them in interpreting the role of the politician as one who can discern the truly advantageous and 
recommend it successfully to the city. “[E]r versucht, die anderen von dem für sie 
Vorteilhafteren zu überzeugen.”42  
Ellen and Neal Wood make a similar argument. Protagoras, they maintain, taught that 
human custom-laws (νόμοι) are neither divinely inspired nor natural (i.e. transcendental), but 
have their origin in convention. Two consequences result from this premise. The first is held in 
common with the educational approach. Human morality is a cultural skill (τέχνη). Being a skill, 
it can be taught to all. Therefore, everybody has the ability to participate in government. The 
second is a new development. Since human custom-laws are of human origin, that must mean 
they are the result of the collective wisdom of the community. Therefore, discovering what is in 
the interests of the city requires the pooled intelligence of all the citizens.43  
This view implies there is an objective truth to be discovered, and so the Woods’ 
interpretation bears some resemblance to the view put forward by H. Gomperz back in 1912.44 
According to him, Protagoras taught that there is an objective truth, but that it is too complex to 
be comprehended to any appreciable degree by the individual. So, the individual only sees one 
facet of the truth and in this sense man is the measure of all things. All, however, are not equal 
measures. Education can change one’s disposition (i.e. can enhance his cognitive capacities) and 
make him able to see more of the truth.45  
 
1.3.2.1  Cynthia Farrar The fullest attempt to find a democratic political theory in 
Protagoras’ complete ontological and epistemological doctrines was undertaken by Cynthia 
42 Ibid. 115.  
43 1978: 128-136, 92. How exactly this conclusion follows from the human origin of custom-laws is not made clear. 
44 1912: 269-278. 
45 1912: 278. Curiously, Gomperz calls the disposition that sees more of the truth “normal” and the one that sees less 
of it “abnormal.” Guthrie implies that “normal” means “more consistent with the majority”(1971: 175), but 
Gomperz is clear on this point. 
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Farrar. She argues that the political changes of the 450s raised for the Athenians the problem of 
reconciling “the collective determination of policy with unity and harmony.”46 Protagoras, she 
maintains, attempted to solve this problem. She first interprets Protagoras’ epistemological 
doctrine. Protagoras was neither a subjectivist nor a relativist.47 Using the “On the gods” 
fragment (DK 80 B4) and the Didymus fragment,48 she argues that what Protagoras taught was 
that an objective reality exists, but knowledge of it must be grounded in personal experience; if it 
is not, then men’s opinions about reality are defective.49 Therefore, the human-measure dictum is 
not a statement of relativism – that is a Platonic construal. Instead, it merely asserts that opinions 
are worthless if not based on experience.  
This interpretation allows Farrar to privilege both the ordinary citizen and the political 
expert. Although “man-measure sanctions the judgment of ordinary men and the collective, 
critical appraisal of human belief,”50 still there is need for outstanding expertise. This superior 
expertise is not incompatible, pace Plato, who tries to argue in the Protagoras that it is, with 
mankind’s basic political competence.51 Instead, the two are part of the same process of 
discovering what is objectively beneficial to the city.52 This process Farrar reconstructs from the 
“Defense” of Protagoras in the Theaetetus, where Protagoras explains the sophist’s and 
politician’s function analogously to that of a doctor (Tht. 167b-c). Taking “better” in the passge 
to mean beneficial, she explains that what Protagoras means is that a doctor determines what is 
beneficial for the sick man by reference to his knowledge of what is normally beneficial for the 
healthy man. Then, instead of convincing the sick man that the treatment is beneficial, he 
46 1988: 28. This perspective, I think, is basically flawed, since it assumes the average Athenian’s political 
competency – an assumption not likely to be granted by the enemies of democracy.  
47 Ibid. 49.   
48 For the fragment discovered in the commentary of Didymus the Blind on the Psalms, see Gronewald 1968.  
49 Farrar 1988: 51-53. 
50 Ibid. 76. 
51 Ibid. 86-87. 
52 Ibid. 74-75. 
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changes the patient’s condition so that the beneficial treatment will appear pleasant to him. 
Similarly, the politician determines what is beneficial for his city on a basis of what is beneficial 
for all cities. Then, addressing the city, he argues that this or that policy normally has these 
beneficial or harmful results.53 In making these arguments, he encourages the citizens “to think 
about their own advantage, or what will benefit the polis, in the way he thinks about it.”54 Thus 
both the doctor and the politician use the “critical standard of normality” to give health to their 
patients (where “normality” means “what is normally beneficial”).  
So far this interpretation appears able to justify monarchy (or even tyranny) and oligarchy 
just as well as democracy. It makes a case that the one who has the greatest intelligence deserves 
the leadership of the city. For Farrar, the democratic element enters the discussion when one 
remembers that all knowledge must be based on experience (which is the meaning, she contends, 
of the human-measure claim). The politician cannot assess what will be the most advantageous 
course of action for his city, unless he takes into consideration the people’s own perceptions of 
what is advantageous. Their perceptions, or their “measurings,” will help him tailor the normally 
expedient to the specific need his city has.55 So, it is democratic inasmuch as the citizens’ 
opinions ought to be polled or surveyed. But, as mentioned above, the politician’s address is also 
instructive and formative. The people learn by his example how to ratiocinate their own interests, 
and so become better measures of their own needs.56 Thus the human-measure dictum states a 
truth about man’s actual nature and his ideal nature. Man is a measure and can become a better 
53 Notice the incongruity in the way Farrar interprets the doctor/sophist analogy at Pl. Tht. 167a5-6. Protagoras says 
the doctor uses medicines (φάρμακα) to effect the change, the sophist words/arguments (λόγοι). This analogy 
suggests that the “arguments” of the sophist work upon the hearer just as insensibly as medicine on a patient. Thus, 
the sophist’s argumentation is almost subliminal. Farrar’s interpretation, however, implies the sophist’s arguments 
are very straightforward. Plato might very well refer to these “subliminal arguments” in his frequent allusion to the 
sophists’ power to charm (κηλεῖν) (cp. Prt. 315a6-b8; Menex. 235b1). 
54 Ibid. 75.  
55 Ibid. 73.  
56 Ibid. 72. Cf. H. Gomperz’ interpretation above, subsection 1.3.2.  
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measure of all things. And if this ideal is realized, the politician will have even more reason to 
survey the opinions of his constituents.  
 
 
 
1.4 THE TWO APPROACHES EXAMINED 
 
Both the educational and philosophical approaches highlight many important connections 
between Protagoras’ philosophy and the Athenian democracy. However, each group suffers from 
several weaknesses.  
 
1.4.1 The Educational Approach 
 
 
To begin with the educational group, the view that Protagoras argued that the common man is 
taught basic political ability and morality in the environment of the polis and so for that reason 
has the moral and intellectual wherewithal to participate in political decision-making is liable to 
two objections. First, it jeopardizes Protagoras’ own position as a professional teacher. As 
Socrates implies in both the Protagoras and Theaetetus, if everybody has political ability, what 
need is there of instruction? Kerferd tried to answer this question by pointing out that for 
Protagoras all have equal ability, but some have greater aptitudes.57 It is these who have greater 
aptitudes that Protagoras teaches. But this explanation privileges one group as leaders. To 
preserve the democratic element (e.g. contra Morrison), these leaders are portrayed by Kerferd as 
strictly advisors. This view, though, is untenable. The fact that there are men qualified to lead, 
but content with an advisory role presupposes a democratic theory to which these leaders 
subscribe. But it is a democratic theory that this view is arguing. The question is therefore 
begged. 
57 1953: 44.  
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Secondly, it does not necessitate democracy. Just because the people have a modicum of 
environmental education does not mean they ought, or have a right, or are able, to determine 
state policy. In other words, it is a non sequitur to say that because one’s environment imparts 
political expertise to a degree, all must take part in decision-making. This point is well 
demonstrated by the fact that Peter Nicholson is able to see an argument for oligarchic decision-
making in this same environmental education Protagoras describes. Since environment is a 
teacher, “[i]t follows that, within the decision-making body, it is reasonable to listen to every 
member since every member has acquired some measure of the political art and there are no real 
professionals.”58 It is reasonable, but not imperative. “This…is a general proposition applying to 
any decision-making body, in a democracy, an oligarchy, or any political system at all.”59 
Moreover, the position the educational group takes on Protagoras’ relativism involves 
their construal of his justification of democracy in an inconsistency. Kerferd and Müller, for 
instance, maintain that his relativism stopped short at considerations of what is beneficial.60 
Now, how can such a relativism square with Protagoras’ defense of democracy on the basis of 
environmental education? Kerferd explains: “No one can teach another man the truth about what 
is just as all beliefs are equally true. What the sophist does is to teach men to abandon the belief 
that X is just, when such a belief is harmful, and to make them believe that Y is just, which it is 
to their advantage to believe.”61 This view deprives environmental education of all meaning. The 
average Athenian’s views concerning morality might be well and good, but concerning state 
policy they are useless, unless the politician instructs him on what is beneficial. But democracy 
was justified by the argument that the common man did not need any instruction, that the 
58 1981: 19. 
59 Ibid. 19.  
60 Kerferd 1949: 25; Müller 1986: 185.  
61 Ibid. 25.  
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education he received from his environment made him competent to contribute to state policy-
making. Thus, a relativism that admits the calculus of utility leads this group to mutually 
exclusive conclusions: a self-sufficient citizen body and a citizen body that requires instruction.  
In sum, the educational group fails to make clear Protagoras’ justification of democracy 
because their construal of that justification a) privileges one group as leaders b) uses Protagoras’ 
doctrine of environmental education as a guarantee of democracy’s superiority and c) interprets 
his relativism in a way that undermines the value of that very environmental education.  
 
1.4.2 The Philosophical Approach 
 
 
The philosophical group has similar problems. In order to explain why decisions must proceed 
from the citizens, Döring argued that by the terms of the social contract any law that was to be 
binding on all had to be agreed upon by all. It cannot be taken for granted, though, that the Great 
Speech presents a social contract.62 And even if it could, that is no more an argument for 
democracy than any other form of government. The Hobbesian contract, for example, justifies 
monarchy. Moreover, his contention that Protagoras’ description of environmental education 
signifies the renewal of the contract in every generation, for every individual, may be true 
(though that is not my opinion); but since Protagoras does not clarify the substance of the 
morality the citizens are agreeing to, one cannot be sure this would be a democratic contract.63 
Similarly, Farrar attempts to explain why decisions of a polis must issue from the whole 
community. As noted above, she denied Protagorean relativism and made the criterion for all 
state policy to be what is advantageous. This construal is, she argues, a defense of democracy, 
62 1981: 110-11. See Rosen 1994: 16-19 for the difficulty in seeing a social contract in the Great Speech.  
63 1981: 111. “[der Erwerb der Bereitschaft, sich in die soziale Ordnung zu fügen] wiederholt sich im übrigen seither 
in jedem einzelnen Leben, denn: Was bedeut der von Protagoras 325c5-326e5 eingehend beschriebene 
Erziehungsprozeß anderes als eben dies?” 
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because the sophistically trained politician cannot properly assess the city’s advantage, unless he 
surveys the opinions of the citizens. These opinions will probably be defective, at least at first; 
but as time goes on, the very procedure of debate and public deliberation, with the wise 
politicians presiding, will teach the citizens to be better assessors of their advantage. In this way, 
by Farrar’s view, the citizens will become intelligent enough to deserve being consulted, and 
democracy will finally be vindicated.  
This solution creates more problems than it attempts to answer. First, her denial that 
Protagoras was a relativist is unconvincing. She maintains that Protagoras’ philosophy was 
merely an “agnosticism about the nature of the world” and that consequently the meaning of the 
human-measure dictum (DK 80 B1) is simply that all knowledge must be based on personal 
experience.64 Consequently, she regards Plato’s treatment of Protagoras in the Theaetetus as a 
distortion of his philosophy (which she denotes under the character “Platagoras”) designed to 
show Protagoras guilty of inconsistency: While claiming that knowledge must be based on 
personal experience, he actually assumes “a form of knowledge independent of personal 
experience.”65 But this interpretation of Protagoras’ philosophy is self-defeating. First, her 
interpretation of the human-measure sentence as claiming that knowledge must be based on 
personal experience is not an alternative to a position of relativism, but a necessary corollary of 
it. This point is made by Livio Rossetti. After showing that no real impasse results from 
Protagoras’ privileging of every individual opinion, he remarks that “ce relativisme, 
reconnaissant la dignité des opinions qu’on ne partage pas, reconnaît surtout la dignité des 
jugements descriptifs et des opinions qui s’appuient sur des experiences personnelles directes et 
64 1988: 49-77; for the quotation, see p. 50. As for agnosticism, Jørgen Mejer suggested this same thesis (1972:175-
178), but was answered compellingly by Paul Woodruff (1982: 80-87, esp. 82). For her interpretation of the human-
measure dictum, cf. the similar view of Versenyi 1962: 178-184.  
65 Ibid. 66.  
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immediates, etc.”66 Farrar argues that he was not a relativist by arguing that he maintained that 
knowledge must be based on personal experience. But if Protagoras was a relativist, this is 
exactly one of the tenets one would expect him to maintain. 
Her view that Plato distorts Protagoras’ philosophy in the Theaetetus is not in itself 
disconcerting, but according to her argument one must regard Plato as constructing a relativistic 
Protagoras (i.e. “Platagoras”) in order to refute the claim that knowledge must be founded on 
personal experience. This view has Plato make a mountain out of a molehill. In order to refute a 
simpler proposition, he foists upon Protagoras a more complicated proposition. In sum, Farrar’s 
attempt to deny Protagoras’ relativism has the opposite effect and suggests that his in fact was a 
relativist philosophy.  
Besides the difficulty in her arguments against Protagoras’ relativism, another problem 
arises when she applies her interpretation of his philosophy to the political sphere. The fact that 
all knowledge must be grounded in experience obliges the politician to tailor his policies to the 
actual needs and interests of the city. He tailors them by consulting the people. Why can this 
only be done through public consultation and debate? Can he not arrive at an idea of the city’s 
needs by other means? And, if the people’s opinions may be defective, he has no reason to think 
that their opinions would provide any helpful information. But, she contends, the more he does 
so, the better their assessments will become.67 This raises the final problem, one to which the 
educational group was also susceptible. A politician would not voluntarily choose to continue 
consulting the people, unless he were already dedicated to the democratic ideal. But how did that 
66 1986: 201. 
67 On this point Ober’s (1996) criticism is instructive. He notes that Farrar assumes democracy is impossible without 
a “benevolent, historically minded elite” (128) and for this reason, as well as others, concludes her thesis to “fit into 
an elistist model of political behavior” (132). Ober is right to fault her thesis, for an elistist model simply cannot 
justify democratic thinking.  
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politician come to believe that democracy was the best form of government in the first place? 
Again, we are back at square one.   
 
 
 
1.5 THE APPROACH OF THIS DISSERTATION 
 
The educational and philosophical approaches to Protagoras’ justification of democracy have had 
an unequal reception in recent scholarship. While Farrar’s view finds the occasional support,68 
the educational approach still holds the field. At least, Balot in his textbook on ancient Greek 
political theory follows this approach.69 In the final analysis, though, the two approaches amount 
to “six of one, half a dozen of the other.” They both incorporate in their interpretations a means 
of arriving at an objective truth, that objective truth being for most of them the beneficial (or 
advantageous).70 Thus, by either rejecting Protagoras’ relativism outright, as Gomperz and Farrar 
do, or by arguing (or assuming) that his relativism was only partial, as Guthrie, Kerferd and 
Müller do, they foist upon Protagoras the idea of utility (under the various labels of 
advantageous, beneficial or expedient). But this manoeuvre has two problems. First, none of 
these interpretations clarifies what utility ultimately means for Protagoras. Is it a Hobbesian law 
and national security, or a Lockian goal of life, liberty and property, or a Benthamite notion of 
the greatest good for the greatest number of people? Saying Protagoras incorporated the principle 
of utility into his political theory does not actually say very much. But while it might not say 
much, it does carry a crucial, non-democratic implication, which brings up the second problem. 
As long as any notion of utility provides the ultimate criterion for political decisions, there will 
68 E.g. Osborne 2010: 34n13, 98n39.  
69 2006: 74-78. Cf. Raaflaub 1996: 142; Schiappa 2003: 176-189, esp. 184n49.  
70 Rossetti 1986: 198 offers καιρός/τὸ πρέπον as a criterion, but this differs little, practically speaking, from utility.  
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always be a way to privilege one group over another. And as long as one group is so privileged, 
democratic equality stands on a rickety foundation.  
My argument therefore will be that Protagoras formulated a rationalization of the 
Athenian democracy that was entirely consistent with his theory relativism. First, in chapter two 
to six I will examine the evidence for Protagoras’ thought as preserved in the Platonic corpus and 
in the fragments. Using this evidence, I will argue that Protagoras’ relativism was the foundation 
for a theory of human knowledge, society and morality in which policy-making by genuine 
consensus was the only guarantee of correct action. Moreover, since democracy was the only 
form of government that endeavored to make policy by genuine consensus, democracy was 
therefore the best form of government.  
Then, after analyzing evidence for Protagoras’ life and concluding that he was in a 
position that encouraged him to theorize on the Athenian democracy (chapter 7), I will examine 
the funeral speech Thucydides gives to Pericles in his History and argue that Pericles describes 
the Athenian state, as well as the pursuits and character of the Athenians themselves, in language 
and concepts that derive from Protagoras’ relativist rationalization of democracy (chapters 8 and 
9). This expression of Protagorean theory in the person of Athens’ democratic leader par 
excellence will serve as evidence that Protagoras’ rationalization of democracy was not limited 
to philosophical discussions, but influenced actual, democratic practice.  
At this point I will turn my attention to the rhetorical aspect of Protagoras’ thought and 
offer a new interpretation of what Protagoras meant when he made the claim of being able to 
teach one how to make the weaker account the stronger. I will argue that this rhetorical claim 
should be seen as part of Protagoras’ overall political theory and that it represents a mechanism 
by which Protagoras intended that genuine consensus so integral to his rationalization of 
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democracy to be realized (chapter 10). I will then examine the rhetorical aspect of Pericles’ 
funeral speech and conclude that the speech shows Protagorean influence on the rhetorical level 
as well. Specifically, it attempts to execute the Protagorean technique of making the weaker 
account the stronger in an effort to render Athenian consensus regarding the war more secure 
(chapter 11).  
Finally, in chapter twelve I will discuss why Thucydides incorporated this Protagorean 
element into both the content and the rhetoric of Pericles’ funeral speech. Analyzing Thucydides’ 
description of the plague that struck Athens shortly after the war began, I will attempt to show 
that it contains conceptual and verbal allusions to both Pericles’ speech and Protagoras’ 
relativism. On the basis of this comparison I will suggest that through these allusions Thucydides 
points to Protagoras’ relativism as a crucial step in the eventual espousal of Realist politics by 
the Athenian democracy. 
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2.0 RELATIVISM AND DEMOCRACY 
 
 
 
 
The section of the Protagoras that precedes the Great Speech (310a8-319a7) provides important 
information on the nature of Protagoras’ teachings. Hippocrates, a young man, has recently heard 
that Protagoras is in town and now comes to Socrates who can give him an introduction to the 
sophist. But before taking him to Protagoras, Socrates questions Hippocrates in order to discover 
what his motives are in desiring Protagoras’ instruction. A brief elenchus (311b1-313c3) soon 
reveals that the young man does not have a clue about the content of Protagoras’ teaching, except 
that he can teach one to be an effective speaker. At this point Socrates indulges in a description 
of the sophists in which he complains that most people do not know what the sophists teach or if 
it is good or bad and even suggests that certain sophists themselves do not know if what they 
teach is good or bad (313c7-314b4).71 Thus the scene at Socrates’ house raises three fundamental 
questions: 1) what Protagoras teaches, 2) whether it is good or bad, and 3) if Protagoras himself 
knows whether it is good or bad. 
 Regarding the question of what Protagoras teaches, a hint is given before the actual 
answer is presented. Having arrived at Callias’ house, where Protagoras is staying, Socrates 
introduces Hippocrates to him and intimates that the two of them would like to know more about 
Protagoras’ teaching. Aware that sophistic doctrine is suspect to many, Socrates offers to hold 
the conversation with Protagoras in private. Protagoras declines. While he is aware that his 
profession could get him into trouble, he thinks hiding it under any other name is not only 
71 Cf. Pl. Rep. 493b7-c8, where this same ignorance makes the sophist an ἄτοπος παιδευτής.  
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useless, but would increase suspicion. He prefers therefore to be frank about his title. Besides, he 
says, he has devised other precautionary tactics to avoid getting into trouble because of the 
sophistic profession (317b6-c1). Although what these precautionary tactics (εὐλάβειαι) are he 
does not explain, the statement gives insight into the nature of Protagoras’ teaching. It is novel, 
requires subterfuge and offends the sensibilities of the aristocratic elite (τοὺς δυναμένους ἐν ταῖς 
πόλεσι πράττειν) (317a3).72 Protagoras’ commitments are more populist than aristocratic.73 
 It is decided to have Protagoras answer Socrates in a make-shift discussion-room before 
all the guests and visitors at Callias’ house. Here, asked what it is he will teach Hippocrates, 
Protagoras replies that his curriculum would be:  
εὐβουλία περὶ τῶν οἰκείων, ὅπως ἂν ἄριστα τὴν αὑτοῦ οἰκίαν διοικοῖ, καὶ περὶ τῶν τῆς 
πόλεως, ὅπως τὰ τῆς πόλεως δυνατώτατος ἂν εἴη καὶ πράττειν καὶ λέγειν (318e5-319a2). 
  
Socrates asks if by this statement Protagoras means in short “political skill” (ἡ πολιτικὴ τέχνη). 
He does (319a6). But what do Protagoras and Socrates mean by ἡ πολιτικὴ τέχνη? As the 
conversation proceeds, it becomes clear that they have been using the phrase synonymously with 
virtue (ἀρετή).74 Protagoras therefore promises to teach Hippocrates virtue. That is why earlier, 
when asked what it was he taught, Protagoras had given the vague reply that Hippocrates would 
return home everyday having been rendered “better” (βελτίονι) (318a6-9).  
 At this point Socrates appears to veer from his original purpose. His conversation with 
Hippocrates had given the impression that above all he wanted to discover what Protagoras 
taught, if it was good or bad and if Protagoras knew whether it was good or bad. But now, 
instead of asking Protagoras how he taught one to manage his estate and city in the best way – a 
72 For οἱ δυνάμενοι (δυνατοί, δυνατώτατοι) as a sociopolitical label indicating economic and/or political power, see 
Reverdin 1945: 209; Donlan 1980: 128. 
73 Similarly, at Tht. 161e4 Socrates, in implying Protagoras might be pandering, uses the verb δημόομαι. If Plato is 
indulging in word play, the pun would fall flat unless Protagoras indeed was δημοτικός.  
74 E.g. 320b5, 323a7-c1, 324b6. See also Taylor 1991: 71-72; 74-76. 
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question which would directly address that agenda – he expresses doubt that virtue is really 
teachable. He backs his claim with empirical evidence. The Athenian Assembly assumes virtue 
is innate. At least, when matters concerning trade-skills are discussed, they consult only those 
with demonstrated expertise in those trades, such as carpenters and shipwrights. When however 
matters involving city management are raised, they listen to anybody, whether he is wealthy or 
poor, noble or lowborn (319a8-d7). Moreover, if virtue were teachable, then those with 
unquestionable expertise would impart it to their sons. But they don’t. They instead allow them 
to pick it up willy-nilly (320a2-3). Socrates’ position is more rhetorical than logical. If it were 
logical, then it would represent a consistent view on virtue. True, Socrates contends that the skill 
is by nature. But if he means to suggests that the Athenians are right to consider everybody to 
have it by nature, then the sons of experts should be included in that number. However, Cleinias 
and Alcibiades have not learned it. Socrates’ two objections thus rest on mutually exclusive 
assumptions. 
 His position therefore is rhetorical, and deliberately so. It is not a view on virtue that 
Socrates wants to get across. Rather, he means to elicit information from Protagoras. And the 
way he does so happens to reveal background information about Protagoras himself. On the 
whole, Socrates’ objections suggest that two implications follow from Protagoras’ premise that 
virtue is teachable. First, it means the Athenians are foolish to assume that everybody possesses 
it. In other words, Protagoras, Socrates ironically insinuates, is coming close to criticizing 
democracy! Secondly, if virtue were teachable, experts would succeed in imparting it. But they 
don’t. Therefore, it is not teachable, and anybody who claims it is must be an impostor. Thus 
Protagoras is on the horns of a rhetorical dilemma. If he persists in maintaining that virtue is 
teachable, he invalidates Athenian democratic practice. On the other hand, if he changes his 
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position and offers an argument that virtue in somehow innate, he discredits his profession and 
calls his honesty into question.75 Hippocrates thought Protagoras an expert rhetorician. The 
sophist’s handling of this dilemma will show if he was right or not. But more importantly, this 
dilemma betrays crucial information on Protagoras’ political commitments. Specifically, Plato 
assumes that Protagoras will not let democracy be invalidated by his view on virtue; otherwise, 
the dilemma he constructs through Socrates would be otiose. Protagoras could simply affirm that 
virtue is teachable and the Athenians wrong. But he doesn’t; and the fact that he doesn’t 
indicates that Protagoras, as far as Plato was concerned, was associated with the Athenian 
democratic ideology. Consequently, the three occasions when Protagoras asserts that his mythos 
has shown the Athenian government to be reasonable (323d6-323a4, 323c3-5, 324c3-d1), ought 
indeed to be read as an approval of democracy, not simply of any cooperative government.76  
 Protagoras then has answered two of Socrates’ three issues. He has said what it is he 
teaches and has given reason to believe that he believes his curriculum to be ethically good. He 
has not yet answered the third question, but since he will do so in the Great Speech, it is thus 
implied that the Great Speech is a demonstration of the way in which Protagoras accounts for the 
nature of the good and the bad. Thus, the section preceding the Great Speech creates the 
anticipation that main point of the speech will be a moral theory. Furthermore, in light of 
Socrates’ rhetorical dilemma this section suggests that, whatever that moral theory is, it is 
somehow committed to democratic politics.  
 Plato, therefore, took it for granted that Protagoras’ moral teachings went hand in hand 
with his political teachings, and that these political teachings were avowedly democratic. And 
since Protagoras’ moral teachings have traditionally been described as relativism, the overall 
75 Cf. Morrison 1941: 7. 
76 For this view that Protagoras recommends simply cooperative, and not necessarily democratic, decision-making, 
see Nicholson 1980/1: 19. 
28 
 
                                                 
impression from this opening section of the Protagoras is that Protagoras represented his 
relativism as one way or another compatible with Athenian-style democracy. Moreover, it is also 
implied that the following section, the so-called Great Speech, will explain that compatibility 
between relativism and democracy. In the following chapters (3 to 6) I will analyze the Great 
Speech and offer a reconstruction of this compatibility. However, before proceeding to do so, it 
is necessary to examine what is known from other sources about Protagoras’ moral teachings, 
specifically his doctrine of relativism, and then to address the question of whether or not that 
relativism figures in the Protagoras, since it has been argued (see section 2.2) that the dialogue 
shows no trace of it. This argument, if it is true, presents a clear problem to an interpretation of 
the Great Speech as predicated upon a theory of relativism.  
 
 
 
2.1 PROTAGOREAN RELATIVISM 
 
 
Protagoras’ philosophy has been interpreted in a variety of ways. In this section I examine 
several of these interpretations and conclude that his philosophy is best described as an 
epistemological, moral and aesthetic relativism that posited a pluralistic, multivalent thing-in-
itself, while simultaneously maintaining an “agnostic” position towards the real essence of its 
substance. It is thus, as Kerferd calls it, an “objectivist” relativism.  
 
2.1.1 The Human-Measure Claim 
 
 
Protagoras’ philosophy is typically summed up in the “human-measure” claim. Plato is the one 
who provides the earliest formulation of this claim. In the Theaetetus he quotes Protagoras from 
his work Truth:  
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φησὶ γάρ που πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἄνθρωπον εἶναι, τῶν μὲν ὄντων ὡς ἔστι, τῶν δὲ 
μὴ ὄντων ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν (152a2-4).77  
 
By this claim Plato explains Protagoras to mean:  
ὡς οἷα μὲν ἕκαστα ἐμοὶ φαίνεται τοιαῦτα μὲν ἔστιν ἐμοί, οἷα δὲ σοί, τοιαῦτα δὲ αὖ σοί 
(152a6-8).  
 
A similar explication recurs in the Cratylus:  
ὡς ἄρα οἷα μὲν ἂν ἐμοὶ φαίνηται τὰ πράγματα [εἶναι], τοιαῦτα μὲν ἔστιν ἐμοί, οἷα δ’ ἂν 
σοί, τοιαῦτα δὲ σοί (386a1-2).  
 
The gloss Aristotle offers (along with some criticism) is:  
ἐκεῖνος [sc. Protagoras] ἔφη πάντων εἶναι χρημάτων μέτρον ἄνθρωπον, οὐδὲν ἄλλο 
λέγων ἢ τὸ δοκοῦν ἑκάστῳ τοῦτο καὶ εἶναι παγίως· τούτου δὲ γιγνομένου τὸ αὐτὸ 
συμβαίνει καὶ εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι, καὶ κακὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι, καὶ τἆλλα τὰ κατὰ τὰς 
ἀντικειμένας λεγόμενα φάσεις, διὰ τὸ πολλάκις τοισδὶ μὲν φαίνεσθαι τόδε εἶναι καλὸν 
τοισδὶ δὲ τοὐναντίον, μέτρον δ’ εἶναι τὸ φαινόμενον ἑκάστῳ (Metaph. Κ 1062b13).  
 
From these glosses some basic information can be gleaned about key ideas in Protagoras’ 
claim. First, ἄνθρωπος is understood to signify the human individual, not the human species, as 
Aristotle’s ἑκάστῳ and Plato’s use of pronouns as examples attest.78 Secondly, χρήματα denotes 
any and everything, as Plato’s ἕκαστα and πράγματα and Aristotle’s τόδε suggest. L. Versenyi 
suggests that there is special point in the word χρήματα in that, deriving from χράομαι (I use), it 
implies that things are what they are only in relation to the user.79 Moreover, the fact that ὄντων 
and μὴ ὄντων modify it supports the idea that in χρήματα a very wide net is cast, since ὄντων 
embraces everything that is in existence and μὴ ὄντων everything that is deprived of existence. 
Furthermore, the negative μή adds an element of contingency, not only to the participle it 
77 Cf. Pl. Cra. 385e4-386a4. For the title of the work, see Pl. Tht. 161c4, Cra. 391c6, 386c2-4. Cf. also Tht. 171c5-7 
where Socrates exploits the name of the work for the sake of a pun. The work apparently went under the alternate 
title οἱ Καταβάλλοντες (sc. Λόγοι) (Sext. Adv. Math. 7.60 [= DK 80 B1]). It might also have circulated under the 
title Μέγας Λόγος (DK 80 B3; Guthrie 1971: 264n2). 
78 Guthrie 1971: 188-189; McDowell 1973: 118; Mansfeld 1981: 43; Chappell 2005: 57.  
79 1962: 182. But see Guthrie 1971: 190-191 who challenges this idea. Although Guthrie’s list of the meanings of 
χρῆμα does suggest that it was used without a writer’s awareness of the etymology, it might make a difference to 
remember that Protagoras was a student of language and that the derivation is fairly obvious (see DK 80 A26-28). 
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negates, but by the law of symmetry to the first ὄντων as well.80 It is not that a definite group of 
things are spoken of as not having being, but an unspecified group of things that may prove not 
to have being under a certain circumstance. Χρήματα then implies contingent existence and so is 
almost unlimited in its conceptual extent.  
Although ἔστι and οὐκ ἔστι do not in the first instance signify existence, but, as Charles 
Kahn argues, have veridical force and denote what is and is not the case, they still amount to an 
assertion about existence. As Kahn again says: “If man is the measure of all things, ‘that they are 
so and are not so’, then he is the measure of the existence or non existence of atoms just as he is 
the measure of the being-cold or not-being cold of the wind.”81 This appears to be the point of 
Aristotle’s εἶναι παγίως: If that which seems to one is “with firm certainty,” then presumably it 
in a way actually exists for him.82 Thus, the veridical implies the existential meaning. In light of 
this meaning for ἔστι, it makes more sense to take ὡς as an equivalent for ὅτι than as one for 
ὅπως; otherwise, the idea of manner would be redundant.83 
This discussion of the vocabulary of the claim suggests the following translation:  
The human individual is the measure of all things: if anything is a fact (the case), that it is 
the fact; if anything is not a fact, that it is not the fact.  
 
 Broadly speaking, Protagoras makes the claim that if anything is the case or is not the 
case, if anything is or is not, it is the individual that determines that it is so or is not so, that it is 
or is not. Thus, depending on what “determines” means, the claim could be interpreted in 
countless ways, from rationalistic humanism to broad empiricism to subjectivism. “Determines” 
here is an effort to render μέτρον. Plato and Aristotle are in agreement that by μέτρον some act 
80 Sextus Adv. Math. 7.60 (= DK 80 B1) has οὐκ ὄντων. How can the individual be the measure of a definite class of 
things that do not exist? 
81 1966: 250. 
82 Vlastos 1956: xiii, n26a. On the whole, Aristotle appears to critique Protagoras’s dictum as though it were a 
subjectivist claim (cf. Burnyeat 1976a: 44, 46 & below, subsection 2.1.2). 
83 Cf. Guthrie 1971: 189-190; Schiappa 2003: 120-121. 
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of assessment is signified, the former restating its idea with φαίνεται, the latter with δοκεῖ. 
However, they are both impersonal verbs, an idea which suggests a degree of passivity on the 
part of the individual. This suggests that rationalism is no longer an option, since the impression 
is that the individual does not actively apply his mental powers to the data, but rather that he 
reacts and responds to them, if not altogether passively, then at least cooperatively. At the same 
time, the fact that ἄνθρωπος is the individual makes the claim for humanism weak.  
 Alternatively, taking μέτρον to refer, not exclusively to the human individual, but to any 
percipient at all, creates an opportunity to interpret the claim as an empiricist statement. So 
Versenyi concludes that “the μέτρον of any χρῆμα is neither man as the individual, nor men 
collectively, nor man in general, but simply whatever organism…is in the relation to it which 
determines it (its essence and existence) qua χρῆμα.”84 The point of Protagoras’ claim is then “to 
remind man that he is not an abstract-theoretical chimera…but a living human being, to point out 
that it is this world of χρήματα within which he lives, that ultimately concerns him, and thus to 
recall him from the world of Parmenides etc.”85 Similarly, Cynthia Farrar analyzes Protagoras’ 
statement on the gods (DK 80 B4), his refutation of geometers (DK 80 B7), and the fragment 
discovered in Didymus the Blind’s commentary to the Psalms,86 and claims that “the Sophist 
opposed theories or approaches to understanding not grounded in personal experience.”87 One 
problem with this approach is of course that it stretches the meaning of ἄνθρωπος. At any rate, 
arguing that Protagoras was an empiricist does not mean he was not a relativist as well. The 
84 1962: 183. 
85 Ibid. 183-184. 
86 Gronewald 1968 first published this papyrus fragment, found in Egypt during World War II (Mansfeld 1981: 
51n43). It reads: φαίνομαι σοὶ τῷ παρόντι καθήμενος· τῷ δὲ ἀπόντι οὐ φαίνομαι καθήμενος· ἄδηλον εἰ κάθημαι ἢ οὐ 
κάθημαι. For discussions, see Mejer 1976: 306-311; Mansfeld 1981: 51-52; Woodruff 1984: 80-87. 
87 1988: 50.  
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former is a position on what data qualifies as such; the latter is interpretation of the veracity of 
that data. The two positions are not mutually exclusive.88   
 Again, taking μέτρον to signify an act of determining without any further qualification 
suggests Protagoras’ claim is subjectivist. There is a rather long history of this approach, 
beginning with Aristotle (Metaph. Γ 1007b18, Κ 1062b13; cf. Θ 1047a)89 and continuing on to 
Sextus Empiricus (Adv. Math. 7.389-390).90 Read as a subjectivist claim, it will then assert that 
any perception and judgment is true absolutely, not just for the percipient, but for the fellows of 
the percipient, at least as far as the original percipient is concerned. A result of this claim is, as 
Aristotle’s gloss points out, a violation of the law of contradiction. If two different percipients 
perceive the same object in opposite ways, then that object is in a real sense at one and the same 
time and place X and not-X. However, there appears to be provision against this fallacy in 
Protagoras’ dictum. If the μέτρον is the human individual, then his assessment of any one thing 
cannot have any value for any individual other than himself; if it did, then for that second 
individual the human-measure claim would no longer be applicable, since a second party would 
for him, the original percipient, be a measure of all things whose measurement would modify his 
reality. It is thus difficult to interpret Protagoras’ dictum as a subjectivist claim without 
nullifying at once that claim. 
 The two glosses Plato gives of Protagoras’ claim add the important qualifiers ἐμοί and 
σοί so that, when the individual determines something to be the case, he determines it to be the 
case for him alone. Thus Plato interprets Protagoras’ dictum to be a claim amounting to 
relativism. Whatever the individual perceives to be the case, such is the case for that individual. 
The immediate illustration Plato gives in the Theaetetus uses wind as an example. If the same 
88 Cf. Mansfeld 1981: 51-53. 
89 Cf. Burnyeat 1976a: 46; Chappell 1995: 334. 
90 Cf. Burnyeat 1976b: 172. 
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wind appears to one person to be cool, to another cold, to another warm and to yet another 
positively hot, Protagoras’ dictum constrains us to say that the wind is in fact cool only to the 
one who feels it to be cool, cold only to the one who feels it to be cold, and so forth (152b).  
 This interpretation of the statement as a relativist claim is, I suggest, preferable to the 
other alternatives. For one reason, it has a strong a presence in the doxographic tradition, being 
found, side by side with the subjectivist, in Sextus Adv. Math. 7.60 and at Pyrrh. Hyp. 1.216, and 
in Cicero’s Academica (2.142).91 But more importantly, it captures the passivity of the 
individual’s assessment which Plato and Aristotle render through impersonal verbs; it asserts the 
importance of empirical knowledge without stopping short at a broadly empiricist claim; it 
avoids the self-contradiction that the subjectivist construal incurred; and, finally, it is 
recommended by the uniformity of the Platonic testimony. Plato depicts Protagoras as a relativist 
not only in the Cratylus passage and, more importantly, in the Theaetetus, but does so in the 
Protagoras as well, as I will attempt to show below (section 2.3).  
 
2.1.2 What Kind of Relativism? 
 
 
Accepting Plato’s characterization of Protagoras’ philosophy as relativism, one is immediately 
confronted with a number of issues. First is the nature of the individual’s assessment, or 
measurement. Plato’s wind-example concerned only perceptions. However, in his overall 
treatment of Protagoras in the Theaetetus Plato takes it as a foregone conclusion that Protagoras 
applied his doctrine to judgments as well. These include judgments, not just on physical 
attributes, but on knowledge claims (178b9-179b9: i.e. on future likelihood) and moral values 
(166a2-168c1) as well. Thus, the human individual is the measure of all that is true and false, 
right and wrong, good and bad, beautiful and ugly, honorable and shameful. Although this 
91…id cuique verum esse quod cuique videatur. 
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extension of perception to judgment has been challenged as un-Protagorean,92 it does not appear 
to be a foul. The inclusion of both sense-impressions as well as cognitive judgments in the 
doctrine is assumed in Protagoras’ assertion that one cannot think what is not nor anything 
except what he experiences (Tht. 167a8-9). Since his thinking involves cognitive judgments 
about reality, those judgments cannot be excluded from the human-measure. Moreover, it is not 
at all clear that Protagoras regards perception and judgment as fundamentally different. 
Thinking, like feeling, is a mode of perception.93 Protagoras’ relativism thus embraced the 
sensory, epistemic and moral fields.  
The second issue concerns Protagoras’ ontology and can be divided into two parts. The 
first part addresses the thing, the χρῆμα. Specifically, does it or does it not exist independently of 
the perceiver? A. E. Taylor offered the suggestion that it does not; rather, each individual lives in 
a private world that is real only for him.94 If honey is sweet to me, but bitter to you, it is because 
there are two honeys, real but independent of each other. This view seems unlikely. One reason 
is given by Kerferd who notes that in the Theaetetus the wind, for example, is always assumed to 
be the same wind (cf. 152b). However, Kerferd’s argument might seem compromised in coming 
from Plato and so one should look at comments outside Plato. In general, these comments on 
what Protagoras’ measurement means suggest that it is always a question of what a thing’s 
identity is, not whether or not there is a shared substance, or thing. For example, Plutarch 
summarizes Protagoras’ theory with the phrase “each of the things are not more this way than 
92 Maguire 1973: passim, his main argument being that in the Theaetetus Plato in several passages uniformly 
progresses in his interpretation of Protagoras’ claim from φαίνεται to δοξάζει to δοκεῖ and that this repeated pattern 
should arouse suspicion (115-119). However, Plato in the Cratylus, where Protagoras’ theory is treated only in 
passing, moves straight and quickly from φαίνηται (386a1) to δοκῇ (386c3). 
93 Cf. Mansfeld 1981: 44n19 & (emphatically) 50: “[I]t can never be said enough that Protagoras does not (his 
italics) distinguish between thinking and sensing.”  
94 1937: 326. 
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that” (τῶν πραγμάτων ἕκαστον εἰπὼν οὐ μᾶλλον τοῖον ἢ τοῖον).95 The interesting point about 
this fragment is that Plutarch’s adversary, Colotes, had attributed the line to Democritus. When 
therefore Plutarch corrects him and says it was Protagoras who said it, the impression is that it 
reflects Protagoras’ actual words. Moreover, if DK 68 B69 is indeed a contradiction by 
Democritus of Protagoras, it implies the same point. It reads: ἀνθρώποις πᾶσι τωὐτὸν ἀγαθὸν καὶ 
ἀληθές· ἡδὺ δὲ ἄλλῳ ἄλλο.96 What is at issue in these two, perhaps near contemporary, 
fragments is whether or not the identity of the thing, not its substance, is shared. 
If there is then a shared reality involving shared matter, do the attributes of those things, 
which differ according to the perceiver, inhere in the thing itself or are they created by the act of 
perceiving? This is the second part of the ontological question. To continue Plato’s example, 
does Protagoras consider the wind to contain coldness, warmness and heat? If so, then the wind 
is an amalgam of qualities, each quality divided along a spectrum of various intensities, and the 
individual perceives the quality to which his disposition inclines him, but can never perceive or 
conceptually embrace the whole thing. Or, does he consider the wind to be bereft of all these 
attributes which accordingly only “come to be as they are perceived, and for the percipient?”97 
The question is thus between a type of ontological subjectivism and an “objectivist” relativism.98 
Kerferd supported the objectivist interpretation and brought a weighty argument to the 
discussion. He points out that Aristotle always dismisses Protagoras’ claim on the grounds that it 
violates the law of contradiction. If Protagoras meant that attributes come to be as they are 
perceived, then the attribute would only exist in a percipient-perceived continuum, not in the 
wind itself, so that this view would never become liable to the law of contradiction. If, however, 
95 DK 68 B156 = Against Colotes 1108ff.  
96 For other Democritean differences with Protagoras, see DK 68 A113, B11l (cf. DK 80 B7), B69. 
97 Guthrie 1971:186, 267. 
98 Cf. Schiappa 2003: 129-130. 
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Protagoras maintained that the attributes did inhere in the thing itself, then it could be taken by 
some as liable to the law.99 Thus the objectivist position explains Protagorean relativism in such 
a way as to account for the way the subjectivist interpretation of his claim could have emerged. 
Another idea that recommends the objectivist interpretation is that it accommodates 
Protagoras’ agnosticism better. About the gods Protagoras is supposed to have declared:  
περὶ μὲν θεῶν οὐκ ἔχω εἰδέναι, οὔθ’ ὡς εἰσὶν οὔθ’ ὡς οὐκ εἰσὶν οὔθ’ ὁποῖοί τινες ἰδέαν· 
πολλὰ γὰρ τὰ κωλύοντα εἰδέναι ἥ τ’ ἀδηλότης καὶ βραχὺς ὢν ὁ βίος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου (DK 
80 B4).100  
 
The point to notice is that Protagoras indicates that given enough time he might very well gain 
knowledge of divine beings. If Protagoras’ relativism posited that attributes came to be as they 
are perceived, then the thing in itself, as it really is, is unknowable. Given all the time in the 
world, one would still only be able to say that he knows only what he perceives, not the thing 
perceived. Protagoras, however, is ready to say that, hypothetically speaking, he might very well 
someday come to a knowledge of gods, that time might overcome the matter’s inherent 
obscurity. Thus, in the objectivist interpretation there is a built-in metaphysical suspension of 
opinion at the ontological level that squares better with Protagoras’ agnosticism.101 
It has been alleged that such an objectivist relativism is really no relativism at all, because 
it posits an objective reality.102 But that objection assumes a simplistic notion of Protagoras’ 
objective reality. Protagoras posits, not a uniform, univocal objective reality, but one in which a 
plurality of attributes was in all things,103 so that whatever is said of an object is true. This is why 
Protagoras could claim that everything is true (ἔλεγε...πάντ’ εἶναι ἀληθῆ)104 and that it is 
99 1949: 21; 1981: 86-87; cf. Schiappa 2003: 130.  
100 = D. L. 9.51. Similarly, at Pl. Tht. 162d he says he does not talk or write about gods ὡς εἰσὶν ἢ ὡς οὐκ εἰσίν.  
101 Cf. Mejer 1976: 309: “Thus the philosophical position of Protagoras will be agnosticism rather than 
phenomenalism, solipsism etc.”  
102 So Bett 1989: 167. 
103 He is said to have argued against those who represented reality as one (DK 80 B2).   
104 D. L. 9. 51 (= DK 80 A1). 
37 
 
                                                 
impossible to contradiction (οὐκ ἔστιν ἀντιλέγειν), since when two people make mutually 
exclusive statements, they are talking about their two, distinct experiences towards the same 
thing.105 This last claim appears to be inconsistent with Protagoras’ claim that there are two 
opposing accounts concerning everything (δύο λόγους εἶναι περὶ παντὸς πράγματος 
ἀντικειμένους ἀλλήλοις) (DK 80 B6a), but Kerferd again offers a good explanation: Protagoras 
maintained that contradiction at the verbal level was possible, but not at the level of the things 
themselves.106 A thing has a plurality of attributes; each individual’s assessment of it is veridical 
and incorrigible; the plurality of assessments on any given thing can always be summed up in 
two positions, X and not-X. These contradict each other at the verbal level (and at the level of 
social interaction), but, Protagoras could say, not on the real level, because the two statements 
are about two different attributes in the one thing. Thus, Protagoras’ objective, but pluralistic, 
reality still can only be assessed in its relation to the percipient individual. His ontology might 
have approached agnosticism at a metaphysical level, but epistemically it was pluralistic, while 
the essence of that pluralistic reality was what it was relative to the individual. Denying it to be 
relativism because it is not something like phenomenalism is just a case of ignoratio elenchi.   
An important question concerning Protagoras’ pluralistic ontology is what attributes were 
considered attributes? Kerferd and Müller argue that Protagoras did not consider the beneficiality 
or advantageousness of a thing to be an attribute relative to the individual perceive/judger.107 In 
doing so they (consciously) admit a major inconsistency to his thought. It is not simply that one 
group of attributes is relativized, while one attribute is not (as inconsistent as that is). But on this 
view Protagoras proves self-refuting. On the one hand, he would claim that the person who 
perceives a coolness in his soup is perceiving a quality that is, for him, really in the soup. On the 
105 Kerferd 1981: 90. But Mansfeld 1981: 48 doubts this claim belongs to Protagoras. 
106 1981: 91-92. 
107 Kerferd 1949: 25; Müller 1986: 185.  
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other, should this person continue eating his soup and receive third degree burns because the 
soup was really hot, it was to his advantage to stop eating, but he continued because he trusted 
his “secondary” judgment. Thus, allowing considerations of advantage and benefit to be absolute 
would have vitiated Protagoras’ entire project. In chapter six (section 6.3) I will suggest that 
Protagoras did theoretically argue that the beneficial and advantageous were attributes relative to 
the individual just as much as physical, moral and aesthetic qualities. His purpose in doing so 
was not just for the sake of consistency, but to eliminate the beneficial and advantageous as a 
standard in human decision-making and behavior, especially at the polis level.  
 
2.1.3 The “polis-measure”: Synopsis of the “Great Speech” 
 
 
Protagoras did not limit his relativism to the individual, but extended it to the polis as well, as 
though the polis were a single, percipient entity and not a collection of potentially discrepant 
assessments of reality. At Tht. 167c4-5 he affirms:  
[φημὶ] ἐπεὶ οἷά γ’ἂν ἑκάστῃ πόλει δίκαια καὶ καλὰ δοκῇ, ταῦτα καὶ εἶναι αὐτῇ, ἕως ἂν 
αὐτὰ νομίζῃ. 
 
As Burnyeat observes, Protagoras’ application of relativism to the city is directly parallel to that 
of the individual.108 It is surprising that Protagoras makes this extension, since what is just and 
honorable to the city will more times than not disagree with what the individual, living in that 
city, holds to be just and honorable to himself, not to mention advantageous. Thus to explain the 
“polis-measure” claim is in essence to explain Protagoras’ political theory.  
On the whole, there appear to be two ways to resolve this problem. Either Protagoras 
holds the perception and judgment of the city to be more authoritative than the individual’s or 
holds the two to be (potentially) synonymous. It is difficult to see how he could hold the city’s 
108 Burnyeat: 1990: 23 & n31.  
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judgments to be more authoritative than the individual’s without introducing a major 
modification to his human-measure claim, a modification that would in effect nullify it. I suggest 
therefore that he regarded the two as synonymous; or, more specifically, that he regarded the 
polis’ assessment of reality to be an amplification of the individual’s assessment of reality.  
How he does so he makes clear in the “Great Speech” given to him by Plato in the 
Protagoras (320c8-328d2). In general, I suggest that Protagoras was able to regard the two as 
synonymous because he defined the human individual as an historical construct.109 This 
historical and anthropological perspective is intimately linked with Protagoras’ relativism. The 
individual in vacuo is veridical and incorrigible. But as a percipient being in history, his nature 
changes somewhat. While his perceptions and judgments are still incorrigible, they are 
automatically pre-conditioned by the history of his community and, moreover, actively 
conditioned by the education he receives from his environment. This conditioning creates a 
prejudice in the individual’s assessment of reality and a proclivity always to have perceptions 
and judgments that are consistent with his community’s perceptions and judgments, as defined 
by its history.110 This prejudice thus sustains a pattern of uniformity regarding both the nature of 
the physical world and moral values.111 True, whatever appears to be the case for one, is the case 
for him as long as he believes it is, and whatever the perceptions the individual has or the 
judgments he forms, they are incorrigible. This is of course the core of Protagoras’ relativism. 
However, the history of his community predisposes him towards certain perceptions and 
judgments, that is, towards a certain worldview. As long as he is a product of this community, he 
109 Cf. Mansfeld 1981: 46: “What I wish to argue is that Protagoras meant ‘man’ in the sense of a person with a past 
and, presumably, a future.” 
110 Cf. Vlastos 1956: xix-xx: “Protagoras, if he had time, might have enlarged the list of preventive measures and 
told us more of the lyre-master’s way of charming the mind into conformity – the temples and statues, religious 
festivals and processions, speeches on state occasions, tragedy and comedy on the public stage, functions, so 
lavishly supported by the Periclean splendor-state, through which a civilized community keeps its hold on the heart 
and imagination of the citizen, ensuring that he will love what the city loves and hate what it hates.”  
111 Cf. Mansfeld 1981: 47-48. 
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will hold this worldview, and hold it sincerely; as long as he holds it sincerely, his capacity of 
having substantively different perceptions or forming substantively different judgments is 
severely limited. But, while it is limited, it is not entirely removed. He is still an individual with 
an individual natural endowment by virtue of which he will have perceptions and form 
judgments which may or may not conform to the community pattern. If they do, then by the 
standards of the community he is “well-born” (εὐφυής); if not, then by those same standards he 
is not (ἀφυής).112 Again, these are relative standards; it is the vocabulary that is constructed on 
the assumption of absolute values.   
 It is this anthropological characterization of the human individual that enables Protagoras 
to use his theory of relativism as the basis of a political theory. Specifically, it allows him to 
make the transition from a descriptive philosophy to a normative philosophy. He ventures to 
show that civilization happened precisely because the human individuals were independent 
assessors of reality and indeed would never have happened unless they were allowed to be so. 
This being the case, the first communities emerged on a democratic basis: The content of the first 
communities’ worldview was what the first individuals genuinely believed in and genuinely 
agreed on. This original democracy, although it does not constitute a moral mandate to establish 
popular government or to base government on the principle of advantage in the interests of self-
preservation and prosperity, does constitute a recommendation for democracy. If civilization 
happened on democratic principles, then to perpetuate democracy would only be to bow to the 
natura rerum. Since this natura rerum is so multivalent as to be unknowable in its totality – like 
knowledge of the gods, it is darkened by the obscurity of the matter itself and the brevity of 
human life113 – this recommendation for democracy perhaps cannot be called natural. But if not, 
112 Cf. Pl. Prt. 327b7-c1 and DK 80 B3. 
113 Cf. DK 80 B4.  
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it can at least be called biological and instinctual. At any rate, it suggests that democracy is 
consistent with human φύσις, a suggestion that easily lends itself to idealistic celebrations and 
representations of democracy. 
 Thus, relativism, mediated through an anthropological definition of humankind, serves as 
the basis of Protagoras’ rationalization of democracy; namely, by using an historical and 
anthropological perspective he developed a rationalization of democracy on the basis of his 
theory of epistemological and moral relativism. In chapter three I will analyze the mythos section 
of the Great Speech and argue that it sets the interpretive tone, so to speak, for the rest of the 
mythos by suggesting an evolutionary model of biological development. Behind the mythical 
trappings of gods and an absent-minded Titan a process of natural selection resembling the 
thought of Protagoras’ contemporary Empedocles is taking place.  
 In chapter four I continue my examination of the mythos. Analyzing Protagoras’ nuanced 
description of the first humans, I argue that their naturally developed intelligence and the almost 
complete autarky that resulted therefrom precluded their coming together in society by their own 
powers. I then apply the Empedoclean evolutionary model suggested in chapter three and argue 
that the mythos does not represent the establishment of all human society, but mythically 
dramatizes the process whereby various communities gradually emerged as a result of a “social” 
natural selection that combined likeminded individuals with other likeminded individuals 
according to a genuine consensus and shared Weltanshauung.  
 In chapter five I examine the second section of the Great Speech, the logos. I argue that 
the picture of societal education it presents is not meant as an explanation as to how democratic 
citizens acquire political skill (or virtue) in the first place, as it has often been interpreted in the 
past (see subsection 1.4.1). Rather, I suggest that Protagoras meant it as an explanation as to how 
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the content of the community’s original worldview is passed on and perpetuated through 
successive generations. The indirect education of parents and elders, as well as the direct 
education of teachers, and finally the civil education imparted by the laws of the community 
(which are the assessments of the citizens in the form of vettings and examinations), predispose 
the members of the community to the perspective of the “founding fathers.”  
 This picture of education and conformity gives the impression that Protagoras thought of 
the Greek polis, especially the democratic polis, as a static entity which, if he did, he would have 
been wide of the mark. Accordingly, in chapter six I discuss how Protagoras conceptualized the 
role of the politician in the democratic state. Using the “Defense” of Protagoras found in Plato’s 
Theaetetus, I suggest an interpretation that sees the democratic leader as one who because of an 
outlook that is in natural alignment with the city’s worldview (εὐφυΐα) and because of an 
education that increases that alignment,114 is in a position to act as guarantor of the city’s opinion 
by recommending the course of action most consistent with the city’s worldview. Thus, though 
he is wiser, the content of his opinion is not any truer than anybody else’s.115  
 In this way then I will attempt to show that Protagorean relativism, coupled with an 
anthropological interpretation of human nature, justified the novel practices represented by the 
Athenian democracy in the mid-fifth century. In chapters seven to twelve I will discuss the 
likelihood of an actual incorporation of Protagoras’ justification into the Athenian democratic 
culture (see subsection 1.5 for a summary of these chapters). For now, because I maintain that 
Protagoras’ relativism lies at the heart of the Great Speech in the Protagoras, it is important to 
discuss the extent to which his relativism occurs, if at all, in that dialogue.  
 
114 Cf. DK 80 B3.  
115 Cf. Protagoras in the Theaetetus: καὶ οὕτω σοφώτεροί τέ εἰσιν ἕτεροι ἑτέρων καὶ οὐδεὶς ψευδῆ δοξάζει, καὶ σοί, 
ἐάντε βούλῃ ἐάντε μή, ἀνεκτέον ὄντι μέτρῳ· σῴζεται γὰρ ἐν τούτοις ὁ λόγος οὗτος (167d2-4).  
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2.2 RELATIVISM AND THE PROTAGORAS 
 
 
The interpretation of the Great Speech on the basis of Protagoras’ human-measure claim so as to 
amount to an explanation of the polis-measure claim is challenged by the apparent absence of 
any reference to relativism in the rest of the Protagoras. If the mythos and logos of the Great 
Speech are conceptually predicated upon a relativism that denies absolute value to ethical 
“goods” and “bads,” then the discussions that follow the speech, being primarily ethical 
discussions, ought a priori to broach the status of “goods” and “bads.” In this section I will argue 
that the Protagoras does treat Protagoras’ relativism, but the treatment is obscured by the fact 
that Plato pays greater attention to the dramatic dénouement of the dialogue than to the 
conceptual refutation of relativism (which he reserves for the Theaetetus).  
 Several scholars have argued that the Protagoras does broach the subject of relativism in 
at least two passages. The first occurs when Socrates, in the course of arguing that δικαιοσύνη 
and σωφροσύνη are both forms of σοφία, asks Protagoras if he considers the good to be 
beneficial, whereupon Protagoras launches into a demonstration that what is beneficial is of 
incredible variety (333d8-334c6). A. E. Taylor took the passage to be “a direct and simple 
application of Protagoras’ own principle of ‘man the measure’ to ethics, etc.”116 Gregory Vlastos 
later agreed.117 This interpretation was challenged by Moser and Kustas on the grounds that 
Protagoras actually accepts the beneficial as a standard,118 and by C. C. W. Taylor, who 
considered the identification of this passage with the human-measure claim to be “sheer 
confusion.”119 The latter is certainly right. Protagoras does nothing more in this passage than 
116 Taylor 1937: 251. This interpretation ultimately derives, via Adam & Adam (1893: 138) from Zeller 1892: 177-
178. 
117 1956: xvi n32.  
118 1996: 114.  
119 1991: 134.  
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expatiate on the variety of what is beneficial. He says some things are beneficial to cows, some 
to dogs. Again, olive oil is bad for animal fur, but beneficial to human hair. This is not moral 
relativism. On the other hand, one cannot take this passage, as Moser and Kustas do, as 
Protagoras’ acceptance of “a standard that can be applied in reaching moral agreement, namely, 
the profitable.”120 Protagoras merely makes the argument that what is beneficial is extremely 
varied. What end he thinks this argument serves, he simply does not say. Nor does he get a 
chance to do so, as Socrates diverts the conversation with a complaint on procedure (334c8ff). It 
has been suggested that Protagoras was attempting to create an occasion for discussing his 
human-measure doctrine, but was forestalled by Socrates.121 Considering the excitement 
Protagoras elicits from the sophistic audience with these words (ἀνεθορύβησαν) (334c7), this 
reading does not seem implausible.  
 The other passage where Protagoras’ relativism comes into play occurs towards the end 
of the dialogue. Socrates has been attempting to convince the majority of people that pleasure is 
the good and pain the bad; that, since this is the case, and since nobody wittingly errs, good 
living involves the accurate and objective measurement of goods and bads (356d3-e4). The idea 
of an objective knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) that shows people what is right and wrong, as well as the 
verbal identification of that knowledge as an art of measurement (μετρητική), has led most 
scholars to acknowledge that this amounts to a reference at least to Protagoras’ relativism.122 
 In short, the presence of relativism in the Protagoras is a generally acknowledged. 
However, in the final analysis it is merely acknowledged that it is present in reference, not in 
120 1966: 114.  
121 Mansfeld 1981: 44, who also draws attention to a possible playful allusion to the human-measure claim when 
Protagoras asks Socrates, who has complained about the length of his speech (although that particular “speech” had 
not been all that long), Πότερα οὖν ὅσα ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ δεῖν ἀποκρίνεσθαι, τοσαῦτά σοι ἀποκρίνωμαι, ἢ ὅσα σοί; 
122 Vlastos 1956: xviii; Taylor 1991: 191; Denyer 2008: 192. Moser and Kustas 1966: 113 once again disagree on 
the grounds that Protagoras freely grants this conclusion to Socrates, which he would not do, if relativism were at 
stake. However, Protagoras does not make the concession in propria persona. He agrees that the majority would 
admit that Socrates is right (356e2-4).  
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discussion. It just hangs there, bearing no integral relation to the dialogue. The result is not 
flattering to Socrates. Since he and Protagoras have not been discussing the latter’s doctrine of 
relativism, when Socrates concludes in a quick reference that it cannot be right, he would 
essentially appear to be sucker punching his opponent, who moreover does not cry foul. 
Therefore, if it can be shown that the dialogue does in fact discuss Protagoras’ relativism in a 
meaningful, though indirect, way, as I propose to do, not only will the presence of relativism in 
the mythos appear more compelling, but the dialogue as a whole will seem more understandable.  
 
 
 
2.3 RELATIVISM IN THE PROTAGORAS 
 
 
The line of argumentation that the Protagoras follows indicates that Protagoras’ relativism, 
though never expressly brought up, casts a long shadow over the dialogue. Specifically, it 
implies that Protagoras’ equation of truth with human opinion is a claim that spells its own ruin. 
Socrates’ strategy is therefore an implicit peritropē (“turning the tables”) and as such anticipates 
the explicit peritropē of the Theaetetus (170e7-171c7). 
 
2.3.1 εὐβουλία 
 
The first indication that Protagoras’ Great Speech did indeed imply a relativistic interpretation of 
human development is provided by Socrates’ response to it. Upon recovering from the charm of 
Protagoras’ words, he proceeds to offer four proofs that the individual virtues (δικαιοσύνη, 
ὁσιότης, σωφροσύνη, ἀνδρεία) are not disparate, discreet notions, but parts of a whole, namely 
σοφία.  
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 The significance of Socrates’ position is lost on Protagoras. At any rate, he is indifferent 
about agreeing or disagreeing with Socrates on this point (331c1-4). Nevertheless, Socrates 
offers first a proof that justice and piety are the same thing, then a proof that self-control and 
wisdom are the same thing. Despite the fallacious character of these proofs,123 Protagoras gives 
his assent to Socrates’ points. In the course of the third proof Protagoras discerns where Socrates 
is headed: He means to get Protagoras to concede that the good has an objective value.  
 However, Socrates’ immediate aim is to demonstrate that justice and soundness of mind 
are the same thing. In order to do so, he has Protagoras grant a series of propositions: 1) Those 
who do wrong show soundness of mind (σωφροσύνη); 2) To show soundness of mind is to show 
logical thinking (εὖ φρονεῖν); 3) To show logical thinking is to exercise right decision-making 
(εὖ βουλεύεσθαι) in the execution of the wrong. The language of this last concession (εὖ 
βουλεύεσθαι) signifies that an important step has been reached. Socrates is on the point of 
clarifying Protagoras’ entire educational program, summed up earlier by the sophist as precisely 
εὐβουλία (318e5) (quoted in section 2.0). The unity of the virtues is no longer the only issue at 
stake. Socrates is not interested any longer in just showing that σωφροσύνη is justice, but that 
εὐβουλία qua εὐβουλία proves it to be. It is Protagoras’ philosophy that is now being examined.   
 The next concession Socrates draws from Protagoras is that one exercises right decision-
making if one succeeds (εὖ πράττειν) in the perpetration of wrong. Here he asks Protagoras if he 
considers good things to be beneficial. It is now clear where Socrates is going. He means to 
equate the good with the beneficial and the beneficial with what is just.124 Once he thus equates 
the good with justice, he will return to εὖ πράττειν and interpret it as to “do good (and so just) 
things” instead of the common meaning “fare well, succeed.” He will then conclude that, since to 
123 For the common view that these proofs are fallacious, and an attempt to demonstrate that they are not, see Vlastos 
1972: 415-458. 
124 Cf. McKirahan 1984: 22-23; Taylor 1991: 132. 
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fare well (now equivalent to “do good (and so just) things”) is a mark of right decision-making, 
one cannot exercise εὐβουλία unless that εὐβουλία leads him to enact just deeds.   
 However, Protagoras does not let him reach these conclusions. When asked if he 
considered good things to be beneficial things, he replied he did, and is even prepared to 
recognize a correlation between what is good and what is beneficial, but proceeds to give a series 
of examples to illustrate the fact that the beneficial (ὠφέλιμον) is a very varied and multifaceted 
thing (ποικίλον, παντοδαπόν) (334a3-c6). Therefore, the beneficial cannot be used to clarify 
what it means to fare well. As faring well was a mark of right decision-making, right decision-
making cannot now be the same thing as justice. Protagoras wins. He has foiled Socrates’ 
attempt to define the sophist’s εὐβουλία as the discernment of an objective value, in this case the 
beneficial. It is this attempt to define the good objectively in the context of Protagorean εὐβουλία 
that indicates the presence of relativism in the passage. 
 Technically speaking, Protagoras does not mount the defense of εὐβουλία in propria 
persona. When Socrates asked if one showed soundness of mind in doing wrong, he replied that 
he himself (ἔγωγε) would be ashamed to say so, though many people do make that claim (333c1-
3).125 Then, when Socrates asks if he should address Protagoras or the many (τῶν πολλῶν), 
Protagoras tells him to address the many. Nevertheless, Protagoras’ emotional response to 
Socrates’ attempt to equate the good with the beneficial is indication enough that Protagoras is 
not simply parroting the multitude (333e2-4), as does also the applause his refutation of that 
same attempt elicits from his fellow sophists (334c7). It is merely insinuated at this point that 
Protagoras and “the many” bear a certain correlation. This insinuation becomes more meaningful 
as the dialogue proceeds.  
 
125 This statement, by the way, would then distance Protagoras from such sophists as Callicles and Thrasymachus.  
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2.3.2 The Fourth Proof 
 
 
The fourth and final proof Socrates presents in his argument that the individual virtues are 
actually instances of a single virtue occurs after the interpretation of Simonides’ poem. Socrates 
means to demonstrate that courage is really wisdom. The first attempt he makes at this 
demonstration fails (349e1-351b2). Protagoras points out that Socrates equated courage and 
daring (θάρσος) illegitimately (351a4-5). Socrates then undertakes a more complicated attempt 
to prove his point.  
 This second attempt involves the introduction of a new character – the Many (οἱ πολλοί). 
They are brought in in a roundabout way. Socrates begins by espousing (for dramatic purposes) 
the hedonistic doctrine that what is pleasurable is good, what is painful is bad, and rejecting the 
view of the Many that some painful things are good and some pleasurable things are bad. He 
then asks Protagoras if he agrees with himself or the Many (351c2-6). But Protagoras refuses to 
commit himself to any answer (351e3-7). However, the two of them can at least agree that 
wisdom and knowledge rule a person’s behavior (352c8-d3) and that the Many are therefore 
wrong in thinking that wisdom and knowledge do not determine behavior, as they clearly do 
when they use such phrases as ὑπὸ ἡδονῆς, λύπης, θυμοῦ, ἔρωτος, φόβου ἡττᾶσθαι. This 
(apparent) agreement on the impossibility of ἀκράτεια makes possible the drawing of sides: 
Socrates and Protagoras in one corner, the Many in the other.126 
 Socrates, backed by Protagoras, proceeds to converse with the Many and address their 
belief that painful things can be good and pleasurable things bad. He points out that what they 
call bad things result in good things, and vice versa. That being the case, they can now agree that 
the essence of the good, despite immediate circumstances, is pleasure and the essence of the bad 
126 As is taken for granted at 353c4:  πειρασόμεθα γὰρ ἡμῖν ἐγώ τε καὶ Πρωταγόρας φράσαι.  
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is pain (353c1-354e2). In sum, Socrates has committed the Many to an (enlightened) hedonist 
philosophy. 
 He now turns to explain what the Many had meant with such phrases as “being overcome 
by pleasure.” It appears to mean that one is compelled to do what he knows to be bad because of 
pleasure. But since pleasure is good, as the recent elenchus showed, the thing one is compelled 
by pleasure to do must not be truly bad. Otherwise, there would be a laughable (γελοῖον) 
absurdity (354d1). Yet the phenomenon remains. One does sometimes find himself compelled to 
do what he knows to be bad, but does it anyway. To explain the phenomenon, it is agreed that it 
is a case of simple miscalculation of size, quantity, intensity and distance (356a3-5). When one is 
overcome so as to do a thing he knows to be bad, he is in reality choosing a thing whose painful 
consequences are greater than its pleasurable consequences. 
 
2.3.3 An Alternative to the Mythos  
 
 
 Socrates now returns to the question of faring well (τὸ εὖ πράττειν) which Protagoras had 
evaded earlier. In recalling that question, the idea also recalls Protagoras’ relativism that was 
implicit in that discussion. Socrates then goes on to draw a conclusion from his treatment of the 
good and bad which will similarly recall Protagoras’ relativism. Supposing, he says, faring well 
consisted in our choosing behaviors according to a selection that recognized the true magnitudes 
of things, he then asks (356d3-e2):  
Τίς ἂν ἡμῖν σωτηρία ἐφάνη τοῦ βίου; ἆρα ἡ μετρητικὴ τέχνη ἢ ἡ τοῦ φαινομένου 
δύναμις; ἢ αὕτη μὲν ἡμᾶς ἐπλάνα καὶ ἐποίει ἄνω τε καὶ κάτω πολλάκις μεταλαμβάνειν 
ταὐτὰ καὶ μεταμέλειν καὶ ἐν ταῖς πράξεσιν καὶ ἐν ταῖς αἱρέσεσιν τῶν μεγάλων τε καὶ 
σμικρῶν, ἡ δὲ μετρητικὴ ἄκυρον μὲν ἂν ἐποίησε τοῦτο τὸ φάντασμα, δηλώσασα δὲ τὸ 
ἀληθὲς ἡσυχίαν ἂν ἐποίησεν ἔχειν τὴν ψυχὴν μένουσαν ἐπὶ τῷ ἀληθεῖ καὶ ἔσωσεν ἂν τὸν 
βίον; 
 
50 
 
This passage contains several echoes of Protagoras’ thought. Socrates now denotes faring well 
(εὖ πράττειν) with the word σωτηρία. The word recalls Epimetheus’ provision for the animals 
which he did for the sake of their σωτηρία (320e3). It recalls Zeus’ gift of δίκη καὶ αἰδώς which 
was meant to preserve the humans (322c1). Thus Socrates takes the conversation back to the 
mythos. 
 Next, he asks if that σωτηρία is provided by ἡ μετρητικὴ τέχνη or ἡ τοῦ φαινομένου 
δύναμις. This opposition implies that the σωτηρία Protagoras had detailed in the mythos can be 
summed up as “the power of appearance.” The word and result suggest that Socrates has 
Protagoras’ relativism in mind. First, φαινόμενον recalls the φάντασμα of Tht. 167b3, where 
Protagoras defends his relativism against the charge of inconsistency. Secondly, relying on 
φαντάσματα in the assessment of one’s world results in a dizzying confusion in which one is 
compelled to assign different values to the same things as different times (ἐποίει ἄνω τε καὶ κάτω 
πολλάκις μεταλαμβάνειν ταὐτὰ) – a relativism of both physical and moral values. 
Here, Socrates challenges that relativism. The recent discussion, he says, suggests that 
there is after all an instrument which can correct a person’s faulty calculation of not only 
physical properties such as size and quantity, but also attributes that determine one’s happiness 
and moral success. He clarifies that this instrument is knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) which he 
characterizes as an “art of measurement” (ἡ μετρητικὴ τέχνη). This is what allows one, whose 
own sense-impressions and judgments are faulty, to gain an accurate reading of reality. This 
definition of knowledge stands in stark contrast to Protagoras’ relativism, as even the vocabulary 
poignantly indicates. Protagoras had offered ἄνθρωπος as the μέτρον of all that is. Socrates’ 
discussion suggests knowledge measures better.  
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Having made this point, Socrates resumes his initial argument that courage and wisdom 
are equivalent according to his hedonistic demonstration. Error (ἐξαμαρτάνειν), he concludes, is 
not baseness, but ignorance due to a mistake in measurement (ἀμαθία) (357d-e). For instance, the 
coward in war places a less pleasurable thing (e. g. running away) over a more pleasurable thing 
(e. g. freedom from subjection). In other words, he has misinterpreted what is truly terrible 
(δεινά). Therefore, courage is the knowledge of what is and what is not terrible (360d4-5).  
Thus Socrates brings the fourth proof to a close. This proof contained a refutation of two 
positions held by Protagoras. Not only did it demonstrate for Protagoras that wisdom and 
courage are indeed synonymous. But it also included a refutation of his relativism. Socrates’ 
peroration now brings out this two-headed refutation with finesse. He observes that the two of 
them are in a laughable position. He himself began with the view that goodness (i.e. ἀρετή) was 
not teachable and attempted to show that “knowledge was all things (ὡς πάντα χρήματά ἐστιν 
ἐπιστήμη) (361b1), whereas Protagoras assumed that goodness was something other than 
knowledge and contended that it was teachable. But, since it is knowledge, then Socrates is right 
to equate wisdom and courage. Moreover, Socrates’ claim that πάντα χρήματά ἐστιν ἐπιστήμη, 
being verbally corrective of Protagoras’ human-measure dictum (πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον 
ἄνθρωπον εἶναι), implies that his relativism has in some way been refuted. 
 
2.3.4 A Peritropē Implied 
 
 
But how can Socrates consider any refutation to have taken place, when his conclusions rely on 
the hedonistic premise? Courage and wisdom are synonymous, only if the good is pleasure and 
the bad pain; and, more importantly, Protagoras’ relativism is mistaken and goods and bads can 
be measured but only on the assumption that, again, the good is pleasure and the bad pain. 
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Protagoras will refute his own relativism, if he subscribes to the hedonistic view. But he is not a 
hedonist. So, the refutation appears to be pointless. 
 This problem, though, can be solved, if one takes into account the dramatic movements 
of this part of the dialogue and asks what meaning these movements suggest. First, as noted 
already, Socrates deployed the fourth proof as though Protagoras sided with him against the 
Many. However, these lines were incorrectly – and ironically – drawn. Actually Protagoras’ view 
had more in common with the Many. When asked if he subscribed to the hedonistic view, 
Protagoras had replied no. He believed some pleasurable things not to be good and some painful 
things not to be bad, while there was a third class of neutrals (351d4-7). Now, this is precisely 
the view of the Many before Socrates challenges it (351c2-3). So it seems that Protagoras is just 
going along with Socrates, having made it clear that he did not commit himself to Socrates’ 
position (351e3-7). He prefers to stand on the sidelines and observe how Socrates treats the 
opinion of the Many. It is noteworthy that he took this very same position earlier, when Socrates 
tried to equate the good with the beneficial (333c4-5).  
 Now that Protagoras is standing by, Socrates proceeds to interrogate the Many as though 
they were a character in the dialogue. He gains the concession from them that the good is 
pleasure (354c4-5) and the result of this concession is that, since there is an objective content to 
the good and bad, knowledge is the measure of all things, not the human. What then has 
dramatically happened? Protagoras and the Many agree on the nature of pleasure and pain, but 
then it is only the Many who are brought round to the hedonistic side.127  This suggests that the 
Many become a dramatic “stand-in” for Protagoras. This “pinch hitting” for Protagoras now 
raises the question of the relationship between the two and, more importantly, it raises the 
127 Zeyl 1980: 257 believes Protagoras does express assent at 358b3. But Denyer 2008: 195 rightly stresses the 
vagueness inherent in the passage.  
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question of why Plato introduces the Many at all, seeing that Callias’ house is full of potential 
interlocutors.  
The reason, I suggest, is that Plato considers there to be an intimate relationship between 
Protagoras and the majority. In the Theaetetus Socrates attempts a peritropē (“turning the 
tables”) on Protagoras’ human-measure claim and does so in the context of majority opinion (see 
subsection 6.4.2). If Protagoras himself believes the human-measure claim, but the majority do 
not, then Protagoras is constrained by the human-measure claim to recognize the truth of the 
opinion of the majority (i.e. that the human-measure is false) (171a1-c7). Plato thus considers the 
human-measure claim to refute itself because it recognizes the truth of its own denial. However, 
he examines the human-measure claim in terms of Protagoras’ relationship with the majority so 
that it is clear Plato thinks holding the human-measure claim commits its holder to the opinion of 
the majority.128 When therefore in two separate passages of the Protagoras Plato associates 
Protagoras with the opinion of the Many, he is similarly implying the point he makes explicit in 
the Theaetetus: Protagoras is joined at the hip with the Many and whatever they do or think he 
must also; if the Many are hedonists, then Protagoras is, too; and if hedonists are objectivists, 
then Protagoras is, too.  If in fact that is true, one must turn to the Theaetetus. Or, if the reader is 
a particularly diligent student in the Academy, he might try figuring it out himself. And this is, I 
suggest, the point of the implied peritropē: to encourage the student to work out for himself how 
relativism is self-refuting.  
 
 
 
128 As to just why he thinks so is an important question. I will suggest in chapter 4 (section 4.4) that Protagoras’ 
relativism privileged the opinion of the majority in a certain locale, or tradition. Therefore, when Plato constructs a 
refutation of relativism that pits against Protagoras the Many (he might with the same effect have pitted against him 
an individual such as Theodorus, as he in fact began to do [Tht. 170d4]), Plato is adding, I suggest, an ironic flavor 
to the refutation: The opinion of the Many, which Protagoras meant to privilege, proves him to be wrong. 
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2.4 CONCLUSION 
 
 
Since it thus appears to be the case that Protagoras’ relativism occupies a place in the Protagoras 
comparable to, though by no means as extensive as, its place in the Theaetetus, I can now 
analyze the first section of the mythos in Protagoras’ Great Speech and argue that it presents an 
evolutionary model of biological development for both the animal and human spheres. Behind 
the mythical trappings of gods and an absent-minded Titan a process of natural selection 
resembling the thought of Protagoras’ contemporary Empedocles is taking place. In this way the 
section offers, I suggest, a model for interpreting the rest of the mythos where human society and 
morality is the theme. 
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3.0 THE MYTHOS OF PROTAGORAS: CONTEXT AND PREMISE 
 
 
 
 
Although a good deal of Protagoras’ ideas comes to us indirectly and secondhand through Plato, 
there is still good reason to consider this material a reliable and accurate, if sometimes ironic and 
irreverent, representation of Protagoras’ thought, as I will attempt to show in the course of the 
dissertation (see esp. sections 4.3, 4.4, 6.4 and subsections 5.3.1, 6.1.1). The focal point for 
discussions of the political, as opposed to the philosophical, ideas of Protagoras is the lengthy 
speech given to him by Plato in his Protagoras (320c8-328d2). This “Great Speech,” as it is 
often called, is self-consciously broken down by Plato’s Protagoras into two parts. The first part, 
in the form of a mythos, describes how animal and human morality came to be, while the second, 
in the form of a logos, or a discourse using reasonable argumentation, treats the mode of 
education current in Athens at the time of the dialogue, and offers as well an explanation as to 
why base sons can be produced by excellent fathers.  
 In this and the following chapters I will discuss the first part of this speech, the mythos 
(320c8-322d5), whereas in this chapter specifically I will argue that the mythos should be read as 
an addition to, and not a variant of, the following logos. When this is done, it is seen that the 
account which the mythos offers of animal life and human society is an historical and 
anthropological one, using figurative languages and symbolic ideas to make real claims about the 
origin of life and society. Finally, these claims, I suggest, amount to an account of animal life 
that is based on an evolutionary model involving a type of natural selection which will serve as 
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the interpretive foundation for the second part of the mythos concerning human morality, which I 
will treat in chapter three.  
 
 
 
3.1 THE MYTHOS: INTERPRETIVE APPROACHES 
 
 
On the whole scholars have approached the mythos from one of two interpretive positions. They 
have either taken the mythos to be a symbolic rendering of the logos that follows. In this case the 
logos merely explicates the ideas the mythos expresses in figurative language and fanciful 
imagery. Alternatively, some regard it as a separate portion of Protagoras’ speech with its own 
contribution to make to his ideas. It still of course incorporates a symbolic element, but adds 
something the logos does not, an account of the emergence of animal life and human society that 
is at base historical and anthropological. As the discussion below will attempt to show, the latter 
approach is the preferable one.  
 
3.1.1 The Mythos as Equivalent to the Logos 
 
 
According to the first view, to interpret the myth, one must refer to the logos. This approach has 
become almost standard. It is followed by Kagan, Schiappa and most recently Balot.129 It 
ultimately derives from Kerferd who developed the idea most fully. According to him, the 
mythos preaches equality among all citizens. Equating justice and shame with the societal 
education Protagoras soon describes in the logos, he defines them as “the teaching which all 
people receive in the community.”130 Since life in the polis thus imparts a basic level of justice 
and political virtue, “all have something to contribute to the discussion of moral and political 
129 Kagan 1965: 81-84; 92; Schiappa 2003: 180-187; Balot 2006: 74-78. 
130 1953: 44. 
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questions.”131 Whether or not this is a cogent argument for egalitarianism has already been 
discussed.132 For now the point is that these scholars arrive at this view by regarding the mythos 
and logos as two sides of the same coin.  
 There is a textual problem with this approach. Protagoras addresses the logos to Socrates’ 
second doubt: Why do fathers not impart it to their sons? (324d6). This suggests that the mythos 
was meant to dispel on its own Socrates’ first doubt (viz. Is virtue teachable?). This suggestion is 
confirmed by Protagoras’ confidence that the mythos has indeed explained that question before 
he begins the logos (322d5-323a4). There is a conceptual problem, as well. As C. C. W. Taylor 
points out, the idea that the mythos is equivalent to the logos fails to explain the origin of 
morality. If justice and shame are merely the instruction imparted by the city as detailed in the 
logos, then Protagoras failed to use the mythos to explain how the city developed a morality to 
impart in the first place, a thing he clearly promised do, when he undertook to explain how virtue 
(ἀρετή) is a thing teachable (διδακτόν) (320c1).133 For these two reasons, then, it does greater 
justice to the text to regard the mythos as a passage containing a meaning supplemental to the 
logos (cf. subsection 5.3.1).  
 
3.1.2 The Mythos as Quasi-History 
 
 
If separate from the logos, what then is its function? Those who have regarded it as a separate 
unit have viewed it as an historical account, incorporating figurative and symbolic elements, of 
human morality. For example, C. C. W. Taylor argues that the mythos explains how family-
based morality became community-based. Taking the “scattered” existence of the humans 
131 1981: 144.  
132 See subsection 1.4.1. It is assumed to be so by the scholars mentioned above, though Kerferd himself later 
expressed his doubts (1981: 144).  
133 1991: 80.  
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(σποράδην) (322b1) to mean that they lived, not as individuals, but in groups, or tribes, he 
contends that the mythos details how humans learned to transfer the moral allegiance they owed 
to kinsmen and tribesmen to members of a larger, unrelated community.134 A problem with this 
interpretation is that it just “passes the buck.” One must still ask how humans originally 
developed a sense of moral obligation to their kinsmen. Taylor is aware of this problem, but 
imputes the shortcoming to Protagoras himself.135 
 Klaus Döring provides another attempt at finding in the mythos an explanation of the 
human morality. Regarding humans’ scattered existence contra Taylor as solitary and individual, 
he interprets the injustices people committed against each other as due to the fact that each 
individual considered himself to be the measure of right and wrong. Eventually, he realized the 
need for agreed upon rules, a contract, which the mythos calls alternately “justice and shame” 
and “ἡ ἔντεχνος σοφία σὺν πυρί.”136 Döring’s interpretation is greatly facilitated by this equation 
of the gifts of “technical wisdom” with justice and shame. Since Prometheus’ gift and Zeus’ gift 
represent the same process, then human society (δίκη & αἰδώς) is the result of human 
intelligence, or προμήθεια. If this is so, then Protagoras explains the rise of society by a social 
contract theory.  
It is difficult to agree with Döring that Protagoras only depicted the gifts of Prometheus 
and Zeus as separate occurrences to emphasize political virtue over human ingenuity (um die 
Sonderstellung der politike techne hervorzuheben).137 The mythos goes to great lengths to 
indicate the separateness of the two gifts, as when it explains why Prometheus stole from 
Hephaestus and Athena and not from Zeus (321d1-e1). It is also difficult to accept his 
134 Ibid. 81.  
135 Ibid. 84-85.  
136 1981: 110-111.  
137 Ibid. 110.  
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interpretation of the human-measure claim. For, by his reckoning, being the measure of all things 
amounts to an extreme form of egoism which was antithetical to civilization, a precondition of 
chaos and anarchy, which played no part once civilization developed. But Protagoras clearly 
meant his human-measure claim to have relevance in and for civilization.138 
 
3.1.3 The Mythos: The Evolution of Human Morality 
 
 
These objections to Taylor’s and Döring’s interpretations aside, their basic interpretive premise 
that the mythos is a freestanding answer to the question of whether virtue is a thing teachable or 
not is preferable to Kerferd’s approach that the logos is an “alternative statement” of the 
mythos.139 Accordingly, I will follow Taylor’s and Döring’s approach and argue that the mythos 
presents a quasi-historical account of the origin of human morality and civilization. Specifically, 
instead of locating the cause of civilization in the beneficence of the gods, as Kerferd does, or in 
the contractual deal struck between individuals for the sake of material advantage or 
preservation, I will argue that the mythos offers an organic, evolutionary picture of human 
morality and civilization as a fortuitous, spontaneous coalescence of viewpoints between 
likeminded individuals. In order to do so, in this chapter I will discuss first the context of the 
mythos in order to show that morality is its basic theme; then I will discuss the first part of the 
mythos itself in which the animal kingdom is treated in order to draw attention to evolutionary 
elements which Protagoras borrowed, I will suggest, from Empedocles of Agrigentum. Once 
138 Also, Plato’s strong disapproval of the claim suggests it had more immediate relevance to contemporary life (see 
Tht. 152a1-b7, 161c2-179b9; Cra. 391c5-7 [especially τὰ τῇ τοιαύτῃ ἀληθείᾳ ῥηθέντα]). Döring might mean to 
imply that Protagoras sanctioned behavior based on this egoistic version of the human-measure claim as far as the 
laws allowed, but this would be inconsistent with Tht. 167cd, where the human-measure is shown to contribute to 
moral, legal and normal behavior. Cf. Prt. 351b7-c2. 
139 1953: 44.  
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these points are established, I will continue in chapter three to chart this evolutionary process to 
the point where human morality, and so civilization, finally emerges.  
My interpretation has several important implications. First, human morality turns out to 
be the consensus of the community, not one agreed upon with a view to the community’s 
welfare, but one that results from the biological preponderance of one viewpoint over another. 
Consequently, moral values are relative, first to the individual, then to the community. Thus I 
agree with Döring that Protagoras’ human-measure claim is operative in the myth. Finally, virtue 
(ἀρετή) becomes a cultural skill (τέχνη), the ability to live in conformity with one’s social 
environment, taught, like carpentry or blacksmithing or tanning or medicine, from generation to 
generation, only, unlike those crafts, collectively. The relevance of these ideas to the Athenian 
democracy is direct. The high premium placed on consensus made decision-making, participated 
in by all the citizens, virtually indispensable, while the equation of virtue with basic social and 
moral competence made elite and commoner alike appear sufficiently qualified for leadership 
positions. 
 
 
 
3.2 THE CONTEXT 
 
The mythos as a whole forms the first part of an extended response to concerns voiced by 
Socrates about the education of Hippocrates. Socrates has come to recommend the young 
Hippocrates to Protagoras, but has requested that Protagoras explain what it is Hippocrates will 
learn (318a). In response Protagoras has promised to teach him right decision-making (εὐβουλία) 
in both private and public affairs (318e5-319a2). Here Socrates, in a move typical of his method, 
restates Protagoras’ εὐβουλία under the phrase ἡ πολιτικὴ τέχνη which he takes as a thing that 
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produces good citizens (ἄνδρας ἀγαθοὺς πολίτας). He gains Protagoras’ assent to this change of 
terms (319a6-7).140 This change of terms thus amplifies Protagoras’ instruction. It is no longer 
just right decision-making, but is much more comprehensive: Protagoras will teach Hippocrates 
how to fulfill the role of a good citizen as well as how to exercise leadership in the polis. 
 
3.2.1 ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς πολίτης 
 
 
But it might be suggested that this amplication, represented in the phrase ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς πολίτης, 
belongs to Socrates and is foisted upon an unwitting Protagoras.141 The course of their 
interchange shows that this is not the case. In voicing his concerns, Socrates offers another label 
for Protagoras’ instruction, ἡ ἀρετή (319e1). At first the demonstrative pronoun used with it 
(αὕτη) implies that Socrates is merely describing the political art as a particular excellence or 
ability. However, when in his peroration Socrates categorically states his erstwhile assumption 
that “virtue is not a thing teachable” (οὐχ ἡγοῦμαι διδακτὸν εἶναι ἀρετήν), it is clear he has again 
extended the initial idea of civic excellence to include moral excellence as well.  
However, in doing so it is clear that he is not entrapping Protagoras, but clarifying him. 
When after the mythos Protagoras concludes that the Athenians behave reasonably in including 
everybody in their political deliberations, he offers a definition of the curriculum he offers, 
which he now expresses in a phrase that combines the three terms so far advanced (ἡ πολιτικὴ 
τέχνη, ἀρετή and εὐβουλία) into the single ἡ πολιτικὴ ἀρετή and proceeds to make clear, or 
rather emphasizes, its moral dimension (ἣν δεῖ διὰ δικαιοσύνης πᾶσαν ἰέναι καὶ σωφροσύνης) 
(323a1-2). Therefore, when Protagoras said he would make Hippocrates every day better 
140 Cf. Cole 1966: 117.  
141 So Morrison 1941: 8-9 who also argues that Protagoras reacts by responding first to the definition of ἡ πολιτικὴ 
τέχνη as “good citizenship,” and later shifting to a definition of it as “being good at politics.” It is more likely that 
Protagoras understands the term to cover both aspects from the beginning (Kerferd 1953: 44-45; Denyer 2008: 96).  
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(βελτίων), he meant just what he said (318a8). Protagoras will impart to Hippocrates and 
anybody else who takes his course a goodness that will enable him to take on a leading role in 
the political, as well as moral, life of his city. The ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς πολίτης embodies a dimension of 
both ability and morality.  
Protagoras’ interest in morality also becomes clear from the two questions Socrates puts 
to him. In sum, Socrates challenges the very premise that this goodness can be imparted by 
teaching. He offers two arguments that it is not a thing teachable, both of them empirical. First, 
the Athenians, intelligent people, do not think this goodness is teachable. At least, the fact that 
they consult all citizens on public matters implies as much (319d5-7).142 Secondly, fathers who 
have this goodness are not able to pass it on to their sons (319d7-e3). If it could be taught, then a 
fortiori fathers would not neglect instilling it in their sons. As it is, they let them roam free if by 
chance they may light upon it accidentally (320a3).  
Socrates’ understanding of this goodness is problematic in that it leaves the acquisition of 
goodness a mystery. Since it cannot be taught by a teacher or a father or a city, one would 
suppose that it is a thing inborn. Yet this cannot be, since Socrates suggests that one might come 
upon it by accident (αὐτόματοι). An incoherence results, but it is an incoherence for dramatic 
purposes. That is to say, Socrates is not implying an alternative, confusing definition of 
goodness, but implying that there may be something incongruous in Protagoras’ version of 
goodness.   
Socrates’ introductory conversation with Protagoras has thus set the stage for the mythos. 
Specifically, it has created the expectation for an account of human political and moral goodness 
142 Socrates forebears to explain what they think, whether they think it is inborn or non-existent. Xen. Mem. 4.2.3-4 
suggests he thought the latter. 
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(ἀρετή, ἡ πολιτικὴ ἀρετή/τέχνη, εὐβουλία).143 Protagoras provides this account. Only, since it is 
clothed in mythical dress, it is likely to exercise the audience’s ingenuity. In fact, Protagoras says 
as much. Given the option of expressing his views in a mythos or a logos, he chooses the former 
because it seems to him to be χαριέστερον to tell a mythos (320c6-7). He is not merely saying it 
would be more pleasing, but more engaging, more intellectually stimulating.144 
 
3.2.2 The Mythos 
  
The mythos begins at the point of creation. When it was the appointed time for the mortal 
creatures to come into life, the gods instructed Prometheus and Epimetheus to apportion the 
appropriate powers to each of them, but Epimetheus obtained permission from his brother to 
perform the task alone. The powers he apportioned were of a great variety, some even 
diametrically opposite. He gave strength to one species, speed to another. Some he equipped 
with predatory powers (claws, horns, beaks, etc.), others with means of escape. Thus by a 
compensatory distribution (ἐπανισῶν) he removed the danger of mutual annihilation 
(ἀλληλοφθορίαι). He then gave protection to each against the elements. To some he gave hair 
and hard hides, others he shod with hoofs or shag or hard, bloodless skin. He then made 
arrangements for their diet. Some were to eat grass, others fruit; some roots, others meat. And 
from those who would be carnivorous he took away the capacity for numerous offspring, while 
to those who would fall prey to the carnivores he gave it. Epimetheus’ distribution follows a 
clear pattern. He progresses from the protection against each other to protection against the 
elements to diet to reproduction. At each step he makes sure that the powers balance each other 
143 After all, that had been the original purpose in coming to Callias’ house, i.e. to discover if Protagoras knew what 
was good and bad (τί χρηστὸν καὶ πονηρόν) (313e2-5).  
144 Cf. the words χαριεντισμός and χαριεντίζομαι. 
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out. But, despite the variety of these powers, they all are designed by Epimetheus to secure the 
same end, preservation of the species (σωτηρία), according to an ecological equilibrium. 
 When finished, Epimetheus realizes he has not left any powers for the humans. On the 
very day they are scheduled to enter life Prometheus intervenes and bestows upon humans τὴν 
ἔντεχνον σοφίαν σὺν πυρί, which he had stolen from Hephaestus and Athena (321d1-2). This 
“wisdom” enables the humans to develop the tools they need to survive, on an individual basis. 
For they are thoroughly asocial. Whenever they try to congregate for the sake of protection 
against the wild beasts, they invariably commit injustices against each other and dissolve the 
very community wherein lies their salvation. After this state of affairs has continued for some 
time, Zeus bestows on them, through his messenger Hermes, justice (δίκη) and shame (αἰδώς). 
Since this grant is made to every individual, human communities are now characterized by 
systems of order and bonds that bring them together in friendship (κόσμοι τε καὶ δεσμοὶ φιλίας 
συναγωγοί). Human beings now have virtue (ἡ πολιτικὴ τέχνη/ἀρετή). 
 Socrates’ first question is thus answered. The Athenians are right to think that everybody 
has ἡ πολιτικὴ τέχνη (ἀρετή); but that does not mean, as Socrates had supposed, that it is not a 
thing teachable, an idea implicit in the mythos (and rendered explicit in the “rider” to the mythos 
[323a5-324d1]). In this way, the mythos gives to Socrates’ questions a response that appears to 
be self-contradictory, as Socrates had implied (see subsection 3.2.1): Virtue, Protagoras asserts, 
is indeed possessed by everybody and it is a thing imparted by teaching. Any interpretation of 
the mythos must make sense of this apparent contradiction (cf. section 5.5). Reading it as a 
mythical dramatization of an evolutionary process ultimately resolves, I suggest, this 
contradiction, but in order to identify this process, Protagoras’ treatment of the animal kingdom 
must first be examined.  
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3.3 THE ANIMAL KINGDOM 
 
Protagoras’ treatment of the animal kingdom provides key information for the interpretation of 
the rest of the mythos. In it he expounds an entirely secular explanation of the appearance of 
animate life on earth and points to biological, accidental and evolutionary causes as the basic 
“first beginnings.” However, he presents this biological explanation in terms of the agency of 
divine beings. Thus, Protagoras mythologizes an explanation of animal life which ironically calls 
into question the mythological trappings of his explanation. In other words, Protagoras is being 
quite χαρίεις. 
 
3.3.1 The Gods 
 
According to the mythos the motive force is the gods. Epimetheus gives the animals their 
powers, Prometheus endows humans with “technical wisdom” and Zeus bestows on them justice 
and shame. Few scholars have taken the presence of the gods to be literal.145 For one, it conflicts 
with Protagoras’ known agnosticism.146 Secondly, the mythos has a revisionist dimension that 
betrays an attempt at rationalization. Epimetheus is given a role that mythology has never 
imputed to him, as Socrates even seems to notice,147 and in accordance with his name 
Epimetheus botches the job. Contrary to the Hesiodic and Aeschylean versions, Prometheus 
steals fire, not from Zeus, but from a more appropriate source, Hephaestus and Athena. 
Protagoras is thus rationalizing the old stories to suit a new agenda of his own. For, not only are 
Hephaestus and Athena obvious symbols for technological know-how, but quite possibly bear 
democratic connotations as well, since the temple overlooking the agora, commonly referred to 
145 See Müller 1967: 140-148; Guthrie 1971: 64; Kerferd 1981: 167-8 (but cf. 1953: 45); Taylor 1991: 80; Denyer 
2008: 100-101, 106. Havelock 1957: 92 regards them as literal, and therefore as a Platonic contamination. 
146 See DK 80 B4; cf. Tht. 162d5-e1.  
147 Prt. 361d2: Socrates’ words are: ὡς φῂς σύ.  
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as the Hephaesteum (or the Theseum), but belonging rather to both Hephaestus and Athena, was 
part of the Periclean building program.148 Thirdly, the gods are not very godlike. Not only does 
Epimetheus make a mistake in the divisions of powers, but Zeus does not have the foresight to 
see humans will need justice and shame until humankind is in dire straits. And when he does 
give justice and shame, there is still the chance that somebody will miss the dole. If the gods are 
to be taken literally, then Protagoras is not following Greek tradition, but a demotic, 
Aristophanic slant on Greek tradition. 
In fact, the mythos itself insinuates they are not just a device, but are to be taken as such 
by the listener. It begins: “For there was once a time when the gods existed, but the races of 
mortal creatures did not. When the appointed time of generation (γένεσις) came for these, too 
(καὶ τούτοις) (320d1), etc.” The solitary καί implies the gods had a genesis. Greek philosophy 
had already challenged this idea. In his Silloi Xenophanes had laughed at mortals for supposing 
that the gods are born (γεννᾶσθαι) and share their dress, speech and likeness (DK 21 B14; cf. 
B23). If Protagoras’ gods were literal, one would expect him to have a loftier notion of the 
creative agents of mankind.  
Nor is this the only place in the mythos where Protagoras undermines the literality of the 
gods. Once humans received, he says, a share in the divine lot, they first, because of their 
relationship with god (διὰ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ συγγένειαν), began to believe in gods – the only animal 
(ζῴων μόνον) to do so (322a2-3). In light of what has been said about the creation of humans so 
far, this relationship cannot be literal and Protagoras must mean that because of the similarity 
that resulted from the gift of intelligence humans believed in gods.149 This resulting similarity 
has either one of two meanings. Either the moment they received intelligence they instantly 
148 Wycherley 1978: 68-71. 
149 So Guthrie 1957: 88; Kerferd 1981: 168; Taylor 1991: 84. The earlier solution was to remove the phrase διὰ τὴν 
τοῦ θεοῦ συγγένειαν as a later gloss (Adam & Adam 1893: 112-113).  
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became aware of the existence of the gods and their similarity with them or they were able to 
infer the gods’ existence. Protagoras points out that the human race did not have any realization, 
but “conceived a belief” (ἐνόμισεν). So, it is more likely that Protagoras means they inferred the 
gods’ existence. This meaning accounts for the wordplay that charts the course of their 
cogitation. Once humans received a divine portion (θείας…μοίρας), they conceived a belief in 
divine beings (θεούς) because of their relationship with the divine (τοῦ θεoῦ). Protagoras subtly 
points out that, despite the activity of Prometheus and Zeus (via Hermes) for the benefit of 
humankind, humans still had to infer the existence of gods. This is a startling departure from the 
rationale of the myth, where gods and men are supposed to be interacting. But the departure 
makes the point that the gods are a screen and implies moreover that religion is a human 
construct.150 Consequently, when he adds that they also inferred what the gods looked like in 
constructing cult-images, there is the strong suggestion that he is making the same point 
Xenophanes made when he declared that, had they the means, horses and cattle would depict 
their gods in the appearance of horses and cattle (DK 21 B15).151 
 
3.3.2 Ecological Equilibrium 
 
 
It has been suggested that the compensatory distribution of the animal powers is evidence that 
Protagoras is here assuming, if not gods per se, then an intelligent agent, much like Anaxagoras’ 
Nous.152 The most compelling piece of evidence for this view is the similarity of Protagoras’ 
150 Cf. Kerferd 1981: 168. However, his assertion that Protagoras treats religion as “a positive human phenomenon 
with a valuable function to perform in societies” goes farther, I think, than the mythos. 
151 For another similarity, besides the two mentioned here, between Protagoras’ and Xenophanes’ opinions about the 
gods, compare the former’s claim that “obscurity” (ἀδηλότης) surrounds all discourse on the gods (DK 80 B4) with 
the latter’s denial of certain knowledge on the gods (DK 21 B34). Cf. Barnes 1979: vol. II. 147-148.  
152 McNeal 1986: 309-310. 
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compensatory distribution with an observation Herodotus makes when discussing the winged 
serpents of Arabia (3.107-109): 
Καί κως τοῦ θείου ἡ προνοίη, ὥσπερ καὶ οἰκός ἐστι, ἐοῦσα σοφή, ὅσα μὲν ψυχήν τε 
δειλὰ καὶ ἐδώδιμα, ταῦτα μὲν πάντα πολύγονα πεποίηκε, ἵνα μὴ ἐπιλίπῃ κατεσθιόμενα, 
ὅσα δὲ σχέτλια καὶ ἀνιηρά, ὀλιγόγονα (3.108.2).  
 
Herodotus then cites as an example of the former the hare and of the latter the lioness. The 
similarity with what Protagoras says at 321b5-6 is striking, indeed verbal. Protagoras uses the 
words πολυγονία and ὀλιγογονία, while Herodotus uses the adjectival forms of the same words. 
One is therefore tempted to conclude that the sophist and the historian must have both accounted 
for this phenomenon of the animal kingdom with reference to the same cause, namely τοῦ θείου 
ἡ προνοίη. Although Protagorean ideas in Herodotus is not unlikely,153 it is unlikely that 
Herodotus owes the notion of divine providence to one who was agnostic and who excluded 
from discourse and writing all talk about the gods.154  
Moreover, the Herodotean passage contains subtle, but significant differences from the 
Protagorean version. Herodotus’ introduction of divine providence appears to be a special point 
he wishes to make. “After a fashion,” he says, “the forethought of the divine, being as is 
reasonable wise, etc.” According to Herodotus, divine forethought designed the animal 
kingdom. In Protagoras’ myth, Epimetheus, the antithesis of forethought, is the designer. And 
Protagoras explains Epimetheus’ mistake by commenting that he was not particularly smart (ἅτε 
δὴ οὖν οὐ πάνυ τι σοφὸς ὤν, 321b6-7). Protagoras attributes the ecological balance of the animal 
kingdom to an agent that is anything by provident. Herodotus does the opposite. Just as 
Protagoras explains the creation of the animals by remarking that Epimetheus was not wise 
(σοφός), Herodotus remarks that providence is in fact wise (σοφή) and, significantly, feels the 
153 See fn. 424 subsection 8.3.3.  
154 Tht. 162d5-e1. 
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need to support the claim with an appeal to common sense (ὥσπερ καὶ οἰκός ἐστι). Not only do 
the two writers have different assumptions on providence, but their respective phraseology 
suggests the relationship here was not one of influence, but disagreement (cf. section 8.3). 
And there is yet another difference. As How and Wells rightly observe, Herodotus’ 
conception of divine providence is that it is a benevolent thing. 155 In other words, Herodotus’ 
view of creation is anthropocentric. He goes on in the present passage to point out that all other 
snakes, besides the flying Arabian serpents (which eat their way out of their mother’s womb), lay 
eggs and hatch hordes of offspring because they do not threaten man’s existence (ἀνθρώπων οὐ 
δηλήμονες) (3.109.3). For Herodotus, divine providence looks out for humanity. This 
anthropocentric view stands in contrast to Protagoras’ myth. There humans are but another 
animal (320c8-d3),156 and the ecological balance Epimetheus establishes is for the sake of the 
animals, to ensure that none of them perishes, not to guarantee, as in Herodotus, that man’s table 
will always be heavy-laden. Though Protagoras and Herodotus refer to the same ecological 
balance, their views concerning the power behind it could not be more different. Herodotus’ 
allows room for προνοίη; Protagoras’ does not. 
It is better therefore to interpret the ecological balance Epimetheus establishes as the 
result of a natural process without any intelligent design. Weak animals are hyper-reproductive, 
and predators are not, not because νοῦς or προνοίη designed them so, but because that is simply 
the way it turned out. Along these lines one must imagine a stage in which imbalance 
characterized the powers of the animals. For example, predators could have many offspring and 
weak creatures only a few. Then, by a gradual process of selection, the weak creatures that 
155 How and Wells 1928: ad loc. D. Asheri 2007: 501 regards providence here as an instance of “a typical 
compromise between transcendental and immanent teleology” and offers parallels from Xenophanes and 
Anaxagoras.  
156 Cf. 322a4: μόνον ζῴων. 
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happened to have πολυγονία survived, while the predators that had the same trait became extinct 
because of internecine aggression.  
 
3.3.3 Necessity (Ἀνάγκη) 
 
 
Such an idea of evolutionary selection is found in Aristotle’s Physics Β 198b10ff. Aristotle is 
arguing that nature operates for an express end (ἕνεκά του) against the view that it operates by 
random necessity (ἐξ ἀνάγκης, ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου). The proponents of the necessity-theory cite 
rain and teeth as evidence. It rains because water is drawn up, cools and falls by necessity.157 If a 
shower destroys somebody’s crops on the threshing floor, it did not rain for that purpose; that 
was merely accident. Similarly, the incisors are sharp, while the molars are flat, not by 
teleological design, but by evolutionary process. This evolutionary process is summed up as 
follows:  
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων μερῶν, ἐν οἷς δοκεῖ ὑπάρχειν τὸ ἕνεκά του. ὅπου μὲν οὖν 
ἅπαντα συνέβη ὥσπερ κἂν εἰ ἕνεκά του ἐγίνετο, ταῦτα μὲν ἐσώθη ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου 
συστάντα ἐπιτηδείως, ὅσα δὲ μὴ οὕτως, ἀπώλετο καὶ ἀπόλλυται, καθάπερ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς 
λέγει τὰ βουγενῆ ἀνδρόπρῳρα (Β 198b27-32).  
 
Characteristics which appear designed for an end actually just developed that way by accident 
(ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου συστάντα ἐπιτηδείως) and because they were “fitly developed” 
(ἐπιτηδείως), they survived (ἐσώθη), while the traits that developed otherwise disappeared and 
continue to disappear (ἀπώλετο καὶ ἀπόλλυται).  
Protagoras, I suggest, has this necessity-theory in mind. This appears so both by the 
process of elimination: The gods in the mythos cannot be literal gods, nor can they represent an 
intelligence immanent in material; and also by more positive evidence. As commented above, the 
character of Epimetheus is the most noticeable departure Protagoras makes from the Hesiodic 
157 Cf. Ar. Nub. 367-378. 
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and Aeschylean versions of the Prometheus myth. Indeed, in the earlier versions he is not much 
more than a name. But in Protagoras’ mythos he is promoted to designer of the animal kingdom. 
The reason is his name. As “Afterthought,” he is an appropriate symbol for an inchoate idea of 
natural selection, which posits a set of creatures with random characteristics that a law of 
survival subsequently whittles down to a harmonious, interlocking subset. This law, being a force 
of nature, cannot be called purposeful or intelligent, just as Epimetheus is expressly denied 
intelligence (οὐ πάνυ τι σοφός).  
Besides being an appropriate symbol, the behavior Epimetheus exhibits is significant. 
The obvious inference from his “stupidity” is the fact that he erred in the case of humans. The 
natural process of generation, Protagoras implies, is not reasoned, but prone to error. This being 
the case, Protagoras would then be suggesting a major point: Nature errs. This point establishes a 
connection with the Physics passage. To refute the adherents to the necessity-theory, Aristotle 
explains how mistakes (ἁμαρτίαι) can occur (Β 199a33-b5), thereby implying that his opponents 
had used arguments based on  “natural mistakes” to support their theory that the material world 
came, and comes, about by a type of natural selection, which they denoted as necessity, or the 
logically necessary outcome (ἀνάγκη).  
 
3.3.4 Empedocles of Agrigentum 
 
Another connection between Protagoras’ mythos and the Physics passage is established through 
a third party. The Physics passage links this necessity-theory with the pre-Socratic philosopher 
Empedocles of Agrigentum, who developed the idea that the universe was composed of four 
elements, or roots (ῥιζώματα): earth, fire, water, air. These elements, as they are brought together 
by Love (Φιλότης, Φιλίη) and driven and held apart by Strife (Νεῖκος), occasion a random 
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mingling of traits and features that results in both ordinary and unusual creatures who by a law of 
adaptability are reduced to the forms familiar to experience. If Protagoras means his mythos to 
signify a coming-to-be by a similar process of selection, then the presence of Empedoclean ideas 
in his mythos would strengthen that idea. Interestingly, tradition places both men at Thurii in 
Italy around the same time (see subsection 7.1.3), while Plato is witness that Protagoras spent 
time on Empedocles’ native Sicily (Hp. Ma. 282d).  
As it turns out, the mythos does indeed have several ideas in common with Empedoclean 
thought (in addition to the fact that Epimetheus behaves much like the “necessity” of Aristotle’s 
Empedoclean followers). In the first place, Protagoras’ gods fashion mortal creatures out of earth 
and fire and “everything else that is mixed with earth and fire” (320d2-3). These are have been 
taken by several scholars as the four elements and as a reference to Empedoclean science.158  
Moreover, not only does Protagoras’ “stuff” of creation resemble Empedocles’, but their 
respective modes of creation are similar. Empedocles explains the emergence of humans as 
follows:  
Νῦν δ’ἄγ’, ὅπως ἀνδρῶν τε πολυκλαύτων τε γυναικῶν 
ἐννυχίους ὅρπηκας ἀνήγαγε κρινόμενον πῦρ,  
τῶδνε κλύ’· οὐ γὰρ μῦθος ἀπόσκοπος οὐδ’ἀδαήμων. 
Οὐλοφυεῖς μὲν πρῶτα τύποι χθονὸς ἐξανέτελλον,  
ἀμφοτέρων ὕδατός τε καὶ εἴδεος αἶσαν ἔχοντες· 
τοὺς μὲν πῦρ ἀνέπεμπε θέλον πρὸς ὁμοῖον ἱκέσθαι,  
οὔτε τί πω μελέων ἐρατὸν δέμας ἐμφαίνοντας 
οὔτ’ἐνοπὴ οἷόν τ’ἐπιχώριον ἀνδράσι γυῖον (DK 31 B62). 
 
In Protagoras’ mythos mortals creatures, humans included, are fashioned under the earth and are 
brought up to the light, just as here in Empedocles’ poem men and women are in the dark 
(ἐννυχίους) and rise out of earth (χθονὸς ἐξανέτελλον), like plants. Again, in the Empedoclean 
passage humans are uncompounded, simple forms (οὐλοφυεῖς), just as in Protagoras’ mythos 
158 See Denyer 2008: 101 for the argument that they are the four elements and Guthrie 1957: 85 & McNeal 1986: 
316 for the Empedoclean influence.  
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mortal creatures are masses that have not yet received body parts. These body parts, or δυνάμεις, 
are self-existent for Protagoras, able to be attached or removed as Epimetheus sees fit. Similarly, 
Empedocles imagines a body (δέμας) without members (οὔτε τί πω μελέων), voice or 
reproductive organ. Another fragment of Empedocles makes the same point:  
 ᾗ πολλαὶ μὲν κόρσαι ἀναύχενες ἐβλάστησαν,  
 γυμνοὶ δ’ἐπλάζοντο βραχίονες εὔνιδες ὤμων,  
 ὄμματά τ’οἶ(α) ἐπλανᾶτο πενητεύοντα μετώπων (DK 31 B57).  
 
Neckless heads shoot forth, arms without shoulders wander as well as eyes begging for brows. 
Thus, both Protagoras and Empedocles envision mortal creatures as entities independent of their 
constituent parts. What is more, they both call these primordial masses “types,” Empedocles with 
the noun τύποι (B62.4), Protagoras through the verb τυποῦσιν (320d2). Contrast the Diodoran 
cosmology, where humans differentiate between each other precisely because they have 
distinguishing τύποι (DK 55 B5.1, v.38).159  
 
3.3.5 Survival (σωτηρία) 
 
 
These similarities between Protagoras’ mythos and Empedocles’ poem are not, I suggest, 
accidental. Protagoras incorporates Empedoclean evolutionary selection by having a non-
intelligent agent (Epimetheus) set up a rational, balanced ecology. The motive force is not the 
gods, but necessity, the impersonal force that guarantees a logically necessary outcome, given 
certain preconditions. This being the case, a crucial implication follows. It is said in several 
places in Protagoras’ mythos that Epimetheus distributes the powers for the sake of preservation 
(σωτηρία) (e.g. 321b6). Since divine, and rational, design is, as I have argued, merely a cover for 
process of selection, σωτηρία cannot be the end, but rather the result, the fortuitous outcome of 
necessity – a meaning the word is capable of, as in the Physics passage things that “randomly 
159 For the provenance of the Diodoran cosmology, see fn. 164. 
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came together fitly survived” (ἐσώθη). Just so is Epimetheus’ provision of preservation a symbol 
for such a chance survival by selection.  
 
 
 
3.4 CONCLUSION 
 
 
Rather than a mythical equivalent to the logos, the mythos Protagoras tells at the beginning of 
the “Great Speech” in the Protagoras should be regarded as separate from the logos and 
contributing a substantive answer of its own to Socrates’ questions. That answer amounts to a 
quasi-historical account of the origin of human morality and civilization. Towards the 
formulation of that account, Protagoras begins with a treatment of the coming-to-be of the 
animal kingdom in order to introduce several foundational ideas: the symbolic character of the 
gods in the mythos, the compensatory equilibrium that obtains throughout the animal world, and 
the idea of necessity (or necessary outcome) as the motive force in their coming to be as they are. 
When combined, these ideas suggest that Protagoras is making use of the evolutionary model of 
survival by selection, as developed by Empedocles of Agrigentum, as the basis for his discussion 
of the origin of human morality and civilization which he treats in the remaining portion of the 
mythos.   
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4.0 THE MYTHOS OF PROTAGORAS: THE ORIGINS OF HUMAN SOCIETY 
 
 
Having covered the animal kingdom, the mythos proceeds to explain the cause of human 
survival and ultimately the formation of human government. On the whole, the human section of 
the mythos will echo the animal section. The causes that brought humans together were as 
accidental and fortuitous as the distribution of the animal powers, and as the animal powers had 
been signified through Epimetheus, so now human survival will be represented through 
Prometheus and the Zeus-Hermes unit.  
 
 
 
4.1 HUMAN INTELLIGENCE 
 
 
When Epimetheus finished distributing the powers to the mortal creatures, it was discovered that 
he had failed to provide for the humans. To correct his error, Prometheus steals ἡ ἔντεχνος σοφία 
σὺν πυρί from Hephaestus and Athena and gives it to the humans as their special power 
(δύναμις). This “technical wisdom with fire” clearly denotes intelligence, but what are the 
characteristics of this intelligence?  
 
4.1.1 Innate or Developed Intelligence? 
 
 
Should this intelligence be regarded as representing an innate intelligence? G. B. Kerferd makes 
the argument that it should. He regards this intelligence, as well as the other animal powers, as 
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innate because both the animals and the humans receive their powers before coming into the 
light.160 While his view appreciates the symbolism of the mythos, it fails to take into account its 
narrative and structure. Prometheus clearly stands for the προμήθεια of humankind (cf. Prt. 
361d1-3). But it is important to notice that he fills this role only by acting as corrector to this 
brother’s mistake. An important question then is why Protagoras has his humans receive 
intelligence from the correction of an original error. As the sequence of events itself suggests, it 
was in order to indicate that human intelligence came from their want and weakness. Therefore, 
if there was a time when humans were pitifully deprived creatures, one cannot consider their 
intelligence to be innate. Any other mortal creature, exposed to similar circumstances, might 
have developed similar intelligence. It is not that humans, when they came to be, were 
intelligent, but that they were made that way by necessity. Their intelligence is the logically 
necessary outcome (see subsection 3.3.3 for ἀνάγκη) of their condition of powerlessness. As for 
Kerferd’s argument, he equates light with life, though one can just as easily take it to signify the 
full development of the living creatures’ biology.  
 Moreover, taking human intelligence to be innate because it was given before life 
assumes that Prometheus stands for a real divine being, as Kerferd in fact does (subsection 
3.3.1). However, there are problems with seeing Prometheus in this way. Upon seeing his 
brother’s mistake, Prometheus steals “technical wisdom with fire” from Hephaestus and Athena. 
On a revisionist note the mythos then adds that he did not bestow virtue and political skill on 
humans, only intelligence, because the former was with Zeus on the Olympian acropolis. Now, 
two reasons keep Prometheus from venturing up to Zeus’ palace: It was not possible (οὐκέτι 
ἐνεχώρει) and, even if it were, Zeus’ guards were quite dreadful (321c7-322a2). If one took 
Prometheus as a divine agent, even in mythical terms that would mean that he is not nearly as 
160 1953: 43; 1981: 133. 
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προμηθής as tradition makes him. In both Hesiod and Aeschylus there is no obstacle that 
Prometheus cannot surmount, at least until he is chained to the Caucasian crag. Here, however, 
he is not nearly as clever as tradition makes him. The traditional Prometheus is not being evoked.  
On the other hand, if Prometheus represents the natural, biological development of 
human intelligence, his actions make perfect sense. Humans developed in the same context of 
survival as the other animals. Their distinctive feature is the absence of a distinctive feature. 
Their lot is lack. Because they do not have anatomical features to protect, feed and clothe 
themselves, they learn to do so by artificial means; those who did not, died. It is a natural 
process. That is why they do not have virtue and the political skill, because their intelligence 
(Prometheus) cannot yet reach that height (Olympus).  
 
4.1.2 The Great Power of Human Intelligence 
 
 
Protagoras calls this intelligence ἡ ἔντεχνος σοφία σὺν πυρί (or ἡ ἔμπυρος τέχνη). The words 
themselves, as well as the victims from whom it was stolen, at first glance suggest that this 
intelligence is nothing more than skill at crafts. Indeed, Protagoras himself later calls it ἡ 
δημιουργικὴ τέχνη (322b3). So has it been interpreted.161 What challenges this view, though, is 
the fact that humans, once they become intelligent, are able to accomplish feats that require more 
than banausic know-how. First, they conceived a belief in gods. That is not to say that Protagoras 
means literal gods, but that the humans analyzed the power of their intelligence, recognized it 
was much more than the animals could do, postulated that there existed invisible beings and 
inferred, moreover, that they were related to them. A brief comparison of this “origin of religion” 
with other fifth-century formulations is instructive. According to Sextus Empiricus, Prodicus, 
Protagoras’ younger contemporary, said the ancients saw the sun, moon, rivers and springs and 
161 E.g. Loenen dat. 1940: 5. 
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considered them gods on account of the benefit they derived from them (θεοὺς ἐνόμισαν διὰ τὴν 
ἀπ’αὐτῶν ὠφέλειαν, S. E. M. 9.18 = DK 84 B5).162 Prodicus’ construal recognizes that primitive 
humans must have a primitive mind. Similarly, Critias (or possibly Euripides) put forward the 
view that the gods were a necessary lie invented by a wise man to prevent people from 
committing crimes in secret.163 If it were not for this wise man, humans would never have 
thought about gods. Protagoras’ mythos stands in sharp contrast to these two “theogonies.” It 
credits humans with a high degree of rational thought. 
Secondly, the mythos mentions how they constructed cult-statues (ἀγάλματα) for the 
gods. This not only means that the humans have postulated what the gods must look like 
(presumably themselves), but also that they have notions about how to worship them and ideas 
about what pleases and displeases these divine beings (εὐσέβεια). After the birth of theology, 
humans next proceed to develop speech – a feat that goes well beyond mere mechanical know-
how. In fact, it is not until the last item of the series that humankind shows what can properly be 
called the “demiourgic skill,” when they invent dwellings, clothes, footwear, bedding and 
procure sustenance. And even this last invention shows unexpected intelligence. For, when 
Protagoras says they procured τὰς ἐκ γῆς τροφάς, he appears to indicate that they bypassed the 
hunting-and-gathering stage and immediately invented agriculture.  
Not only have humans developed skills common to all humanity, but have also invented 
specialized crafts. Later in the myth, when Zeus dispatches Hermes to distribute justice and 
shame among mortals, Hermes asks if he should distribute them as the τέχναι have been 
distributed, which have been distributed unevenly, so that one person who knows medicine can 
162 The phrase is parallel to Prt. 322a4: διὰ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ συγγένειαν. It is interesting that Prodicus sees humans 
theorizing on a basis of benefit, while Protagoras does not. Was this a point of disagreement between them?  
163 DK 88 B25. The spirit, however, is hard to gauge, since the view is expressed in a satyr play, the Sisyphus. For 
the Euripidean authorship of the fragment, see Dihle 1977: 28-42. 
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be of service to many others (εἷς ἔχων ἰατρικὴν πολλοῖς ἱκανὸς ἰδιώταις) (322c6-7). Thus the 
audience learns (belatedly) that certain humans have also developed specialized crafts such as 
medicine. 
Therefore, the intelligence that the humans immediately demonstrate is more than skill 
and craftsmanship. It is an intellectual αὐτάρκεια (autarky or self-sufficiency) that allows them to 
meet all their needs and wants, from food and clothing to religion and language.  
 
4.1.3 Intellectual Autarky 
 
 
Their intellectual autarky is also illustrated in the solitary life they lead. Other fifth-century 
reconstructions of primitive humanity emphasize the gradual process in the development of 
human ingenuity and the importance of community in that development. The account found in 
the opening chapters of Diodorus’ history portrays humans, even after the discovery of fire, 
developing the crafts only gradually (κατὰ μικρόν) and formulating language in the same way 
(ἐκ τοῦ κατ’ὀλίγον).164 This last point especially contrasts with Protagoras’ conception of a quick 
development of language (ταχὺ διηρθρώσατο) (322a6). More importantly, the Diodoran 
cosmology credits humans’ technological development to the foundation of cities, which is 
prima facie more believable. Protagoras, on the other hand, has his primitive humans develop 
most of the trappings of polis-life while still solitary, before there are actually poleis.  
This view of their solitary lifestyle has been challenged for the very reason that it seems 
incredible that they could do so before interacting with each other. Intepreting the word 
σποράδην at 322b1, Taylor believes small groups are meant and that “there is no suggestion that 
164 D. S. 1.8 (= DK 68 B5.1). On the provenance of the Diodoran cosmology, the consensus appears to be that it 
reflects fifth-century thought. Kerferd 1981: 141 regards the account as an amalgam of fifth-century theorizing, 
while Thomas Cole defends the position earlier taken by Reinhardt (1912: 492-513) and argues that it derives from 
Democritus via the Aegyptiaca of Hecataeus of Abdera. The consensus view is challenged by Spoerri, who argues 
that it belongs closer to Diodorus’ time. See Burton 1972: 44-51 for a comparison of Cole’s and Spoerri’s views. 
80 
 
                                                 
in the pre-political phase men lived as isolated individuals.”165 He therefore interprets this phase 
of human existence as organized in family units. However, this interpretation means that 
Protagoras is wasting his breath. He decided to tell the mythos in order to explain the origin of 
virtue. If he begins his discussion of humankind at the stage of the family unit, he has dodged the 
question altogether (cf. subsection 3.1.2)! It is therefore better to understand humans as living as 
isolated individuals. And, pace Taylor, there are suggestions that this is indeed the case. In their 
scattered existence the humans are devoured by beasts. If we are to imagine family units, why do 
the beasts have the upper hand? Surely a family can protect itself from a bear, lion or a pack of 
wolves. Also, Zeus becomes afraid that the entire race will become extinct (322c1). This is clear 
enough indication that, though Protagoras probably envisions his humans practicising 
reproduction, he does not envision stable family units.  
The humans then live in solitude. But one can, cum Taylor, feel surprise at the fact that 
Protagoras dates the nearly complete realization of human intelligence to before the foundation 
of cities. It is a very unique feature of Protagoras’ mythos, as, again, comparison with other 
reconstructions illustrates. For instance, Aeschylus’ Prometheus comments that mortals naturally 
live in groups, since even at the stage when they were like shapes of dreams (ὀνειράτων/ἀλίγκιοι 
μορφαῖσι) (448-9), they lived in underground caves like “light-as-air ants” (ἀήσυροι/μύρμηκες) 
(452). Similarly, the Hesiodic scholia of Johannes Tzetzes contain the summary of an account of 
the origin of human society which Diels and Kranz have connected with Democritus (DK 68 
B5.3). In this summary humans are considered at the earliest stage to be cultivators of 
φιλαλληλία. Also, Sophocles’ “Ode to Man” implies that humans developed speech (φθέγμα) 
and civilized behavior (ἀστυνόμους ὀργάς) as parts of the same process (Ant. 354) and the tragic 
165 1991: 84-85.  
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playwright Moschion describes the raising of cities as the result of Prometheus’ gift.166 Lastly, 
the Diodoran account, while similar to the Protagorean inasmuch as the ferocity of the beasts 
brings humans together, is quite dissimilar in that this original union succeeds from the start 
because they realize cooperation is in their interests (ὑπὸ τοῦ συμφέροντος διδασκομένους) (D. 
S. 1.8.2 = DK 68 B5.1).167  
In short, other versions of early society either assume humans are by nature social (the 
Tzetzes scholion) or see it as a product of, or corollary to, human intelligence (Sophocles, 
Moschion, Diodorus). Protagoras stands alone in imputing to humans so much intelligence 
before actually coming together in communal life. This difference between them allows one go 
gauge just how much intellectual autarky Protagoras attributes to his humans.  
 
4.1.4 An Uncompromising Autarky 
 
 
Why do Protagoras’ humans thus counter-intuitively reach so high a stage of development in 
isolation from their fellow creatures? Because, I suggest, he is making a crucial point about 
human nature. Humans are not by nature characterized by mutual attraction (φιλαλληλία), as the 
Tzetzes scholion declares, but are solitary. While they have the intelligence to build cities, they 
don’t. The reason is because they actually prefer not to; they prefer solitary life. This idea is 
borne out by their behavior in the first experiments at cohabitation. Because they fell victim to 
the wild beasts, they came together for mutual defense. Here the Diodoran account leaves it. 
Humans came together, saw it was to their benefit and lived happily ever after. Not so 
Protagoras’ humans. Instead, they commit repeated injustices against each other (ἠδίκουν) 
166 For the fragment and discussion, see Xanthakis-Karamanos 1981: 410-417. 
167 Both in its description of the origin of language, as discussed above, and in this explanation of human 
cohabitation as motivated by the expedient, the Diodoran account appears to be reacting to the Protagorean account, 
or vice versa. Cf. subsection 4.1.3, fn. 164.  
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(322b7) – an idea not particularly unique in reconstructions of primitive life. What is unique, 
though, is the result. Because of the injustices, they scatter again individually and perish (πάλιν 
σκεδαννύμενοι διεφθείροντο) because they once again begin to fall victim to the wild beasts, and 
not to each other. The humans prefer to die by the beasts than be wronged by their fellow 
humans. Humankind is uncompromising and in a sense asocial, and it is its intellectual autarky 
that enables it to be so. Protagoras then endows his humans with so much intelligence before the 
rise of cities in order to make the fundamental point that humankind’s autarky renders it 
uncompromising and autonomous.  
Two consequences on Protagoras’ version of the origin of society result from this 
assessment of human nature as intellectually self-sufficient, but uncompromising. First, it is 
incompatible with such positions as that advocated by Thrasymachus in Republic I. 
Thrasymachus maintains that justice is the interests of the stronger, whether the stronger is a 
democratic body or an individual tyrant (338e1-339a9). By Protagoras’ reckoning, such is human 
nature that a stronger would never have emerged. His early humans prefer death by mauling to 
suffering any diminution of their autonomy or imposition on their autarky.  
Secondly, if human society succeeds, it will not be the product of human intelligence. 
Protagoras’ human is no πολιτικὸν ζῷον. He can come together with others, but because of 
ἀδικία he prefers to return to isolation and perish in the jaws of a beast than to compromise his 
autarky.168 Indeed, a contract of the kind Döring suggests (subsection 3.1.2, 4.3.3) would benefit 
him; and he certainly has the intelligence to see where his interests lie and that compromise 
would save him. But he nonetheless refuses to cohabitate. And this, I suggest, is Protagoras’ 
point. His commitment to his intellectual autarky is so strong that it overrides logical 
168 Rich 1956: 27-38, in discussing the Cynic conception of autarky, points out clearly the inherent incompatibility 
between autarky and living in a community.  
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considerations of interest and advantage. He is thus in a basic sense ἀκρατής.169 Zeus’ gift of 
justice and shame has been regarded as the foundation of Protagorean egalitarianism.170 But, in 
light of the fact that his early humans prefer isolation to any diminution of their intellectual 
autarky, that egalitarianism appears to predate Zeus’ gift by quite a long time, since Protagoras’ 
human does not regard any other human to have a right to restrict his movements. He is from the 
beginning egalitarian to a fault.   
 
 
 
4.2 HUMAN SOCIETY 
 
 
This failure of human intelligence puts Protagoras’ mortals in a desperate position. If their 
intelligence will not produce society, what hope do they have? The answer is the same as for the 
animal kingdom: natural selection. That is why so much attention and detail had been given to 
Epimetheus and the animals. It laid the groundwork and introduced the basic principle in the 
formation of human social and moral life.  
 
4.2.1 The Origin of Law 
 
 
Protagoras says human society kept failing because the humans kept committing injustices 
against each other (ἠδίκουν ἀλλήλους) (322b7). The word choice is surprising, as Zeus has not 
yet bestowed on humanity justice (δίκη) and shame (αἰδώς). So, technically speaking, they 
cannot commit an injustice. However, the word choice is likely to be deliberate, since it is 
difficult to believe Protagoras casually uses a word for an idea whose origin he is currently 
169 It is interesting that later in the dialogue Socrates introduces a discussion of ἀκρασία in which he not only doubts 
it as a true phenomenon, but secures Protagoras’ agreement to the doubt (353a4-6). Has Plato through Socrates made 
Protagoras contradict himself? 
170 So, most recently, Balot 2006: 74-78.  
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explaining. One might circumvent this problem by diluting the word so as to mean harm, a 
meaning attested for the verb.171 But again what kind of harm? It is noteworthy that there is no 
violence in these early experiments. When they fall foul of each other, they simply part ways. 
There is no Cain to strike down an Abel. This absence of violence is possibly related to the 
absence of war. Protagoras explains that the humans individually are powerless against the beasts 
because protection requires the art of war, but the art of war is the one τέχνη that is impossible 
before the emergence of cities (322b5).  So the question remains: How can they be said to 
“wrong” each other before Zeus actually gives them law? 
The answer is that there is a law – of sorts. As detailed above, the humans have invented 
the necessities of life (clothes, shoes, bedding),  have developed skills common to all humanity 
(agriculture, language), have deep thoughts (theology) and have invented specialized skills (e.g. 
medicine). Now, these capabilities serve the mortals in the same way that the powers (δυνάμεις) 
serve the animals. For, when Epimetheus ran out of powers to give the humans, Prometheus 
found them in the workshop of Hephaestus and Athena. Remembering this analogy helps clarify 
the problem. Concerning the animal powers Protagoras makes a point of implying that they are 
animal νόμοι.172 For, in the short passage that describes Epimetheus’ distribution of the powers 
to the animals (320c8-321c6) a form of νέμω is used seven times, while the process itself is 
called a νομή.173 This identification of the animal powers as νόμοι, in addition to the parallelism 
between the animal powers and the human τέχναι, suggests that the human τέχναι too are νόμοι. 
Considering the wide semantic range νόμος had, this identification is not surprising. Protagoras’ 
humans have many institutions (e.g. religion, farming, demiourgic crafts) that involve specific 
171 LSJ s. v. ἀδικέω II.2.  
172 For the use of νόμος for animal behavior, see Ostwald 1969: 21-22.  
173 See [Ps]-Pl. Min. 317d3-318a7 for another argument based on the etymology of νόμος from νέμω. Modern 
lexicography agrees with the ancient etymology (Ostwald 1969: 9).  
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procedures that can be considered νόμοι. Moreover, this identification of the human τέχναι as 
νόμοι is given added confirmation when Hermes, asking Zeus how he should give justice and 
shame to mortals, not only comments that the τέχναι have been “distributed” (νενέμηνται), but 
uses the verb νέμω four times in four lines (322c5-d1). Heremes takes the τέχναι to be νόμοι. 
This being the case, if Protagoras’ humans already have νόμοι, an interesting consequence 
follows. The humans being solitary, each of them will then have his (and her?)174 own set of 
νόμοι. They are, quite literally, a law each unto himself.  
This being the case, a major implication about how Protagoras conceptualized law, and 
so morality, follows. At its root it is the way of life the individual developed in isolation from 
other humans. In one sense this way of life is descriptive, as it merely denotes the customs and 
practices the individual used in, for example, worshipping the gods, speaking, or farming. But 
since these practices presuppose an examination and interpretation of the natura rerum on the 
part of the individual and so reflect his assessment of that reality, which inevitably produces a 
sense of obligation, there is also a normative aspect to his way of life. He does what he does 
because he believes it ought to be done that way. Thus the origin of law, especially from the 
perspective inherent in the word νόμος, is located by Protagoras in the assessment of reality by 
the human individual. 
 
4.2.2 The Humans as Measures: Epistemological Autarky 
 
 
Therefore, when Protagoras describes the difficulties the humans faced in coming together in a 
community as ἀδικία, he is being literal. Every time they tried to congregate, one committed 
174 So one would think. Cf. subsection 4.3.4 where Protagoras includes women in his list of those who could prove 
out of step with the moral environment, and subsection 4.1.3 where I conclude that reproduction was not followed 
by a lasting family relationship. For the consistency of such ideas on the rights and position of women with sophistic 
thought in general, see Kerferd 1981: 159-162. 
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what to another was an injustice. Klaus Döring has a similar interpretation of the problem that 
drove humans apart:  
Solange für jeden einzelnen allein das gerecht war, was ihm als soches erschien, und er 
sich mithin berechtigt fühlte, demgemäß zu handeln, waren ständige Überschneidungen 
des Rechtes des einen mit dem des anderen und damit ständige Übergriffe und 
Gewalttätigkeiten die notwendige Folge.175  
 
In other words, each individual was his own measure of right and wrong. My interpretation of 
the intelligence, autarky and uncompromisingness of Protagors’ first humans, as well as my 
analysis of human τέχναι which result from their intellectual autarky as νόμοι, suggests that this 
assessment by Döring is broadly correct (without of course the Übergriffe and 
Gewalttätigkeiten), and that the human-measure claim is to be seen as the reason why the 
humans’ first experiments at community at first failed. Discrepant beliefs, opinions, views and 
practices made concerted action and community impossible. In this way, then, Protagoras’ 
relativism serves as the conceptual starting-point for his theory of human society and morality.  
The question now becomes how the humans in the course of these failures to cohabitate 
finally succeeded. Döring finds the secret to their success in a social contract. I think this is 
unlikely. For, not only does a social contract imply that Protagoras’ relativism has little or no 
relevance for a working society (cf. subsection 3.1.2), but also the picture Protagoras draws of 
the first humans tells against contractualism. As discussed above, this picture is quite unique. 
The humans are intelligent, so they can develop practices and institutions that can be called 
νόμοι. They do not need cities or interaction with others to develop these νόμοι. Moreover, since 
they are isolated, these νόμοι will show great variety. Indeed, they will be quot homines, and any 
attempt at union will inevitably end in conflict of νόμοι. However, since they are intellectually 
175 1981: 111.  
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self-sufficient and uncompromising beings, “private worlds,”176 no degree of intelligence will 
succeed in founding cities. In the terms of the mythos, Prometheus cannot approach Zeus’ 
acropolis. Their autarky likewise precludes union by force of arms. Until cities are founded, they 
are all on equal terms, with equal powers. They always prefer to withdraw than submit to 
another. In short, Protagoras’ unique assessment of the first humans is drawn in such a way as to 
preclude the possibility of any rationalistic theory of human society and morality such as 
contractualism requires. Protagoras’ humans simply do not act with an eye on interest and 
advantage, but act rather at their own discretion and judgment. A rationalist means of success 
being thus incompatible with this epistemological autarky of Protagoras’ humans, the remaining 
option is a biological one.  
 
 
 
4.3 SUCCESS 
 
 
4.3.1 Union by Accidental Matching 
 
 
How then do Protagoras’ humans achieve success in cohabitation? Since Protagoras has shown 
that humans were already intelligent, had developed many, if not most, of the pre-conditions of 
civilization (the art of war is an obvious exception), but failed to cohere and cohabitate for the 
single reason that they each had an individual way of life and worldview that they would not 
compromise (which ironically is a result of their having developed civilization in nuce), to make 
community work does not require any new, superadded information. It does not require any 
enlightenment regarding the truth or correction regarding moral practices (cf. Tht. 166e4-167a3). 
They were succeeding well enough at survival but for the beasts. All that was needed was union. 
176 To borrow a phrase from Taylor 1937: 326 used to describe Protagorean relativism (cf. Burnyeat 1976: 182).  
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In order therefore to enable their individual and independent assessments of reality to coexist 
what was needed was the right combinations, a process that grouped like with like.  
This is in fact what Zeus says they needed. Fearing their extinction, he sent δίκη and 
αἰδώς “in order that there might be configurations of cities and encompassing bonds of 
friendship” (ἵν’εἶεν πόλεων κόσμοι τε καὶ δεσμοὶ φιλίας συναγωγοί) (322c2-3). Whatever δίκη 
and αἰδώς are (and it is not quite clear yet), they are sent to earth for the sole purpose of bringing 
humans together in order and harmony. For, this passage is noteworthy for the secularism of 
Zeus.  He simply wants men to survive. He is not outraged at any lawlessness on their part, nor 
does he consider them to be perpetrating any evil, nor again is he disgusted at any shameless 
acts. His only concern is that they should band together. And if they failed to do so and perished, 
so what? The biological world will go on. True, Zeus is said to fear for them, but the fact that 
why he fears for them is never explained once again implies that he is just an impersonal force, 
the principle of survival cropping up again (as in the natural selection of the animal kingdom and 
in the survival by necessity represented by Prometheus’ gift). Moreover, Protagoras adds the 
detail that he sent Hermes to deliver the gift, instead of having Zeus bestow it directly or send 
Iris who, Denyer aptly comments, would not have carried, as Hermes does, connotations of 
deceit and trickery.177 But besides being the god of trickery and lies, Hermes is also the god of 
accident and dumb luck. By making Hermes the deliverer, Protagoras can insinuate that the 
“gift” he bestows is truly a windfall (ἕρμαιον).  
Finally, the phrase ἵν’εἶεν πόλεων κόσμοι τε καὶ δεσμοὶ φιλίας συναγωγοί is itself 
arresting for several reasons. First, beginning with δεσμοί, the line is the complete second half of 
a dactylic hexameter after the third foot caesura. Secondly, the emphasis on union (συναγωγοί 
coupled with φιλίας is somewhat redundant) stresses the fact, already brought up in the person of 
177 2008: 108.  
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Zeus, that it is not moral enlightenment or correction that humans need, only union. Finally, that 
union is called friendship (φιλία). It is an intimate term, compared with, e.g., κοινωνία. In fine, 
Protagoras wants to draw attention to this line in which he stresses the fact that all that humans 
needed was a mechanism for intimate union. They had morality already – many versions of it, in 
fact. The question was how they were going to coordinate these conflicting versions and create 
intimate unions. In sum, Zeus’ observation stresses the need for mere union and implies it will be 
an intimate, but accidental one effected by configuration (κόσμος), not revelation. 
 
4.3.2 Natural Law 
 
 
Union is brought about, in the terms of the myth, by the delivery of δίκη and αἰδώς. When 
Hermes asks how he is to give it, Zeus replies that he is to distribute it to all. All are to have a 
piece of justice and shame. If only a few were to receive a piece as it was handed out, cities 
would never emerge. As a matter of fact, if anybody will not be able to possess a portion of 
them, he is to be killed as a disease of the city (322d1-5). These words at least make it clear what 
the bestowment of δίκη and αἰδώς is not. It is not the discovery (or invention) of eternal truths.  
First of all, Protagoras never specifies the content of justice and shame. But if the point of 
the mythos were that humankind discovered that X was just and Y was shameful according to 
some standard, then he would certainly have needed to make that clear. But besides thus arguing 
from silence, one can notice that, when Protagoras has Zeus declare that if a few people were to 
receive shares in justice and shame, cities would never emerge, he thereby removes the 
possibility of a “natural law” interpretation, since ancient theories that sought a source of human 
law in divine law typically made use of the πρῶτος εὑρετής model. For instance, in the pseudo-
Platonic dialogue Minos, it is argued that the Spartans enjoy excellent laws because they derived 
90 
 
them from Cretan law which ultimately came from Zeus through the legendary king Minos.178 If 
cities will not emerge if a few share in justice and shame, then all must. If all must, then it is 
difficult to base Protagoras’ morality on transcendental truths.   
There is a further suggestion later in the dialogue that natural law does not figure in the 
mythos. Beginning the logos portion of his speech, Protagoras tells Socrates to imagine that there 
is one thing – what it is does not yet matter – that everybody must have in order for there to be 
cities. He then asks Socrates how, if the older generation did not teach this certain thing to the 
younger generation, people could become good (σκέψαι ὡς θαυμασίως γίγνονται οἱ ἀγαθοί) 
(325b3-4). Protagoras here makes it clear that, if goodness is not taught in a community, there 
will be no goodness. Δίκη καὶ αἰδώς thus cannot be sparks of the divine lodged in the human 
breast.  
 
4.3.3 Social Contract Theories 
 
 
The same information that precludes natural law also presents a problem for a social contract. If 
cities would never emerge if morality began as the preserve of a few, there is consequently no 
group to instruct the masses on how to live. Alternatively, the author of the Sisyphus, as well as 
Glaucon in the second book of the Republic, gives the impression that a contract was struck by 
mutual agreement between all the members of the community.179 But certain pieces of 
information Protagoras has dropped in the course of the mythos suggest that such a mutual 
agreement was highly unlikely. The essence of the social contract is that the potential members 
of a community realize they must no longer behave in their own individual interests, but for the 
interests of the whole body, whether these interests are security in a Hobbesian model or 
178 318c4-321d10. For a treatment of the dialogue as representative of thought peculiar to the fourth-century BC, 
despite its non-Platonic authorship, see Strauss 1968: 66-75.  
179 For the Sisyphus fragment, see DK 88 B25 and above, fn. 163. For Glaucon, see Pl. Rep. 358e3-359b5. 
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property in a Lockian or pleasure in a Benthamite. The interests of the sum are now the ethical 
criteria of the parts. Contractualism thus has for a primary precondition sheer intelligence, if not 
mere common sense. The myth, however, characterizes humankind as very intelligent, yet failing 
repeatedly to cohere in a political body. In other words, Protagoras points out that the humans 
had the necessary precondition for the social contract, intelligence; but that that intelligence was 
simply not enough. If human society were a set of stipulations, then humans would have figured 
it out at the same time as they developed religion, language, agriculture and medicine. The fact 
of the matter is that the humans’ strong sense of autonomy and autarky overrode their 
intelligence on this point. They would not cohere in such a pact, because they would not brook 
any imposition on their individual νόμοι. It is thus implied that if they are to cohere in one body, 
the “ties that bind” must be rooted on a deeper, more intimate level. Zeus demands bonds of 
friendship (φιλίας), not a business-like pact (συνθήκη, κοινωνία).   
Moreover, there are broader reasons for rejecting the bestowment of justice and shame as 
the emergence of a social compact. In a brief, but penetrating study of the social contract theory 
in antiquity, Charles Kahn determines that the essential features of its historical development are 
1) an original “state of nature” 2) a principle of insecurity that makes organized society desirable 
or inevitable 3) the deliberate striking of the compact.180 Protagoras’ mythos does not satisfy 
these conditions very well. As for an original “state of nature,” in the course of his argument 
Kahn shows that every ancient version construes the original state of nature in Hobbesian terms: 
Humans are in the beginning exceptionally violent towards one another.181 As noted above, 
Protagoras’ humans are rather disinterested in each other. They do commit injustices against 
each other, but their disagreements never descend into war or violence. They simply part ways. 
180 1981: 93.  
181 97-101. 
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The mythos does satisfy the second condition, but compared with other ancient versions, it 
becomes clear that Protagoras is minimizing the desirability of organized society. As Kahn 
points out, organized society is desirable because the incentives are so great: the development of 
the “civilized arts.”182 Protagoras’ humans have already worked these out individually. The only 
incentive to congregate is defense against the beasts. Finally, as mentioned above, Protagoras’ 
humans do not come together by deliberate agreement, as the ancient versions typically 
require.183 The intelligence of Protagoras’ humans fails them on this score.  
Guthrie offers an interpretation of the mythos as a social contract that attempts to 
circumvent this failure of human intelligence. He suggests that by an evolutionary process 
sporadic groups of humans came together. Then, on the principle of “survival of the fittest,” the 
individuals who learned the lesson of contractualism survived, while those that failed to learn it 
perished.184 This is an interesting idea. Although Guthrie’s argument for contractualism is on the 
whole undermined by the reasons so far discussed, his suggestion that a process of selection is at 
work recalls the Empedoclean influences discussed earlier and likely points in the right direction. 
 
4.3.4 Agreement by Natural Selection 
 
 
To recapitulate, the mythos makes it clear that in order to survive the humans need union, not 
because they are not violent or wicked, but because, as I argued above, each individual is his 
own standard; or, in Protagorean terms, his own measure. And this disparity of standards causes 
them to fall foul of each other in a scenario Protagoras’ call ἀδικία (thereby implying his 
definition of injustice as the clash of two or more different standards). Consequently, the much 
needed union between these self-sufficient, uncompromising entities can only come about by 
182 96. 
183 93, 99.  
184 1957: 92. Cf. Guthrie 1971: 136-137.  
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genuine agreement. The individuals must somehow genuinely come to share the same standards. 
And when at the climax of the mythos Hermes comes from Zeus to deliver δίκη and αἰδώς to 
mortals, it is this type of genuine agreement that is delivered, as is seen in the language of the 
delivery and in its accidental, fortuitous nature.  
First, when told by Zeus to deliver δίκη and αἰδώς, Hermes asks if he is to deposit (θῶ) it 
as the property of a few. The answer from Zeus is no. He is instead to divide it among everybody 
(ἐπὶ πάντας [sc. νεῖμον]). The image is that of a single object divided and distributed so that all 
may have a piece (πάντες μετεχόντων), and the use of ἐπί instead of the dative stresses the idea 
of dissemination. Thus, they all then have a piece of the same object. They are united insofar as 
they each have a piece; and in genuine agreement, since they each have a piece of the same 
thing. In other words, the delivery and division of δίκη and αἰδώς does not signify the time when 
humans developed a moral conscience. How could it be? As Protagoras implies when he remarks 
that the first attempts at community ended in ἀδικία, there already existed morality in its basic 
sense (i. e. the individual’s assessment of reality). Rather, it signifies an ordering of that moral 
universe into population pockets of genuine union and agreement. Thus, the will of Zeus is 
fulfilled and the original purpose of sending δίκη and αἰδώς served, which had been ἵν’εἶεν 
πόλεων κόσμοι τε καὶ δεσμοὶ φιλίας συναγωγοί (322c2-3). 
 The way in which the union and agreement come about supports this idea of a genuine 
agreement. Specifically, there is a strong suggestion that it is the result of pure accident. First, the 
account preserved in Diodorus again provides an instructive contrast. It says that humans first 
came together in order to help each other against the onslaught of the beasts, taught to do so by a 
consideration of what was expedient to them (ὑπὸ τοῦ συμφέροντος διδασκομένους) (DK 68 
B5.1, p. 135, vv. 36-7). Protagoras’ humans, by contrast, fail to realize their own expediency and 
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instead scatter and perish. Protagoras’ language here, with the present participle and imperfect 
tense, suggests a long, repetitious series (σκεδαννύμενοι διεφθείροντο) (322b8). So, they not 
only fail to realize what is beneficial to them, but do so repeatedly. This failure is surprising, 
since Protagoras’ humans are so much more intelligent and accomplished than the Diodoran 
humans. Thus, by drawing attention to the fact that humans not only failed, but continued to fail 
to establish union, Protagoras stresses the fact that agreement (when it was actually achieved) 
was not the product of their ingenuity, but fortuitous.  
 Secondly, the fortuitousness of original human agreement is indicated by the one law 
Zeus lays down for humanity: The humans are to kill anybody who is not able to possess a piece 
of justice and shame (τὸν μὴ δυνάμενον αἰδοῦς καὶ δίκης μετέχειν) in the conviction that (ὡς) 
such a person is a disease of the city (νόσον πόλεως) (322d4-5). If the agreement that these 
mortals make were deliberate and designed for the sake of self-interest, then this “odd man out” 
must be somebody who refused to abide by the agreement. In other words, his recalcitrance in 
that case would be a matter of will. Protagoras, however, makes a point of saying that his 
recalcitrance is a matter of capacity (τὸν μὴ δυνάμενον). This suggests that he is constitutionally 
unable to abide by the agreement in question. Protagoras then is either making provision for a 
sociopath in his mythos (a priori unlikely) or subtly indicating the nature of original society as a 
sincere and genuine agreement. Those who congregate do so because they genuinely see eye to 
eye; those who fail to do so, fail because they genuinely cannot.  
Protagoras has more to say later on this odd man out. In the later, developed city any 
man, woman or child who fails to live in accordance with δικαιοσύνη, σωφροσύνη and ὁσιότης 
are to be taught and/or punished. If he or she proves unable to show these virtues they are to be 
removed by expulsion or execution (324e2-325b1). Again, non-conformity is not a matter of 
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volition, but of capacity, as the offending person is said to be irremediable (ἀνίατος). However, 
the person is not in truth irremediable. As the particle ὡς twice indicates, the citizens are merely 
to regard him as such (ὡς νόσον πόλεως [322d5]; ὡς ἀνίατον ὄντα [325a8]). Besides, Protagoras 
has already assumed that virtue is teachable (subsection 3.2.1). This odd man out is not one who 
fails to live in civilization, but to live in a certain kind of civilization. And he fails not because he 
refuses, but because he is genuinely unable, to live in that brand of civilization. His outlook is 
constitutionally different.  
This does not mean that this non-conformist will forever be an outcast, but rather, since 
success in the formation of a society is a long, drawn-out process, involving repetition and false 
starts described through the imperfects σκεδαννύμενοι διεφθείροντο (322b8), one should 
imagine that individuals keep trying to combine with others until they find those with whom they 
naturally agree. Finally, this idea of a fortuitous agreement is consistent with the symbolism of 
the myth. Every other aspect of human culture and achievement was the result of human 
intelligence. They issued from human προμήθεια and so were provided by Prometheus. The 
agreement that produces society, however, is not deliberate or designed. It is fortuitous, a 
ἕρμαιον and accordingly delivered by Hermes.185  
 
 
 
4.4 CONCLUSION: ETHICALITIES 
 
 
The picture of the origin of human society and morality that emerges from Protagoras’ mythos is 
much more complex than it has in the past been taken. Premising his account on the intelligence 
185 Hermes assumes quite a deal of authority when he uses active θῶ; (Am I to establish justice and shame?) instead 
of the middle θῶμαι; (Am I to have justice and shame established?). And Zeus sanctions this authority when he uses 
similar language (θές) instead of θοῦ. This simply means, I suggest, that Zeus and Hermes are essentially aspects of 
the same idea, viz. original human agreement. 
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of the individual, he portrays that intelligence as being sufficient in and of itself for all the 
trappings and institutions of civilized life, but, paradoxically, he points to this very autarky 
which is the germ of civilization as the sole impediment to the individual’s coming together in a 
stable society with others. At the heart of this uncompromising autarky lay, I argued, 
Protagorean relativism. The humans each live according to his own judgment and assessment of 
reality and the fact that they refuse to suffer any violation of that assessment, unlike Döring’s 
contract, vindicates that relativism, since that stubbornness represents the basic incorrigibility of 
their individual assessments.  
Relativism thus being the operative starting-point of his account, Protagoras explains how 
such creatures still, despite their uncompromisingness, came together.  Rather than explaining 
how one global human morality was established in human history, Protagoras gives an account 
of how a plurality of moralities, or ethicalities, developed by a process of selection according to 
fitness that mirrors the Empedoclean natural selection in Epimetheus’ compensatory distribution 
of powers in the animal kingdom. In a gradual process people who were independent assessors of 
reality repeatedly came into contact with each other. If their worldviews proved different, they 
fell foul of each other and parted; if they happened to be likeminded and to have the same 
worldview, they tended to stay together and to survive because their numbers and cooperation 
protected them against the beasts. The result was that stable communities began to develop and 
to dot the globe. Each of these communities did not have the same worldview, but rather each 
had its own ethicality, or intersubjective truth, 186  that ultimately derived from the individual’s 
(and of those likeminded to him) unmediated intellectual response to the conditions of reality.  
186 Cf. Mansfeld 1981: 49: “Whenever a plurality of persons agree, a common measure has arisen. This 
intersubjective truth is not independent of those who have agreed to it; it is only valid for them, i. e. only exists, as 
long as it is accepted.” 
97 
 
                                                 
Protagoras then does not give an account of a metaphysical goodness, but an account of 
various versions of goodness. Δίκη and αἰδώς then are nothing transcendental, but stand for the 
natural and fortuitous development of these ethicalities. This being the case, it is interesting to 
notice that Protagoras’ mythos would then be quite consistent with the intellectual climate of the 
fifth-century BC. The invasions of the Persians and the growth of the Athenian Empire had 
thrown into relief the variant ethical traditions of different cultures and created an interest in 
ethnography and in the relationship between these ethical traditions. Protagoras can be regarded 
as having offered in his mythos an interpretation of this phenomenon. 
 
4.4.1 Ὁμοδοξία? 
 
 
Did Protagoras have another name for the development of these ethicalities other than the 
mythical/poetic δίκη and αἰδώς? In the Clitophon the dialogue’s namesake complains to Socrates 
that for all his exhortations to cultivate justice Socrates has not once explained what the product 
(ἔργον) of justice is.187 Clitophon goes on to tell how he once questioned Socrates’ associates in 
an effort to learn from them this very lesson. But these fellows only spouted out Socratic 
platitudes. One of them, though, he thought had an interesting idea. He said that the specific 
product of justice was political friendship (φιλία ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν) (409d4-6). Asked whether he 
included the friendship of boys and animals under this heading, he answered a flat no and 
clarified what he meant by offering the more precise term “likemindedness” (ὁμόνοια) (409e4). 
Clitophon then asked whether he meant by ὁμόνοια a likeness of opinion (ὁμοδοξία) or 
knowledge (ἐπιστήμη). He emphatically disavowed likeness of opinion (ἠτίμαζεν), his reason 
being that cases of likeness of opinion between men necessarily prove to be numerous and 
187 For a recent discussion on the dialogue’s authenticity, see Slings 1999: 227-234. He concludes with hesitation 
that it is genuine (234). Taylor 1926: 538 regarded it as the work of “some fourth-century Academic.” 
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harmful (ἠναγκάζοντο γὰρ πολλαὶ καὶ βλαβεραὶ γίγνεσθαι ὁμοδοξίαι ἀνθρώπων) (409e6-7). 
Thus he concludes that, since ὁμόνοια is a good thing, it must be ἐπιστήμη, not δόξα. 
Clitophon’s conversation with this associate of Socrates falls apart at this point, because it is felt 
to have become circular.  
Though brief, this exchange is indeed interesting. Clitophon’s interlocutor had offered 
φιλία and ὁμόνοια as the products of justice. In this he is faithfully reproducing the views of his 
teacher.188 Then he is asked if he understands friendship (φιλία) and likemindedness (ὁμόνοια) to 
be ὁμοδοξία or ἐπιστήμη. Again being true to his teacher Socrates, he explains it must be the 
latter.189 Be that as it may, it is interesting to note that Clitophon’s question implies that there 
was a theory that equated friendship and likemindedness with ὁμοδοξία? If this is indeed the 
case, to whom could Clitophon be referring? It has been suggested that sophistic thought is 
lurking in the passage;190 and Guthrie even specified Protagoras as the reference.191 Indeed, there 
is some reason for thinking Guthrie was right. The interlocutor’s equation of justice with φιλία 
recalls the fact that in Protagoras’ mythos Zeus is concerned that there be δεσμοὶ φιλίας 
συναγωγοί. Also, the interlocutor’s rejection of ὁμοδοξία on the grounds that, being mere 
opinion, it entails a plurality and harm inconsistent with the inherent goodness of justice suggests 
that this ὁμοδοξία was associated with an idea of relativism which, I have argued, is represented 
in the mythos by the autarkic nature of the original humans.  
Certainty in so brief a passage is impossible. But if Protagoras did explain the origin of 
human society and morality as the fortuitous meeting of likeminded individuals, as I suggest in 
this chapter he did, then ὁμοδοξία would describe it with an almost Prodican precision.  
188 At Rep. 351d Socrates makes the same assertion. 
189 Cf. Prt. 361a6-b7. 
190 Slings 1999: 193. 
191 1962-78: III. 149, 175.  
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5.0 Δίκη AND Αἰδώς AS THE CONSENSUS OF THE POLIS 
 
 
 
 
After telling his mythos, Protagoras gives two proofs, in what has been called the “rider” to the 
mythos, to demonstrate that what the point the mythos was meant to make is a fact, that 
everybody does in fact possess goodness (ἀρετή). According to the relativist interpretation I am 
proposing this claim is true because, every individual’s assessment of reality being veridical and 
incorrigible, what the individual judges to be good and bad (as well as right and wrong, 
honorable and shameful, etc.) will be good or bad for him. Thus, on a basic level every 
individual has virtue because his perceptions and judgments effectively create virtue for him. But 
Protagoras must also explain for Socrates how, if everybody has virtue, it can still be a thing 
taught (cf. subsection 3.2.1). The answer to this has actually already been hinted at. If in the 
mythos the creation of ethicalities, not a global morality, is depicted, then over the course of time 
there will arise the need for some mechanism or system by which one can be adapted to one of 
these ethicalities, it not being a given that those born later will have a disposition that will 
automatically square with the community’s outlook. This idea of adaptation and conformity was 
only hinted at in the mythos, though; Protagoras reserves its full elaboration for the logos that 
follows the “rider.”  
 However, before discussing the logos, it remains to be seen what the mythos and its 
creation of ethicalities means for Athenian-style democracy. If the first communities successfully 
coalesced because the autarky and autonomy of the first humans was not violated, but instead 
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came together in such a way that their autarky was represented through equality (ἰσονομία) and 
their autonomy through freedom (ἐλευθερία); though that kind of coalescence suggests a 
democratic origin, it does not necessarily follow that democracy still remains the preferable form 
of government, especially considering that its conceptual basis, relativism, implies that any form 
of government is just as good as any other, provided the polis believes it. In short, how can a 
relativistic account of the origin of human civilization prescribe democracy?  
 
 
 
5.1 THE MYTHOS: DEMOCRACY PRESCRIBED 
 
 
The political implications of the mythos are significant. When Protagoras describes the origin of 
human society, he is at the same time prescribing a behavior for contemporary governments. The 
origin of society being as the mythos portrays, it follows that the government that most closely 
approximates to the original formula and recipe of civilization is best, not in a dogmatic sense, 
but insofar as it conforms to the natural pattern and has a proven track-record of success. In 
Protagoras’ day democracy came closest to the original formula. It represented freedom 
(ἐλευθερία), not just in a legal and political sense, but, as the citizen-body in casting its votes 
actually created Law, Right, Justice and Good, it was a freedom from dogma and from a tradition 
that interpreted worth and competence genetically. Democracy, however, looked beyond that 
tradition to the incunabula of human life. It corrected the wreck of the ages by asserting that by 
nature, biologically understood, every individual’s judgment could produce an ethicality just as 
legitimate as any other’s. Human equality was an epistemological fact. The government that 
recognized this fact by the enactment of political ἰσονομία would again be true to humanity’s 
biological roots. 
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 Democracy, in short, was a return. It restored human society to the way it ought to have 
been all along, but wasn’t, because a sinister development, which some might call “tradition,” 
intervened. Anthropologically speaking, then, democracy appears to be globally better. But how 
can a relativist insist that a certain form of government is globally better? There are two ways by 
which I suggest Protagoras argued for the global preferability of democracy within the 
framework of his relativist philosophy. The first is by an appeal to reason: Democracy is globally 
better because it is the one form of government that is consistent with its conceptual charter. The 
second is a moral claim: In the last analysis democracy is the means of arriving at the likeliest 
thing to be considered moral. 
 
5.1.1 Consistency with the Founding Principle 
 
 
In what sense can Protagoras, a relativist, claim that one form of government is “better” than 
another? Could not a government, construed in Hobbesian terms, be just as Protagorean as a 
democracy? For instance, if a body of citizens determined their powers were insufficient to 
regulate the community and decided jointly that large powers should be committed to one man, 
there would be government at least based on, if not operating by, consensus. “If oligarchy and 
monarchy seems [sic] just to the citizens of a polis, oligarchy or monarchy is just for them.”192 
While casual adherence to the human-measure claim might suggest this justification of monarchy 
or oligarchy is legitimate, at least to an extent, it still remains true that democracy, by operating 
regularly by consensus, is a more consistent application of the human-measure principle. 
According to Protagoras’ model, other forms of government would then actually use consensus 
to cancel the principle of decision by consensus. Democracy, on the other hand, always observes 
192 Keyt & Miller 2004: 308.  
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the rule. In this way, Protagoras’ justification of democracy would then be an assertion that it is 
better than other forms of government by virtue of its logical consistency.  
 This mode of justifying democracy makes sense of Protagoras’ refrain in the Great 
Speech. At the end of the mythos he summarizes its import by saying that the Athenians with 
good reason (εἰκότως) listen to every citizen when deliberating on matters touching on justice 
and self-control (322d5-323a4). He is referring to the mode of decision-making the Athenian 
democracy used, which in the dialogue stands for democracy itself. He draws the same 
conclusion in the middle of the rider to the mythos (323c3-5) and one last time at the end of the 
rider (324c5-d1). In all three passages it is the adverb εἰκότως that is used to describe their 
actions. It is not a moral or aesthetic idea; so he does not say καλῶς or εὖ. The Athenians are 
reasonable, they act with reason, because they behave consistently with the data provided in the 
mythos. If on the other hand the citizens unanimously agreed that there should be an oligarchy, 
they would in the same breath nullify agreement as a legitimate mode of decision-making 
because oligarchy would invalidate the rule that sanctioned it.  
If Protagoras thought relativism was globally true (and Plato’s refutation of it in the 
Theaetetus (166a2-179b9), as well as that of many others,193 assumes he did); and if relativism 
was integral in human civilization, then Protagoras can fault other government forms as 
deviations from the historical and logical rule. Monarchy and oligarchy, though in one sense the 
“tradition” of Greece, cannot be legitimate. In other words, if morality is the genuine agreement 
of the members of the community on any given topic, then these government forms are lopsided 
in their imposition of the opinion of a single individual or the agreement (even if genuine) of 
oligarchs on the entire community.  
 
193 Chappell 1995: 333-338 has a brief summary of these refutations.  
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5.1.2 True Morality 
 
 
Protagoras’ formulation of human society addresses a problem concerning morality which was at 
the center of ethical discussions in the mid fifth century BC: What is the value of traditional 
legal, social and moral customs (νόμοι), if these customs, as can be demonstrated, differ from 
nation to nation and even, in the case of the Greeks themselves, from polis to polis? The locus 
classicus for this idea is provided by Herodotus (3.38). He relates how Darius once questioned 
Greeks and Indian Callatiae regarding their burial customs. He asked the former what price could 
compel them to follow the practice of the Callatiae and consume the bodies of their dead. The 
Greeks were appalled at the idea of this sort of cannibalism. He then asked the Callatiae if they 
could be compelled to follow the practice of the Greeks and burn their dead. They were likewise 
appalled at the idea of cremation. Herodotus tells this story in order to corroborate his opinion 
that, if one gave all men the option of choosing the best customs from all that exist, each person 
would, after careful examination, choose his own (3.38.1). This leads Herodotus to the 
conclusion that Pindar was right when he said that νόμος was king.194 The multitude of human 
custom-laws which are various to the point of being contradictory, thus engaged the interest of 
Greek thinkers, many of whom, like Herodotus, despair of finding any rule to negotiate between 
them besides native preference.  
Nor was the issue of fleeting interest. The author of the Δισσοὶ Λόγοι repeats a version of 
the observation Herodotus makes and is clearly more aware of its value as an argument for 
relativism (2.18 & 26). Similarly, the author of the late fourth-century dialogue Minos finds an 
argument for relativism in the variety of human νόμοι (315a4-6). The variety of human νόμοι 
was thus a long-lasting problem pervading the Greek world. The fact alone that the three works 
194 For Herdotus’ understanding of Pindar’s statement, see Dodds 1959: 270.  
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mentioned were written in a different dialect (Ionic, Doric, Attic respectively) illustrates its 
pervasiveness.  
Protagoras’ mythos addresses this problem of the interrelationship of νόμοι. As the 
mythos explains, the original agreement that resulted in a local ethicality was organic. No party 
to it was obliged to compromise his personal assessment of right and wrong, but, on the contrary, 
was enabled to give expression to his personal assessment through the institution of that very 
local ethicality. The group ethicality was thus an amplification and extension of his own. 
Moreover, since Protagoras’ objectivist relativism still recognized the true existence of the thing 
perceived and only maintained that that thing was vastly pluralistic, the νόμοι of the original 
group can be regarded by Protagoras as direct and unmediated expressions of that higher, but 
enigmatic, sphere of existence, which is best denoted by the word φύσις.195 Thus, Protagoras 
might be said to have attempted to reconcile the apparent νόμος/φύσις contradiction. His 
relativism accounts for the variety of ethicalities, while keeping unsevered the cord between 
νόμοι and their transcendental base. This reconciliation has a price, though. It postulates a 
metaphysical universe without providing any precise definition of it. There is a physis-world, but 
what it looks like cannot be laid out in detail. It can be empirically observed, but not 
institutionalized. Protagoras was not just a theological agnostic (cf. subsection 2.1.2). Perhaps 
nothing can be said of that universe with absolute certainty; but, be that as it may, establishing a 
community that does not pervert the means of perceiving it inspires much greater confidence 
than one that does not. 
195 The distinction between νόμος and φύσις is datable as far as back as one Archelaus of Athens (or Miletus?) who 
taught τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι καὶ τὸ αἰσχρὸν οὐ φύσει, ἀλλὰ νόμῳ (D. L. 2.16-17 = DK 59 A1). If Ion of Chius is right in 
saying that Socrates studied under him (quoted in D. L. 2.23 [= DK 59 A3]), he will then belong to Protagoras’ 
generation (for Protagoras’ date of birth see subsection 7.1.1).  
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What makes this reconciliation of νόμος and φύσις morally meaningful is the assumption 
the mythos makes that the individual’s assessment of reality is veridical and incorrigible. This is 
the essence of his formulation of human morality. The individual humans would not congregate 
with each other under any other terms except those that recognized their respective readings of 
reality. The ethicalities that finally formed did so because they acknowledged this rule, or rather 
because they were a collective manifestation of it. The group’s νόμοι then are connected with a 
transcendental φύσις, but the content of that φύσις, in the final analysis, is what the individuals in 
the group determine it to be. In other words, if that φύσις ever has content, it does so only for the 
perceiver, whether the perceiver is an individual or group. It is therefore morally imperative that 
the government be an amplification of the individual’s assessment. Otherwise, he stands 
disconnected from and at odds with the physis-world.  
 
5.1.3 The State and the Individual 
 
 
An interesting relationship results from this political application of the human-measure. The state 
and the individual are thus inextricably tied together. On the one hand, the individual does not, 
properly speaking, need the state for his personal intellectual development or for the realization 
of his humanity. As the mythos showed, the humans had invented almost everything needed for 
civilized life before coming together in cities. However, the state serves an important purpose for 
him. It removes the obstacles that stand in the way of that personal development. In the terms of 
the mythos these obstacles were the beasts. But, despite this function the state can perform, the 
human animal can only submit to communal life if the community respects the integrity of his 
own assessment of reality; otherwise, the connection with φύσις is lost. The state then is to be an 
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amplification, through combination with others, of the individual’s own assessment of reality. 
For Protagoras the state and the individual are ideally one and the same thing. 
On the other hand, the “state” is reduced to the status of being merely the harmonized 
opinion of the individual citizens that compose it. It is not the organs or bodies designed to reach 
opinions, but the collective opinion that makes up those governmental organs. If then it is going 
to be the opinion of the city, it must incorporate all the citizens,196 since a city is not the physical 
spaces, but the men who fill them.197 Thus, while the individual and the state are identical, they 
are not indivisible. For, the moment they cease to be identical, division is imminent.198 The state 
then for Protagoras is all the citizens; and if it is not, if there is disagreement and dissension, 
every effort must be made to restore or impart same-mindedness (ὁμόνοια) to the whole citizen-
body (see chapter 10).   
 
5.1.4 Conclusion: The Psychological Effect 
 
 
These then are the ways I suggest Protagoras represented democracy in prescriptive, not just 
descriptive, terms. Since civilization emerged according to a consensual model, government by 
consensus and a harmonizing of opinion will preserve that original formula, and so preserve 
civilization. However, one might suggest that on the basis of relativism there is no real moral 
mandate to preserve civilization. To this Protagoras could respond that there very well was, that 
if there was going to be joint, concerted action (one might, I suppose, prefer to go off and die), 
the rectitude of that action, in light of the indefinable link between opinion and φύσις, depended 
on government by agreement.  
196 For the inclusion of women here see subsection 4.1.3 and 4.3.4. 
197 This definition of the city was current at the time. See Th. 1.143.5, 7.77.7; S. OT. 56-57. 
198 If Protagoras went further and even said “justified,” he has anticipated arguments for disobedience and rebellion 
by centuries. 
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 In addition to these reasons, the idea that democracy is a return to “the original and right 
way of doing things” and a rectification of the intervening centuries has inherent in it a stirring 
psychological effect, one that is comparable to a restoration of a golden age and that is likely to 
fill its followers with a spirit not unlike the one that celebrated Athens in stone, bronze, and 
speech as the pinnacle of human civilization. It is interesting to wonder if Protagoras’ thinking 
did not contribute in some way to that energetic and creative Zeitgeist of Periclean Athens.  
  
 
5.2 THE LOGOS: INTRODUCTION 
 
 
On the theoretical foundation provided by the mythos, Protagoras uses a logos to give an account 
of the practical implications of his theory. The logos is thus dedicated to an explanation of how 
the compromise-free origin of society can be perpetuated in the actual workings of a democratic 
government. His answer is, in word, consensus. Decision-making by consensus observes and 
acknowledges the fact of the individual’s biological and existential freedom and equality. It 
recognizes that the individual is, in the words of Plato when describing Protagoras’ philosophy, 
intellectually self-sufficient (αὐτάρκης εἰς φρόνησιν).199 But the consensus must be genuine and 
must embrace the entire city, because a great deal is at stake. Indeed, as discussed above 
(subsection 5.1.2), nothing less than morality is at stake, everything that the city denotes in and 
between the terms δίκη and αἰδώς. Thus, just as in the mythos δίκη and αἰδώς signified the first 
occurrence of genuine agreement, so in the logos they will represent the continuance of genuine 
concord and government by the consensus of the entire city. 
 But on the practical level, genuine consensus appears to be a highly impracticable mode 
of government. Bring just a handful of people together and quot homines tot sententiae. One 
199 Tht. 169d5. 
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would think disagreement is the rule in human cooperation, not the exception. The question 
naturally arises: How is government by consensus feasible among so many self-sufficient 
entities? If the human-measure is a political statement, it would seem to give a recipe for 
political chaos. While this idea might well inform anti-democratic depictions of the Athenian 
Assembly at work,200 Protagoras, I will argue, had an answer based on a sociological analysis of 
the polis: The community has coercive mechanisms in place to predispose its members to a 
certain outlook. However, this societal predisposition does not eliminate the possibility of 
making wrong decisions. Contrary to what Socrates might think, there is a need for a teacher in a 
government by consensus. These are the two issues that Protagoras addresses in the logos.  
 
 
 
5.3 THE FEASIBILITY OF GENUINE CONSENSUS 
 
Granted that the tiny nucleus came together by genuine concord and coincidence of opinion, as 
time progresses one would think that the community would reach a size where the opinions of its 
members would be too multiple and discrepant for any consensus, much less genuine consensus, 
to survive. Protagoras’ response is to deny that this would happen. On the contrary, an empirical 
assessment of the community’s institutions indicates that the citizens’ opinions never become 
very discrepant at all. The original ὁμοδοξία is passed on.   
 
5.3.1 The Logos: Its Use and Structure 
 
 
The change from a mythos to a logos is a quintessentially sophistic and un-Platonic trait. In a 
recent article, R. Fowler compares the sophistic use of mythos and logos and the Platonic use. 
200 E. g. Xenophon’s coverage of the trial of the generals responsible for the victory (!) off the Arginusae islands 
(Hell. 1.7).  
109 
 
                                                 
For Plato, mythos transmitted information and ideas that could not be transmitted by logos, 
although ideally speaking logos should be able to express them; it is the problematic of human 
epistemology that it cannot.201 The sophists, on the other hand, regarded both mythos and logos 
as equally valuable transmitters of ideas, not because both could be vehicles of metaphysical 
truths, but because both, logos and mythos, contain dubious knowledge, since Truth for them 
was either relative, subjective or non-existent (depending on the sophist).202 This attitude of the 
sophists towards mythos often shows itself in an indifference in the choice between the two. As 
Protagoras says before his speech, it does not matter to him whether he uses mythos or logos to 
convey his ideas (320c2-4). When therefore Plato has Protagoras change from narrating by 
mythos to arguing by logos, he is continuing his portrait of the sophist, not making Protagoras’ 
ideas conforms to his mode of expression.  
In terms of structure, the logos is a response to Socrates’ second concern: If ἀρετή is 
taught, why don’t men who excel at it pass it on to their sons? On a deeper level, though, it is 
Protagoras’ response to the second horn of the dilemma Socrates put him in. As discussed above 
(section 2.0), Socrates objections to Protagoras’ assumption that virtue is a thing taught were 
rhetorically constructed. If virtue is a thing taught, Socrates says, then the Athenians, wise 
people, are wrong to think that it isn’t; and if it could be taught, excellent fathers would pass it 
on to their sons. Protagoras’ mythos responded to the first horn. Protagoras maintains that the 
Athenians are right, it is not taught (in a sense [see section 5.0]). In another sense, however, it 
must be a thing taught; otherwise, Protagoras, a teacher of virtue (which he calls εὐβουλία), is a 
charlatan and a phoney. Thus, according to the dialogue’s structure, the logos will explain the 
201 Fowler 2011: 64.  
202 Ibid. 58-59.  
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teachability, not the acquisition (pace the educational group [subsections 1.3.1 & 1.4.1]), of 
virtue. 
In general, Protagoras’s logos lays out the details of a societal education. There is 
independent evidence outside of Plato that Protagoras theorized about education. An unknown 
rhetorician203 in the second century AD in a work encouraging the study of rhetoric defends 
Protagoras against the insult thrown at him by Epicurus that he was a late-learner (ὀψιμαθής) by 
citing two of the sophist’s pronouncements from his Great Speech (Μέγας Λόγος).204 The first 
reads: φύσεως καὶ ἀσκήσεως διδασκαλία δεῖται, while the second runs ἀπὸ νεότητος δὲ 
ἀρξαμένους δεῖ μανθάνειν (DK 80 B3). For the anonymous writer these statements exonerate 
Protagoras of Epicurus’ slander. For our purposes they inspire confidence in Plato’s account of 
Protagoras’ educational ideas. For, the two statements contain two ideas that are integral in 
Plato’s account: a) An important function is played by natural endowment (see subsections 5.4.2, 
5.4.3) and b) Education must start early and involves a type of drilling. Indeed, the Protagoras 
even appears to contain an echo of the first statement, when Plato has Protagoras say of bravery 
that ἀπὸ φύσεως καὶ εὐτροφίας τῶν ψυχῶν γίγνεται (351b1-2). But to understand exactly how 
these two ideas were incorporated by Protagoras into his political thought, one must turn back to 
Plato. 
Plato has Protagoras describe what is apparently the typical Greek education, but, as will 
be seen, the sophist draws a novel inference from what is typical. As soon as a child can 
understand speech, he says, his nurse and mother, his pedagogue and father point out to him 
what is just and unjust, honorable and shameful, pious and impious, what to do and what not to 
203 The fragments survived as an appendix in certain MSS of Stobaeus. They were first edited and published by J. A. 
Cramer 1839-1841, and again by A. Bohler 1903 who also added a commentary. For a synopsis of the work, see 
Bohler 1903: 12-13. 
204 It has been suggested that this “Great Speech” is identical with Protagoras’ On Truth (see n77). If so, then an 
even closer connection is made between Protagoras’ relativism, his political thinking and his ideas on education. 
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do. If he learns the lesson, great; if not, “they straighten him with threats and blows like a stick 
that’s beginning to warp and bend” (326d5-7). His γραμματισταί continue the same process and 
furthermore have him read poets so that the praises of good men will encourage him to be like 
them (325e-326a). The κιθαριστής continues the education by corporal punishment, and also 
uses musical tunes to inculcate the qualities of docility and “how to be in step and in harmony” 
(326b3). He does not expressly indicate with what exactly the student is supposed to be in 
harmony, but since the quality of “harmony” is coupled with docility (ἡμερώτεροι) and occurs in 
the context of learning the morality of the elders, it is safe to say that Protagoras means here 
conformity with the rules he is learning.  
The student also goes to the παιδοτρίβης in order that his body may gain the strength and 
coordination to execute what he has learned from the other teachers (326b5-c2). Finally, the last 
teacher the student confronts – and shall confront until he dies – is the city itself. The city 
prescribes laws which, if violated, whether the violator is an office-holder or a civilian, demand 
punishment. The punishment is not vindictive, though. Protagoras makes it clear that it is really 
an act of instruction (324ab). This idea that criminal punishment is really just an act of public 
instruction is stressed when Protagoras compares obeying the laws to a child’s following the 
model letters of his grammar teacher. It is also stressed by an etymological argument. Civic 
punishment, he notes, is called εὔθυναι. Thus the city εὐθύνει, just as the parents had 
straightened (εὐθύνουσι) (325d7) their unruly stick. The etymological argument is somewhat 
strained, as the Athenians called only the examination of outgoing officials εὔθυναι, not criminal 
punishment either per se or in its entirety.205 It is a weak point in his argument, but encapsulates 
nonetheless his major thesis: The community teaches ἀρετή (political ability together with 
morality) by an elaborate, often painful, system of coercion (κόλασις).  
205 Cf. Adam & Adam 1893: 124; Taylor 1991: 97; Denyer 2008: 118.  
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5.3.2 Κόλασις and Conformity 
 
 
The interpretation of the logos as explaining how virtue is acquired does not account for the fact 
that, actually, virtue is never taught in Protagoras’ description of education. A passage from the 
Theaetetus is instructive here. Asked what knowledge is, Theaetetus replies it is geometry, 
tanning and the other crafts (146c7-d2). Socrates then launches into an elenchus to show that the 
young man has given an instance (or an ὄνομα) of knowledge, not a definition of knowledge 
(147b10-c1). Similarly, in the logos Protagoras’ “teachers” have not taught morality, they have 
taught instances of morality. It is summed up in the candid imperatives τὰ μὲν ποίει, τὰ δὲ μὴ 
ποίει. The child does not learn virtue; he learns how to behave. Several conclusions can be 
derived from this one point. First, it suggests that Vlastos was right to see a tacit assumption of 
relativism in this description.206 The argumentum ex silentio has value here. If Protagoras 
assumed any sort of objective content in the morality whose origin he has just mythologized, 
now that he is describing how societal education imparts knowledge of that morality, his case 
would be immeasurably better, if he would simply identify that objective content. As it is, the 
child only learns the community’s do’s and don’t’s; Protagoras says not a word on the content of 
those do’s and don’t’s. On the other hand, if the opinions of the city are the community’s 
morality, as I have argued the mythos claims, then in pointing out that the child is conformed to 
the ways of the community, Protagoras has said all he could about the learning of virtue. Thus 
the picture of societal education presupposes a relativist outlook.  
The leitmotif of this section of the logos is not the acquisition of virtue, but rather 
κόλασις. The child is to be bent into shape by his parents, made to imitate his ancestors by his 
γραμματισταί, taught the quality of conformity by his κιθαρισταί, and any recalcitrance meets 
206 1956: xviii n37.  
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with physical correction. Protagoras is describing typical education in order to point out, not the 
illumination of young minds with important moral and democratic concepts, but the coercion 
inherent in the process. He is giving an empirical and sociological argument that education is 
merely a socialization process enacted by parents and city alike in order to produce conformity 
with the environment.  
Once the theme of κόλασις is appreciated, the point Protagoras wishes to make in this 
section of the logos becomes clearer. It is not re-stating the mythos and justifying (per se) 
democratic decision-making, but building on the mythos and explaining how the original 
community, brought together by accidental concord, endured despite the multiplicity of human 
opinions. The original generation instilled their opinions by a systematized process of 
environmental κόλασις into the second generation, which the second generation did to the third, 
the third to the fourth, and so on. In this way there was established a continuity of consensus.207 
The individual is conditioned from birth to think in accordance with his environment. The 
ethicality of the original nucleus perpetuates itself through κόλασις of which education is one 
form just as much as criminal punishment.208 Genuine consensus is feasible because opinions are 
shaped by the environment. 
The parallelism of this section of the logos with the mythos supports this reading of 
Protagoras’ societal education as an explanation of how morality is passed on, not acquired. 
When doling out the powers to the animals, Epimetheus gave powers that were divided into four 
categories. He gave powers that provided for protection against other animals, then powers that 
protected the animals from the elements. Then he provided for the animals’ diet and finally 
207 Cf. Vlastos 1956: xix-xx, Mansfeld 1981: 46. 
208 Protagoras’ unique interpretation of punishment (which he curiously attributes to the Athenians [see Denyer 
2008: 111-112]) as a deterrent of unjust behavior, rather than a vindictive act for its own sake (Prt. 324a3-b7) would 
thus be, according to my interpretation, another side of his sociological analysis of the polis as an institution 
perpetuated by conformity.  
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addressed the issue of reproduction. Similarly, the mythos proper explained how humans gained 
for themselves through the use of intelligence the means of obtaining food and protection from 
the elements, then how they gained protection from the other animals by the emergence of cities. 
At this point to be parallel to the animal kingdom, the mythos should address the perpetuation of 
the human species. But it doesn’t, and the fact that it doesn’t suggests that the logos was meant to 
do just that.  
 
 
 
5.4 RIGHT DECISION-MAKING (εὐβουλία)  
 
 
Having described education as an instrument of κόλασις, Protagoras devotes the rest of the logos 
(326e6-328d2) to addressing directly Socrates’ second concern: If ἀρετή is taught, why do 
excellent fathers not pass it on to the sons? On the whole, his answer is that Socrates is asking 
the wrong question. Fathers do pass on this ability to their sons, as he has just made clear in the 
first section of the logos and as he will repeat at the end of the Great Speech itself, when he 
accuses Socrates of being spoiled (τρυφᾷς) because he claims nobody teaches Greek, when 
actually everybody teaches it (327e1-328a1). The question that Socrates ought rather to ask, he 
says, is why ordinary sons are born to fine fathers (326e6-7). Protagoras answers this question 
through the flute-players analogy (327a2-c4). Imagine, he says, that civilization consisted in 
everybody’s being able to play the flute. While everybody would have the skill to play, certain 
individuals would excel because of a natural proclivity (εὐφυΐα). This natural proclivity is not 
genetically transmittable. An ordinary flute-player can produce an exceptional son, and vice 
versa.  
115 
 
In the immediate context this analogy satisfies Socrates’ concern. In the larger picture, 
however, it provides important information about how in a community of consensus one makes 
good and bad decisions. The fact that the city’s institutions shape opinions does not preclude the 
possibility of wrong decision-making. Protagoras’ answer is that one should be able to divine 
what the city believes and act accordingly. This is the essence of the good decision-making 
(εὐβουλία) that he teaches. 
 
5.4.1 Ἀρετή and Harmony 
 
The flute-players analogy also reinforces the idea that for Protagoras ἀρετή (goodness, virtue) 
consists in conformity to the community’s standards. Once the analogy is introduced, something 
that has probably been suspected for some time finally becomes clear. Protagoras considers 
ἀρετή to be a τέχνη. Up till now there had been some confusion on this score. Both Socrates and 
Protagoras agree that political “skill” (ἡ πολιτικὴ τέχνη) constitutes a large portion of moral 
virtue. Socrates had equated the two before Protagoras’ address (320c1) and Protagoras had 
voiced no objection (cf. section 2.0, subsection 3.2.1). But whether ἀρετή itself is a τέχνη is a 
different matter altogether. As the dialogue will finally reveal, Socrates is more inclined to hold 
that ἀρετή is a knowledge (ἐπιστήμη), while Protagoras has an entirely different conception of it. 
For him it is as much a skill as the trade of the blacksmith or potter and is learned by the same 
process – apprenticeship. This conception is reflected in the mythos. Although different 
divinities give the technological crafts and political virtue, they are both “learned behaviors” that 
are the result of an evolutionary process. For that reason in the flute-players analogy Protagoras 
likens human ideas of right (τὰ δίκαια) and lawful (τὰ νόμιμα) to manufactured products 
(τεχνήματα) (327b1). If society and morality originated from the accidental coincidence of 
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outlooks among primitive humans and was then passed on by societal education from father to 
son, mother to daughter, then virtue can be considered a “learned skill.” However, it is a trade 
that, unlike other human skills, did not have its origin in human ingenuity. It did not come from 
Prometheus, but from agreement and, ultimately, from the individual’s genuine assessment of 
reality. For this reason its rules can never be set down in perpetuity, but remain alterable, in order 
that the individual’s assessment of reality will never be compromised.  
The flute-players analogy is therefore quite appropriate. It captures the aspect of technical 
skill in ἀρετή and highlights the relativity of human values by likening what a city considers 
right and lawful to a tune. The city’s ethicality being a tune, the individual’s ἀρετή therefore 
consists in being in harmony with the collective ethicality. Harmony is an important idea for 
Protagoras. Not only did his interpretation of societal education as a means of conformity reveal 
his concern for it, but also at one point in that discussion he offered the almost programmatic 
statement: πᾶς γὰρ ὁ βίος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου εὐρυθμίας τε καὶ εὐαρμοστίας δεῖται (326b5-6). When 
therefore he compares ἀρετή to a tune in the flute-players analogy, he is continuing the metaphor 
and hinting a second time that an individual’s virtue is, in the last analysis, harmony. As it turns 
out, it is more than a metaphor. It is an image for his theory.   
 
5.4.2 Superiority and εὐφυΐα 
 
The analogy introduces the idea that certain individuals are superior to others. The citizens can 
be divided into those who are ordinary, run-of-the-mill (φαῦλοι) and those who are of particular 
ability (ἀγαθοί); or, those who are without any natural proclivity (ἀφυεῖς) and those who have it 
(εὐφυεῖς). This statement of Protagoras that certain people are better than the rest of the citizens 
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in ἀρετή is attested in another source.209 It is a problematic statement, being inconsistent with the 
mythos. There Zeus disseminated through Hermes δίκη and αἰδώς in equal portions. This meant, 
I argued, that each person’s assessment of reality is equally veridical to another’s (subsections 
4.2.2, 4.3.4). If, however, certain individuals are better, it is implied that their assessments of 
reality are better, and so more accurate, than another’s. If so, then individual assessments of 
reality are not equally veridical. Some are fundamentally flawed, while others are verifiably 
better. 
The question of how one can be superior in ἀρετή is further complicated by Protagoras’ 
description of his role as a professional teacher. He concludes the entire logos by saying that 
Socrates’ failure to find a teacher of ἀρετή is just as absurd as one who fails to find a Greek 
teacher among Greeks. Then, he makes the startling claim to have the ability to make one excel 
in ἀρετή:  
ἀλλὰ κἂν εἰ ὀλίγον ἔστιν τις ὅστις διαφέρει ἡμῶν προβιβάσαι εἰς ἀρετήν, ἀγαπητόν. ὧν 
δὴ ἐγὼ οἶμαι εἷς εἶναι, καὶ διαφερόντως ἂν τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων ὀνῆσαί τινα πρὸς τὸ 
καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν γενέσθαι (328a8-b3).  
 
There appears to be a contradiction between Protagoras’ relativism and his belief in individual 
εὐφυΐα. This superiority of both the εὐφυεῖς citizens and Protagoras himself has been variously 
interpreted. J. S. Morrison argues that Protagoras means that they are the men who have 
expertise in leadership and that this amounts to a subversion of the Cleisthenic ideal of equal 
opportunity in office-holding.210 As Morrison argues, Protagoras makes this implication by first 
beginning with a definition of ἡ πολιτικὴ τέχνη as “good citizenship,” then shifting to a 
definition of it as “being good at politics.” However, it is clear that Protagoras does not see a 
209 The claim φύσεως καὶ ἀσκήσεως διδασκαλία δεῖται (DK 80 B3) implies that one φύσις is superior to another (for 
details on the claim see subsection 5.3.1).  
210 1941: 8-9. 
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fundamental distinction between these two ideas.211 Kerferd considers their superiority to consist 
in a natural aptitude which enables them to direct the city by the most beneficial decisions.212 
Most recently Balot has advocated this view.213 Farrar agrees with Kerferd and Balot that those 
with εὐφυΐα direct the city’s decision-making by the standard of the beneficial, but adds that the 
politician who is εὐφυής is regarded by Protagoras as one who encourages the citizens through 
his own argumentation to learn how to calculate their own interests by the same standard, in the 
hope that at a future date the city will be more self-ruling.214 These views, however, all agree in 
having Protagoras recognize the standard of objective utility, and as such, are incompatible with 
a relativist position (see section 1.4). They are also at variance with the fundamental difference 
between Socrates and Protagoras in the dialogue in that they assume that virtue is an ἐπιστήμη 
that calculates and deduces what is proper behavior, rather than a τέχνη (cf. subsection 5.4.1).  
  Quite some time ago A. E. Taylor, commenting on this apparent contradiction, offered 
the following interpretation:  
“To make the whole speech consistent, we should have to understand him [Protagoras] to 
be claiming for himself a certain exceptional ability in catching the tone of the ‘social 
tradition’ of Athens, or any other community he visits, and communicating that tone to 
his pupils.”215  
 
In other words, Protagoras’ relativism has led him to conclude that “there is no moral standard 
more ultimate than the standard of respectability current in a given society.”216 I maintain that 
Taylor is basically correct, despite the tendency of some scholars to reject him out of hand.217 
When Protagoras says he has the ability to make people superior in ἀρετή, he means he can teach 
211 Cf. Taylor 1991: 71-72, 74-76. Kerferd 1953: 44 observes that Socrates too accepts this definition, at least he 
does not object to (or notice?) Protagoras’ blending of two ideas which modern thought sharply distinguishes.  
212 1953: 45.  
213 2006: 76-78. 
214 1988: 74-75.  
215 1937: 246.  
216 1937: 246.  
217 E.g. Cornford 1935: 73; Guthrie 1971: 175.  
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them to make decisions that are in keeping with the moral standards of the student’s 
environment. This curriculum results in a similarity between the sophist and the student. When 
the student becomes a politician and applies what he has learned to public matters and public 
debate, he will stand to the city as the sophist stands to the student.  
 
5.4.3 Consistency with one’s Moral and Social Environment 
 
 
Understanding the role of the sophist as making the student behave with more consistency with 
his social and moral environment and make decisions that are more consistent with it, makes best 
sense of the passage in which Protagoras claims to be able to make one superior in ἀρετή. He 
makes the claim through an analogy:  
εἶθ’, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ ζητοῖς τίς διδάσκαλος τοῦ ἑλληνίζειν, οὐδ’ἂν εἷς φανείη, οὐδέ γ’ἂν 
οἶμαι εἰ ζητοῖς τίς ἂν ἡμῖν διδάξειεν τοὺς τῶν χειροτεχνῶν ὑεῖς αὐτὴν ταύτην τὴν τέχνην 
ἣν δὴ παρὰ τοῦ πατρὸς μεμαθήκασιν, καθ’ὅσον οἷός τ’ἦν ὁ πατὴρ καὶ οἱ τοῦ πατρὸς 
φίλοι ὄντες ὁμότεχνοι, τούτους ἔτι τίς ἂν διδάξειεν, οὐ ῥᾴδιον οἶμαι εἶναι, ὦ Σώκρατες, 
τούτων διδάσκαλον φανῆναι, τῶν δὲ ἀπείρων παντάπασι ῥᾴδιον, οὕτω δὲ ἀρετῆς καὶ τῶν 
ἄλλων πάντων· ἀλλὰ κἂν εἰ ὀλίγον ἔστιν τις ὅστις διαφέρει ἡμῶν προβιβάσαι εἰς ἀρετήν, 
ἀγαπητόν. ὧν δὴ ἐγὼ οἶμαι εἷς εἶναι κτλ (327e3-328b2).  
 
Socrates had questioned the teachability of ἀρετή because remarkable fathers failed to pass it on 
to their sons. Protagoras then launched into the logos in order to explain this phenomenon and 
now he draws his conclusions. First, he compares ἀρετή to language. Virtue is taught by 
everybody in the community just as one is taught to speak Greek. This point recaps his 
discussion of societal education. Then, he defines his role as teacher. He compares ἀρετή to a 
trade-skill (τέχνη) and comments that while it would be very easy to find a teacher for the 
inexperienced (τῶν ἀπείρων), like Pherecrates’ wild men, it would be very difficult to find a 
teacher for the sons of the practitioners of that skill (τῶν χειροτεχνῶν) who could teach them the 
very skill they learned from their fathers just as well as they learned it from their fathers and his 
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friends who practice the same skill (ὁμότεχνοι). The comparison of ἀρετή with a τέχνη shows 
how Protagoras conceptualizes his role as teacher. He teaches the sons of citizens the very skill 
that they would have learned from their fathers and their fathers’ friends. In other words, the 
teacher replicates societal education.  
But in doing so he only teaches a local ethicality. Protagoras takes the place of one’s 
father and his same-minded friends. The phrase φίλοι ὄντες ὁμότεχνοι is important. It shows that 
Protagoras does not teach morality simpliciter, but a local variant. He does not teach a trade-skill 
that can be practiced anywhere, but as it is practiced by the young people’s fathers and their 
environment. If he taught a morality or political science that was globally valid, there would be 
no reason for him to stress the fact that he teaches only what fellow tradesmen would have 
taught. In fine, there is reference here to the mythos. By restricting his teaching to what the 
young people’s φίλοι would have taught, Protagoras recalls his definition of society, and so 
morality, as κόσμοι καὶ δεσμοὶ φιλίας συναγωγοί, while by adding that these φίλοι are ὁμότεχνοι 
he repeats the point that the original φιλία was merely a ὁμοδοξία.  
 This passage then provides strong support for Taylor’s interpretation of the sophist as one 
who determines what a given polis considers to be right and wrong, good and bad, honorable and 
shameful and who passes it on to the younger generation. Consequently, his students differ from 
the rest of the citizens inasmuch as they have a deeper familiarity with their polis’ ethicality. 
They are better interpreters of the city’s ethicality than the rest, who are not ignorant (ἀμαθεῖς), 
but merely inexperienced, unaware (ἄπειροι).218 Each person is still the measure of right and 
wrong and democracy is the best means available to him to live according to that personal 
measure of his without compromise. But certain individuals are more familiar with the city 
because they have undergone the right kind of education. If Protagoras did in fact call this 
218 For ἀπειρία in Protagoras’ thought, see below subsection 6.1.2 & fn. 226. 
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education an ἄσκησις, as a fragment suggests (φύσεως καὶ ἀσκήσεως διδασκαλία δεῖται [DK 80 
B3]), then he used a word that captured well the literal idea of training and drilling he envisioned 
and at the same time the emphasis he placed on beginning this education early (ἀπὸ νεότητος δὲ 
ἀρξαμένους δεῖ μανθάνειν [DK 80 B3] is better understood.  
 But as the first fragment recalls, it might also be natural endowment (φύσις) that makes 
his students differ from the rest, not just training. These people will then be the same as those he 
calls the εὐφυεῖς and ἀφυεῖς in the analogy. But if it is consistency that makes right, then these 
εὐφυεῖς will be those who by chance are fit for their environment, while the ἀφυεῖς are the unfit. 
In terms of natural ability and intelligence, if these two groups were placed in an unbiased area, 
they would be intellectual and ethical equals. But because they find themselves in an area biased 
to one outlook, there emerge apparent discrepancies. Εὐφυΐα then is just the chance fitness with 
one’s environment, not absolute superiority, and the student does not receive absolute, 
unqualified superiority from his training, but rather develops a greater fitness with his 
environment. That is why Protagoras in the Theaetetus says that one is not to be made smarter 
and even denies that this is possible. Rather, he says, his disposition is to be changed; that is, as I 
suggest, his personal outlook is to be made more consonant with the outlook of his environment 
(166e-167a).  
 The presence of such men who have the ability to read the city and determine its opinion 
on public matters explains what Protagoras means by right decision-making. It is choosing the 
course of action that is consistent with the city’s ethicality. This ability Protagoras professes to 
impart, namely to divine what the city thinks on a given question, is well suited to the behavior 
the Athenian democracy historically expected from its office-holders. Despite the fact that the 
Athenian Assembly often tried to micromanage the approximately fourteen hundred offices in 
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the empire, an Athenian office-holder had many occasions when he was obliged to exercise his 
own judgment. In these cases his duty was not so much to make the right decision, as to make 
the decision the Demos would approve of. As Demosthenes axiomatically observes, τὸν γὰρ 
ὑπὲρ πόλεως πράττοντά τι δεῖ τὸ τῆς πόλεως ἦθος μιμεῖσθαι (22.64). There was a market for 
Protagoras’ teaching. 
 
5.4.4 Εὐβουλία, Harmony and Δίκη καὶ Αἰδώς 
 
 
This ability to make decisions in keeping with the moral and social environment of the city is of 
a piece with Protagoras’ emphasis on harmony. As he states programmatically: πᾶς γὰρ ὁ βίος 
τοῦ ἀνθρώπου εὐρυθμίας τε καὶ εὐαρμοστίας δεῖται (326b5-6) (cf. subsection 5.4.1). Just as 
parents, teachers and juries seek to instill conformity and punish any failure in demonstrating it, 
so the politician who shows it to a high degree will receive praise and commendation. In this way 
Protagoras’ doctrine of harmony simply institutionalizes societal praise and blame (ἔπαινος καὶ 
ψόγος) and codifies in a theoretical way the operative principle of a shame-culture. If the 
collective opinion makes right (as long as it is truly collective and truly an opinion), then 
harmony with it is praiseworthy behavior. Good decision-making is synonymous with moral 
goodness. Protagoras promises to impart to Hippocrates not only εὐβουλία (318e5), but to make 
him a better person as well (318a8, 328b3). Thus, the interpretation of Protagoras’ εὐβουλία as 
making decisions consistent with one’s moral and social environment not only gives a 
foundation to his emphasis on harmony, but explains also how he can speak of his εὐβουλία as 
synonymous with moral goodness. Consensus and δίκη καὶ αἰδώς are the same thing. 
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5.5 CONCLUSION 
 
 
The logos Protagoras delivers does not in itself provide a justification for democracy. That had 
been done in the mythos. Instead, in two sections it provides answers to questions that that 
justification had raised. In the first section of the logos he explains how his theory that morality 
is ultimately the individual’s assessment of reality creates, not anarchy, but a stable community. 
Characterizing polis life as a system of κόλασις allows him to interpret the polis on the whole as 
a form of education designed to produce conformity to the polis’ established consensus. In the 
second section of the logos he explains what his role as teacher in a community of consensus is 
and, in so doing, explains what he means when he professes to impart εὐβουλία to his students. 
He will give them the ability to make decisions that are entirely consistent with his city’s moral 
and social environment. In this way they will not only be in perfect harmony with their polis, but 
they will be good men as well, since in living according to consensus, they live according to δίκη 
and αἰδώς.   
 On a personal note Protagoras is also free now of Socrates’ dilemma and has explained 
how two apparently self-contradictory statements were true (cf. subsection 3.2.2). Just as the 
mythos explained how ἀρετή was possessed by everybody: Because morality at base derives 
from the individual’s opinion, the individual cannot but have virtue; so now the logos has made 
clear how the Athenians are right to think that it is also a thing taught. Because it can not be 
guaranteed that every new member born into the community will by nature have the same 
disposition as its founding members, that new member must undergo a process of adaptation 
which, while it might be called “teaching,” properly speaking it is not the acquisition of anything 
that will make him in any true sense more virtuous. 
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 If these students of Protagoras were going to lead a private life, this instruction of his 
might never seem to be at odds with the relativism it was based on. But what if they took on 
leadership roles as politicians in their city? How would they maintain the community of 
consensus instead of imposing their own opinions on the citizen-body? In the next chapter I 
discuss this question.  
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6.0 PROTAGORAS’ WISE POLITICIAN 
 
 
 
 
For the most part, Protagoras’ students were not going to become citizens holding the occasional 
office. They were going to be near-professionals who would play a leading role in public 
decision-making. After all, that is the reason Hippocrates shows up at Socrates’ house, eager for 
an interview with Protagoras (section 2.0). This role they would play raises an important 
question about Protagoras’ political theory. How could one take an active part in political 
deliberation without giving the lie to relativism? The problem is inherent in the function of a 
politician. In his role as adviser, he occupies a position of superior knowledge and expertise to 
the voting citizens. In times of emergency, he knows what is best, when the rest of the citizens 
do not know or, if they ventured a solution, would prove mistaken. How is this position 
compatible with the ἀρετή of Protagoras’ instruction which apparently binds him to the 
consensus of the community? Plato has Protagoras answer this question in the Theaetetus. In 
sum, Protagoras here explains that the politician is only an advocate of the city’s opinion. In 
times of emergency, when there is real uncertainty as to which course of action is best, the wise 
and expert politician advocates the opinion that is consistent with the city’s ethical environment. 
Thus he does not have any moral or intellectual superiority over others, but is simply familiar 
with the process that makes values and properties real and actual as far as his city is concerned.   
 This interpretation of Protagoras’ words in the Theaetetus stands at variance to the 
traditional interpretation which argues that, when it came to leadership, Protagoras espoused a 
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doctrine of utility. The politician is not one who knows what is good to the city, but what is good 
for the city. He has a privileged insight into the nature and essence of the good and bad and into 
how the former benefits and the latter harms the city. The inconsistency of such a politician with 
Protagoras’ relativism is clear and there have been many various attempts to reconcile the 
apparent inconsistency.219 These attempts, however, typically take a passage dripping with irony 
at face value. An examination of this irony will suggest that the utilitarian Protagoras is a 
facetious mirage which Plato has Socrates construct in order to point up that very incompatibility 
between moral relativism and any doctrine of utility that has made the passage so problematic. 
At the same time it will provide evidence that the role Protagoras envisions for his politician 
does not give the lie to relativism, but preserves it, by making him the guarantor of the city’s 
opinion by discharging his office according to what may be called the doctrine of consistency.  
 
 
 
6.1 THE DOCTRINE OF CONSISTENCY IN THE THEAETETUS 
 
 
Protagoras elaborates on the doctrine of consistency and, specifically, how it is applied by the 
politician in a community without contradicting his relativism, in a passage of the Theaetetus 
given to him by and through Socrates (166a2-168c2). Though the bulk of Protagoras’ elaboration 
is contained in that part of Socrates’ defense of Protagoras which I will call the direct testimony, 
a look at the way Socrates introduces Protagoras, as well as a consideration of some preliminary 
remarks Protagoras makes on changing one’s state, or disposition (hexis), already suggest at the 
outset that the idea of consistency occupied an important place in the sophist’s overall thought, 
not just his political thinking.220  
219 See Burnyeat 1990: 23-4 & n32 for a summary.  
220 For another use Protagoras made of logical consistency, see subsection 5.1.1. 
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6.1.1 The Inconsistent Philosopher 
 
 
Socrates, acting as intellectual midwife for the young Theaetetus, has been trying to elicit a 
definition of knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) from him. Theaetetus had offered the definition that 
knowledge is perception. Socrates equated his definition with the human-measure claim of 
Protagoras (151e8-152a4) and goes on to “help” this idea of Theaetetus’ by placing this 
epistemological claim on the foundation of a Heraclitean ontology. Once done, Socrates turns to 
a critical examination of this Protagorean-Heraclitean system he has just constructed, to see if it 
is a legitimate idea. Beginning with the human-measure claim, he criticizes Protagoras for being 
self-contradictory. If the individual is the measure of all things, then how in the world can 
Protagoras lay claim to any exceptional σοφία, as he does by acting as a professional teacher? 
Certainly he can’t; so, in order to make it clear that his judgments were no better than another’s, 
he ought, Socrates says, to have said “baboon is the measure of all things,” or “pig” (161c2-e3). 
As it is, he implies that he is the teacher of all adult men and so gives the impression of either 
being hybristic (161e2), godlike (161c8, 162a2), or just a crowd-pleaser (161e4).   
 This criticism is quite similar to the approach Socrates takes in the Protagoras. There 
Socrates challenges Protagoras’ assertion that ἀρετή is teachable by pointing out that the 
Athenians, who are wise people, believe everybody possesses it, thereby implying that, if 
everybody has ἀρετή, nobody can be taught it (319b3-d7). Since Protagoras, as Socrates knows, 
does not deny that everybody possesses it, Socrates’ argument amounts to a tacit insinuation, 
resembling a rhetorical dilemma, that Protagoras’ claim to be a teacher is either nonsensical or 
devious (see subsection 2.0). Similarly, now in the Theaetetus Socrates complains that if 
everybody’s perceptions and judgments are incorrigible, neither Protagoras nor anybody else can 
claim to be a teacher of another. In both dialogues Socrates attacks Protagoras for advocating a 
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theory that contradicts his profession. Only, in the Theaetetus Socrates is a bit more malignant. 
He makes the point that Protagoras’ theory and profession are self-contradictory through the jest 
that he must either think himself a god or be pandering to the general populace. By the way, this 
similarity of approach between the dialogues reinforces the argument that the two dialogues 
present a consistent account of Protagoras’ thought. But more to the point, it reflects on the role 
consistency played in Protagoras’ thought. If Plato in two dialogues argues that Protagoras is 
inconsistent with himself, it is implied that consistency must have been an idea particularly 
valuable to Protagoras.  
 After a round of argumentation against the proposition that perception is knowledge, 
which in the end Socrates himself admits to be specious and fallacious (162a4-164e1), Socrates 
expresses his confidence that, if Protagoras were alive, he could satisfactorily defend his position 
as teacher against the charge of being inconsistent with his philosophy (164e2-6). Since he is not 
alive, Socrates attempts himself to give a defense for him. This defense will show that one can be 
“wiser” (σοφώτερος) within Protagoras’ theory of relativism.221 Socrates delivers the first 
installment of this defense – the direct testimony – in the person of Protagoras. 
 
6.1.2 A Change of Ἕξις 
 
 
After some preliminary comments in which Protagoras asserts that he would not have answered 
Socrates’ questions regarding remembering and seeing with but one eye as Theaetetus, a mere 
boy, had, but would have given entirely different answers,222 Protagoras proceeds to the charge 
of self-contradiction. He begins by re-asserting the validity of his human-measure claim: Each 
person is the measure of what does and does not exist. Or, what appears to be the case to one is 
221 Cf. 167d1-4.  
222 Namely, that the perceiver in each instance of perceiving is a different person (166a2-c6), although that idea is 
merely continuing the Heraclitean-Protagorean amalgam (see below, this subsection).   
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the case for him. However, perceptions are incredibly different (μυρίον διαφέρειν). To one “bad 
things” (κακά) can appear and be; for another “good things” (ἀγαθά). This is where the wise man 
comes in. The wise man is the one ὃς ἄν τινι ἡμῶν, ᾧ φαίνεται καὶ ἔστι κακά, μεταβάλλων 
ποιήσῃ ἀγαθὰ φαίνεσθαί τε καὶ εἶναι (166d6-8). This clarification does not amount to much of a 
defense, since anybody who hears it would naturally give κακά and ἀγαθά their usual moral 
values and be puzzled as to how one can have true, but bad perceptions and judgments. 
Protagoras is aware that κακά and ἀγαθά can be misunderstood, so he tells Socrates not to attack 
his claim on a verbal basis: τὸν δὲ λόγον αὖ μὴ τῷ ῥήματί μου δίωκε (166d8-e1). This request 
(i.e. not to judge his idea “by the word”) is indication that Protagoras’ meaning – and the 
solution to the inconsistency – lies in the correct understanding of the words κακά and ἀγαθά.223 
 Protagoras attempts to make his point now through examples. A sick person will have 
certain perceptions/judgments about the food he eats. He will consider them bitter. A person who 
is well will have the opposite perceptions/judgments. The former is not ignorant (ἀμαθής), just as 
the latter is not wise (σοφός). This is an important point. The sick person’s assessment of reality 
is just as veridical as the healthy person’s. Or, in terms of a single individual, a person’s 
assessment of reality when sick is just as true as his assessment when well. Protagoras has this in 
common with Heraclitus, but whereas Heraclitus explained the impressions of a sick and a 
healthy person as different because they were at root different people (159e1-5), Protagoras 
explains it as a difference of ἕξις. The sick person is no more wrong than the healthy person. So 
it is pointless to make him wiser. He is however to be brought from a sick ἕξις to a healthy one 
(167a2). The reason for this is that the other state (ἡ ἑτέρα ἕξις) is better (ἀμείνων). This scenario 
serves as the analogue to human education: οὕτω δὲ καὶ ἐν τῇ παιδείᾳ ἀπὸ ἑτέρας ἕξεως ἐπὶ τὴν 
223 For this use of ῥῆμα as a predicate, see Guthrie 1971: 220-221. 
130 
 
                                                 
ἀμείνω μεταβλητέον (167a4-5). Only, the doctor brings about the change by drugs, the 
professional teacher by speech.  
 This analogy between medical treatment and human education gives the additional 
information that a person to whom “bad things” appear and are must be brought into another 
state, or disposition. It fails to give any clarification as to what constitutes “bad” and “good” 
things. This appears to be deliberate. Protagoras is still speaking with reserve as to the nature of 
good and bad. He prefers to call the one state either “the other” (ἑτέρα), the opposite (τἀναντία) 
or “better” (ἀμείνων) and never labels the opposite state explicitly as “worse.”224 He merely 
wants Socrates to understand that a change must be made between ἕξεις.  
 Protagoras then re-asserts perceptual and judgmental incorrigibility and accounts for it 
with a Cyrenaic argument: One cannot form judgments on what is not, nor can one form 
judgments on anything that he is not experiencing.225 He then offers a reason why a change of 
perception/judgment necessitates a change of state:  
ἀλλ’οἶμαι πονηρᾷ ψυχῆς ἕξει δοξάζοντα συγγενῆ αὐτῆς χρηστῇ ἐποίησε δοξάσαι ἕτερα 
τοιαῦτα, ἃ δή τινες τὰ φαντάσματα ὑπὸ ἀπειρίας226 ἀληθῆ καλοῦσιν, ἐγὼ δὲ βελτίω μὲν 
τὰ ἕτερα τῶν ἑτέρων, ἀληθέστερα δὲ οὐδέν (167b1-4).227  
 
It is because a πονηρὰ ψυχῆς ἕξις causes one to generate correspondingly πονηρὰ φαντάσματα 
and a χρηστὴ ψυχῆς ἕξις causes one to generate correspondingly χρηστὰ φαντάσματα that a 
change of opinion requires a change of state (ἕξις). Thus the importance of consistency and the 
224 See below, fn. 226.  
225 For the similarity with the Cyrenaic school, see Mannebach 1961: 48-49 (fr. 211A) and subsection 6.3.1. For the 
pragmatism in the statement, cf. subsection 2.1.1.   
226 Ἀπειρία here is perhaps more than a euphemism. People, Protagoras admits, call some perceptions/judgments 
true and false, but he cannot say they do so because they are wrong, since that would present a problem for the 
human-measure claim. Instead, he says they do so because they are “without experience” (ὑπὸ ἀπειρίας). Protagoras 
uses this word again for human “ignorance” at Prt. 328a7, which suggests it is indeed a feature of Protagoras’ 
thought. It can also explain Protagoras’ hesitation to use the word “worse” (χείρων) in this passage. To see the world 
in absolute terms is not wrong, but only a result of inexperience, a want of greater awareness, because one is 
forming an opinion on what one is not experiencing (cf. above, fn. 225). In other words, Protagoras explained 
human fallibility as a merely ἀπειρία. Plato in the peritropē that follows (171a6-c7) will challenge the cogency of 
this position. 
227 I follow the text here of Duke et al. 1995.  
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correspondence between two factors already figures in Protagoras’ understanding of human 
epistemology. 
Additionally, this observation finally reveals what Protagoras meant by κακά and ἀγαθά; 
namely, πονηρά and χρηστά. These terms then become his preferred terms until the end of the 
direct testimony. 
 
 
 
6.2 THE ROLE OF THE POLITICIAN 
 
 
6.2.1 The Creation of Δίκη and Αἰδώς 
 
Armed now with these terms, Protagoras clarifies the role of the sophist and politician:  
Φημὶ γὰρ...τοὺς δέ γε σοφούς τε καὶ ἀγαθοὺς ῥήτορας ταῖς πόλεσι τὰ χρηστὰ ἀντὶ τῶν 
πονηρῶν δίκαια δοκεῖν εἶναι ποιεῖν. ἐπεὶ οἷά γ’ἂν ἑκάστῃ πόλει δίκαια καὶ καλὰ δοκῇ, 
ταῦτα καὶ εἶναι αὐτῇ, ἕως ἂν αὐτὰ νομίζῃ· ἀλλ’ὁ σοφὸς ἀντὶ πονηρῶν ὄντων αὐτοῖς 
ἑκάστων χρηστὰ ἐποίησεν εἶναι καὶ δοκεῖν (167b7-c7).  
 
This passage is a challenge to translate. The first two clauses are fairly straightforward:  
For I assert that the wise and good politicians cause good things instead of bad things to 
seem to be just to their cities. For, whatever sort of things seem just and honorable to a 
city, these things [I maintain] are in fact so for it, as long it holds them to be.  
 
What is noteworthy here is that the couplet δίκαια καὶ καλά appears to be a prosaic version of 
what in the mythos had been δίκη καὶ αἰδώς. Both signify morality by designating it by its legal 
and ethical poles.  
Translation becomes a problem in the last clause regarding the underlined words. Is 
χρηστά an oblique predicate after εἶναι καὶ δοκεῖν, in which case δίκαια καὶ καλά from the 
previous clause must be understood as its accusative subject? Or, is the accusative subject 
χρηστά, in which case δίκαια καὶ καλά from the previous clause must be understood as its 
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predicate? The second option is typically preferred, which renders the sentence along these lines: 
“But the wise man when (these) things are in particular case unsound, makes sound things be and 
appear (just) to them.”228  
There are several problems with this translation. First, the absence of the article with 
χρηστά suggests that it is indeed an oblique predicate, not an accusative subject. Secondly, it is 
forced to render ἐποίησεν in the present tense.229 However, Protagoras is not making either a 
gnomic or an empirical statement, but is referring to a time prior to the city’s establishment of 
what is just and honorable. Finally, it makes the last clause tautological with the first: the wise 
man makes good things appear just and honorable. But tautology is typically used to elucidate 
obscure phraseology and there is nothing particularly obscure in the first clause. At any rate, 
ἀλλά indicates Protagoras is adding something new.  
For these reasons, the first option appears preferable.230 Thus the whole passage is 
rendered thus:  
For, I assert that the wise and good politicians cause good things instead of bad things to 
seem to be just to their cities. For, whatever sort of things seem just and honorable to a 
city, these things [I maintain] are in fact so for it, as long it holds them to be; but it is the 
wise politician who made those just and honorable things, when they each were bad 
things to them, be and seem good things.  
 
This translation makes clear the point ἀλλά is making. The politician makes sure that the 
city determines things that are χρηστά to be just and honorable. True, whatever the city considers 
just and honorable is so, but the politician made those things it would presently determine to be 
just and honorable, back at the time when they seemed (and so were) bad, seem and be good, 
which in turn enabled them to be deemed just and honorable. In other words, while it is the city 
that determines what is just and honorable by collective decision-making, the politician operates 
228 This is Kerferd’s rendering (1949: 24-25). So McDowell 1973: 40. 
229 As McDowell 1973: 40-41; Levett (in Burnyeat 1990: 293); Chappell 2004: 104 do. 
230 This is the rendering of Cornford 1935 and Chappell 2004.  
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before that process. Hence the aorist. When the city is about to ratify (i. e. deem just and 
honorable) things that are πονηρά, he intervenes and causes the city to ratify things that are 
χρηστά. And just how he causes the city to do so Protagoras has already explained: He changes 
the audience’s state (ἕξις) through speech (λόγοις).  
Who creates what is just and honorable? The traditional translation suggests it is the 
politician. In making sound things appear just and honorable, he presents an interpretation of 
good things to the city which, when ratified, become justice. However, besides the problems 
discussed above with this translation, it attributes to the politician special insight into goodness 
and justice – a claim incompatible with the human-measure. On the other hand, when read as I 
suggest, the city’s pronouncement is what is just and honorable. The politician just offers what 
he deems to be χρηστόν or πονηρόν. He has no privileged insight into Justice or Honorableness. 
 
6.2.2 “Good Things” and “Bad Things” 
 
 
However, he might have considerable insight into what is χρηστόν or πονηρόν. It is thus 
imperative to know what these adjectives mean in this passage. Socrates concludes that 
Protagoras must have meant χρηστόν to mean the useful, and several modern scholars and 
translators have followed the Platonic lead.231 However, there are problems with taking it in this 
way. First of all, although etymologically derived from χράομαι (whence χρήσιμος), the word 
seldom admits the translation “useful.”232 Furthermore, in this passage its antonym is πονηρός, 
not ἀχρεῖος or ἄχρηστος, and later, when Socrates concludes that Protagoras must not have 
considered the beneficial relative, he uses different vocabulary, denoting the beneficial with the 
words τὸ συμφέρον (172a5) or ὠφέλιμα (177d5). For these reasons, others have preferred to 
231 E.g. Cornford 1935: 73; McDowell 1973: 40, 165-168; Chappell 2004: 105-107.  
232 Cf. Dover 1974: 296. 
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translate it as “sound” or “wholesome.”233 While this translation is better, it still fails to do 
justice to the wide semantic field covered by the adjective. The word πονηρός is even more 
problematic. Those who translate χρηστός as useful render it “harmful,” while those who 
translate the former as sound or wholesome, render it “pernicious.” Both, however, strain the 
meaning of the word.  
On the whole, the words simply mean good and bad. However, though in a sense 
synonyms to ἀγαθός and κακός, their meaning can be broken down into four aspects: an 
etymological, a concrete, a moral and a sociopolitical one. It is sometimes claimed that the 
etymology of χρηστός justifies translating it “useful,” since its derivation from χράομαι suggests 
an original meaning of “usable.”234 However, there is a world of difference between “usable” 
and “useful,” and Greeks in the fifth century were more likely to signify the latter with χρήσιμος, 
ὠφέλιμος, or εὔχρηστος. The concrete sense of χρηστός is clearly related to the etymology of the 
word. What is usable is that which is fit for use (χράομαι). Accordingly, in Herodotus it is found 
as an epithet for furniture (1.94), a bow (3.78), a path (7.215) and in Plato for a house (Grg. 
504a).235  
The etymology of πονηρός is typically given as deriving from labor and hardship 
(πένομαι, πόνος).236 However, the concrete sense it bears suggests that that etymological force 
was quite weak.237 Aristophanes uses it of a piece of merchandise (Pl. 352) and of a coin’s mint 
(Pl. 862, 957), while Xenophon uses it to denote shabby horses (Cyr. 1.4.19). This concrete use 
of πονηρός is closer to the use of the perfect active of πονέω in the sense of being damaged, and 
233 So Burnyeat 1990: 26. 
234 Cf. Dover 1974: 50-3; Chantraine 1968-80: 1276; Frisk 1960-70, vol 2: 1119. 
235 Chantraine 1968-1980: 1276 does not recognize a concrete usage for χρηστός. Frisk 1960-70, vol 2: 1119 does, 
but gives no examples. 
236 Neil 1901: 206-8; Chantraine 1968-80: 881; Frisk 1960-70, vol 2: 505. 
237 Cf. Chantraine 1968-80: 881: “le lien sémantique avec penomai et même avec ponos [est] relâché,” as well as 
Frisk 1960-70, vol 2: 505, who translates it as “mühselig, unbrauchbar, schlecht, böse.” 
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so unfit for use (e.g. of ships in Th. 7.38). Since the etymology of πονηρός as full of hardship 
does not account for these concrete usages, it would be a mistake to regard it as informing the 
other aspects of the adjective. In sum, the basic idea in both χρηστός and πονηρός will describe 
the physical and operational integrity of an object, i.e. whether they are “faulty” or “faultless.” 
To say that an object is useful or harmful is to infer new information from its operational 
integrity, information that Greek used different words to express (e.g., χρήσιμος, ὠφέλιμος, 
βλαβερός). 
The words also developed a moral aspect. The χρηστός individual is virtuous, while the 
πονηρός is wicked.238 It is sometimes asserted that the moral sense of these words grew out of 
their etymological meaning in order to highlight the civic assumptions lying behind Greek, and 
specifically Athenian, morality. So, the χρηστός man is the one who can benefit his city 
materially,239 while the πονηρός is the one who is too poor to do so.240 While the ethic of service 
to the state undeniably looms large in Greek thought, it can be denied that this ethic is reflected 
in the roots of these words. First, as noted just above, the etymology of χρηστός appears to 
denote operational integrity rather than any “beneficialness,” while the etymology of πονηρός 
was soon overshadowed by the concrete aspect the word developed. Secondly, while it is true 
that being useless in this civic sense is often denoted by ἄχρηστος,241 the positive “useful” is in 
fourth-century oratory typically denoted by the word χρήσιμος.242 Therefore, it is more likely 
that the moral sense grew out of the concrete sense. Just as an object can be faulty or faultless for 
various reasons, so an individual is “blameless” or “blameworthy” for a variety of reasons. This 
238 Cf. Connor 1971: 88-89nn2 & 3. 
239 So, Adkins 1960: 215n6; Donlan 1980: 66; Rosenbloom 2004: 63-66. 
240 Neil 1901: 206; Reverdin 1945: 210. Rosenbloom 2004: 59 is quite explicit: “The label πονηρός/μοχθηρός 
derives from its bearers’ relation to the means of production.” 
241 E.g. Is. 4.27, 7.41, 11.50; D. 19.135.  
242 E.g. D. 18.311, 19.281, 4.7; Hyp. 2.10. This last citation is in particular instructive. The speaker entertains the 
scenario in which his opponent is not a good man (χρηστός), but is at least useful (χρήσιμος).  
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derivation makes much more sense of the wide scope the moral sense of the words has. As Dover 
observes, πονηρός is frequently the antonym of ἀγαθός, ἐπιεικής, καλός, καλὸς κἀγαθός, 
σώφρων,243 and χρηστός often an antonym of μικρόψυχος and frequently treated as a synonym 
of ἐπιεικής and – most significantly – δίκαιος.244 This wide scope is hard to explain, if the 
operative connotation of the words was “beneficial service.” 
This derivation of χρηστός and πονηρός also makes much better sense of the 
sociopolitical aspect the words assumed in the course of the fifth century. To close ranks against 
their demotic opponents, the aristocrats and nobility claimed the label χρηστοί (and its 
comparative and superlative βελτίους, βέλτιστοι)245 as their exclusive epithet, along with many 
others (e.g. ἀγαθοί/ἐσθλοί [and its comparative/superlative ἀμείνους, ἄριστοι], καλοὶ κἀγαθοί, 
εὐγενεῖς, γνώριμοι, πλούσιοι, ἐπιεικεῖς, ἐπιφανεῖς, οἱ ὀλίγοι, οἱ δυνατοί, κτλ).246 In so doing, they 
were claiming more than a label; they were laying an exclusive claim to virtue. Since moral 
goodness (ἀρετή) is inborn, it stands to reason that only they can be, in the true sense of the 
word, good (χρηστοί).247 The others, for their part, while recognizing their deficiency in wealth, 
birth and education, did not however acknowledge any inferiority in themselves on the score of 
ἀρετή. “No one,” Dover aptly comments, “ever says seriously ‘I am not kalos kāgathos.’”248 
This situation is sometimes treated as though it were a purely political debate, with two sides 
claiming the same label and the same content of that label.249 However, ordinary citizens cannot 
claim to be χρηστοί for the same reason as elite, well-born citizens can. They are socially, 
243 1974: 65. 
244 1974: 62-63, 65, 185. 
245 For βελτίων, βέλτιστος as the degrees of comparison for χρηστός, see Dover 1974: 296, who cites D. 20.14. 
246 Cf. Donlan 1980: 127. Reverdin 1945: 208-212 has a fairly exhaustive list.  
247 See [Xen.] Ath. Pol. 2.19. Cf. Donlan’s remarks on the passage (1980: 145).  
248 1974: 43. Interestingly, Protagoras makes the same point in the Protagoras (323b). If anybody claims he is an 
unjust man, even if his fellow-citizens know him to be, still they will not believe him or consider him to be level-
headed, but will suspect his sanity. 
249 So Rosenbloom 2002: 300-312.  
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economically and genetically shut off from their type of moral goodness. The situation then is a 
debate, not a lexicographical one, but an ethical one. The definition of moral goodness, of 
χρηστότης and πονηρία themselves, is at issue, with one side offering the aristocratic code as a 
definition and the other re-defining it along broader lines.250 
Χρηστός and πονηρός are weighty words. At root they denote operational integrity. True, 
what has operational integrity can prove to be useful, but that is an inference one degree removed 
from the actual fact of an object’s compositional and operational integrity. It is this operational 
base, seen in both the etymological and concrete aspects of the adjectives, that made the words in 
time general terms of the broadest moral valuation, indicative of not much more than one’s 
subjective disposition towards an object or person. In turn, this broad subjective import made the 
words ideal sociopolitical labels, when ethical warfare broke out in Athens. 
 
6.2.3 “Good Things” and “Bad Things” for Protagoras 
 
 
To return now to the Theaetetus passage, Protagoras had begun to explain the role of the σοφός 
by using the words ἀγαθός and κακός. He then realized his word choice might cause confusion 
and so selected different words for good and bad: χρηστός and πονηρός. There is reason to 
believe that Protagoras was particularly fond of these words. Versenyi points out that χρήματα in 
the human-measure dictum, deriving, as it does, from a verb meaning “to have dealing with” 
(χράομαι), aptly stresses our “attitude and relation to a thing, and not what that thing may or may 
not be in itself” (cf. subsection 2.1.1).251 Χρηστός, derived from the same verb, would therefore 
be an appropriate label for that “attitude and relation to a thing,” that is, our perception and 
250 For these “broader lines” as equality, legality, freedom and community, see Brock 1991: 167-169. For the view 
that it was an ethicality of intent that challenged the aristocratic ethicality of external success, see Donlan 1980: 113-
119, 153. 
251 Versenyi 1962: 182.  
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judgment of a thing. Plato also suggests Protagoras made much use of both adjectives when in 
the Protagoras he has Socrates point out to Hippocrates that the young man wishes to receive 
good wares from Protagoras when neither he nor perhaps the sophist himself knows what good 
and bad is. Not only does he designate good and bad in this passage with χρηστόν and πονηρόν, 
but does so five times (313a-e, i.e. one Stephanus page). The tedious repetition of these words 
suggests Socrates is joking and, as Protagoras does indeed fail to understand what virtue is later 
in the dialogue, the joke is quite possibly aimed at Protagoras’ (over-) use of the words.252 
However, Protagoras may have a reason for selecting these words in the Theaetetus 
passage which escaped his critic Plato. The results of the discussion above (subsection 6.2.2) 
were that these words embody an ethical debate that is currently playing out in Athens. The 
Athenians are not at all agreed as to what a χρηστὸς ἀνήρ and his opposite are. They naturally 
disagree also as to what things are χρηστά or πονηρά. Moreover, the disagreement, though 
basically ethical, intersects with the political sphere. There is a demotic and democratic 
definition of χρηστά and πονηρά and an elite and aristocratic definition. Cleon was the exemplar 
of πονηρία for the conservative citizens. Yet his advocates did not call him πονηρός and he 
certainly did not own the label himself. This debate then imparted an ambivalence to these 
epithets, or rather a political relativity. In the final analysis they do not mean much more than 
“what your side/my side considers ἀγαθόν or κακόν.” I suggest, therefore, that Protagoras, a 
keen observer of language, understood the subjective status of these words and so deliberately 
used them as synonyms of ἀγαθός and κακός in the Theaetetus passage (and elsewhere) because 
they allow him to plug in for good and bad the values “what X considers good” and “what X 
considers bad.”  
252 It is also worth nothing that Hermogenes in the Cratylus rejects Protagoreanism because it fails to acknowledge a 
difference between people who are χρηστοί and people who are πονηροί (386a1-c5). 
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6.2.4 The Guarantor of the City’s Opinion 
 
 
This being the basic meaning of χρηστός and πονηρός in this passage,253 what is the role now of 
Protagoras’ σοφὸς ῥήτωρ? Protagoras had said, according to my translation above:  
For, I assert that the wise and good politicians cause good things (τὰ χρηστά) instead of 
bad things (τῶν πονηρῶν) to seem to be just to their cities. For, whatever sort of things 
seem just and honorable to a city, these things [I maintain] are in fact so for it, as long it 
holds them to be; but it is the wise politician who made those just and honorable things, 
when they each were bad things (πονηρῶν) to them, be and seem good things (χρηστά). 
 
After plugging in the value “what the city considers good” for χρηστός and the value “what the 
city considers bad” for πονηρός, the following sense is yielded:  
For, I assert that the wise and good politicians cause what-the-city-considers-good things 
instead of what-the-city-considers-bad things to seem to be just to their cities. For, 
whatever sort of things seem just and honorable to a city, these things [I maintain] are in 
fact so for it, as long it holds them to be; but it is the wise politician who made those just 
and honorable things, when they each were what-the-city-considers-bad things to them, 
be and seem what-the-city-considers-good things. 
 
The role of Protagoras’ wise politician is that of a supervisor. It is a Protagorean truism that the 
city creates its morality. The words δίκαια καὶ καλά are a hendiadys for morality in the same way 
that δίκη καὶ αἰδώς in the mythos stood for a city’s ethicality. The wise politician does not 
tamper with this process. If he does, he risks imposing an individual’s δόξα on the whole. And if 
he does that, the opinion of the city is fundamentally incorrect, inasmuch as it does not represent 
the genuine perception and judgment of the entirety of the population (see subsection 5.1.3). In 
that case, the correlation between reality and the assessors of reality would be broken. Any 
mediation is a perversion. Instead, the wise politician is guarantor of that accurate correlation. 
When he sees that the city is inclined to ratify a course of action it considers bad (and thereby 
stamp on it the status of just and honorable), he brings about a change so that it ratifies a course 
253 This view assumes that Plato is working from a written text of Protagoras’ work Ἀλήθεια. For evidence for this 
view, see Pl. Tht. 152a4, 161c4, 166c8, 166d1, 171a1, 171c5-7; Cra. 386c2-4.  
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of action it considers good. He makes sure the city determines to be just and honorable only 
those courses of action the city itself considers just and honorable. He is the advocate of the 
city’s opinion, its δόξα. Such being his function, the title προστάτης τοῦ δήμου, as Connor 
interprets the label, fits him quite well. He is protector of the entire polis and “has the best 
interest of the citizenry at heart.”254 
 Does this construal of Protagoras’ wise politician run into the same problem for which I 
have faulted other construals (section 1.4)? That is, must this wise politician be committed 
beforehand to democracy in order to behave in this way? The answer is no. In order to present 
himself as this type of politician he does not have to be an avowed democrat. He only has to be 
committed already to Protagoras’ relativist theory of morality and ethical correctness – a pre-
commitment that is unproblematic and essential to Protagoras’ justification of democracy.  
 Similarly, one should ask if this construal of the role of the politican privileges one group 
above others as more intelligent, as again other reconstructions have done (subsection 1.4.1). 
Here the answer is yes and no. The politician has insight because of his natural endowment and 
education. Yet that superiority of insight still does not justify any claim to greater weight in 
decision-making, since consensus, issuing genuinely from the citizen-body, is what makes 
something right (and even feasible). His education only acclimates him more to his environment, 
while his natural endowment only means he is more likeminded to the ancestors than others; they 
do not make him in any absolute terms more expert in the administration of cities. Thus 
Protagoras’ theory neutralizes the superiority of his wise politicians and precludes the idea that 
they are objectively better, in either intellectual or ethical terms, than their poorer, less powerful, 
peers.   
 
254 Connor 1971: 115.  
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6.2.5 Factional Division  
 
 
In this passage Protagoras assumes a scenario in which the city is inclined to ratify a course of 
action it actually holds to be bad. This scenario does not a priori represent any and every meeting 
of the Assembly. Cases in which there is little disagreement over a bill reflect no such inclination 
on the part of the city to vote contrary to its actual opinion. Cases however where the city’s 
opinion is obscure can be characterized as an inclination to ratify as just and honorable what the 
city does not in fact hold to be so.  
On the whole, two scenarios of such obscurity can be envisioned: 1) When the minority 
view has a better turn out on the Pnyx. In Athens, this was always a possible occurrence. The 
usual estimate has only one-fifth of the total population vote on a given bill.255 That means the 
minority view could, given the right circumstances, be enacted. It was therefore imperative that 
decisions taken on the Pnyx represent the will of the whole Demos – an idea the Athenians took 
as a foregone conclusion.256 2) When the opinions of the citizenry were equally divided. 
When the citizens’ views were more or less split 50/50, the actual opinion of the city was liable 
to be suppressed in favor of a view at variance with it. Thus the passage describes, not every 
instance of decision-making, but, as Vlastos rightly assumes, 257 times of political disagreement 
at its worst. Protagoras’ theory is concerned foremost with the resolution of factional division 
and the stabilization of the polis, not by make-shift means, but by the establishment of genuine 
concord and likeminededness.  
255 Hansen 1976: 129-30. 
256 Cf. Hdt. 5.97.2; [Pl.] Ax. 369a2. See also Hansen 1978: 127-46 and 1989: 101-6, who predicates his argument 
that the dikasteries of the 4th century were not institutionally identical with the Assembly (though they did represent, 
in a loose sense, the whole people [1989:106]), on the important piece of evidence that Athenian decrees, orators 
and historians overwhelmingly used δῆμος as a virtual synonym for the Assembly. In short, the 6,000 in the 
Assembly were for all intents and purposes, on the particular occasion, the δῆμος. “As an ideological construct…the 
assembly was conceived as the whole of the people, and not just a part” (1989: 104).  
257 Vlastos 1956: xvi-xx.   
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Does this construal of the wise politician imply that the city can have perceptions and 
judgments that are mistaken? On an individual level, no. Protagoras never loses sight of the fact 
that in discussing the opinion of a city, he is dealing with the multiple opinions of multiple 
individuals, as is nicely illustrated by his referring to the polis with the masculine plural pronoun 
(αὐτοῖς) (167c6). In terms of the entire city, though, it is possible. But such cases of error are not 
epistemological. In the case of minority control of the Pnyx, it is logistical, while in cases of a 
50/50 split, the city cannot be said, properly speaking, to have formed any judgment yet (cf. 
subsection 5.1.3).  
The question remains: In cases where the citizens’ opinions are equally divided – that is, 
when there is neither consensus nor a majority view – how is one to discover what the city 
considers χρηστόν or πονηρόν, what its “actual opinion” is? I discuss this question in chapters 
ten and eleven.  
 
 
 
6.3 THE UTILITARIAN READING OF THE “DEFENSE” 
 
 
This interpretation of Protagoras’ wise politician as an advocate of the city’s opinion is 
challenged by the Platonic interpretation of the Theaetetus passage which has been followed by a 
good many scholars.258 It contends that, when formulating the role of the wise politician, 
Protagoras abandons a relativistic position and adopts criteria based on benefit and advantage. 
This interpretation relies on: 1) the analogies the Theaetetus passage presents between the wise 
politician and a physician and farmer and 2) the fact that Socrates concludes Protagoras was a 
258 Cornford 1935: 73; Kerferd 1945: 24-5; 1967: 91-3; 1981: 108; Guthrie 1971: 164-75; McDowell 1973: 40, 165-
8; Müller 1986: 185; Schiappa 2003: 126-30; Chappell 2004: 105-7. Cf. Moser and Kustas 1966: 114.  
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relativist as far as moral values were concerned, but anything but, when it came to the expedient. 
Seen in the right light, however, these reasons do not prove compelling.  
 
6.3.1 The Analogies 
 
 
Protagoras compares the wise politician to the farmer who, when one of his plants is sick, 
imparts to it good, healthy and even true perceptions (167b7-c1). This statement appears to imply 
that the action the politician exerts on the city is as objectively beneficial as the farmer’s curing 
of the sick plant. Similarly, when Protagoras compares the politician to the doctor who, when an 
ill patient tells him his food tastes bitter, makes his food taste agreeable, he appears to suggest 
that the wise politician can have perceptions which assess reality better than the totality of the 
city. However, one cannot treat these analogies as strictly parallel.259 The medical analogy is 
introduced to make the point that the wise politician, in order to bring the city from a “bad” 
opinion to a “good” opinion, must not teach or make the city smarter, but change its ἕξις. 
Furthermore, the horticultural analogy is much less developed than the scenario it is supposed to 
illuminate. 
 Be that as it may, the analogies do appear to assume a calculus of utility. It is hard, 
though, to agree with A. T. Cole that Plato misrepresents these analogies in order to extort from 
Protagoras a tacit assumption which he can then use to refute Protagoras.260 It is more likely that 
Plato’s agenda was simply different and not directly concerned with expounding Protagorean 
doctrine. This is not to say, though, that the original point the analogies made cannot be 
recovered. Here the discussion above of χρηστός and πονηρός proves pertinent. Understanding 
χρηστόν to mean “what-X-considers-good” and πονηρόν the opposite not only suggests that 
259 As for instance Cole 1966: 110-112, who accordingly sees discrepancies, and Burnyeat 1990: 25-27 do.  
260 Cole 1966: 116-117. 
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these were indeed analogies used by Protagoras, but may also explain what he originally meant 
by them.  
 The first step one might take for a sick plant might be to water it. Now, if, as I have 
argued (subsection 2.1.2), Protagoras’ ontology was, though objectivist, still so pluralistic that a 
thing’s being, and its being a certain way (its essence and substance), depended upon the 
individual’s assessment, then Protagoras must reject a globally beneficial value to water. So, 
while he would not deny that water encourages growth in plants, he can deny that water 
encourages growth in all things. This train of thought is patently erroneous, requiring one to 
think that because water helps plants grow, but does not encourage growth in other things (such 
as animal fur or human hair), it is not beneficial for growth at all. It is, on the other hand, 
understandable. In conceptualizing the biological world, Protagoras does not have the 
convenience of a Linnaean taxonomy. He classifies things not by common attributes, but by 
common function, e.g. things that grow, things that taste, etc. At the same time, the human genus 
is for him on the same plane as animal genera and even the plant kingdom. This peculiar (though 
not anachronistic) scientific outlook is in fact identical with the outlook assumed in the mythos 
Protagoras tells at the beginning of the Great Speech in the Protagoras (320c8-322d5).261 There 
Epimetheus’ distribution of body parts (thick fur, hard skin, hoofs and tough feet) to amorphous 
creatures suggests Protagoras had paid more attention to the individual parts themselves and their 
function, irrespective of biological differences, while his exposition of human intelligence and 
even human society as just a νόμος of the human creature comparable with the δυνάμεις given to 
the animals by Epimetheus, reveals a similar confusion between animal classes and orders. This 
scientific outlook of categorization by function, not by generic and special commonalities, might 
well have figured in the sophist’s grammatical work as well. If he is categorizing the biological 
261 Cf. Denyer 2008: 103-4. 
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world according to its function, it would be no surprise, if he was in fact the first to define what a 
verb (ῥῆμα) is.262 
 There is more evidence that this is indeed the way Protagoras is thinking. After the Great 
Speech in the Protagoras, Socrates tries to prove that the individual virtues are actually one and 
the same thing. In the course of his elenchus that σωφροσύνη and δικαιοσύνη share a common 
denominator (i.e. σοφία), he asks Protagoras if he considers things that are good (ἀγαθά) to be 
things that are beneficial (ὠφέλιμα) to humans (333d8-e1). Protagoras replies that he not only 
considers things beneficial to humans to be good, but even things that are not beneficial. Socrates 
asks for clarification: Does he mean things which are beneficial to no person are yet good or that 
things which are not beneficial simpliciter are yet good? Protagoras denies that things absolutely 
unbeneficial can be good but, lest he be obliged by his answers to equate the good and the 
beneficial, he points out that the same thing is not consistently beneficial. What is beneficial for 
humans may not be so for horses, oxen, dogs or plants. At this point he appears to categorize 
living organisms by taxonomic class. However, it becomes clear that this is not the case when he 
goes on to say that what is beneficial for one part of a plant is not so for another part, and ends 
the section by a description of olive oil: It is harmful for all plants and the bane of all animal hair 
except human hair, which it actually nourishes. Protagoras conceptualizes the biological world in 
terms of anatomical parts. Like the floating limbs of Empedocles (see subsection 3.3.4) and the 
animal attributes attached by Epimetheus, he is focusing more on the plant and animal parts that 
serve the same function than on the physiology peculiar to a class, order, family, genus or 
262 Cf. Guthrie 1971: 220. If he also first articulated the grammatical definition of λόγος as an ὄνομα and a ῥῆμα, 
then he would have in λόγος not only a convenient tool for describing the world, but a tangible mechanism for 
categorizing and defining the biological world. For Protagoras’ interest in natural science contra the Platonic 
portrait, see Thomas 2000: 147-9.  
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species. A biological taxonomy based on function and failing to take into account generic and 
special differences makes it easier for him to relativize even physical properties. 
 These physical properties include the beneficial. Socrates had asked him if he considered 
things absolutely unbeneficial to be good (334a2). If Socrates can get him to deny this, then 
Protagoras will be obliged to admit an objective content to the good. Protagoras breaks free of 
the trap. While he admits the quality of being beneficial does indeed share in the quality of being 
good (334a3), he points out that the beneficiality of a thing (e.g. olive oil) depends on the 
member (man, plant, root, hair, etc.). In so doing, he is in effect denying that the beneficiality 
inheres in the thing itself (e.g. olive oil): οὕτω δὲ ποικίλον τί ἐστιν τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ παντοδαπόν 
(334b6-7). Protagoras argues that, if a thing’s beneficiality did inhere in the thing, it would be 
beneficial across the board – for men, oxen, hair, roots, branches alike. Since it is not, it must not 
inhere in the thing. The beneficial, like all other properties, is relative. Mistaken though the 
argument may be, it is entirely consistent with his understanding and scientific outlook on the 
biological world. 
An important question now comes to the fore: If the beneficial does not inhere in the 
thing, how does one account for the undeniable phenomenon of a thing’s proving beneficial? In 
order to explain this question, Protagoras needs to expound his theory of relativism. It appears 
therefore that Mansfeld is right when he suggests that, if the lively applause of the audience and 
Socrates’ impatience at (what he calls)263 a long speech had not derailed the conversation, “a 
discussion of the implications of the man-measure principle” would have followed.264 As it is, 
Socrates refuses to be led down that path. His stated reason is that he has another engagement 
263 Cf. Havelock 1957: 206: “[T]he accusation of long-windedness is grotesque.” 
264 Mansfeld 1981: 44. Mansfeld also sees a verbal allusion here to the human-measure claim. See fn. 121.   
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(335c2-7).265  In terms of strategy, his dialectic mode has once again proven ineffective and he is 
attempting to approach his opponent in a different mode.266 Nevertheless, Protagoras’ attempt to 
broach the topic of relativism at this juncture in the dialogue echoes the point that he did not 
exclude what is beneficial from the human measure. 
 In this way Protagoras argues for the relative status of not only moral values, but even of 
what is beneficial by the empirical argument that the quality of the beneficial is evidently not 
inherent in the actual things. The Cyrenaic school made a similar argument. An important 
implication of their major tenet that only the feelings were comprehensible was the denial that 
human cognition of externals was veridical. In order to demonstrate our error in judging 
externals, they gave, according to Plutarch, the following proof (Adv. Col. 1120b):  
If honey is sweet and the olive shoot bitter and hail cold and neat wine warm and the sun 
bright and the mist of night dark, the opposite account is given by many animals, 
circumstances and people, since some disdain honey, and others welcome olive shoots 
and burn up in hail and feel freezing because of wine and have dim sight in the sun and 
see at night.  
 
Because different animals and people and even inanimate objects (πράγματα) have different 
perceptions even of things as quantifiably measurable as sunlight, the Cyrenaics maintained that 
these attributes did not inhere in the things. Their biological outlook had the same limitations that 
Protagoras’ did, and led them to similar conclusions. 
 Whether or not Protagoras argues for a relative value to the beneficial in this passage has 
been the subject of debate. Taylor believes he does; Vlastos and Mansfeld think the passage is 
prelude to a discussion of relativism.267 Challenging this view Kerferd, along with Moser and 
Kustas, believes Protagoras actually enunciates a utilitarian view.268 The similarity of 
265 However, as the prologue (309a1-310a7) shows, Socrates has a great deal of leisure. 
266 For the transition from a dialectic mode of argumentation to a didactic, see Allen 2006: 30.  
267 Taylor 1937: 251; Vlastos 1956: xvi n32; Mansfeld 1981: 44. 
268 Kerferd 1949: 24; Moser and Kustas 1966: 114. 
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Protagoras’ argument with Cyrenaic argumentation on the same topic suggests that Vlastos and 
Mansfeld are right. The fact that the Cyrenaics, a school epistemologically similar to Protagoras, 
used the same argument to challenge the notion of inherent values is another reason that suggests 
Protagoras used the argument for the similar purpose of defending his relativism.269  
It appears then quite plausible that, historically speaking, Protagoras did explain a thing’s 
beneficiality with reference to his relativism. But, again, how did he account for a thing’s 
undeniable beneficiality? I suggest that he had recourse to the local ethicalities and his 
anthropological definition of the human being. Benefit being contingent on the properties a thing 
has, and their properties being dependent for what they are on the individual’s perception, it 
would seem to follow for Protagoras that what is beneficial is just a description of how a thing is. 
And since the way one perceives a thing has been subjected to environmental conditioning to the 
point that the adult individual is predisposed to feel and think like his environment (to a degree), 
the “undeniable” beneficiality of a thing is simply the product of the “intersubjective truth” of 
the community. Were one suddenly transported to the Hyperboreans, he might be surprised to 
see that honey there is considered disgusting and that the locals do not die from temperatures he 
considers unbearable. In this way one might say that for Protagoras the individual creates the 
physical world, but the individual’s environment creates the individual. 
 In sum, the analogies that Protagoras draws at Tht. 167a-c between the wise politician on 
the one hand, and the physician and farmer on the other, do not commit Protagoras, or his wise 
politician, to a utilitarian doctrine. On the contrary, once one takes into account the character of 
Protagoras’ scientific outlook, they suggest that Protagoras regarded the quality of being 
beneficial just as relative an attribute as color or smell or flavor.  
269 For Protagoras’ possible influence on the Cyrenaics, see Guthrie 1962-1981: vol. III, 494-499 (especially 497 
n1). See above (subsection 6.1.2 & fn. 225) for Protagoras’ use of a Cyrenaic tenet in the defense. 
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6.3.2 The testimony of Socrates 
 
 
Besides the analogies, the other argument that Protagoras espoused a utilitarian view in the 
Theaetetus passage was the fact that Socrates concludes Protagoras did so. He was a relativist, 
Socrates asserts, as far as moral values were concerned, but anything but a relativist, when it 
came to the expedient (169d3-8, 172a1c1, 177c7-d6). However, it has been argued that Socrates’ 
treatment of Protagoras is problematic. Specifically, Cole argues that Socrates delivers a defense 
of Protagoras in which no doctrine of utility is expressed; then, in the course of restating the 
content of the defense, tacitly injects the calculus of utility.270 This interpretation has found some 
support, most notably in Burnyeat.271 A brief analysis of Socrates’ treatment, with particular 
attention paid to the heavy dose of irony infused in the passage, suggests that Cole and Burnyeat 
are in the main correct.  
 
 
 
6.4 SOCRATIC IRONY 
 
 
Socrates begins the examination proper of Protagoras’ human-measure claim by pointing out a 
possible contradiction it makes. If everybody’s perception/judgment is incorrigible, then nobody 
is properly wiser than another; if nobody is wiser than another, nobody can presume to be a 
teacher of another. Yet Protagoras was incontrovertibly a teacher. There is thus an inconsistency 
between Protagoras’ philosophy and his profession. How can one resolve this problem? Socrates 
suggests a few solutions. One, more implied in jest than offered seriously, is that Protagoras 
suffered from a Caligulan megalomania and considered himself a god (161c8, 162a1-3). Another 
is that he was pandering to the crowd and, since he denotes his pandering by the word δημόομαι, 
270 Cole 1966: 117; 1972: 27. 
271 Burnyeat 1990: 31-33. 
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one suspects Socrates means a primarily democratic crowd (161e4). He then deploys a reductio 
ad absurdum to undermine Protagoras’ human-measure claim, insofar as it is equivalent with 
Theaetetus’ definition of knowledge as perception (Tht. 151e1-3). Since perceiving is knowing, 
then seeing too is knowing. But when one recollects a thing, since he does not literally see the 
thing, he cannot be said to know the thing. Therefore, remembering a thing is not knowing a 
thing – a proposition, one might feel, per se absurd (163d1-164b9). 
 At this point, however, Socrates feels some compunction. He has been testing Protagoras’ 
doctrine superficially and verbally (164c7-d1). He begins to feel sorry for Protagoras’ doctrine 
and likens it to an orphan bereft of father and even a guardian, since Theodorus, a former student 
of Protagoras, refuses to protect the foundling. He himself therefore will undertake the defense of 
Protagoras’ human-measure claim (164e2-6). However, this “defense” is highly ironical. 
Socrates says he will help Protagoras (164e6). But he will help him, not by showing how the 
incorrigibility of human judgment is consistent with his professional position as a teacher, but by 
showing that in actuality he made no such claim that human judgment is incorrigible. In other 
words, he will argue Protagoras’ relativism committed him to an (epistemologically) objectivist 
position. That is why he could claim to be a teacher of others. Thus Protagoras’ position as a 
teacher is vindicated at the expense of everything Protagoras taught! 
 
6.4.1 The Language of the Direct Testimony 
 
 
Socrates begins his defense by giving Protagoras’ direct testimony in the first person. At first 
glance, it appears Socrates uses the first person to alleviate the tedium of this very un-dramatic 
dialogue. As it turns out, however, the use of the first person is an integral part of Socrates’ 
ironic proof that Protagoras was no relativist.  
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 Upon completing his direct testimony, Protagoras  (as quoted by Socrates) believes he 
has exonerated himself of the charge of inconsistency. That he believes his human-measure 
doctrine has been vindicated is clear when he tells Socrates he must accept being a measure, 
whether he wishes it or not (167d1-4). Socrates, however, once he begins to speak in propria 
persona again, interprets the same words in an entirely different way. He tells Theodorus that the 
two of them were wrong to take issue with Protagoras’ claim that everybody’s perception and 
judgment were incorrigible (αὐτάρκη ἕκαστον εἰς φρόνησιν), because Protagoras made no such 
claim. He actually maintained that certain individuals differ from others on the score of what is 
better and worse, and these are the ones who are wise (169d3-8).  
There is then a discrepancy between Socrates and Protagoras as to what the direct 
testimony had meant. The discrepancy is apparent in Socrates’ words to Theodorus as well. He 
adds the word “worse” (χείρονος),272 where Protagoras had studiously avoided it, and speaks of 
Protagoras’ testimony as a concession (συνεχώρησεν), though it clearly was not.273 In short, 
Protagoras concludes the human-measure is vindicated on the basis of words Socrates gives him, 
while Socrates on the basis of the same words thinks the same doctrine is disavowed by the 
sophist. This disconnect at first glance might seem disconcerting, but upon closer inspection 
simply proves to be due to Socrates’ irony. Being facetious, he is using, not just ideas, but 
language as well which Protagoras actually used against Protagoras in order to “prove” he did 
not teach what he in fact taught.  
This point is borne out in the courtroom-style hypophora that follows. Socrates soon 
pauses to express a concern: Somebody might claim that Protagoras, were he present, would 
have said no such thing, but that Socrates had put words in his mouth; therefore, Socrates must 
272 See above, fn. 226. 
273 Cf. Chappell 2004: 109n87.  
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prove Protagoras taught that judgments were indeed corrigible (i.e. that the human individual is 
NOT the measure) from Protagoras’ own philosophy (169d10-170a1). McDowell remarks that 
this hypophora suggests the content of the direct testimony is not authentic material.274 When the 
hypothetical objector claims Protagoras would not have said any such thing, he, a Protagorean, is 
asserting that he does not recognize the language of the direct testimony.  
However, Socrates is simply assuming that this objector understands the direct testimony 
just as he himself did – as indeed he must. If the objector had said: “Protagoras did use those 
words, but you have drawn the wrong conclusion from them,” Socrates could not keep the irony 
going. True, he could still prove that Protagorean relativism is self-contradictory, but he could 
not “prove” that Protagoras himself thought so, too. Yet that is the ironic leitmotif of the passage: 
to “exonerate” Protagoras of the hybris in which the human-measure claim implicates him. It is 
therefore integral to Socrates’ irony that the language of the direct testimony be at one and the 
same time recognizable, and objectionable, to a Protagorean. This Protagorean, who wishes to 
“condemn” Protagoras of relativism, must deny that the language is Protagoras’, in order that the 
historical reality that it was indeed the language Protagoras used can “convict” this Protagorean 
of being wrong in asserting that Protagoras was, as indeed he was, a relativist. In other words, 
the whole point of this mock courtroom scene is to use Protagoras’ words against him. The 
words therefore must be authentic, if the irony is to have any point. Thus, once the irony is taken 
into account, the hypophora is actually an argument for the authenticity of the direct testimony. 
 
6.4.2 The Peritropē 
 
 
Socrates soon proceeds to a second proof that Protagoras did not hold the human-measure 
doctrine. This one will not be direct testimony, but a demonstration culled from his own 
274 1973: 169. 
153 
 
                                                 
philosophy. This proof is a “turning of the tables” (περιτροπή) on Protagoras. The majority, 
Socrates begins, believes there is such a thing as a wiser individual (170a6-c8). If Protagoras 
agrees with them, then there is a wiser individual (170e9-171a1). If he does not, then one of two 
results follows: He must recognize the belief of the majority as a provisional truth.275 If they 
think there is a wiser person, although he himself does not, he can still claim to be a teacher by 
virtue of their opinion. However, this position would not inspire much confidence in a 
prospective student. So, he should probably justify his profession in another way. He could 
contend that, since everybody else thinks there is a wiser person, they are necessarily right, 
because they are the measure of all things; and for the same reason his claim, that there is no-one 
wiser than another, is mistaken. In other words, Protagoras’ human-measure claim commits him 
to the opinion of the majority.  
The success of this περιτροπή has been called into question. Vlastos remarks that 
Socrates reaches his conclusion only by omitting the very important qualifier “for” at 171a8-b7. 
Thus, he does not speak of what is true for the many or for Protagoras, but what is true 
simpliciter.276 The efficiency of the περιτροπή is not, however, relevant to the matter at hand.277 
What matters here is the position it holds in the overall polemic. Just as the direct testimony 
showed Protagoras’ own words “denied” the human-measure, and so justified his profession as 
teacher, so the περιτροπή shows how Protagoras could use his human-measure claim to “deny” 
his human-measure claim, and justify his legitimacy to teach. In other words, Socrates is still 
being ironical and has “proven” on the basis of Protagoras’ own philosophy that the Abderite did 
not really believe his own philosophy. 
275 Cf. Chappell 2004: 112.  
276 Vlastos 1956: xiv, n27. 
277 Burnyeat 1976 contends Plato’s reasoning is sound even though the qualifiers are dropped. Chappell 1995: 338 
argues Plato’s περιτροπή does not prove Protagoras’ doctrine to be self-refuting, though it does suggest it is self-
defeating. 
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6.4.3 Protagoras the Socratic 
 
 
After – and as a result of – these two highly ironical “proofs,” Socrates and Theodorus agree that 
Protagoras conceded (171d507)278 that one was wiser than another, and one was more ignorant 
than another (and so that Protagoras did not mean any sort of complete relativism by his human-
measure claim). Socrates can now move on to his second contention, viz. that Protagoras 
considered the beneficial and expedient to have objective value. As noted above, Socrates 
believes the direct testimony had proved this (i.e. that Protagoras believed in an objective 
beneficialness), but the presence of an objector had suggested Protagoras held no such view. 
Now that he has “proven” Protagoras considered one could be wiser than another, he argues that 
this claim of Protagoras would be untenable unless he recognized an objective value in the 
beneficial and expedient, which is, he comments, the way he interpreted the direct testimony all 
along: ἦ καὶ ταύτῃ ἂν μάλιστα ἵστασθαι τὸν λόγον, ᾗ ἡμεῖς ὑπεγράψαμεν βοηθοῦντες 
Πρωταγόρᾳ κτλ; (171d9-e1). As regards the human body, this means Protagoras must have 
considered the healthy and unhealthy to have objective value; as regards the civilized 
community, it means:  
καλὰ μὲν καὶ αἰσχρὰ καὶ δίκαια καὶ ἄδικα καὶ ὅσια καὶ μή, οἷα ἂν ἑκάστη πόλις οἰηθεῖσα 
θῆται νόμιμα αὑτῇ, ταῦτα καὶ εἶναι τῇ ἀληθείᾳ ἑκάστῃ...ἐν δὲ τῷ συμφέροντα ἑαυτῇ ἢ μὴ 
συμφέροντα τίθεσθαι, ἐνταυθ’, εἴπερ που, αὖ ὁμολογήσει σύμβουλόν τε συμβούλου 
διαφέρειν καὶ πόλεως δόξαν ἑτέραν ἑτέρας πρὸς ἀλήθειαν (172a1-8).  
 
Socrates has taken liberties. Since Protagoras, he says, did believe one could be quantifiably 
wiser than another, it stands to reason that he must have recognized some standard as objective. 
278 This passage is obscure. The Greek runs: καὶ δῆτα καὶ νῦν ἄλλο τι φῶμεν ὁμολογεῖν ἂν τοῦτό γε ὁντινοῦν, τὸ 
εἶναι σοφώτερον ἕτερον ἑτέρου, εἶναι δὲ καὶ ἀμαθέστερον; It is usually translated as for example Chappell 2004: 
118 does: “Anyone at all would agree that some people are wiser than others, and some people are more ignorant.” 
However, what anybody (ὁντινοῦν) would concede is not at issue. In fact, it is quite immaterial. What is at issue is 
what Protagoras himself would concede. Therefore, a better translation is: “And so aren’t we to say that anybody at 
all would grant our point as to the fact that one is wiser and one more ignorant than another” – “our point” being of 
course “that Protagoras thought so.” In other words, the articular infinitive serves as a shorthand expression for the 
theme of the passage, not a mere equivalent to an indirect statement. 
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But the first premise is unacceptable, because it entails the total denial of the human-measure 
claim. The second premise, therefore, since it depends on the first, is unacceptable, too. 
Protagoras recognized an objective value to the expedient if and only if he recognized the 
existence of a better and worse assessment of reality (i.e. a wiser person) at the expense of his 
human-measure claim. In short, Socrates intensely ironic argument amounts to this: Protagoras 
did consider what is beneficial and expedient to be objective because he really did not assert the 
human-measure claim. 
 In this way an analysis of the Theaetetus passage that pays close attention to the irony of 
the context suggests that Cole and Burnyeat are correct. Socrates foists on Protagoras the 
doctrine of utility. However, he is being ironical, not, as Cole says, “unfair.”279 His irony has 
point. It highlights the incompatibility of Protagoras’ human-measure claim and any notion of 
utility as it was (and is) traditionally understood. Theaetetus is his audience. The young man is to 
realize from this discussion that he has a choice. Either perceiving is knowing or what is 
expedient is so simpliciter; but one cannot have both. And moreover Socrates himself implies 
that Protagoras himself knew very well that these two ideas were incompatible, not only when he 
introduces a hypothetical Protagorean to object to his direct testimony, but also when he 
distinguishes Protagoras’ teachings from contemporary Protagoreans ὅσοι γε ἂν μὴ παντάπασι 
τὸν Πρωταγόρου λόγον λέγωσιν (172b6-7). These “incomplete Protagoreans,” as Cole labels 
them,280 do admit the calculus of utility, which suggests that Protagoras didn’t.  In what follows 
Socrates drives home the point he has been making with another, more weighty,281 argument: 
Considerations of future benefit prove the expert has a more accurate assessment of all reality 
(177c6-179b9). But this argument represents a new direction. Regarding Protagoras himself, the 
279 Cole 1966: 117. 
280 Ibid. 113.  
281 At least in the opinion of Theodorus (179b6-9). 
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damage has been done. Socrates has had fun with him. In a passage dripping with irony, he has 
shown Protagoras did not really espouse anything near a relativist philosophy. On the contrary, 
he recognized the calculus of utility and therefore was, for all intents and purposes, a good 
Socratic.282 
 
 
 
6.5 CONCLUSION 
 
 
In sum, the utilitarian Protagoras in the Theaetetus is a mirage brought on by Socrates’ irony. It 
might strike one as too playful or too ad hominem, but Socrates has a real point: A relativist 
philosophy, such as Protagoras’, and a philosophy that interprets the good as the beneficial, are 
incompatible. If Theaetetus persists in his original definition of knowledge, he will fail to make 
any provision for the beneficial – a troubling idea for Socrates.  
 Nevertheless, behind the irony the real Protagoras is discernible. Specifically, one can 
still gather what he taught the role of the politician in a community of consensus to be. He was to 
be the advocate of the city’s opinion. In times of doubt, when the city’s opinion was obscure and 
various viewpoints laid claim to being its actual opinion, he determined which of these 
viewpoints was most consistent with the city’s ethical environment. In this way, he made sure 
that what the city determined to be just and honorable, was in fact a thing it actually considered 
“good” (χρηστόν). In this way Protagoras accounted for leadership in the community of 
consensus without undermining the consensus doctrine. What the city deems just and honorable 
is so, for as long as it so deems. The fact that there are leaders in this city is not a problem. They 
do not impose their will by force or speech on the citizens. Rather, they isolate the opinion that is 
consistent with the city’s ethicality and advocate for it.   
282 For Socrates and the place of the useful in his teachings, see Pl. Grg. 470a9-c3, Rep. 336c6-d4.  
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7.0 PROTAGORAS AND PERICLES 
 
 
 
 
In the previous chapters I have set forth an interpretation of the democratic political theory which 
I suggest Protagoras developed on the basis of his doctrine of relativism. It remains to see if this 
political theory exerted any actual influence on the Athenian democracy. While it certainly is not 
responsible for the origin of democracy, and just as certainly did not contribute to the inestimable 
boost Ephialtes gave it in the late 460s, but on the contrary was influenced and inspired by those 
reforms, it did have a role in the ultimate direction Periclean democracy in time took. The 
presence of Protagorean ideas in the funeral speech of Pericles suggests that Thucydides was 
well aware of a Protagorean element in the democracy of the second half of the fifth century and 
that it was part of his historical agenda to draw attention to it.  
 However, before discussing the Protagorean contours and colors Thucydides applies to 
his portrait of Pericles, it is important to revisit the evidence regarding Protagoras’ life and his 
relationship with Pericles, in order to make sure such a view for Thucydides is historically 
possible. A new reconstruction of Protagoras’ life will not only suggest that the two men shared 
a friendship, but that Protagoras occupied an informal advisory position in the friendship. An 
analysis of other evidence confirms this conclusion. Plutarch transmits a very important piece of 
gossip about the two men, and Plato in his Protagoras exploits their relationship as an 
opportunity for a subtle subversion of Protagoras’ educational ideas. Seeing then that the 
evidence suggests Pericles, Athens’ σύμβουλος par excellence, had himself a σύμβουλος in 
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Protagoras, it should come as no surprise, if Thucydides drew a portrait of Pericles in which he 
incorporated Protagorean elements.  
 
 
7.1 CHRONOLOGY OF PROTAGORAS’ LIFE 
 
 
The most relevant in-depth analysis of the evidence for Protagoras’ life is still the studies done 
by Morrison and Davison.283 However, as important as these studies are, especially in 
determining the dates of Protagoras’ birth and death, they fail to weed out suspect information 
and to take account of other information that could bring Protagoras’ residencies and movements 
into greater focus. In this section I attempt to do just that; and the results are suggestive. In brief, 
they are hardly explicable unless a close, informally advisory relationship between the two men 
is granted.  
 
7.1.1 Birth  
 
 
At the end of the twentieth century Theodor Gomperz questioned Johann Frei’s more or less 
canonical date of c. 480 for the birth of Protagoras by pointing out that it made Protagoras’ 
remark at Prt. 317c3 (viz. that he was old enough to be the father of everybody present), hard to 
believe, since Socrates was born in 469.284 He therefore suggested a date of c. 485. This 
suggestion found approval for a while,285 but was finally challenged by J. A. Davison, who 
objected that it assumed Protagoras to be speaking in terms of strict puberty.286 Since he believed 
that Eupolis’ Kolakes placed Protagoras in Athens in the archon year of 422/1 and since 
283 Morrison 1941: 1-7; Davison 1953: 33-38. At any rate, recent biographical discussions rely heavily on one or the 
other or both (see, e.g., Schiappa 2003: 217-8). 
284 Frei 1845: 64; Gomperz 1898: 471. For Socrates’ date of birth, see D.L. 2.44.  
285 E. g. Morrison 1941: 4. 
286 1953: 35.  
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moreover Plato again is witness that Protagoras lived more than 70 years (Meno 91e), he 
suggested a date of birth of 492 or 491. This date was followed by von Fritz and has since not 
been challenged.287 Although there is always danger in taking Plato literally, Davison’s 
reasoning appears sound. Since Plato knew Socrates’ age (Crito 52e3) and had set the 
Protagoras in 433/2 BC288 a few years before the well-known date of a major event (i.e. the 
Peloponnesian war), a fair degree of precision can be expected from the remark he puts in 
Protagoras’ mouth.  
 The sources agree that he was born in Abdera on the Thracian coast some fifty miles east 
of Amphipolis. The one noteworthy exception is a fragment from Eupolis’ Kolakes which 
designates him as Teian (fr.147 PCG), but in light of the unique relationship between Abdera 
and Teos this is little problem. Around 545 BC the Teians abandoned their city and founded 
Abdera, then some years later re-founded Teos by sending a colony to the mother site, with 
which they remained united in a sympoliteia.289 Eupolis is most likely making a joking reference 
to this special relationship.  
It has been suggested that in the years 480 to 450, if not earlier, Abdera and Teos were 
beginning to build a democratic government. The argument depends on the interpretation of 
Teian imprecation decrees in which the αἰσυμνήτης (elective ruler) receives negative treatment, 
any judicial decision to put a citizen to death requires a quorum (200 at Teos, 500 at Abdera) and 
the liability of the magistrates upon failure to have these decrees recited and enforced is 
emphasized.290 If the Abderites were already moving in a democratic direction as early as 480, 
287 von Fritz 1957: 908-909; Schiappa 2003: 217-8.  
288 See below, fn. 343. 
289 See Robinson 2011: 140-145. 
290 Ibid: 140-145. 
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then it means that Protagoras was early on exposed to the ideas, as well as to the problems, 
involved in democracy.  
Philostratus tells how Protagoras’ father played host to Xerxes in 480 and in exchange 
received Persian magi as instructors for his son, then a παῖς (VS 1.10). This for him helps explain 
Protagoras’ agnosticism, since Persian magi customarily refrained from saying anything definite 
about the gods in public (VS 1.10). Interestingly, Diogenes Laertius records the very same story 
as an event in the boyhood of Democritus (9.34). As long as the date of birth of neither 
Protagoras nor Democritus appeared to square with this story, it was assumed to be a total 
fabrication which Diogenes, not Philostratus, rightly recorded as belonging to the biographical 
tradition of Democritus.291 However, now that a date of birth before 490 for Protagoras seems 
likely, it appears that Philostratus was right after all and that it was Diogenes who was 
mistaken.292 Von Fritz suggests that this instruction exposed the young Protagoras to Persian 
customs and religion which, as a horizon-broadening experience, exerted a formative influence 
in the later development of his relativism.293 
Epicurus called Protagoras a porter (φορμοφόρος) (ap. D.L. 9.53) and in a Hesychian 
scholion to Plato’s Republic he was once a φορτοβαστάκτης.294 On that note he is said to have 
invented a shoulder-pad for carrying loads, the τύλη (D.L. 9.53), and to have devised an 
ingenious way of binding wood into a bundle (Gell. 5.3).295 Although the fact that the Hesychian 
scholion and Gellius include the erroneous tradition that Protagoras was Democritus’ pupil 
greatly reduces the likelihood of these stories, still the tradition of Protagoras as a porter is 
291 See Wright’s comment (1921: 32n2) for an example of the view at this time.  
292 Cf. Davison 1953: 33-34 and Kerferd 1981: 42.  
293 von Fritz 1957: 911. Davison 1953: 34 likewise believes the story to belong to the biographical tradition of 
Protagoras and to serve as evidence for a pre-490 birth, but is more reluctant than von Fritz to accept it as fact.  
294 = DK 80 A3. In Aulus Gellius the word is ἀχθοφόρος (5.3).  
295 Cf. Ath. 8.354c (= DK 68 A9) who says Epicurus asserted Protagoras was also Democritus’ private secretary. It 
appears Diogenes and Athenaeus are referring to the same “Epicurean” letter, since according to Athenaeus 
Epicurus called Protagoras a φορμοφόρος (as well as a ξυλοφόρος).  
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interesting in its own right. As I have argued in chapters one through six, Protagoras’ 
formulation of human society and morality reduced virtue, both political and moral, to an 
outlook or frame of mind that one’s environment conditions. Originally that outlook derives from 
an unconditioned, biological, perhaps even natural, assessment of reality; but the mere fact that 
one is born at a later date in an already advanced community means that his environment will 
determine his outlook more than his own thought. As a result of this determinism, virtue for 
Protagoras is effectively a trade-skill, a τέχνη, learned like other τέχναι, by societal 
apprenticeship and cultural osmosis. It is therefore entirely believable that Protagoras was 
actually in the habit of comparing, as Plato has him do (Prt. 328a), the way the young learn 
virtue to the way sons of craftsmen (χειροτέχναι) learn their fathers’ craft. The tradition of 
Protagoras as a porter may very well be a vestige of both his theory (as well as the analogies he 
was fond of using to propound that theory) and the insults and witticisms that his manner of 
speaking encouraged. This type of misrepresentation, obviously aiming at arousing laughter, 
possibly had its origin in Attic comedy.296 
 
7.1.2 Life 
 
 
At Meno 91e3-9 Socrates asserts that Protagoras plied his trade for “more than forty years.” For, 
he says, he believes he died around seventy years of age after practicing his profession for forty 
years. It seems strange that Plato would know when Protagoras began to teach, unless that time 
was somehow easily datable for Plato. It has therefore been suggested that this statement from 
296 Protagoras was one of Callias’ flatterers in Eupolis’ Κόλακες (see PCG s. l., fr. 157, 158), whose poverty (τὰ δὲ 
χαμᾶθεν ἐσθίει) would be consistent with a lowly, banausic occupation.  
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Socrates reflects the time when Protagoras first arrived at Athens.297 If this is correct, then 
Protagoras will have first arrived at Athens in 462 or 461 BC.  
 There is very good circumstantial evidence to recommend this as the date of Protagoras’ 
arrival. It was in the archon year of 462/1 that Ephialtes had the measures passed that deprived 
the Areopagus of many of its traditional powers and transferred them to the Council, Assembly 
and Courts.298 This transference of powers amounted to an overhaul of the Athenian state.299 The 
presidency of the Assembly was taken away from the board of archons who, by the rule that 
made them members of the Areopagus after their term of office, had de facto, if not formal, 
obligations to the Areopagites, and was entrusted to a rotating subcommittee of fifty men drawn 
from the Council.300 These prytaneis, representing three of the four Solonian property brackets, 
presided over the entire legislative process of the Athenian state. Furthermore, the vetting of 
incoming officials (dokimasia) and the examination of outgoing officials (euthyna) was given to 
the jury-courts which all four property brackets occupied.301 If Wade-Gery is right in suggesting 
that at this time the Courts were not only enlarged, but actually created, that the Heliaea which 
had up to now been an appeals courts, was transformed by Ephialtes into the court of first and 
last instance, then these measures can indeed be called “an experiment of committing justice to 
the unlearned” (see subsection 1.2.3).302 But Wade-Gery’s phrase only captures half of the 
situation. Not only had the judicial branch been entrusted to the free, adult male population in its 
entirety, but the legislative had as well, and in four years the executive branch would be opened 
297 Morrison 1941: 5; Davison 1953: 37. Cf. Kerferd 1981: 43.  
298 Ath. Pol. 25. 
299 See Rhodes 1985a: 144-207, 203-205 for arguments for, and 1992: 67-75 for a strong statement of, this position 
on the Ephialtean reforms. For a counter view (i.e. that Ephialtes merely had the vetting and examination of officials 
transferred to the Council), see Sealey 1981: 311, 323-4.  
300 Rhodes 1992: 71-79.  
301 Rhodes 1992: 71. So too Sealey 1981: 323-4. 
302 Wade-Gery 1958: 192. Cf. Smith 1925: 118-9; Rhodes 1985a: 168-9, 204n1, 210.  
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up to the third Solonian bracket, the zeugitae.303 Many Athenian citizens were doing what 
Athenian citizens had never done before. It was the perfect opportunity for an educator, as more 
Athenians now than ever needed basic instruction in the practical skills of delivering, and 
(perhaps more importantly) in critiquing, a speech and in civic administration as well.   
Moreover, it was the ideal time for Protagoras’ particular brand of instruction. The 
measures the Athenians had ratified placed an enormous amount of responsibility on the average 
Athenian. The most pressing problem this new responsibility posed was how one was going to 
fulfill his public duties on top of his domestic obligations. Protagoras’ courses were a direct 
answer to this concern. At Prt. 318e5ff he sums up what he teaches in the word εὐβουλία, good 
decision-making, which he promises to teach in the management of both one’s private estate and 
of the city at large. He contrasts his instruction with that of other sophists, in this case Hippias, 
who teach their students useless abstractions (318d9-e5). It has been suggested that Protagoras’ 
political thought, while it advocated democracy, demanded a specialized, elite leadership within 
that democracy.304 On the contrary, Protagorean εὐβουλία was a curriculum targeting the 
amateur politician whose time was divided between Assembly and farmstead, office-holding and 
shop-keeping. As such, it was particularly at home in the year 462/1, when the issue of the 
feasibility of part-time politics would have been first raised.   
 
7.1.3 Thurii 
 
 
The next recorded event in Protagoras’ life occurred some seventeen years later. Heraclides of 
Pontus is witness, in his work On Laws, that Protagoras “wrote laws for Thurii” (ap. D.L. 
303 Ath.Pol. 26.2. His name was Mnesitheides, who served as archon in 457/6. 
304 Cf. Morrison 1941:16 (a “led democracy”) and Farrar 1988: 71-87. 
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9.50).305 Thurii was founded in the archonship of Praxiteles (444/3 BC).306 The significance this 
fact has on the life of Protagoras is bound up closely with the question of whether or not Athens 
played a leading role in its colonization and, if so, whether Pericles was instrumental in that 
decision.  
 In keeping with his thesis that democracy was a Greek, not just an Athenian, 
phenomenon, Eric Robinson argues that the role Athens played in the foundation of Thurii and 
its democratic constitution was minimal.307 However, this argument turns a blind eye to a great 
deal of evidence. According to Diodorus Siculus, the Sybarites were driven from their city a 
second time in 448/7 (11.9).308 The Sybarites appealed to Sparta to help them regain their city. 
When the Spartans refused to help, the Sybarites asked the Athenians. At this point the sequence 
of events becomes problematic. Diodorus relates that 1) the Athenians send ten ships under 
Lampon and Xenocritus, at the same time inviting Peloponnesian individuals to join; 2) Lampon 
and Xenocritus then select the site in accordance with a Delphic oracle; 3) they build the city; 4) 
the new colonists, called Thurians by Diodorus, quarrel with the Sybarites because these insist on 
special privileges; 5) the new colonists kill the Sybarites and establish a democracy (9.10-11).  
 This sequence clearly omits some clarifying details; but the question is if it compresses 
two events. V. Ehrenberg argues it does, relying on a passage from Strabo which gives a 
different sequence of events. According to Strabo, 1) Athenians and other Greeks re-found 
Sybaris with the Sybarites; 2) they soon conceive contempt for the Sybarites; 3) they kill them; 
4) they then move the community to a new site and name it Thurii. Reconciling the two 
305 It is sometimes claimed Heraclides said he wrote the laws for Thurii (e.g. Ehrenberg 1948: 168; Robinson 2011: 
120), which he clearly did not say. 
306 [Plut.] VDO 835c. Cf. Ehrenberg 1948: 150; Andrewes 1978: 6. 
307 2011: 119-122. 
308 In 510 BC they had been defeated and driven into exile by the Crotoniates, led by Milo, the renowned Olympic 
victor, dressed as Heracles. Then, fifty-eight years later (in 452), they re-settled the site, but five years later (448/7) 
were again driven out. 
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accounts, Ehrenberg suggests that there was an initial re-colonization of Sybaris in 446/4 that 
went terribly wrong and a subsequent relocation of the colonists to Thurii in 444/3.309  
 The problem with this reconstruction is that, in following Strabo in placing the 
foundation of Thurii shortly after the failed re-settling of Sybaris, one must also place the 
establishment of a democratic government after the relocation. This in turn means that the 
original Athenian colonists agreed, when departing for Sybaris, to live in a non-democratic 
government. It is hard to believe the Athenian demographic that typically found colonization 
appealing would agree to that condition.310 Strabo knew Sybaris and Thurii were two different 
sites.311 He also knew there had been a quarrel. He has simply inferred that the change of name 
was due to the quarrel.  
309 Ehrenberg 1948: 156-7. This “two foundations theory” ultimately derives from Wade-Gery 1958: 256-7, 261-2, 
who was attempting to explain why the Vita Anonyma Thucydidis 6-7 had Thucydides (the son of Melesias) 
prosecuted by Xenocritus and ostracized after a return from Sybaris. He argued that an initial Periclean re-
foundation of Sybaris was turned into a panhellenic project by Thucydides, who upon returning was attacked in 
court for it. Thus the idea of two foundations underpins a Thucydidean panhellenic project. Ultimately the theory 
rests on numismatic evidence. Sybarite coins depicting the head of Athena on the obverse, but bearing the legend -
ΥΒΑΡΙ in Ionic letters (instead of the local abbreviation ΜΥ) on the reverse  must, it is thought, refer to a Sybarite-
Athenian enterprise prior to any foundation of Thurii (Kraay 1976: 173-4, 184, & fig. 586; cf. Ehrenberg 1948: 152; 
Rutter 1973: 163; Andrewes 1978: 6, 8n24). However, a similar coin, but with a different reverse design, has also 
been found (Kraay, fig. 587) which Kraay claims to be a second issue by the New Sybaris. According to the timeline 
proposed by the two-foundations theory, this means between 446 and 444 New Sybaris struck two different coins! 
Kraay tries to solve the timeline problem by claiming that the Sybarites were not expelled until 440 (184); this 
however removes the reason for positing two foundations in the first place (i.e. to explain Thucydides’ involvement 
in 444)! Moreover, Kagan 1969: 383-4 warns against placing too much emphasis on the Athena type, since it occurs 
throughout the Greek world (cf. Head: 1911: 85). Kagan’s point is supported by the fact that in 434/3 the Thurians 
disavowed the Athenians as their οἰκιστῆρες (D.S. 12.35), yet the Athena type continued on their coins into the 
fourth century (Head 1911: 86; Kraay 1976: 184-5). Alternatively, therefore, the coins could come from Sybaris on 
Traes, where the Sybarite survivors wound up. The objection to this, voiced by Rutter 1973: 163, is that these 
survivors would hardly keep the Athena type after their harsh treatment at the hands of the Athenians. But, as Kagan 
points out, by that reasoning the Thurians should never have used the bull, a Sybarite tradition, on the reverse, a 
thing they clearly did. In short, the numismatic evidence offers little to no control over the literary evidence. My 
own suspicion is that the Thurii coins have nothing to do with the 440s but postdate 434/3 when the Thurians broke 
with Athens. The Thurians would then have been in a position to establish friendly relations with Sybaris-on-the-
Traes, whose similar coinage will have expressed that friendship. 
310 In the decree providing for the foundation of Brea around this same time (IG I³ 46 [= ML 49]), a special 
amendment was made guaranteeing the right for θῆτες to enroll (cf. Meiggs and Lewis 1988: 132).  
311 As, for instance, the writer of the Plutarchan Vitae Decem Oratorum (and Plutarch himself at Per. 115), as well 
as Stephanus Byzantinus (s.v. “Thourioi”) do not (835c). 
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 It is therefore better to follow the Diodoran sequence.312 What obscurities it does contain 
become explainable once it is remembered that constructing a new city takes time. In this light it 
appears that Lampon and Xenocritus departed in 446/5 with ten ships in order to select a new 
site. Otherwise, if the selection of the site occurred later, why was Lampon, a seer whose 
expertise was needed in site-selection, present in the small (and therefore initial)313 expedition? 
Once the site was selected, construction began. Nor was this any makeshift construction, but the 
more scientific, painstaking construction of Hippodamus, who it is reasonable to suggest 
accompanied Lampon, as the architect should have a say in the selection of the site. While 
construction was going on, Peloponnesian individuals were being recruited and at Sybaris, for 
the moment a temporary base,314 talks were underway on what the constitution should look like. 
It is at this point that the Sybarites proved intractable, proving an obstacle to a democratic state. 
Evidence that the disagreement occurred during debate, not after a government was installed, is 
provided by Diodorus’ language. He says the Sybarites “were allotting” (προσένεμον) to 
themselves the highest offices.  This word is more indicative of arranging a plan of division than 
appointing a magistrate. He also says the Sybarites “thought their women should” (ᾤοντο δεῖν) 
sacrifice before the newly-arrived women, not that they were already doing so. Finally, he says 
that they “were assigning the nearest lots of land to themselves,” using the imperfect 
(κατεκληρούχουν). If the government is up and running, why have land allotments not been 
finalized? It is therefore more likely that this imperfect has conative force and refers, as do the 
312 Cf. Arist. Pol. 1303a32 who like Diodorus records the quarrel as happening at Thurii, not Sybaris. 
313 As Ehrenberg 1948: 151 believes. 
314 But Rainey 1969: 272 reports that “all the archaeological evidence points to the conclusion that Thurii was built 
over the southern section of the city of Sybaris.”  
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others, to the claims and demands the Sybarites were making when plans were being drawn up, 
not to actual behavior.315  
At this point the Athenians and the other Greeks take up arms against the Sybarites, give 
a rather cruel coup de grâce to a very unlucky nation and proceed as planned until they “cut the 
ribbon” in 444/3 BC – which became the date for the chroniclers.316  
Thus taking the Diodoran account as reliable means attributing to the Athenians a role of 
leadership in the enterprise. Although they promised to participate (συμπράξειν), it is clear that 
they quickly commandeered the venture, as their subsequent actions show. First, they issued an 
invitation to the Peloponnesian states to take part, not officially, but on an individual basis (τῷ 
βουλομένῳ). There are several a priori reasons why the Athenians would throw open the colony 
to Peloponnesian citizens.317 Why the Sybarites would, after receiving the cooperation of 
Athens, and her empire, is much more difficult to explain. The Athenians are serving their own 
agenda.  
Furthermore, the Athenians provided the seer for the expedition, Lampon. The presence 
of this man is significant. It indicates that, although the Sybarites had originally requested help in 
effecting a return (κάθοδος), the project quickly became the organization of an entirely new 
colony which required the direction of Delphian Apollo through the mediation of a μάντις to be 
supplied by Athens. Is this what the Sybarite refugees had in mind? On this note, a reference 
made by Aristophanes is noteworthy. He mentions among those “sophists” nurtured by the 
Clouds certain Θουριομάντεις (Clouds 331). This comedic compound, rather obscure on its own, 
gains in clarity when set against the Diodoran passage. Aristophanes may very well be referring 
to the clever politicking by which the Sybarites’ project was usurped and transformed into an 
315 Cf. Arist. Pol. 1303a32 who likewise uses the language of demands, not of behavior (πλεονεκτεῖν ἀξιοῦντες).  
316 E.g. Apollodorus ap. D.L. 9.56. Cf. von Fritz 1957: 908; Ehrenberg 1948: 150n6. 
317 See Ehrenberg 1948: 153ff.  
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Athenian initiative by the sophistic machinations and oracle-mongering of men like Lampon, and 
Lampon himself.318  
 The streets of Thurii were laid out in orderly fashion, with four avenues on a north-south 
axis intersected by three avenues at right angles (D.S. 12.10), with each street bearing a religious 
name (Ἡράκλεια, Ἀφροδισιάς, etc.). This grid pattern at Thurii is called the “Hippodamian 
manner” by Aristotle (Pol. 1330b21) and Hesychius expressly says that the Milesian sophist and 
city planner Hippodamus went to Thurii.319 There is all the more reason to believe that 
Hesychius is right, as Aristophanes in the same passage in which he mentions the 
“Thuriomanteis” speaks of σφραγιδονυχαργοκομῆται (331). These idle, long-haired individuals 
decked out with onyx signet-rings are evidently some foppish dandies who keep company with 
men like Lampon. Hippodamus, Aristotle records, was just this type of man (Pol. 1267b22).320 
Now, Hippodamus is best known for designing the Peiraeus according to a grid pattern around 
450, as well as being the first non-politician to write about the ideal state.321 The inclusion of this 
high-profile character implies a scale that goes far beyond what the Sybarite refugees could have 
had in mind when they came asking the Athenians for a κάθοδος.   
 In sum, there are good reasons to believe that Diodorus’ account is on the whole reliable; 
he merely narrates the several years of the Thurian foundation story under the year it began, 
446/5, a thing he commonly does. According to this account it is clear that the Athenians lost no 
318 For Lampon as a Thuriomantis, see Suda s.v. Θουριομάντεις [Θ 418 Adler]. For Lampon’s political career and 
the room for oracle-mongering in Athenian debates, see Bowden 2003: 269-70, 274, who concludes that there were 
no professional χρησμολόγοι, only politicians who used the mantic skill they happened to have as a way of 
supporting their proposals (270-74). 
319 Hsch. s. v. Ἱπποδάμου νέμησις (= DK 39.3).  
320 Specifically, he wore his hair long, donned expensive jewelry (κόσμος πολυτελής) and wore heavy clothes even 
in summer. Thus he can quite fittingly be described as σφραγιδονυχαργοκομήτης. Dover 1968:144f takes the ὄνυξ in 
this Aristophanic compound to denote, not the gem, but long fingernails, and so construes the meaning to be 
“unkempt creatures, like the Socratics, whose ‘seal’ is the marks they can make on wax with their nails.” But this 
seems far-fetched.  
321 Cf. Arist. Pol. 1267b22; Hsch. Mil. s.v. “Hippodamos”; D. 49.22 speaks of a “Hippodamian agora” at Peiraeus. 
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time in transforming the opportunity presented to them by Sybarite refugees into a grand, but of 
course self-serving, enterprise. Thurii was an Athenian idea. The implications this has on 
Protagoras’ life are important. Heraclides’ notice that Protagoras wrote laws322 for the Thurians 
indicates that he must have been involved in the process or on the committee commissioned with 
drawing up a constitution for the colony.323 It also implies, according to the reconstruction of 
events followed here, that he most likely was involved from the start, perhaps even going out 
with Lampon, Xenocritus and Hippodamus in the ten ships in 446/5. The collaboration between 
Protagoras, Hippodamus and Lampon on the Thurian project is perhaps alluded to again by 
Aristophanes in the same line of the Clouds as the one discussed above. Above it was suggested 
that in line 331 Θουριομάντεις and σφραγιδονυχαργοκομῆται alluded to Lampon and 
Hippodamus respectively. In between these two epithets stands ἰατροτέχναι, a theoretical 
doctor.324 Protagoras, it appears, developed a reputation, whether true or groundless, in medicine. 
At any rate, Eupolis in his Kolakes has Protagoras bid somebody to drink before the season of 
the dog-star for the sake of the good health of his lungs (fr. 158 PCG).325 If Aristophanes has the 
same understanding of Protagoras as Eupolis does, he may well bring together in this one line 
sophists who had at some time in the life worked together.  
 If Hippodamus was selected to design the Thurian city plan, it is not surprising, given his 
previous work for the Athenians. In a similar way, if the inclusion of Protagoras on the 
committee for drawing up laws for Thurii was approved by vote of the Assembly, he must have 
322 Not the laws, see above, fn. 305. 
323 Muir 1982: 17-24 argues that the law prescribing that the city pay for teachers to teach theThurian children their 
letters – the first instance of public education – is to be credited to Protagoras. 
324 See Dover 1968: 144 for the translation.  
325 If medical theory (not medical practice, as Aristophanes’ term is ἰατροτέχνης) was another area of interest of 
Protagoras, it would place in context the biological and anatomical analogies he uses at Pl. Tht. 166-167 and Prt. 
334a3-c6. Cf. above 6.3.1. 
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been a fairly well-known figure in Athens, and so must have spent some time there.326 Thus 
between his arrival in 462 or 461 and his departure for Thurii in 446/5 it is likely that he spent 
the bulk of this time in Athens. Alternatively, the Assembly could have voted wide powers to a 
procurator of the Thurian project who in turn would be responsible for commissioning the 
individual agents. However, given the number of private interests involved in sending out a 
colony, there is reason to assume that this was one of those occasions when the Athenian people 
micromanaged the staffing of the project. 
 If there is reason to think Protagoras departed as early as 446/5, there is just as much 
reason to suppose he remained there, or in the area, well after the opening ceremony in 444/3. 
Thurii was a great attraction. It brought the sons of the wealthy Cephalus, Polemarchus and 
Lysias, the last of whom also learned rhetoric from the famous Teisias there at Thurii.327 It 
brought Herodotus who is thought to have died there and, since his manuscript tradition 
preserves “Thurian” as an alternative to “Halicarnassian,” he must have been among the original 
settlers, to have citizenship in the city.328 It brought the philosopher Empedocles who, 
Apollodorus records in his Chronica, came to Thurii right after its foundation (νεωστὶ παντελῶς 
ἐκτισμένους) (ap. D.L. 8.52). There is a good deal of evidence that suggests Herodotus was 
familiar with Protagoras’ works,329 and above (subsection 3.3.4) I suggest that Protagoras was 
influenced by the work of Empedocles. Thurii is the common denominator between the three. 
Finally, the minor sophists Euthydemus and Dionysodorus took part in the colonization (Pl. 
Euth. 271c3) and some years later returned to the Aegean area spouting ideas that betrayed a 
326 Cf. Kerferd 1981: 43. 
327 D.H. Lys. 1.  
328 For his death and burial at Thurii, see St. Byz. s.v. Θούριοι. For the alternative toponym, see Arist. Rh. 3.9.  
329 Cf. Thomas 2000: passim and in particular 126-7, 147-9, 174, 199. 
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heavy Protagorean influence.330 This implies that Protagoras was not too busy at Thurii to teach. 
In sum, in light of this interaction he had with colleagues and students alike one should imagine 
Protagoras resident at Thurii for some time well after 444/3.   
 A related question is what role Pericles performed in the Thurian project. In his 
biography of the statesman Plutarch credits him with a good measure of responsibility for it 
(11.5), but the reliability of this entire chapter (11), as well as 12 to 14, has been called into 
question. A. Andrewes, in an effort to show that Thucydides’ moral objections to the empire 
were foreign to the thinking of contemporary Athenians, whether democrats or not, challenges 
the historicity of the chapters point by point and concludes that a “student in some post-classical 
school” (4) is responsible for the story of the squaring off of Pericles and Thucydides.331 P. 
Stadter suggests that that student was Plutarch himself, who was indirectly advising Greek 
officials of the Roman Empire to treat their urban proletariat with an indulgent hand.332  
However, the fact that this statement occurs in a defense of Pericles’ demagogic behavior 
which Plutarch finds troubling vindicates the account. Melesias’ son Thucydides, Plutarch 
explains, had organized the hitherto disunited conservatives into something of a group, the Few, 
pitted against the democrats, now for the first time called the Demos (11.1-4). Because of this 
maneuver Pericles was obliged to “slacken the reins on the people” and indulge their baser wants 
with festivals, shows, cleruchies and colonies, amusing them with pleasures (which however, 
Plutarch adds, were not low-brow [οὐκ ἀμούσοις]), until he secured his position and was finally 
able to “tune his administration to an aristocratic and king-like pitch” (15.1). This is the Pericles 
Plutarch wants: the stern, the staid, the very undemocratic leader. If he were composing these 
chapters himself, as Stadter maintains, why would he create a Pericles he disapproved of, in 
330 See Pl. Euthd. 286c2 and Cra. 386c2-d6. 
331 1978: 1-5. 
332 1989: 130-1.  
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order to give advice he disapproved of? And if he were drawing the information from an 
unreliable source, as Andrewes wants, he would certainly have challenged it instead of excusing 
it, just as he in fact does in the case of the story Stesimbrotus records of Pericles’ improprieties 
with his son’s wife (13.16). However much credit Plutarch deserves, it is more than this, and the 
witness he gives to the Periclean motivation behind the Thurian project cannot be dismissed or 
taken so lightly.  
Another piece of evidence Plutarch provides, though small, is valuable. In his treatise on 
the administration of government he expressly says that Pericles Λάμπωνα...Θουρίων οἰκιστὴν 
ἐξέπεμψεν (Praec. Ger. Reip. 812d). This recurrence of Lampon nicely supplements the 
Diodoran passage, which nowhere mentions Pericles, and inspires confidence that the evidence 
Plutarch gives for Periclean responsibility is strong. 
 Diodorus had mentioned an initial invitation to Peloponnesian individuals. In time this 
invitation was extended to all Greeks, and those who responded were registered in one of ten 
tribes organized along ethnic lines. Thus there was an Arcadian tribe, an Achaean, an Elean, a 
Boeotian, an Amphictyonian, a Dorian, an Ionian, a Euboean, one for the islanders and, finally, 
an Athenian. Thus it appears that Thurii was envisaged as a panhellenic venture, but one in 
which the Athenians were to be prominent. For their tribe is the only tribe named after a city, not 
a region.333 This panhellenic element is very similar to the Congress Decree passed three years 
before (spring 449) which attempted (unsuccessfully) to convene the Greek states at Athens to 
discuss the rebuilding of the temples burned by the Persians, the sacrifices vowed during the war 
and the steps necessary in order to preserve peaceful waterways (Plu. Per. 17). This decree, 
especially the last clause, was pregnant with meaning. It implied that peace depended on 
333 Cf. Ehrenberg 1948: 158; Andrewes 1978: 7, who also makes the interesting suggestion that Thurii was also a 
way for the Athenians to make provisions for Greeks who were now refugees because of their cooperation with 
Athens during the first Peloponnesian war. 
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peaceful waterways which in turn depended on a strong fleet exercising a thalassocracy. Athens, 
the only state with such naval capabilities, was in effect proposing a common peace under her 
own tutelage.334 
 Plutarch is again witness that Pericles was the one who proposed the Congress Decree 
(Per. 17), whose express purpose was peace and the united action (κοινοπραγία) of the Greeks 
under Athenian leadership. The Congress Decree and the Thurian project appear to be two sides 
of the same coin. What the Congress Decree envisaged on a large scale the foundation of Thurii 
enacted on a smaller, but still impressive, scale. This similarity is another strong suggestion that 
Plutarch is right when he makes Thurii a project conceived by Pericles and carried out through 
his associates.335 
 
7.1.4 Sicily 
 
 
In the Hippias Maior Plato has Hippias tell Socrates how he once went to Sicily and in a brief 
span of time earned more than a hundred and fifty minas despite the fact that Protagoras was 
there and commanded a great deal of admiration (282d6-e8). When could Protagoras not simply 
have gone to Sicily, but have made a business tour of the island, as this passage suggests he did? 
Davison argued that he went to Sicily before the Thurian project, sometime between 458 and 
445.336 This is much too early. According to this reckoning, Protagoras was between thirty-four 
and forty-seven years old when Hippias held his own against him in Sicily. But Hippias says that 
when he was in Sicily he was much younger (πολὺ νεώτερος) and Protagoras older 
334 Cf. McGregor 1987: 70-74. 
335 Cf. Andrewes 1978 reaches the same conclusion about the Thurii project (8), though he rejects the Plutarchan 
material lock, stock and barrel (1-5). Xenocritus, Lampon’s partner in the Thurian project, was also in the Periclean 
camp. At any rate in the Vita Anonyma Thucydidis (6-7) he appears as the prosecutor of Pericles’ rival, Thucydides, 
son of Melesias, after the latter returned from Sybaris at some unknown, but much discussed, date (see Stadter 1989: 
131-2).   
336 Davison 1953: 37.  
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(πρεσβυτέρου). His point is that “though Protagoras was a seasoned sophist, I still took in a huge 
haul that stupefied my father and fellow citizens,” not “I took in a huge haul, despite Protagoras’ 
being a decade or so older.” This age difference accords well with the context of the passage, 
which is a discussion of the state of knowledge in different generations and a comparison of 
those generations.337 
 Another reason why Protagoras probably did not go to Sicily before the Thurian project is 
that from 466 to 440 the island was in a state of intermittent upheaval. The problems raised by 
the continued presence of the mercenaries and new citizens brought in by the tyrants created 
problems of citizenship and property rights which, while more or less settled in Syracuse, Gela, 
Acragas and Himera by 462, provided the native Sicel population an opportunity to assert itself. 
Their leader, Ducetius, was from 459 until his death sometime before 447338 a thorn in the side 
of the Syracusans and Acragantines. Through the foundation of new cities (Menaenum in 459, 
Palice in 453, Cale Acte between 450 and 447) or the seizure of existing ones (Morgantina in 
459, Motyon in 451), he kept the Siceliotes, already troubled with land issues, from the island’s 
eastern hinterland (D.S. 11.77, 78, 88, 90-92).  
Meanwhile, the young Syracusan democracy was beset with internal problems. No doubt 
capitalizing on the exacerbation of the land issues caused by the Sicels, men like Tyndarides 
tried to use the dissatisfaction of the working class as a springboard to tyranny. Tyndarides’ 
arrest in 454 led to street-fighting and eventually the institution of the procedure of petalism. 
Though the only event he records, Diodorus is careful to point out that the Tyndarides episode is 
just one example of many, and so one should take it as an illustration, not an explanation, of the 
337 See in particular 281d3-7.  
338 His death is usually placed at 440 BC (e.g. Hammond 1986: 377, OCD s.v. “Ducetius”), but Diodorus 12.29 only 
apparently places his death at Ol. 85, 1 (440). The μέν-clause that relates his death by disease refers back to the time 
of the foundation of Cale Acte (around 447), while the δέ-clause resumes the current narrative. 
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poor relations prevailing at Syracuse between the πένητες and χαριέστατοι (11.86-87). In 
addition to this civil strife, the Syracusans had to deal with Etruscans who were pirating their 
holdings (11.88).  
Relations between Syracuse and Acragas deteriorated over the lenient treatment Ducetius 
received from the former after his surrender in 450. The hostility between these two cities, 
Diodorus relates, split the Sicilian cities in two, who called for war quite vehemently (12.8). The 
two cities, each with its own allies, met at the Himera River in 447 and in a hard-fought battle in 
which 1,000 Acragantines perished the Syracusans and their allies took the victory. The 
Syracusan democracy now had the upper hand in Sicily, but still had to deal with the Sicels who 
continued to keep them out of their own backyard until 440, when they were defeated in a last-
ditch effort at Trinakia (12.29-30).  
These being the conditions that the major Sicilian cities were experiencing in the 450s 
and 440s, it is very unlikely that a young, inexperienced Hippias would have thought a trip to 
Sicily worth his while and, even if he did, would have brought back two and half talents. 
Likewise, Protagoras, whom Hippias found there already teaching, probably did not go there 
until after Thurii and since, as I argue in the previous section, it appears he stayed at Thurii for 
some years after its foundation in 444, it would not be unreasonable to suppose he crossed over 
to Sicily around 440, when the recent pacification of the Sicels would not only have aroused 
euphoria in the eastern part of the island, but would have created as well the right conditions in 
which one could dispose of his income on less basic commodities.  
If a terminus post quem for Protagoras’ Sicilian tour can thus be set in the neighborhood 
of 440 BC, a terminus ante quem can perhaps be set by a passage in the Protagoras. When asked 
by Socrates to clarify what exactly he teaches, Protagoras says what it is not. He will not, as 
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other sophists do, take a student fresh from mechanical subjects (τέχναι) and throw him into 
more mechanical subjects, like mathematics, astronomy, geometry and music. Here Socrates 
interjects the observation that Protagoras, when making this statement, gave Hippias a look 
(318e3-4). Hippias of course was active in these, and other, subjects, but so were the sophists 
generally, even Protagoras himself.339 So, the nature of Hippias’ curriculum is not enough to 
explain why Protagoras wishes to discredit Hippias, and why he spares Prodicus, in front of the 
young Hippocrates. On the other hand, Protagoras’ look would be explained if Hippias and he 
had a history. What Hippias brags about in the Hippias Maior implies that his earning the two 
and half talents in Sicily involved an occasion or a series of occasions in which he, though much 
younger, outdid the older Protagoras. As a result, there would be some bad blood between them 
which Plato dramatized as a reality-effect.  
This success Hippias had might also explain why later in the dialogue Plato has him put 
on airs in self-righteously chiding Protagoras and Socrates for bickering and patronizingly 
calling upon the two men to find a compromise by electing, in good democratic fashion,340 a 
referee (337c6-338b1). Considering Hippias’ actual position in the drama (he has throughout 
occupied the best, most authoritative seat in the house, the θρόνος [315c1, 317d9]), he probably 
has himself in mind as the referee.341  
I submit then that Plato’s portrait here of the conceited Hippias is meant to reflect his 
recent Sicilian successes which hurt Protagoras’ profit or pride and caused some antipathy 
between them. Since the dramatic date of the Protagoras is usually placed at around 433, 
339 See Arist. Metaph. B2 997b32 (= DK 80 B7) for a contribution of his to a geometrical discussion in a work on 
mathematics (unless the title, Περὶ τῶν μαθημάτων, is on the sciences in general; but in either case the point stands). 
Cf. also Plato, who says Protagoras composed refutative treatise s on wrestling and other τέχναι (Soph. 232d9-10).    
340 Hippias remarks that Athens is the πρυτανεῖον of Greece. So, when he says that they need to elect an ἐπιστάτης, 
the reference to the democracy is clear, as this word denotes the presiding tribe’s chairman who officiated in a 
daylong term in both the Assembly and Council. 
341 Cf. Adam & Adam 1893: 148. 
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Protagoras will have been bested by Hippias before that date.  And so his entire Sicilian tour can 
be placed between the years 440 and 433.  
 
7.1.5 First Return to Athens  
 
 
As indicated above, between 440 and 433 was the perfect time to visit Sicily, as the island was 
then enjoying more peace and prosperity under Syracusan leadership than it had in a long time. It 
was also a time when it was wise to stay away from Athens. If J. Mansfeld is right in dating the 
decree of Diopeithes to 438/7 and the related attacks on Pericles’ associates Pheidas, Aspasia and 
Anaxagoras to the years 438-6,342 then Protagoras, as a thinker, stood in violation of that decree 
and, as a friend of Pericles, was vulnerable to similar attacks. 
 When the heat was off, he returned to Athens. Since the return to Athens that Plato 
dramatizes in the Protagoras is generally set in 433 or 432,343 it was probably at this time when 
he returned. In this dialogue Hippocrates is made to say that he was a παῖς (fourteen years old or 
below), when Protagoras τὸ πρότερον ἐπεδήμησε (310e5). Davison takes these words to indicate 
a previous arrival, but there is little reason to do so. Ἐπιδημεῖν typically indicates a term of 
residence, not a simple arrival,344 and the aorist tense makes sense if one simply assumes that 
Hippocrates envisages a second term of residence for Protagoras, as in fact Protagoras himself 
does.345   
 And as a matter of fact it appears that Protagoras resided in Athens for several years. In 
the summer of 430 the plague broke out in Athens and killed many, eventually including Pericles 
342 Mansfeld 1980: 84-89. Cf. Ostwald 1986: 192-198. For the substance of the decree, see Plu. Per. 32.  
343 So Adam & Adam 1893: xxxvi; Morrison 1941: 2-3; Davison 1953: 37; Denyer 2008: 66. For a summary of the 
arguments for this date, see Morrison 1941: 2-3. 
344 LSJ s.v.  
345 Protagoras too believes Socrates and he will have plenty of time to discuss the nature of virtue further, as he says 
at the end of the dialogue (361e). Cf. also Kerferd 1981: 42-3. 
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in the fall of 429.346 His two legitimate sons, Paralus and Xanthippus, died of the plague as well 
sometime before.347 In a fragment Protagoras describes Pericles’ fortitude in bearing the deaths 
of his sons, which, if it really is an eyewitness account, as Davison thought it was, means 
Protagoras was in Athens for some time after its outbreak in summer 430.348  
This was also the year in which Pericles suffered a political setback. According to the 
most probable account, having been elected general for the year 430/29, in the course of this 
term of office he was fined and deposed because of the resentment the plague had aroused 
against him, and remained deposed until re-elected the following Anthesterion (mid February to 
mid March) of 429 for the archon year 429/8.349 If Plutarch’s sequence of events can be trusted, 
Pericles’ sons died during their father’s term of deposition (Per. 37), and this deposition, 
Thucydides says, occurred late in Pericles’ generalship of 430/29, since the Athenians re-elected 
him not long after deposing him (ὕστερον δ’αὖθις οὐ πολλῷ) (2.65.4). Further, Protagoras’ 
description of Pericles’ reaction to his sons’ deaths suggests it had a part in reconciling him to 
the people (πολλὸν ὤνητο...εἰς...τὴν ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖσι δόξαν).  It therefore seems that Pericles’ 
sons died shortly before his re-election and that Protagoras witnessed both, which puts him in 
Athens as late as Anthesterion of 430/429, around eight months after the breakout of the plague. 
 
7.1.6 Second Return to Athens 
 
 
At some point after this date Protagoras left Athens. This is suggested by the information 
provided by Athenaeus who states that the Konnos, a comedy produced by Ameipsias in 424/3 
346 Th. 2.37, 65; Plu. Per. 38. 
347 Plu. Per. 36. 
348 Davison 1953: 38. For the fragment, see DK 80 B9. 
349 Th. 2.65.4; Plu. Per. 35. Cf. Hornblower 1991: vol 1, 341. Gomme believes Pericles quickly paid the fine and 
was re-instated within a few weeks (Gomme, et al: 1945-81), but Thucydides’ use of εἵλοντο suggests a regular 
election. For the date of elections (the seventh prytany = Anthesterion), see Ath. Pol. 44.4.  
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had a chorus of thinkers (φροντισταί) in which Protagoras was noticeable by his absence (5.218b 
= DK 80 A11). The weight of this evidence is strengthened by the fact that Aristophanes’ Clouds 
which was for the first time produced in the very same year foists on Socrates several 
Protagorean ideas350 and that during the debate between Just Logos and Unjust Logos the sophist 
who developed these logoi is nowhere mentioned. It is as though Aristophanes’ Protagorean 
jokes would fall flat unless he pinned them on a present personage.351 When Protagoras left 
Athens is uncertain, but considering the fact the Pericles died in the fall of 429, that the plague 
continued to be a problem and that Cleon, Pericles’ enemy,352 had not only stepped into the 
limelight, but was distinguishing himself from Pericles by taking an anti-intellectual stance 
which he voiced as early as 428,353 429/28 was a good year for Protagoras to depart. 
 However, Eupolis’ Kolakes, produced in 422/1 and caricaturing Protagoras as a flatterer 
at Callias’ house,354 suggest he was back in Athens when this comedy was being composed.355 
Two events might have encouraged Protagoras to return by this date. The armistice that the 
Athenians, discouraged by their defeat at Delium and alarmed at Brasidas’ successes in 
Chalcidice, struck with the Lacedaemonians for the year 423/2 might have made Protagoras 
confident enough to return in 423/2. Or, if Cleon had indeed been a factor in Protagoras’ 
departure earlier that decade, his death at Amphipolis in summer 422 might have brought him 
back in 422/1 just in time to be incorporated by Eupolis into his comedy (which by the way took 
first prize at the City Dionysia356).  
350 636-642, 658-692, 1020-21. 
351 There were changes to the comedy after the first production, but they did not affect the dramatis personae or 
suggest that the debate between the Logoi was not in the first production. See Dover 1968: lxxx-xcviii.  
352 Plutarch, interpreting the contemporary comedian Hermippus’ δηχθεὶς αἴθωνι Κλέωνι, says Cleon increased his 
influence by means of the people’s anger at Pericles (Per. 33.7). 
353 Cf. Th. 3.38.  
354 Cf. PCG Eupolis Κόλακες Test. iii-vi, viii.  
355 Ath. 5.218b (= DK 80 A11). So Davison 1953: 34.  
356 See Hypothesis I to Ar. Pax. (= PCG Eupolis Κόλακες Test. I).  
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7.1.7 Death 
 
 
By the time of the production of Eupolis’ Kolakes in early 422/1 Protagoras was around 72 years 
old, and so near the end of his life. There is a tradition that he was accused by Pythodorus, son of 
Polyzelus on a charge of impiety (ἀσέβεια) for his atheism, tried and condemned; that the 
Athenians burned his books; and that Protagoras drowned in a shipwreck when going into 
exile.357 Morrison and Davison accepted the tradition and each tried to determine when the 
fiasco occurred.358 Kurt von Fritz rejected everything except the death by drowning, evidently 
because it comes from the respected Atthidographer Philochorus.359 His reasons for rejecting the 
tradition are compelling. In the Meno passage in which Socrates comments that Protagoras lived 
for more than seventy years Socrates adds that Protagoras enjoyed popularity (εὐδοκιμῶν) for his 
entire career right down to the present date (c. 402 BC) (91e). Von Fritz points out that if the 
Athenians had publicly outlawed Protagoras and his works Plato could hardly have written this. 
He also points to the fact that Diagoras of Melos, the most famous ἄθεος, underwent a similar 
trial for impiety and likewise perished during flight;360 and since Diagoras not only voiced his 
atheist ideas, but actually committed an act of sacrilege attested to by Aristophanes,361 it appears 
357 Timon of Plius ap. S.E. 9.55-6 (= DK 80 A12), Cic. Nat. D. 1.63; D.L. 9.52-54; Plu. Nic. 23.3 (only exile, or 
flight).  
358 Morrison 1941: 3-4; Davison 1953: 36. Guthrie 1971: 263 also believes the trial and condemnation story and 
dismisses Meno 91e by affirming that Plato “would have said the same about Socrates,” but does not explain this in 
no way self-evident claim. Kerferd 1981: 43 also defends the tradition. 
359 1957: 910-11. For his death by drowning, see Philochorus ap. D.L. 9.55. A year earlier Vlastos 1956: viii, n6 had 
expressed his doubts concerning the trial and condemnation, finding them inconsistent with Meno 91e, and 
suggested that, while they were to be rejected, the story of a prosecution might well be true, since Diogenes 
mentions Aristotle (9.54) as the source for the name of the prosecutor (Euathlus – which however the supporters of 
the tradition [see above, n358] reject in favor of Polydorus!). But not only is the name Euathlus suspect, since Aulus 
Gellius (5.10) mentions him as Protagoras’ opponent in the peritrope that resembles the one in which Corax and 
Teisias wrangled (S.E. 95-96), but, as I argue below, it is the habit of Diogenes to make connections. His 
Aristotelian source might very well have mentioned the Protagoras/Euathlus story as an alternative to the 
Corax/Teisias story, and Diogenes took it as history. So, even the prosecution story relies on weak evidence. Cf. also 
Podlecki 1998: 97-98.  
360 For Diagoras, see D.S. 8.6; Ath. 13.611a.  
361 Ar. Av. 1073.  
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that information belonging to him was saddled onto Protagoras who, though technically only 
making an agnostic statement, was still included in antiquity’s canon of ἄθεοι. 
 Consequently, all that can be said of Protagoras’ death is that it occurred at the end of 
422/1 or shortly thereafter. The story of his drowning should probably be rejected, too, since 
Philochorus really does not make this claim. Diogenes records: φησὶ δὲ Φιλόχορος, πλέοντος 
αὐτοῦ ἐς Σικελίαν, τὴν ναῦν καταποντωθῆναι· καὶ τοῦτο αἰνίττεσθαι Εὐριπίδην ἐν τῷ Ἰξίονι. 
ἔνιοι κατὰ τὴν ὁδὸν τελευτῆσαι αὐτόν, βιώσαντα ἔτη κτλ (9.55). Philochorus, in addition to Attic 
history, wrote on Euripides’ tragedies and so in the passage Diogenes is referring to he is simply 
explaining a reference in Euripides’ Ixion to a misfortune Protagoras once suffered, perhaps 
during his trip to Sicily between 440 and 433.362 It is Diogenes who joins Philochorus’ statement 
with accounts of Protagoras’ death. As the asyndetic ἔνιοι and the definite article governing ὁδόν 
make clear, Diogenes has no idea when this shipwreck took place and is venturing to locate it 
chronologically by connecting it with the Diagoran-inspired tradition of trial, flight and 
drowning. All Philochorus mentioned was a shipwreck that Euripides’ Ixion alluded to.363 Lastly, 
if that shipwreck did occur between 440 and 433, then there is left no other suggestion that 
Protagoras again left Athens. Circumstantially at least, the peace of Nicias would be 
encouragement enough to stay on.  
 
 
 
7.2 PROTAGORAS’ RELATIONSHIP WITH PERICLES 
 
 
The above discussion results in the following timeline: 
 
362 Suda s.v. “Philochorus.” Philochorus’ Euripidean treatise might also be the source of the tradition, likewise 
recorded in Diogenes (9.54), that Protagoras read his treatise On the gods at Euripides’ house. 
363 There is no evidence for the date of the Ixion independent of this tradition of Protagoras’ death. Cf. Morrison 
1941: 4 and n2.  
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Birth at Abdera    492 or 491 
First Residence at Athens  462/1 to 446 
Thurian Project   446 to 440 
Tour of Sicily    440 (or later) to 433 
Second Residence at Athens  433 to 429/8 
Third Residence at Athens  423/2 or (early) 422/1 
Death      late 422/1 or early 421/0 
 
 
This timeline has several interesting implications. First, Protagoras’ first residence at 
Athens coincided with years during which the Athenian democracy reached its highest 
development. Pay (in the generous amount of two obols)364 was instituted around 459. In 457/6 
the first zeugites held the archonship. Wade-Gery’s “experiment in committing justice to the 
unlearned” was continued in 453/2 when demes juries were instituted in addition to the state 
courts. In 451/0 was passed Pericles’ proposal that the state only recognize as citizens those who 
were born of two Athenian citizens in an effort to safeguard the privileges the “radical” 
democracy was granting its citizens.365 Protagoras was in Athens during the time when these 
practical steps were taken to implement a governmental system that fundamentally challenged 
Greek moral and social assumptions on the individual and his community. Just as the institution 
of these measures alone was enough to exacerbate and even scandalize traditional thinkers, so 
were they also a sharp stimulus for more sympathetic thinkers to rationalize the novel changes 
that were going on around them. And if Protagoras’ early life in Abdera was exposed to similar 
events, then that stimulus for him was even greater. 
 That the democrats did begin during these years to conceptualize democracy in 
theoretical terms and attempt a rationalization of it is indicated by their interest in state-craft that 
emerges at this time. In 452 the Athenians compelled the Erythraeans, who had attempted with 
364 For the buying power of this pay, see Markle 1985, who concludes that “a family of four could have been fed on 
about two-and-a-half obols per day during the fourth century BC” (112 [pagination according to the 2004 reprint]).  
365 For the dates of these events, see Rhodes 1992: 67-77.  
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Persian aid to secede from the league, to resume payment of the tribute and, in order to forestall 
any future secession, to dismantle their existing government and install a democracy.366 The 
imposition of a democratic regime, of which Erythrae is the first example, not only indicates a 
high degree of self-consciousness on the part of the Athenian democrats, but suggests they felt 
sufficiently confident in their understanding of it to transplant it to foreign soil.  
The building program, begun in 449/48 and to run for the next fifteen years,367 shows a 
similar democratic self-consciousness, if not an exuberant self-celebration which is also evident 
in the contemporary panhellenic gestures of the Congress Decree and the Thurian project. To the 
Athenians at this time democracy is not just a form of government which has, as Herodotus 
makes prosaically clear, its pro’s and con’s just like any other governmental form. It is a new 
chapter in human history, the dawning of a new era, a discovery that they even owe their fellow 
Greeks. The establishment of new democracies, the panhellenic projects and the celebration of 
the new government atop the cult center of the city denote a confidence, or rather a fervor and 
zeal, which could only emerge as the result of deep reflection on the meaning of democracy and 
its momentous implications on the moral and intellectual identity of the individual and the value 
and self-worth that accrue therefrom to his person. If thinkers in Athens ever rationalized 
democracy, it was during the years of Protagoras’ first stay in Athens.  
 This timeline also serves as evidence of the friendship between Pericles and Protagoras. 
The latter’s movements are almost keyed to the career of Pericles. He first arrived in Athens 
when the democrats after the assassination of Ephialtes were looking to Pericles for leadership. 
He left Athens on a project that Pericles conceived, stayed away when Pericles’ non-Athenian, 
366 IG I³ 14 (= ML 40). There is to be a council of 120 men who are selected by lot and in an effort to allow as many 
Erythraeans as possible to serve as councilors, nobody can serve a second term within four years. Athenian 
episkopoi and a garrison commander are in charge of setting up the new government. Cf. McGregor 1987: 61-63. 
367 According to the Strasbourg Papyrus (see Wade-Gery & Meritt 1957: 182-4). 
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intellectual associates were being hounded by his political enemies and not only returned to 
Athens in 433 despite the looming war, but even dared to stay there despite the terrible plague. 
This last point in particular suggests Protagoras was not merely a friend and associate, but a 
member of Pericles’ informal cabinet, who returned and stayed in Athens not because he wanted 
to do so, but because he could be of service. 
The evidence for an advisory friendship between Protagoras and Pericles that this 
timeline provides is consistent with the testimony provided by other sources. Plutarch tells the 
story how, when one Epitimus of Pharsalus, perhaps in 430 BC,368 was accidentally struck by a 
pentathlete’s vagrant javelin, Pericles spent an entire day considering with Protagoras the 
question what had been the cause “according to the most correct account,” the javelin, the 
thrower or the judges (Per. 36). The concern for correctness, as well as the specific details of the 
victim and the competitor, vouches for the story’s credibility.369 These points alone are enough 
to suggest a relationship between the two men; but a closer inspection of Plutarch’s story shows 
that that relationship was not just casual. Plutarch relates that Pericles’ eldest son, Xanthippus, 
spread this story abroad for the sake of mocking his father (ἐπὶ γέλωτι). What in the story did he 
expect would embarrass his father? As seen above, Protagoras enjoyed a reputation at Athens 
that really never waned. So it was not because Pericles was keeping company with sophists. 
Athenian law acknowledged that an inanimate object could carry blood-guilt and accordingly a 
368 The pentathlon was an event in the Greater Panathenaea (Kyle 2007: 153, cf. OCD s.v. Panathenaea). Since this 
quadrennial festival would have only been held when Protagoras was in Athens either in 450 or 430, the latter date is 
clearly more consistent with the age of Xanthippus, Pericles’ son, who witnessed the daylong discussion.  
369 For Protagorean ὀρθοέπεια, see Pl. Phdr. 267c6. For ὀρθόν itself, see Untersteiner 1954: 56f. According to 
Diogenes, Protagoras wrote a treatise entitled Περὶ τῶν οὐκ ὀρθῶς πρασσομένων (9.55 = DK 80 A1). On the story’s 
authenticity, Stadter 1989: 328 is doubtful because Antiphon’s Tetralogy B makes use of a similar scenario, and 
suggests the name of the victim is given for the sake of verisimilitude. This seems excessively skeptical. One might 
just as easily say that Antiphon’s tetralogy made use of a conundrum that the historical event of 430 BC had raised 
(a terminus post quem for the tetralogy?), and the added details that the victim was Pharsalian and died during a 
pentathlon goes far beyond the interests of verisimilitude.  
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court in the Prytaneum was set up to try such cases.370 So it was not because the subject of their 
discussion was laughable. That leaves one option: the relationship itself. The academic words of 
the passage (διατριβαί, διαπορεῖν), as well as the length of time spent (ὅλη ἡμέρα), suggest that 
the insult Xanthippus had in mind was the fact that Pericles spent so much time with Protagoras 
as to risk looking like his student. Pericles was too old for that.371 
In the Protagoras, after Protagoras has finished delivering the Great Speech, Socrates 
declares that if one discussed the things that the Great Speech had addressed with any of the 
popular orators (δημήγοροι), he would get the same kind of speeches from Pericles or a some 
other skilled speaker (328d3-329a2). The reference to Pericles is arresting, despite the inclusion 
of “any of the orators” and “some other skilled speaker,” because it is then recalled that Pericles 
and his family have been casting a long shadow over the dialogue. Upon arriving at Callias’ 
house, Socrates find Pericles’ sons, Xanthippus and Paralus, almost cleaving to the pacing 
Protagoras, accompanied by Callias himself, whom Socrates is careful to mention as the half-
brother of Pericles’ sons (ὁμομήτριος).372 Moreover, when Socrates needs an example of sons 
who were not taught the wisdom of their fathers, he not only points to Pericles’ sons, but also 
brings up the story of Cleinias, Alcibiades’ little brother, whom Pericles tried to educate, but 
failed (319e-320a). It has also been argued that Hippocrates, son of Apollodorus, whose 
admiration of Protagoras was the reason for Socrates’ visit in the first place, was the son of 
Pericles’ sister, but this connection is unlikely.373  
370 For homicide by inanimate object, see Harrison 1971: 42-3.  
371 For late-learning, cf. Thphr. Char. 27. For Pericles’ late-learning, cf. Pl. Alc.1. 118c5-6. 
372 Hipponicus, Callias’ father, had married the ex-wife (name unknown) of Pericles. See Nails 2002: s. l. Callias III.  
373 See Nails 2002: s. l. Hippocrates. Cf. Denyer 2008: 68. It is unlikely because, if this Hippocrates were Pericles’ 
nephew, Plato would have had to explain why he sought access to Protagoras through Socrates instead of going 
through his cousins. 
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These frequent reminders that Plato gives of Pericles give one the sneaking suspicion that 
Plato is having some fun with Protagoras. He not only implies that Pericles is a speaker whose 
style resembles Protagoras’, but in having Socrates comment that one could (and perhaps did) 
hear Pericles express the very same ideas Protagoras’ Great Speech expressed, he declares him in 
fact to be a politician whose thought and principles are in agreement with Protagoras’ 
philosophy. However, it is made abundantly clear that Pericles failed miserably as an educator of 
his sons and ward; and in another dialogue Plato stresses how he failed as an educator of the city 
as a whole (Grg. 515d6-516d3). The failure of Pericles gives the lies to Protagoras’ philosophy. 
It claims to impart virtue, but it really doesn’t; and those who learn it – as Pericles is the prime 
example – cannot impart it, because it has a zero value. This point of Plato’s is of course 
tendentious, but that presents little problem for a work addressed to an Academic readership. It is 
a point that verges on joke374 and presupposes on Plato’s part the assumption of a clear 
Protagorean influence in Pericles’ ideas and speech which moreover he could count on his 
readers to recognize.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
374 See above 6.2.3 for another possible inside-joke.  
187 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
8.0 PROTAGOREAN PREFACES 
 
 
 
 
In chapter seven I investigated the historical evidence for a relationship between Protagoras and 
Pericles. I found that there were grounds for positing such a relationship and determined that it 
was of an informal, advisory nature. Alone that investigation is not enough to prove Protagoras 
exerted any sort of influence on Pericles, but it does have suggestive value and, more 
importantly, will have supportive value, if any evidence of influence appears from another 
quarter. In this chapter I argue that the funeral speech composed by Thucydides for Pericles in 
the pages of his history supplies that evidence. In this speech Pericles is made to express certain 
ideas, use certain language, and give certain descriptions of Athens that are meant to recall and 
reflect the teachings of the Abderite sophist. 
It is with characteristic subtlety that Thucydides prepares the reader for a Protagorean 
dimension in his portrait of Pericles. He formally introduces him at 1.139.4: “Pericles, the son of 
Xanthippus, the leading man of Athens at that time, the most capable in speech and management 
(λέγειν τε καὶ πράσσειν δυνατώτατος), came forward and gave the following advice.” Neil 
O’Sullivan has observed that, though the idea of excellence in both speech and management is 
common enough in Greek literature, “a search through the TLG data base indicates that there is 
only one other place in Greek literature where this form of words is used to express supreme 
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ability in both words and deeds.”375 That one other place is Protagoras 318e-319a, where 
Protagoras gives his “professional statement”:  
τὸ δὲ μάθημά ἐστιν εὐβουλία περὶ τῶν οἰκείων, ὅπως ἂν ἄριστα τὴν αὑτοῦ οἰκίαν διοικοῖ, 
καὶ περὶ τῶν τῆς πόλεως, ὅπως τὰ τῆς πόλεως δυνατώτατος ἂν εἴη καὶ πράττειν καὶ 
λέγειν.  
 
O’Sullivan goes on to explore the implications of this coincidence of phraseology on Plato’s 
portrait of the sophist in the dialogue. As interesting as those are, the implications it bears on 
Thucydides’ portrait of Pericles are just as significant. The historian introduces Pericles in 
language that almost duplicates the professional promise of Protagoras. It is not simply influence 
that is thus insinuated, but the influence of a teacher/student relationship – an insinuation that 
was also made accusatorily by Pericles’ son Xanthippus (see section 7.2, p. 186-87). 
 Pericles’ funeral speech, however, is not a verbatim report, but the creation of the 
historian and as such reflects the historian’s analysis and interpretation of Athenian political 
culture which he arrived at after careful and painstaking study (cf. 1.20-22). At the same time, 
though, he put his interpretation in the mouth of a leader who could scarcely be misrepresented 
by a writer who aimed at writing sine ira et studio and was interested in the search for truth (ἡ 
ζήτησις τῆς ἀληθείας) (1.20.3). What this means, as I will argue in chapter twelve, is that the 
Protagorean dimension in the funeral speech is both a Thucydidean construct and an historical 
reality (or at least an historical reality insofar as one acquiesces in the historian’s analysis).  
 The funeral speech contains a portion that is foreign to the genre. From sections 35 to 41, 
in what can be called the “constitutional” portion, Pericles describes Athenian political culture, 
and it is only in sections 42 to 46 that he actually eulogizes the fallen soldiers. The reason of 
course is that the funeral speech has been incorporated by Thucydides into his history and is now 
375 1995: 21.  
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made to serve a literary function within that history which it was not, properly speaking, 
designed to serve, viz. to be a vehicle of historical exposition.376 Consequently, the Protagorean 
influence is limited to this first half (2.35-41). Moreover, within this first half it is best divided 
into two parts. For all of Thucydides’ terseness and compression, Pericles actually gets off to a 
slow start, spending two sections on prefatory material. In 2.35 he prefaces the speech as a 
whole, while in 2.36 he prefaces the constitutional portion.  
 In this chapter I will deal with these prefatory passages. I will argue that in the first 
preface Pericles speaks as one who subscribes to Protagorean epistemology. What he says on 
belief, truth and human opinion, as well as the binary organization he employs, implies that 
relativism is his assumed intellectual frame of mind. Similarly, I will attempt to show that in the 
second preface, that to the constitutional half, Pericles chooses as the leitmotif of the speech a 
principle that served as the core assumption in Protagoras’ political science: the autarky of the 
individual. In the next chapter (chapter 9), as well as in chapter eleven, I will discuss the rest of 
the constitutional half (2.37-41), and argue that Pericles characterizes Athens and the Athenians 
as though they embodied that form of government that Protagoras’ political thought 
demonstrates to be the ideal paradigm for organizing the fundamentally unorganizable human 
creatures, thereby making Athens a paradox.  
 
 
 
8.1 PERICLEAN EPISTEMOLOGY 
 
Pericles has been selected to deliver the eulogy over the Athenians who fell during the previous 
year (431 BC). However, he does not take it as a given that everybody present will believe that 
the subjects of the eulogy are truly praiseworthy. He therefore uses the first preface (2.35.1-3) to 
376 But Herodotus (9.27) might have anticipated him in incorporating the epitaphios into history.  
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discuss issues bearing on the reception of the speech as a whole. This discussion in the preface 
shows Pericles making significant assumptions. Specifically, he gives priority to unanimous 
belief in what the city has deemed right and good over an objective examination of valorous 
actions that he could otherwise very easily, and amid much approval, represent as inherently 
right and good. These epistemological assumptions are of a piece with Protagoras’s ethical 
relativism.  
 
8.1.1 Belief (πίστις) 
 
 
As the preface begins, Pericles is uncertain whether or not a speech should be delivered at all. He 
thinks it would be enough for men who were brave in deed to be honored in deed, that is, with an 
impressive funeral (2.35.1). The reason for this attitude is that, if his words fail to do justice to 
the fallen soldiers, their merit might not be believed. Belief (πίστις) is important. The 
Peloponnesian War has just been declared in accordance with the will of the Athenian 
majority.377 The death of these men symbolizes the Athenian war effort. If their merit is not 
believed, then there is a portion of the population whose disbelief might cause disharmony in the 
execution of the expressed will of the majority. They must believe, and believe genuinely. 
Pericles is so concerned that their merit be believed that he would rather not give occasion for 
anybody to conceive disbelief through an act of speech. 
Significantly, the motivation for belief does not lie in the inherent worth and believability 
of the merit of the fallen. Indeed, the campaigns in which they fought were very minor (cf. 2.18-
33).378 Instead, the audience ought to believe in their praiseworthiness because, simply put, that 
is what the city believes. This point comes across when Pericles declares that he will 
377 For the war as the will of the Athenian majority, see Th. 2.60.4, 2.61.2.  
378 See Bosworth 2000: 5.  
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nevertheless follow the law and speak (2.35.3). The mere mention of the law shows what the 
city’s belief is: The fallen, whether they deserve it or not, ought to be eulogized in grandiloquent 
praise, and there is ample evidence that this law does indeed represent the city’s official opinion. 
Not only is it typically praised by “the majority of those who have so far spoken here” (οἱ πολλοὶ 
τῶν ἐνθάδε ἤδη εἰρηκότων) (2.35.1), but it was sanctioned by previous generations as well (τοῖς 
πάλαι οὕτως ἐδοκιμάσθη ταῦτα καλῶς ἔχειν) (2.35.3). Athenians recently and in the past 
approved of this law. For this reason Pericles accepts the challenge of vindicating the law, 
although he personally is not very enthusiastic about it. In other words, he is modeling desired 
behavior. One ought to believe and acquiesce in what the city by majoritarian rule has 
decreed.379 Belief in the merit of the fallen is important, not because such is the just deserts of 
valor, but because the city has decreed such belief for any who perish in its wars. This 
prioritization of belief over truth with its simultaneous subordination of individual belief to the 
collective belief recalls Protagoras’ application of the human-measure claim to the scale of the 
polis (see subsections 5.1.1, 5.1.2, 5.1.3), and thus sets the stage for the rest of the passage.   
Pericles goes on to explain the causes of disbelief. Many will likely not believe him 
because there is disagreement regarding not just the truth, but even the appearance of truth in the 
matter (2.35.1). On the one hand, the one who is intimately acquainted with the fallen and is well 
disposed towards them expects lavish praise. On the other, the one who lacks familiarity with the 
fallen will give a disapproving hearing to any lavish praise. Both sides, however, have this in 
common: They are subjective. The one who expects lavish praise might claim to be right because 
of his intimate acquaintance (ξυνειδώς) with the fallen, but that intimate acquaintance is 
undermined by his benevolent predisposition (εὔνους). True, he is said to “know” certain facts, 
379 Pericles expresses the same sentiment, when at Xen. Mem. 1.2.42 he defines law as: πάντες γὰρ οὕτοι νόμοι 
εἰσίν, οὓς τὸ πλῆθος συνελθὸν καὶ δοκιμάσαν ἔγραψε, φράζον ἅ τε δεῖ ποιεῖν καὶ ἃ μή. 
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but his knowledge is compromised by personal desire (βούλεται).  Similarly, the one who lacks 
such acquaintance will likely respond to the eulogy with jealousy (φθόνος) because he will 
assess the ability of an unknown person by his own ability (2.35.2), and if any praise exceeds his 
ability, he responds with jealousy and disbelief. True to the Protagorean doctrine that the 
individual is the measure of all things, both sides of the audience use themselves as the measure 
of the worth of the fallen, rather than any objective criterion.  
Because opinions are formed in so subjective a way, one can establish, certainly no 
absolute truth over the fallen, and just barely the grasp of truth (ἡ δόκησις τῆς ἀληθείας) (2.35.2). 
Therefore, Pericles will follow the law, praise the fallen and in doing so “try to satisfy the 
preference and opinion of each of you to the degree possible” (πειρᾶσθαι ὑμῶν τῆς ἑκάστου 
βουλήσεώς τε καὶ δόξης τυχεῖν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πλεῖστον) (2.35.3). I discuss the relativistic implication 
of the phrase ἡ δόκησις τῆς ἀληθείας in a later chapter (see subsection 11.1.1). What matters 
here more is Pericles’ reaction. Surprisingly, he has decided not to advocate a factual truth 
regarding the dead. One wonders how the relatives of the fallen would have reacted to hearing 
that the valor of their sons, fathers and brothers would not be treated as fact, but as an 
interpretation of reality which, even if the entire city held it, was still ontologically contestable. 
But their reaction is not the point. Thucydides is not recording an Athenian moment, but giving a 
portrait of Pericles who, true to Protagorean doctrine, sets greater store by the truth that consists 
in men’s opinions than in the one that lies outside men’s minds.380 The fact that he sets greater 
store by such a truth is stressed again when he declares that he will satisfy the preference of both 
380 For the funeral speech as a representation of Periclean thought, cf. Flashar 1969: 33: “Es handelt sich um eine 
von Thukydides komponierte Rede…mit der er die Politik und die Denkweise des Perikles auf dem Höhepunkt der 
Macht Athens nach dem ersten Kriegsjahr durch den Mund des Perikles selbst zum Ausdruck bringen wollte.” 
Loraux 1986: 191-192 comes to a similar conclusion and ends with the insightful observation: “Thucydides’ mark is 
to be sought, then, in the register of expression accorded to the work as a whole, rather than in the context and 
strategy of the oration.” Cf. Bosworth 2000: 16, for whom the funeral speech is a “potent distillation of the speech 
Pericles actually delivered.” It is Thucydides’ creation, but “his art is taken from life.”  
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sides. He will not call one side wrong (to the disappointment of the relatives no doubt). Instead, 
he will somehow show how both are right. Protagoras’s human-measure claim is assumed from 
the start in Pericles’ privileging of belief, especially collective belief, over fact. 
This attitude towards fact, or truth, is consistent with the two instances in the speech in 
which Pericles actually uses the word ἀλήθεια.  At 2.41.2, after he asserts that the individual 
Athenian is sufficient on his own for any challenge, he declares that the power of the city is 
ample proof that this is no boast, but “the truth of deeds” (ἔργων ἀλήθεια). But that proof is a 
priori problematic. For Pericles says that Athens is the only city that “causes no indignation in 
her attacking enemy at the rough treatment he receives and no objection in her subject to the 
effect that he is ruled by unworthy rulers.” These are bold words after the first summer of the 
war when the Peloponnesians’ invitation to come outside the walls was never answered.381 
Similarly, Pericles shortly thereafter (2.41.4) declares that because of this “indubitable” power 
they need no Homer as an encomiast nor anybody else “to give momentary delight with his lays, 
while the truth of the deeds is damaging to his averred meaning.” Despite the similarity of these 
words with the values Thucydides himself holds, as he makes clear at 1.22.4,382 they are ironic in 
the mouth of Pericles whose eulogy of the fallen soldiers far exceeds any tour of duty they could 
have been involved in.383 Pericles is using ἀλήθεια loosely.384  
Protagoras’ human-measure claim is also present in the language Pericles is made to use 
in 2.35. Terms of measurement describe the two possible reactions to his eulogy. The benevolent 
381 Strasburger 2009: 210-211 rightly warns against taking this claim naively, “as if an appreciation of such good 
fortune was to be easly expected from Athens’ enemies and subjects.” Cf. Connor’s comments (1984: 74 & n54) on 
the amoral strain in Pericles’ thought in this passage, especially regarding the μνημεῖα κακῶν.  
382 Cf. Hornblower 1991 ad loc.  
383 See Bosworth 2000: 5; Connor 1984: 63n31. 
384 Cf. Ober 2009, who argues that Pericles’ invocation of power itself as proof of his claims implies that his claims 
might be little more than just that – claims (450). Also, such an appeal to visible, “unmistakable” proof in power 
invites comparison with Thucydides’ authorial observation (1.10.1-2) that, if Sparta and Athens were to be judged 
by later generations on a basis of soley outward appearances, wrong conclusions would be drawn (451). In short, 
Pericles’ “proof” is not, according to Thucydides, sound methodology, but (by implication) rhetoric.  
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might think the praise is insufficiently demonstrated (ἐνδεεστέρως), while the invidious might 
think it to be excessive (πλεονάζεσθαι) (2.35.2). These measurement terms suggest Pericles 
regards the members of the audience themselves as measures (μέτρα) and, as such, arbiters of 
reality. Objective truth is impossible. What matters is people’s opinions. People form these 
opinions on a basis of subjective knowledge. They use themselves as measures, not only of their 
fellow citizens, but of what they hear as well (in this case, Pericles’ speech). Now the bon mot of 
Pericles becomes intelligible. It will indeed be difficult to speak “in good measure” (μετρίως), as 
he says at 2.35.2, since the two sides that will critique his speech will measure it with discrepant 
measuring rods – themselves. Additionally, the fact alone that in so crucial a sentence, when the 
valor of the fallen is at issue, he uses this adverb, instead of another such as ὀρθῶς or δικαίως, 
which Maurice Pope shows means harmoniously or consistently,385 suggests an indifference 
towards a factual account. Pericles wants to speak consistently with their individual opinion, not 
with the record. For if he did that, he would have very little to say. 
 
8.1.2 Two Logoi 
 
 
While thus assessing the causes of disbelief, Pericles has at the same time been reducing the 
possible opinions on the fallen soldiers to two opposite logoi: They deserve grandiloquent praise 
or they do not. A glance back at what he said on the law calling for a grand eulogy (2.35.1) 
showed what the consensus view was. It is that they deserve it. Therefore, the opposite is the 
dissension view. Moreover, Pericles characterizes the dissension view as emanating from a 
disposition of envy (φθόνος). The dissenters suffer this φθόνος first, because of their 
unfamiliarity with the fallen; secondly, and more importantly, because, as is natural, they 
385 1988: 288-289. Specifically, he argues that μέτριος in Thucydides typically means “harmonious” instead of 
“intermediate” and suggests that here in the funeral speech it signifies “strik[ing] the right note.” 
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measure the capability of other people according to their own capability (εἴ τι ὑπὲρ τὴν αὑτοῦ 
φύσιν ἀκούοι) (2.35.2). In other words, Pericles candidly notes what he has been suggesting, that 
they are measures and they experience corresponding dispositions (cf. subsection 6.1.2). 
However, he makes it clear that there is nothing inherently incorrect about using oneself as a 
basis for knowledge. He has already suggested that those who are well-disposed to the fallen, 
and so hold the consensus view, have done the same. Likewise, the final sentence of the preface 
(2.35.3) in which he states he will aim for the wish and opinion of each side is a strong 
suggestion that, epistemologically speaking, neither side is wrong (2.35.3). The first preface thus 
enacts Protagoras’s two-logoi fragment without condemning the one logos or the other, though it 
does privilege one, not for any inherent correctness, but for its city-wide approval. 
Thus, 2.35 sets forth Pericles’ intellectual assumptions in such a way as to show how they 
bear the stamp of Protagorean thinking. Conceptually, Pericles describes the situation that faces 
him in terms that assume Protagorean relativism, the incorrigibility (despite the subjectivity) of 
human knowledge, the priority of belief over truth and the insistence that the individual’s belief 
must accord with the city’s decreed belief, while structurally he frames the situation according to 
the two-logoi doctrine. Protagoras’ epistemology is thus the key note struck at the very 
beginning of the funeral speech. 
 
 
 
8.2 AUTARKY 
 
 
After striking this note Pericles broaches the subject of Athens’ historical tradition, but instead of 
giving a long, drawn-out account of mythical expeditions, as other funeral speeches do,386 he 
summarizes the result of that tradition by defining Athens as the state that in all things is self-
386 Cf. Hdt. 9.27; Lys. 2.4-16.  
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sufficient (αὐτάρκης). That this is an important idea in the speech is suggested by the fact that at 
2.40 Pericles defines the individual Athenian citizen as self-sufficient and, more bleakly, by the 
fact that, when soon after the speech the plague ravages Athens, the Athenian individual proves 
in no way self-sufficient.387 Self-sufficiency then, or autarky, is the second note struck in the 
speech and, just like the first, has Protagorean antecedents.  
In the Theaetetus, after Protagoras finishes explaining how an individual can be wiser 
than another, and yet still be the measure of all things, Socrates invites Theodorus to examine 
with him whether or not they were right to take issue with Protagoras’ claim (λόγος) on the 
grounds that it means that the individual is self-sufficient in intelligence (αὐτάρκη εἰς φρόνησιν) 
(169d3-8). In this section I will argue that it is this Protagorean conception of autarky that lies 
behind the theme of autarky found in the funeral speech.  
 
8.2.1 Protagorean Autarky: An Existential Necessity 
 
 
Though the words Socrates uses do not pretend to be Protagoras’ own, there is nevertheless good 
reason to believe that Protagoras both characterized his view of human nature in terms of self-
sufficiency and denoted it with the adjective αὐτάρκης as well and that Socrates in using this 
adjective merely reflects Protagoras’ phraseology.  
 The little work found in the Platonic corpus under the title Ὅροι (Definitions), while not 
typically considered Plato’s, is regarded as Academic nonetheless and is a very instructive source 
for the way certain key words were defined in a philosophical context.388 For αὐτάρκεια it gives 
two meanings.389 The first is the material possession of everything one needs. In this sense the 
387 Cf. Macleod 1983: 152-153 who sees in the repetition an undermining, in the spirit of tragedy, of Pericles’ proud 
claim. Raaflaub 1990: 57 has a similar interpretation.  
388 Cf. Taylor 1937: 544-545. 
389 Cf. [Pl.] Def. 412b6-7.  
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word took on various connotations, according to the various assumption of what a mortal 
needs.390 In a deeper, but clearly related, sense, it signified the absence of the need of any 
external aid in living one’s life and so denotes being master of one’s self, not in the negative 
sense of self-control (σωφροσύνη), but in the positive sense of self-determinism.391 As the entry 
reads, it is the condition whereby those who possess it αὐτοὶ αὑτῶν ἄρχουσιν.  
Both of these meanings figure prominently in Protagoras’ formulation of human society. 
Because of their innate intelligence (represented by Prometheus) which necessity activated, the 
humans individually developed the skills (τέχναι) necessary in order to obtain everything they 
needed to survive. They were therefore by nature self-sufficient (see subsections 4.1.2, 4.1.3, 
4.1.4). In fact, Protagoras considers this ingenuity that gives each of the humans his material 
autarky so important and impressive that he considers it a link, although figurative, between 
them and the divine (see subsection 3.3.1). Their material autarky makes them Promethean.  
However, their autarky was a mixed blessing. Because they refused to compromise the 
way of life and Weltanschauung they each had developed, every effort at community failed and 
put them again and again at the mercy of the wild animals (see subsections 4.1.4, 4.2.2). This 
process of attempt and failure continued until, by a random process that gradually brought like 
individual together with like individual, they finally succeeded in living together, because the 
product of that random process was a community of genuine same-mindedness, where no 
member’s opinion was compromised (see subsection 4.3.4; section 4.4). It was an original 
democracy, founded upon ὁμόνοια (see subsection 4.4.1).  
 Thus the idea of autarky is integral to Protagoras’ theory of human nature and of the role 
of government. The individual has everything he needs to meet his physical needs and has 
390 For instance, the connotation it carried for the Cynics was different than that which it had for Hippias. See Rich 
1956: 23-25. 
391 Cf. Pl. Rep. 387d11-e1. 
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everything he needs within himself to interpret the world around him correctly. He is in need of 
no education, no instruction. At any rate, there is nobody superior who might give him that 
instruction.392 On both the basic and the deeper level, he is absolutely αὐτάρκης πρὸς τὸ εὖ ζῆν, 
much like Plato’s brave man at Rep. 387d11-12, except that for Protagoras the individual is 
naturally so; for Plato he must develop that ability by rigorous training. Thus Protagoras’ mythos 
explains historically how one is the measure of all things (see subsections 2.1.1, 2.1.2, 4.2.2). 
Consequently, the form of government that recognizes the autarky of the individual will be the 
best, insofar as it will not impose a foreign interpretation upon his conscience, but will 
acknowledge his freedom (ἐλευθερία) as an autarkic entity, since the decisions that government 
makes will be identical with his own and will represent in the most correct sense of the word the 
opinion of the city (see section 5.1). Since democracy is the only form of government capable of 
satisfying these two conditions, it is therefore the best form of government, because it respects, 
and thereby encourages and foments, individual autarky, where other forms of government 
suppress, and in suppressing, enslave it; and it is the truest form of government, because the 
opinion it enacts is the closest approximation to the population’s true opinion and thus comes 
closest to reflecting a natural order, if any exists (subsection 5.1.2).  In this way then the idea of 
autarky lies at the very heart of Protagoras’ relativism, as well as at the core of his defense of 
democracy, as it raises the democratic principles of equality (ἰσονομία), full participation 
(ἰσηγορία) and, most especially, freedom (ἐλευθερία) above mere pragmatic concerns to the 
status of existential necessities.   
 This being the case, the fact that Protagoras nowhere uses the word αὐτάρκεια nor is 
made to use it in any source may well be an accident of preservation, especially since it is clear 
that in the second half of the fifth century both the word and the idea of autarky were important 
392 Cf. Pl. Tht. 166e.  
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in philosophical discussions. Pythagoreans sublimated it as an idea of the absence of want into 
spiritual completeness.393 Hippias regarded it as the acquisition of skills and abilities that would 
allow one to satisfy every need or desire he might have, and considered it the τέλος of life.394 It 
figured in Democritus’ thought as an ingredient in one’s quest for εὐθυμία.395 But it is important 
to note that Protagoras’ conception of autarky differs from all the foregoing in that, while they 
elaborated upon the basic idea of autarky as absence of want, Protagoras utilized both the basic 
idea, as well as the deeper signification of being one’s own master (αὐτὸς αὑτοῦ ἄρχειν), the 
author of one’s own fate. Owing to this comprehensive use of the idea, it is just possible, if not 
probable, that Protagoras was the one whose doctrines were responsible for the expansion of this 
word.   
 
8.2.2 Periclean Autarky 
 
 
In the funeral speech autarky is likewise a theme that carries existential implications for the 
Athenians. Indeed, it can be considered the motif that binds the entire speech together into a 
conceptual unity. Pericles first takes autarky as the premise of the Athenian state and proceeds to 
describe it in terms reminiscent of the Protagorean conception. He then makes a transition to the 
individual Athenian and claims that the autarky which living in the Athenian state develops in 
the individual is a trait of supreme value in human history.  
 The quintessential feature of the Athenian state for Pericles is autarky. As he explains at 
2.36, Athenian history has moved towards it as towards a climax.396 Their ancestors kept the land 
free from foreign rule. Their fathers, the previous generation, transformed it into an empire. And 
393 If, that is, later Pythagorean thought reflects earlier thinking. See Scanlon 1994: 160. 
394 Unless the relative pronoun refers to Hegesidamus. DK 86 A1. Cf. Rich 1956: 25; Guthrie, 1971: 284. 
395 Scanlon 1994: 161. 
396 Cf. Loraux 1986: 121-22. 
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now they have enlarged most areas of that empire397 and developed the city (that is, Athens 
itself) until it has become “exceedingly self-sufficient (αὐταρκεστάτην) in all respects in terms of 
both war and peace” (36.3). The greatness of Athens lies in this fact. It is therefore important to 
ask what this autarky consists in. Gomme rightly clarifies that Pericles does not mean to say that 
Athens produces within the confines of Attica everything it needs, as though it were an ideal 
Aristotelian state. When however he goes on to explain that by this phrase Pericles means Athens 
is in a position to import everything it needs to meet its material needs, he does not do the 
passage full justice.398 First of all, there is an antithesis between empire (τὰ πλείω αὐτῆς [sc. 
ἀρχῆς]) and the city (τὴν πόλιν), which indicates a clear transition from empire and resources to 
the civic realm. Then, Pericles claims that they have rendered the city very self-sufficient in all 
things (τοῖς πᾶσι) for both war and peace (καὶ ἐς πόλεμον καὶ ἐς εἰρήνην). The preposition ἐς is 
significant. There is a tendency to translate it as though it meant “in time of peace.”399 But 
Thucydides expresses that idea with ἐν εἰρήνῃ.400 Rather, the preposition is final. Not only does 
the Athenian state have everything it needs to pursue war (a point Pericles has always at the back 
of his mind),401 but it has as well everything it needs to pursue peace. It is a polar statement. The 
autarky of Athens is seen in both “the increase of the revenue and the advance of culture.”402 
 The following sentence (2.36.4) confirms this reading. Of the features that make up this 
autarky (ὧν),403 Pericles will forego the military ones (τὰ κατὰ πολέμους ἔργα), and will rather 
expatiate upon the principles (ἐπιτήδευσις) that led to these features (αὐτά) and the polity 
397 So Rusten 1989: 142 and Hornblower 1991: 297 contra Gomme 1956: 105 who takes ἐπηυξήσαμεν as referring 
to a strengthening and consolidating of the empire rather than an increasing of it on the grounds that the latter 
interpretation would contradict ὅσην ἔχομεν ἀρχήν. 
398 1956: 105-6. So, too, Foster 2010: 202-204. 
399 So Jowett 1881; Warner 1972. Blanco’s (1998) “for war and peace” is better.  
400 Cf. 1.142, 2.2, 2.5, 3.82, 5.17. 
401 Cf. Bosworth 2000: 14-15. 
402 Marchant 1891 ad loc.  
403 I follow the scholiastic interpretation (see Hude 1927: 130) of ABFc2 for the reasons stated in this paragraph.  
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(πολιτεία) and personality that are responsible for their excellence (τρόπων ἐξ οἵων μεγάλα 
ἐγένετο). Some have taken “these features” to refer just to Athens’ military and imperial 
power.404 In this case αὐτά would refer to the growth of power in 36.2-3, and so would mean (to 
preserve the plural number) “accretions of power.” As a result, since μεγάλα certainly refers to 
the same thing, when Pericles says he will explain τρόπων ἐξ οἵων μεγάλα ἐγένετο, he must be 
saying that he will explain the character “as a result of which these accretions became great.” 
However, how a character can render an accretion of power great is not at all clear. Characters 
can make great accretions of power, but can they make accretions great? At any rate, it is a 
complicated notion and Pericles would have had to say more, if that is what he meant.405 It is 
better therefore to take αὐτά and μεγάλα as referring to ὧν, viz. the features in which Athens’ 
autarky consists, just as the scholia to ABFc2 recommend.406 This being the case, not only is it 
clear that Pericles understands Athens’ autarky to comprise a military and a cultural part, but also 
that he regards its cultural autarky as the greater achievement, since that is the aspect of Athens 
he will now elaborate upon.  
 Pericles goes on to explain what this cultural autarky looks like in the principles, polity 
and personality of the Athenian system. The outline alone of this portion of the speech is enough 
to show how he defines the idea. However one understands 2.37.1, it is at least clear that Pericles 
recapitulates the idea of the sentence at the beginning of the next with the phrase ἐλευθέρως δὲ 
τά τε πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν πολιτεύομεν.407 Pericles can say this because he has just explained how the 
entire citizenry is involved in the leadership of the state. Thus, Athenian autarky manifests itself 
404 Rusten 1989: 143; Hornblower 1991: 298.  
405 Hornblower 1991: 298 avoids the problem by translating αὐτά as power and μεγάλα as empire, but while 
Thucydides will use a neuter plural where a singular substantive is more usual, that does not mean the two 
expressions are synonymous and interchangeable for him. 
406 See above, fn403. See also Parry 1981: 161 for a similar reading of αὐτά. 
407 Cf. Rusten 1989: 147. 
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in the freedom and self-rule that characterizes its polity. Pericles here makes use of that deeper 
signification of autarky, so integral to Protagoras’ view of mankind. Because of the individual’s 
intellectual and spiritual autarky he must, if he is to be true to nature, dwell in a free state where 
he has a share in the power. Similarly, Pericles praises the Athenian polity for having these very 
features and moreover subsumes them under the heading of autarky, indeed as the first and most 
important aspect of that autarky. 
 In 2.38 Pericles notes that Athens enjoys plenty of diversions throughout the year. He 
then observes how Athens reaps the benefits of foreign products by import. Other writers have 
handled the theme, but for very different purposes. The “Old Oligarch” describes Athens’ receipt 
of goods from all over as a feature of its thalassocracy, and when he refers to those imports as 
τρόπους εὐωχιῶν, it is clear he is charging the demos with extravagant indulgence (2.7). The Old 
Comedy poet Hermippus makes much the same point, when he lists all the products, from 
Cyrenaic silphium to Carthaginian carpets, that flow into Athens as a result of the imperial power 
being placed in the hands of the naval mob.408 On the other hand, Isocrates uses the theme to 
show how Athens has conferred yet another benefit on Greece in establishing a depot in the 
middle of the Mediterranean (Paneg. 42). For Pericles, however, it is a sign of extreme material 
autarky. It is not simply the case that Athens gets many things. It gets everything (τὰ πάντα) 
from every country (ἐκ πάσης γῆς) and harvests the crops of other peoples with the same 
appropriation as they do their own. Pericles appreciates both aspects of autarky, just as 
Protagoras, unlike his contemporaries, did. 
 At this point Pericles turns to discuss the military life of Athens (2.39) and the principles 
that guide its civic life (2.40). Although Pericles does not directly relate these aspects of 
408 PCG Hermippus Φορμοφόροι 63. For Dionysus as the naval mob Kassel and Austin cite Zielinski’s paraphrase 
of the line (1931: 95) “ex quo penes populum Atheniensem est maritimum imperium.”  
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Athenian life to autarky, it is still clear that he regards them as ultimately emanating from it, 
since at 41.1, where he summarizes all he has said so far, he concludes that the city is the 
education of Greece, and the person (σῶμα) that the individual Athenian puts at the city’s 
disposal is sufficient in and of itself (αὔταρκες) for a great variety of action with great and 
graceful versatility. All aspects of Athenian life, not just its self-rule and economic prosperity, 
but its military practices and civic life, derive from its capacity to be a self-standing, independent 
entity.  
 This passage also brings out another point that Pericles is making. The self-sufficient city 
produces the self-sufficient citizen. The general idea that the city educates the citizen is certainly 
not peculiar to this speech. In a speech which in several ways mirrors this funeral speech 
Archidamus is made to make a comparable assumption about the Spartan polis (1.84.3).409  The 
thought goes back at least to Simonides who in a lost elegy asserted, albeit under unknown 
circumstances, that a city teaches a man (πόλις ἄνδρα διδάσκει).410 But Pericles takes the idea to 
a new level. The autarky that Athens imparts to its citizens does not simply teach them 
excellence (ἀρετή), as important as this point is.411 But more importantly it renders them 
exemplary specimens of the human race. They are capable to perform almost any task set before 
them with versatility and grace. Whoever they attack do not get indignant as though lesser men 
were attacking them; whoever they rule do not find fault with them as though unworthy to be 
their masters (2.41.3).412 Their daring has made every sea and every land receive them and 
409 For the antithesis between these two speeches and the theme of environmental education, see Hussey 1985:123-
24; also Bosworth 2000: 1.  
410 Plu. Mor. 784b. It occurs in the treatise An seni respublica gerenda sit. The argument is that since a city educates 
a man, one cannot be too old to “learn new tricks.” For the democratic spirit of Simonides’ work, see Donlan 1980: 
113-16. 
411 That ἀρετή could be taught is another point of agreement between Protagoras and Pericles. See subsection 5.4.1 
and cf. Schiappa 2003: 170. 
412 Cf. Strasburger 2009: 210-211 (quoted above, fn. 381).  
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everywhere they have left “everlasting memorials of wrong repaid and aid rendered” (2.41.4).413 
For these reasons they are admired by their contemporaries and shall be admired by future 
generations (2.41.4).  
 In the Menexenus Socrates describes his reaction to such passages as this (235a6-b1):  
ὥστ’ἔγωγε, ὦ Μενέξενε, γενναίως πάνυ διατίθεμαι ἐπαινούμενος ὑπ’αὐτῶν, καὶ ἑκάστοτε 
ἐξέστηκα ἀκροώμενος καὶ κηλούμενος, ἡγούμενος ἐν τῷ παραχρῆμα μείζων καὶ 
γενναιότερος καὶ καλλίων γεγονέναι. 
 
It is obvious why Plato took such passages as shameless pandering. Is Plato right? After all, he 
does call the speech he soon has Socrates deliver in imitation of epitaphioi περιλείμματ’ ἄττα 
from this very speech of Pericles (236b6).414 In a sense he is probably right, even despite 
Pericles’ two appeals to the truth (see subsection 8.1.1). But as far as the argument is concerned, 
this is really inconsequential. What matters is that Pericles is able to create an exemplary 
specimen of humanity out of the Athenian on the basis of the physical and intellectual autarky 
that the Athenian polis, itself autarkic, imparts to him. The Athenian epitomizes humanity. He 
achieves mankind’s manifest destiny by achieving autarky, a personal autarky, yet indissolubly 
linked with the group. Thus for both Pericles and Protagoras autarky is the key to the 
individual’s full realization of his humanity. Protagoras takes it as a premise of human nature and 
claims that human civilization came about only because no infringement was made on human 
autarky. Pericles implies that human history has reached a point it has never reached before. 
True, he uses a theme common to Greek political thought; but he develops it to enormous 
proportions. And it is the Protagorean doctrine on autarky that enables him to do so. The 
Protagorean recipe for civilization is thus re-enacted and re-created in Periclean Athens. For both 
413 For this rendering of μνημεῖα κακῶν τε κἀγαθῶν ἀίδια, see Rusten 1989: 161. 
414 See Coventry 1989: 3. 
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the achievement of autarky is the prelude to the maximization of humankind’s individual and 
collective potential. 
8.3 HERODOTEAN POLEMIC 
This coincidence of thought between Pericles’ and Protagoras’ conceptions of autarky finds 
confirmation in the writings of their contemporary. In the famous meeting Herodotus depicts 
between Solon and Croesus, the Athenian lawgiver attempts to teach the Lydian king the lesson 
of human vulnerability and the vital difference between a sufficiently fortunate life (εὐτυχίη) and 
wealth (πλοῦτος). One step in his argumentation is the status of human autarky, and what Solon 
has to say about it stands in sharp contrast to the way Pericles conceptualizes it in the funeral 
speech. Croesus, upon losing the distinction of being the most felicitous mortal to the Athenian 
Tellus and the Argive brothers Cleobis and Biton, asks Solon to explain how this can be. The 
explanation Solon gives is complex. It is complex because, I argue, it contains three lessons for 
the Lydian king each of which looks allusively, and critically, to Protagorean tenets. Moreover, 
in the second lesson it becomes clear that the view on autarky Herodotus is rejecting is not only 
directed against Protagoras, as the other lessons, but against Pericles, too. The way Herodotus 
thus lumps Protagoras and Pericles together in these lessons serves a further evidence of the 
close relationship between Protagoras and what Pericles says in the funeral speech on autarky. 
8.3.1 Lesson 1: Knowing the gods 
Solon begins the first lesson by remarking that he has been asked about things pertaining to 
mortals when he knows that “god-ness” (τὸ θεῖον) is jealous and disruptive through and through: 
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Ὦ Κροῖσε, ἐπιστάμενόν με τὸ θεῖον πᾶν ἐὸν φθονερόν τε καὶ ταραχῶδες ἐπειρωτᾷς ἀνθρωπηίων 
πρηγμάτων πέρι (1.32.1). Though the sentiment is quite traditional,415 Solon’s words have 
important points of emphasis. First of all, the use of τὸ θεῖον in place of the concrete θεός raises 
the discussion to a higher level of abstract philosophizing about the gods than is customary in 
traditional treatments,416 and the anastrophe of περί similarly draws attention away from mortal 
concerns to the sphere of the divine. The gods are the protagonists in the created world, not man, 
who far from being a measure must instead accommodate himself to them. Secondly, the 
participle ἐπιστάμενον emphatically occupies initial position, not just of the sentence, but of the 
entire sermon. In short, Herodotus bases Solon’s wisdom and his qualification as a σοφιστής, as 
he is called at 1.29.1, on his intimate knowledge of the way the gods are. He is a σοφιστής 
because he knows the divine. This emphasis on knowledge of the divine as the qualification of 
true σοφία and of a sophist invites comparison with a fake “wise-man,” a fake sophist,417 who 
denies the possibility of knowledge of things divine, such as Protagoras, the first to own the title 
of sophist proudly,418 who took a position of agnosticism when he declared:  
Περὶ μὲν θεῶν οὐκ ἔχω εἰδέναι, οὔθ’ὡς εἰσὶν οὔθ’ὡς οὐκ εἰσὶν οὔθ’ὁποῖοί τινες ἰδέαν· 
πολλὰ γὰρ τὰ κωλύοντα εἰδέναι ἥ τ’ἀδηλότης καὶ βραχὺς ὢν ὁ βίος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου.419  
 
 The comparison is rewarded upon further inspection. According to the quotation above, 
Protagoras denies the possibility of knowing anything about the gods on the grounds that the 
matter was in its very essence riddled with obscurity (ἀδηλότης) and because human life was too 
short. Solon, on the other hand, bases his entire thesis that the gods are jealous (or stated from 
the mortal view, mankind is a disaster waiting to happen), on the argument that human life is 
415 Cf. Asheri, Lloyd & Corcella 2007: 97-98, 102; Lloyd-Jones 1983: 68-70. 
416 The effect is the same in the other two occurrences (over against 146 occurrences of θεός [Asheri, Lloyd & 
Corcella: 2007: 102]) of the adjective as a neuter substantive in Herodotus, viz. 3.40 and 3.108.  
417 For the sophists as ἀλαζόνες, cf. Ar. Nub. 102. Cf. also Xenophon’s eagerness to acquit Socrates of the charge of 
ἀλαζονεία at Mem. 1.7.1-5. 
418 Pl. Prt. 317b3-5. 
419 DK 80 B4 (= Eus. PE 14.3.7, who states that the claim formed the opening of Protagoras’ treastise On the gods).  
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more than long enough to teach one this divine jealousy. To demonstrate the “long life” (ἐν τῷ 
μακρῷ χρόνῳ)420 of the human individual, Solon goes into a correspondingly long calculation of 
a typical life cycle which far from being brief, as Protagoras opined, actually provides many 
opportunities to experience and learn this vital lesson (πολλὰ μὲν ἔστι ἰδεῖν...πολλὰ δὲ καὶ 
παθεῖν). For Herodotus, παθήματα are μαθήματα. That is why he uses the word ἐπίστασθαι for 
Solon’s knowledge. The calamities one experiences during this long life provide clear 
knowledge about the gods. The first lesson Croesus must learn is not to buy into Protagoras’ 
agnosticism. 
 
8.3.2 Lesson 2: Autarky 
 
 
The next lesson concerns income. If a person makes it to the end of his life without ever having 
experienced terrible calamity, then he can be called blessed. Otherwise, any judgment is 
premature and until one does one is either rich (πλούσιος) or moderately well off (μετρίως 
ἔχοντες) (1.32.5). If a choice has to be made, Solon says it is better to be moderately well off 
than rich. For, while the rich man has the means to satisfy his desires and sustain any calamity, 
the moderately well off man does not invite either of them in the first place, but enjoys many 
good things nonetheless (1.32.6). Thus for Solon, having less is more. This being the case, the 
moderately well off man has a better life and the chance for a good end (1.32.7). Here Solon 
adds a caveat: Having it all (wealth, gratification of desires and the good things of the 
moderately well off man) is impossible for a human, who, since his person (σῶμα) is not self-
sufficient (αὔταρκες), will always be in need of something (1.32.8).  But still, he says, having a 
great many of them and dying without ever having tasted calamity is true felicity. Therefore one 
must judge every life by its end (τελευτή) (1.32.9). 
420 See Hdt. 5.9.3 for this same phrase, but meaning “since time out of mind.”  
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 Thomas Scanlon has argued that Herodotus’ concept of autarky is essentially the same as 
that expressed by Pericles in the funeral speech, since for both autarky is a necessary ingredient 
in the happy life.421 While it is true that the Herodotean passage verbally echoes the Periclean 
σῶμα αὔταρκες, the relationship between the two texts is rather polemical than, as Scanlon 
argues, complementary,422 and Nicole Loraux comes much closer to the truth when she says that 
the funeral speech “lays claim to exemplariness and proposes a perfect model of humanity, thus 
renouncing Solonian wisdom, which, born of a time of crisis, considered that ‘no man can unite 
everything within himself.’”423  
This relationship becomes clear when one considers the overall lesson which is that 
Croesus should beware of the envy of the gods, cultivate a moderate lifestyle, and not attempt to 
achieve autarky. For, not only is that impossible, but, it is implied, it will also excite the gods’ 
jealousy. For Herodotus autarky is not the ideal, but rather compromise and balance between 
human capability and divine envy is the ideal. The conclusion of his lesson is: ὃς δ’ἂν αὐτῶν 
πλεῖστα ἔχων διατελέῃ καὶ ἔπειτα τελευτήσῃ εὐχαρίστως τὸν βίον, οὗτος παρ’ἐμοὶ τὸ οὔνομα 
τοῦτο, ὦ βασιλεῦ, δίκαιός ἐστι φέρεσθαι. Yes, he considers the one who has without interruption 
a great number of things to be blessed, but the second colon of the clause (καὶ ἔπειτα τελευτήσῃ 
εὐχαρίστως τὸν βίον) puts a severe limitation on that “great number.” His good things cannot be 
so many as to tip off the gods. Humans must only be as capable as the egos of the gods allow. In 
421 1994: 147. 
422 After rightly noting the echo between Herodotus’ ἀνθρώπου σῶμα ἓν οὐδὲν αὔταρκες at 1.32.8 and Pericles’ τὸ 
σῶμα αὔταρκες at 2.41.1, Scanlon 1994: 147 proceeds to argue that Pericles’ words ἐπὶ πλεῖστα ἂν εἴδη recall 
Herodotus’ τὰ πλεῖστα ἔχῃ, and again Pericles’ μετὰ χαρίτων recall Herodotus’ εὐχαρίστως. Macleod 1983: 151 
makes the same connections, but to suggest disagreement between the two. But what use are verbal echoes, if there 
is no conceptual similarity? With ἐπὶ πλεῖστα ἂν εἴδη Pericles means the Athenian is sufficient in himself “for a 
great variety of actions”; Herodotus’ τὰ πλεῖστα ἔχῃ refers to a country having the greatest number of natural 
resources. Again, Pericles says the Athenian performs his actions with grace (μετὰ χαρίτων). So Scanlon argues that 
when Herodotus remarks that one is blessed, if he dies εὐχαρίστως, he means “if he dies in good grace” (153). But 
that is entirely dissonant with the passage. LSJ’s “happily” (sc. as one treated well) is clearly better. 
423 1986: 153-54. So too Macleod 1983: 152. 
209 
 
                                                 
sharp contrast, Pericles’ funeral speech idealizes an unlimited self-sufficiency in both city and 
the individual (see subsection 8.2.2). Pericles intends his praise of Athens’ autarky to encourage 
the citizens to add to it, become lovers of it, contribute to it with their lives (2.43.1). The 
Periclean speech is a call to action to increase the already high level of autarky of Athens. The 
Herodotean lesson to Croesus is a warning against believing that such autarky in anything 
mortal, whether city or individual, is ever possible or, if possible, even wise. Pericles, just as 
much as Croesus, is reprimanded by Solon for his pursuit of autarky à la Protagoras.  
 
8.3.3 Lesson 3: Present versus Future Certainty 
 
 
Having made these crucial points, Solon turns to extrapolate a general rule, a truth to live by: 
σκοπέειν δὲ χρὴ παντὸς χρήματος τὴν τελευτὴν κῇ ἀποβήσεται (1.32.9) – an idea and phrase 
Herodotus wants to emphasize, since in the very next sentence he redundantly describes Solon as 
one ὃς τὰ παρεόντα ἀγαθὰ μετεὶς τὴν τελευτὴν παντὸς χρήματος ὁρᾶν ἐκέλευε (1.33.1). The 
reiteration encourages the suspicion one is likely to conceive when reading this passage that the 
Herodotean παντὸς χρήματος is meant to recall the Protagorean πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον 
ἄνθρωπος, especially if, as I argue earlier in this section, Solon’s words on the knowledge of 
things divine are meant to engage with Protagoras’ agnosticism. This being the case, the general 
rule Solon is introducing appears to refer to, and reject, relativism.  
A passage in Theaetetus suggests just how Solon rejects it. A major implication of 
Protagoras’ relativism is that it privileges the present over the past and future. Accordingly, in 
the “defense” he gives through Socrates in the Theaetetus, Protagoras denies the existence of all 
but what one experiences (οὔτε γὰρ τὰ μὴ ὄντα δυνατὸν δοξάσαι, οὔτε ἄλλα παρ’ἃ ἄν τις πάσχῃ) 
(167a7-8). This rejection of future knowledge is the very thing that allows Socrates to level his 
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weightiest argument against the Abderite’s relativism. If the individual, he argues, has within 
himself the criterion for all things, then this criterion presumably includes future qualities and 
outcomes as well. So, if a patient believes he will catch fever, while his physician believes he 
will not, according to whose opinion, Socrates asks rhetorically, are we to say the outcome will 
be (ἀποβήσεσθαι)? Of course, time will tell that the physician was correct and that therefore the 
patient was mistaken (178b2-c7).  
Whether or not Socrates has Protagoras where he wants him,424 it is important to note 
how he attacks Protagoras’ relativism. He pits future outcomes against the individual’s present 
opinion. Similarly, Solon’s final lesson to Croesus advises him to judge everything (παντὸς 
χρήματος) by its final outcome (τὴν τελευτὴν κῇ ἀποβήσεται) and realize that his present 
prosperity (τὰ παρεόντα ἀγαθά) gives no real indication of his identity as felicitous or not. 
Croesus must stop judging things by the palpable objects that enter his immediate experience.  
Herodotus is not of course refuting Protagoras. But he is, I suggest, referring to 
Protagoras’ teaching in order to invest his portrait of Croesus with a current, topical nuance. 
Through anti-Protagorean advice to Croesus he insinuates that, when one commits himself to the 
human-measure claim, he limits his judgment to only present data, casts a blind eye to the future 
and thus exposes himself to the age-old warning, found frequently in previous literature, not to 
claim anything to be the case until it has reached its end.425 Traditional wisdom taught a humble 
abeyance and suspension of certainty; Protagorean relativism encouraged a devil-may-care self-
assuredness. Herodotus, through the words he gives Solon on knowledge and the gods, on 
424 At Tht. 166b4-c6 “Protagoras” gives the impression that he might have responded that one’s future self is entirely 
different from one’s present self, a response Burnyeat entertains and examines (1990: 40-42). However, it is clearly 
based on the Heraclitean doctrine of flux.  
425 Aesch. Ag. 928-29; Simon. 521 (PMG); S. Tr. 1-3, OT 1528-30. 
211 
 
                                                 
autarky and on present versus future certainty, pits this traditional wisdom, in the person of 
Solon, against Protagorean wisdom, in the person of Croesus.426 
The Protagorean nuance Herodotus uses in his Solon/Croesus narrative suggests a link 
between Pericles and Protagoras on the score of autarky. I have been arguing that there is a mild 
polemic between Herodotus and Protagoras in this passage.427 Therefore, seeing that Herodotus 
characterizes autarky in a way that contrasts so sharply with the way Pericles characterizes it, 
and does so in the context of a passage that criticizes the Protagorean worldview, it appears that 
Herodotus, in taking the one to task, takes them both to task. He can thus be regarded as 
providing literary evidence, on top of the conceptual evidence given in the previous section, that 
Periclean and Protagorean autarky go hand in hand.   
 
 
 
8.4 CONCLUSION 
 
 
These are the ways in which I suggest the first two sections of the funeral speech reflect 
Protagorean teaching. From what Pericles says in the first preface it is clear that he views the 
situation he is presented with through the lens of a Protagorean-style epistemology that 
privileges belief over factuality, places greater value on subjective impression than on objective 
inference, and organizes its data in opposing, yet equally validated, perspectives. Similarly, what 
Pericles says in the preface to the constitutional portion of the speech on autarky and its role in 
the Athenian democratic ideology is much closer in its degree of importance to the role autarky 
plays in Protagoras’ thought than in that of other contemporary thinkers. Finally, a comparison of 
426 It is interesting to note that Solon, as representative of the πάτριος πολιτεία, was similarly pitted against the 
Periclean democracy by Ath. Pol. (29.3, cf. D.S. 14.3).  
427 For other passages where Herodotus appears to register his disagreement with Protagoras, see subsections 3.3.2, 
5.1.2, 9.4.2. For the presence of both Herodotus and Protagoras at Thurii, see subsection 7.1.3 with fn. 328. 
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Periclean autarky with Herodotus’ construal of it not only suggests a link between Pericles and 
Protagoras, but also, in a broader perspective, a basic disagreement on Herodotus’ part with the 
Abderite sophist. In the next chapter I will discuss how Pericles goes on in the constitutional 
portion of the speech to characterize the facets of Athenian government in ways that suggest that 
the hallmarks of the Athenian democracy were rationalized, and to an extent justified, by the 
relativistic worldview of Protagoras.  
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9.0 THE PROTAGOREAN SIDE OF ATHENIAN POLITICS 
 
 
 
 
Now that Pericles has set isolated autarky as Athens’ most characteristic feature, he undertakes 
to show what that autarky looks like in Athenian political culture. While he addresses many 
elements and dimensions of the Athenian state, it is particularly in his discussion of leadership, 
society, and justice in Athens in 2.37 and decision-making and military activity in 2.40 that his 
Protagorean assumptions come most visibly to the fore. Specifically, he characterizes office-
holding in Athens as determined by the sole criterion of political ability, or virtue (ἀρετή). True, 
there are other factors, in particular one’s income, but these are miniscule and at any rate only 
help ensure that political ability is always the final and weightiest qualification. Athens remains 
an aristocracy of virtue. The Protagorean influence in this passage resides in the assumptions 
Pericles makes about the political ability of the individual, about the role of natural endowment 
in government, and about the function wealth should perform in it. Similarly, what Pericles says 
here about Athenian society and justice are indebted to Protagoras’ construal of the ideal human 
government as a society of consensus.  
After describing Athenian leisure and military training, Pericles returns in 2.40.1-3 to the 
political arena and discusses the mode of decision-making in Athens. Here again the influence of 
the sophist betrays itself in Pericles’ insistence on city-wide participation in the decision-making 
process, in his praise of the process as a way of finding agreement without sacrificing plurality, 
and in his attribution of Athenian military success to precisely this deliberative procedure. All in 
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all, these two passages present a picture of Athenian political culture that is determined by a 
Protagorean Weltanschauung.  
It is around this point that Pericles concludes this portion of the funeral speech and turns 
to its proper subject, the praise of the fallen soldiers. But the influence of Protagoras does not 
stop there. As I will argue in chapter eleven, the rhetorical agenda of the speech as a whole 
reflects the sophist’s rhetorical teachings (which I will set out in chapter ten), just as in this 
chapter I argue key passages reflect his political science. 
 
 
 
9.1 POWER TO THE PEOPLE 
 
 
Pericles addresses Athenian leadership from two perspectives. First, he discusses broadly where 
authority constitutionally lies. He then becomes more specific and describes the nature of office-
holding in the Athenian state. In this section I will discuss the first issue and attempt to show that 
Pericles claims that power has been invested in the entire citizen body of Athens and that in 
making this claim he uses explanations that Protagoras likely used. 
 
9.1.1 Wholeness over Partiality 
 
Pericles begins (2.37.1) by observing that the Athenians have a unique constitution, one that 
serves as a model to others.  It has been named, he says, democracy διὰ τὸ μὴ ἐς ὀλίγους ἀλλ’ ἐς 
πλείονας οἰκεῖν. What exactly does this phrase ἐς πλείονας οἰκεῖν mean? Does it mean that 
power lies in the hands of the majority, or that the state is run in the interests of the majority? Is 
the government by the people, or for the people?428 On the whole, the arguments that it means in 
428 See Robinson 1997: 57n71 for a list of commentators, translators, scholars who favor one or the other 
interpretation. Those who favor an interpretation of “in the hands of the majority” include: Poppo, Classen, Steup, 
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the hands of the majority are the more compelling. As Eric Robinson points out, the preposition 
ἐς meaning “in the hands of” is more consonant with general Thucydidean usage (cf. 8.38.3, 
8.89.2 and 8.53.3 [especially]); and moreover Plato’s Menexenus 238d3-4, being modeled 
closely on this passage,429 “defines the Athenian democracy with the phrase ἐγκρατὲς τῆς 
πόλεως τὰ πολλὰ τὸ πλῆθος.”430 Besides these reasons, an a priori argument also carries some 
weight. Pericles’ point in using the phrase is to explain the formal name “democracy.” It would 
hardly make much sense to say “it is called People-Rule, because it takes the people’s interests 
into account, while actually being ruled by others.”431 
The phrase is often translated just as I have been translating it: “management in the hands 
of the majority.” But “majority” fails to capture a vital idea. It is significant that the comparative 
of πολύς is used here, since it stands against the positive degree (ὀλίγους) and is the sole instance 
where Thucydides uses the uncontracted form of the comparative, everywhere else preferring the 
contracted πλείους. Harris suggests it is used “to allude to the procedure followed in both the 
deliberative bodies, the Council and the Assembly, which passed only those measures that 
received a plurality of the votes cast.”432 It is hard, though, to expect such precision from so 
broadly thematic a sentence. A more likely explanation can be found in the ideological 
sloganeering inherent in many fifth-century political terms. Discussing this sloganeering, R. 
Brock argues first that oligarchs got the jump on democrats in developing a “moral terminology 
Gomme, Kakridis, de Romilly, Vretska, Raaflaub, Harris. Those who favor the other are: Sheppard/Evans, Sealey, 
Meyer, Ostwald, Rusten, Hobbes, Crawley, the Oxyrhynchus Commentator.  
429 Cf. Vlastos 1973: 191; Coventry 1989: 3.  
430 1997: 57-58. So too Raaflaub 1990: 60.  
431 Cf. Harris 1992: 164 for this same argument. He adds two more which I find quite compelling. First, the entire 
point of the passage is a contrast between democracy and oligarchy. A meaning of “in the interests of” would 
severely cripple that contrast. Secondly, it would just be otiose. Any government could claim, as even some 
dictatorships have done, to be administered in the interests of the majority.  
432 1992: 162. 
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to denote class and/or political alignment.”433 They, qua aristocrats, were ἀγαθοί, while the 
democrats were κακοί and πονηροί.434 He notes by the way that this terminology likely 
intensified after the Ephialtean reforms of 462 BC, going some way “to mitigating the impotence 
[of the oligarchs] in practical politics.”435 He next argues that the democrats responded in various 
ways. One way they responded was by redefining those very moral terms, so as, for example, to 
give a meaning of civic uselessness to ἀπραγμοσύνη. Another way, and one more to the point, 
was by using numerical terms to denote the two groups. Oligarchs were ὀλίγοι, ἐλάττους, while 
democrats were ὁ δῆμος, τὸ πλῆθος, οἱ πλείονες, τὸ πολύ, οἱ πάντες. “Such slogans,” he states, 
“served to identify democracy with the interest of the whole people and city [my italics] while 
branding oligarchy as factional.”436 In support of this interpretation, he cites Th. 6.39.1, where 
Athenagoras defines democracy: ἐγὼ δέ φημι πρῶτα μὲν δῆμον ξύμπαν ὠνομάσθαι, ὀλιγαρχίαν 
δὲ μέρος. In this vein he notes that among democrats there was an effort to equate the city with 
the Demos, an effort he sees already in Solon and Simonides, and believes complete by the time 
of Aeschylus’ Supplices.437 The important result of Brock’s study then is that the numerical 
terminology encountered so often in Athenian politics was a democratic invention used in order 
to express the democratic slogan of wholeness over partiality. Brock’s conclusion receives 
emphatic support from Herodotus’ Otanes who sums up his encomium of democracy with the 
epigrammatic clincher ἐν γὰρ τῷ πολλῷ ἔνι τὰ πάντα (3.80.6).438 What democrats meant 
therefore when they referred to “the more numerous” was the entire polis. Ὀλίγοι was the 
original disparaging term. Here belongs the Athenians’ assumption that decisions taken on the 
433 1991: 163. 
434 163. Cf. Reverdin 1945: 208-212; Donlan 1980: 127 (who however attributes the origin of οἱ πολλοί to the 
aristocrats, though LSJ does not cite an attestation of the word bearing this meaning before Thucydides) and 
subsection 6.2.2 above.  
435 163n17. 
436 164. 
437 For dating this play to the spring of 463 BC, see Podlecki 1966: 42-43.  
438 Cf. Asheri, Lloyd and Corcella 2007: 475 and Raaflaub 1990: 41-42. 
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Pnyx, though representing at most 6000 heads, stood for the entire citizenry (cf. subsection 
6.2.5). 
In light of Brock’s article, Pericles’ use of πλείονας can now be seen more clearly. He is 
drawing a contrast between oligarchy and democracy and characterizing the former as factional 
and the latter as representative of the whole, just as Otanes and Athenagoras do.439 Not only does 
this reinforce the view that Pericles declares the state to be in the hands of the majority, but also 
suggests the influence of Protagoras. Pericles’ democratic slogan is similar to Protagoras’ 
doctrine of consensus. For Protagoras the opinion of the city was synonymous with the just and 
honorable (cf. subsection 5.1.2). It was therefore necessary for the entire city to be in agreement 
on decisions taken; otherwise, if anybody was left out or sat out of his own volition, that decision 
could not be called in the most correct sense of the word the city’s opinion (see subsection 5.1.3). 
What is more, his entire rhetorical program was designed to be an instrument for securing 
unanimity and same-mindedness in the voting public (see section 10.5). Pericles’ insistence on 
wholeness over partiality thus resonates with the logical requirements of Protagoras’ relativist 
state.  
After discussing the democratic terminology that arose in response to oligarchic moral 
bias, Brock concludes that this terminology implies the existence of a systematic theory of 
democracy which however was not set down to writing: “[t]he Athenians were perfectly capable 
of justifying democracy in theoretical terms.”440 There is good reason for this conclusion. The 
very fact that οἱ πολλοί counter-intuitively first appears as a term insinuating wholeness, instead 
439 Similarly, a Thucydidean variatio  at 4.86.4 is helpful. There Brasidas says that the freedom he brings would not 
be worth much, if he subjected the majority to the few (τὸ πλέον τοῖς ὀλίγοις) or vice versa τὸ ἔλασσον τοῖς πᾶσι. 
“All” and “the majority” are synonymous. Related to this concept is what Pericles says at Th. 2.60.1-3 on the 
relation of the individual to the state. 
440 1991: 169. A particularly strong argument of Brock’s is that in the Persian debate at Hdt. 3.80 Otanes rejects 
monarchy and oligarchy, not because of the quality of the ruler(s), but because of the nature of power, while 
Megabyzus and Darius reject democracy in terms of class prejudice. This suggests for Brock that democrats took the 
lead in thinking abstractly about government (165-6). 
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of commonality,441 does indeed suggest not simply systematic, theoretical thinking on the 
democrats’ part, but specifically thinking along the lines of Protagoras’ doctrine of consensus.  
 
9.1.2 ἰσονομία rejected 
 
 
Both Protagoras and Pericles acknowledge the fact that democracy and isonomy are in a sense 
synonymous. Protagoras evokes isonomy by specific vocabulary that is etymologically related to 
νόμος.442 At the time when humanity’s first experiment in community is going awry and Zeus 
bids Hermes to take δίκη and αἰδώς to men, Hermes asks how he is to give them (322c6-9):  
“As the skills have been distributed (νενέμηνται), am I to distribute (νείμω) these too? 
This is the way they’ve been distributed (νενέμηνται): one man proficient in medicine 
meets the needs of many private men, and [so are] the rest of the craftsmen; accordingly 
am I to enact (θῶ) δίκη and αἰδώς in this way among men, or am I to distribute (νείμω) 
them to all?”  
 
There is repetition and symmetry of the verb νέμω. It is used four times and alternates between 
νενέμηνται and νείμω. Moreover, Hermes offers a synonym (θῶ) that evokes legislation443 which 
Zeus picks up on and elaborates upon (νόμον γε θές). Thus the vocabulary, while it fails to 
mention isonomy expressly, still suggests that what Zeus is instituting in Protagoras’ democratic 
myth is isonomy. Similarly, Pericles at 2.37.1 explains the polity that is an example to others 
with a μέν/δέ antithesis: The μέν-clause provides the name, while the δέ-clause explicates the 
concept. The explication of the concept of democracy is itself divided into a μέν/δέ antithesis, the 
μέν-clause of which concessively grants that isonomy figures in the democracy, specifically in 
441 As the term of course later came to mean (cf. Brock 1991: 165). 
442 Protagoras was interested in language, including etymology. At Cra. 391b-e Socrates suggests that Hermogenes 
should learn from his brother Callias (another connection between Callias and Protagoras!) what Protagoras teaches 
on the correctness of names (ὀρθότης ὀνομάτων) in order to receive guidance in the present question whether or not 
language has an origin in convention or nature. Moreover, Cra. 385e-386a, where the human-measure doctrine is 
mentioned, suggests these language studies were relevant to his moral/political theory. See Kerferd 1981: 75-77.  
443 Cf. e.g., νομοθέτης. 
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the legal process (μέτεστι δὲ κατὰ μὲν τοὺς νόμους πρὸς τὰ ἴδια διάφορα πᾶσι τὸ ἴσον).444 But 
the δέ-clause that follows indicates that, while they are related ideas, democracy and isonomy 
cannot, properly speaking, be considered synonymous. Isonomy, Pericles makes clear, ceases to 
describe the Athenian polity when it comes to office-holding. In a similar way Protagoras, 
though he implies that the bestowment of Dike and Aidos was the establishment of isonomy, 
nowhere uses the word outright and likewise assumes, especially in his flautist analogy (327a4-
c4), that, if one takes office-holding at Athens into account, the word is actually a misnomer 
(falling short of ὀρθοέπεια?).445 Thus both Pericles and Protagoras pay respectful lip service to 
the older name for democracy,446 but at the same time politely reject it as semantically unfit for 
service. 
 
 
 
9.2 AN ARISTOCRACY OF VIRTUE 
 
 
Why do they consider it unfit for service as a descriptor of democracy? I believe Martin 
Ostwald’s study of the first appearance of νόμος in a political sense answers this question.447 In 
the course of arguing that Cleisthenes was responsible for the substitution of νόμος for θέσμιον 
as the vox propria for statute in Athenian political language, Ostwald asks what ἰσονομία, a word 
almost indubitably associated with Cleisthenes’ measures, essentially means. An examination of 
its first appearance (Alcmaeon frg. 4) determines that the word denotes, not an orderly balance 
444 Ostwald 1969: 114n3 criticizes Gomme 1956: 109-10 for taking μέτεστι...τὸ ἴσον as referring to political 
equality, when it actually refers to merely judicial equality. This is a good criticism. Pericles restricts isonomy to a 
judicial context and so cannot, as Gomme assumes, have political equality in mind. On the other hand, Pericles 
cannot say κατὰ μὲν τοὺς νόμους...πᾶσι τὸ ἴσον without clearly evoking isonomy which is simply too powerful a 
word for one to say, with Ostwald, that Pericles simply has some other isonomy in mind. However, when the 
passage is read as I suggest, this problem disappears: Pericles explores the fitness of the word isonomy for 
democracy, concedes it has a place in the judicial branch, but determines that it does not fit the executive.  
445 For Protagoras’ interest in ὀρθοέπεια, see Pl. Phdr. 267c4-7. 
446 Ostwald 1969: 97n1 lists citations for the view that isonomy was the original name for democracy.  
447 1969.  
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between several parts, but one between two parts opposite to each other.448 In the political sphere 
this manifests itself as a system of checks and balances between those who govern and those who 
are governed;449 and in the Cleisthenic constitution it manifested itself in the deme-based 
government that provided “an effective check on those who, in accordance with the census 
classification of the Solonian constitution, were alone eligible to the archonship and other high 
offices.”450 In other words, Cleisthenes did not create democracy; he merely rectified the 
imbalance of power between the two members of the state, the commoners and the elite. He did 
not throw the high offices open to the non-elite, but instead compensated them with (a) local 
self-government and (b) an impartial system of voting (which in Athens means both election and 
legislation). This explanation sheds light on why Pericles and Protagoras reject isonomy as no 
longer capturing the essence of democracy. Since the days of Cleisthenes the constitution has 
changed. It is no longer a balance, but an imbalance. There is a disparity that stands out. In the 
area of office-holding one group is privileged above the others.451 But this instance of privilege 
is fair.  
 
9.2.1 The Privileged Group 
 
 
Who is this privileged group? In a word, it is the ones who are endowed with political ability, or 
virtue (ἀρετή). If the clause μέτεστι δὲ κατὰ μὲν τοὺς νόμους πρὸς τὰ ἴδια διάφορα πᾶσι τὸ ἴσον 
recognizes the fact that isonomy stills figures in the Athenian polity, the adversative κατὰ δὲ τὴν 
ἀξίωσιν that follows indicates where isonomy fails to play a part: eligibility for office. The 
448 Ostwald 1969: 101. 
449 Ibid. 106. 
450 Ibid. 154.  
451 Related to this rejection of isonomy as an obsolescent word for democracy is an attendant re-interpretation of the 
word along strict etymological lines as something equally doled out, a conceptualization Pericles and Protagoras 
share, the former in his claim of equal standing in the Courts and the latter in his claim that every individual’s sense 
of moral correctness has equal validity. In other words, they both prefer the “new” meaning of isonomy. 
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scholarly consensus appears to be that ἀξίωσις here refers to personal distinction; or, as the 
Oxyrhynchus commentator glosses it, one’s ἀξία.452 However, too much respect has been paid to 
the Oxyrhynchus commentator. If ἀξίωσις means distinction, several ineloquent inconcinnities 
result: (a) the “judicial branch” (κατὰ μὲν τοὺς νόμους) which sets up the first part of the 
antithesis is answered, not by a reference to another branch, but by the criterion (κατὰ δὲ τὴν 
ἀξίωσιν) in an as yet unspecified branch of government; (b) the clause ὡς ἕκαστος ἔν τῳ 
εὐδοκιμεῖ becomes, not epexegetic, but simply redundant; (c) there emerges no appreciable 
difference between ἀξίωσις and ἀξίωμα in the following clause; and finally (d) election to office 
is then signified by the phrase ἐς τὰ κοινὰ...προτιμᾶται which is too broad to be taken on its own 
to refer only to Athenian χειροτονία. Maurice Pope rightly criticizes this reading:  
[T]he result of these misrepresentations (if we took them seriously) would be to give us 
an absurd picture of the στρατηγία as a kind of Committee of All Talents and at the same 
time to make Pericles guilty of a monstrous libel on the Athenian δῆμος which contained 
vastly more than ten people who were particularly good at something (ὅστις ἔν τῳ 
εὐδοκιμεῖ).”453 
 
But if one takes ἀξίωσις as a vox media and to mean, not rank, but ranking – that is, the act of 
determining what each person’s rank, or ἀξίωμα, is – these problems disappear. Κατὰ δὲ τὴν 
ἀξίωσιν broaches the topic of eligibility for office.  
What offices? Those who take ἀξίωσις to signify rank or status feel that only the elective 
offices could here be meant.454 However, as it is better to take the word as a vox media meaning 
eligibility, then it would appear that Pericles refers to all the offices. But in that case a question is 
raised about the sortitive offices. Seeing that the lot figured so large in Athens, how can Pericles 
speak as though ability was the only qualification? The lottery might promote men who were 
452 See Gomme 1956: 108; Rusten 1989: 145 (“popular esteem”); Hornblower 1991: 300 (“the claim of 
excellence”). For the Oxyrhynchus commentator, see Hude 1927: 131.  
453 1988: 292.  
454 So e.g., Gomme 1956: 108; Rusten 1989: 146.  
222 
 
                                                 
absolute idiots. Harris considers it an omission and dismisses it as a “venial instance of 
suppressio veri,” permissible in the rhetorical context of a funeral oration.455 This zealous 
suppressio veri may very well be. But an alternative explanation is simply that Pericles means 
what he says, that the Athenian official, whether he has gained his position by election or by lot, 
has gained it because of his ability.456 The onus is on us to explain how this might be. 
V. Lynne Snyder Abel did some interesting work on this topic in the 1980s. She argued 
that as of 487/6 the archons, and probably all sortitive offices, were not appointed by pure 
sortition, but by a procedure known to the writer of Ath. Pol. as κλήρωσις ἐκ προκρίτων (the 
drawing of lots from a short-list).457 This procedure entailed the nomination of candidates by the 
demes458 to stand for the lottery of offices. For example, in the case of the 9 archons the total 
nominees presented by the demes numbered 500. Sortition by tribe then reduced the number to 
100 (each tribe drawing 10 lots from the initial 50); then sortition again produced 10 (9 archons 
+ secretary).459 Thus sortition after an initial selection of appropriate candidates by the demes 
(πρόκρισις) took much of the randomness out of the process. “It formed a sophisticated 
procedure which both secured candidates of general ability and integrity and, except for the 
periods of the tyranny and the oligarchies, eliminated from the appointment undue influence of 
money or political philosophy.”460 If this mode of sortition was practiced at the time of Pericles’ 
funeral speech, then Pericles can indeed consider sortition a way of producing magistrates of 
ability.  
455 1992: 165-66. 
456 Raubitschek 1969: 90 offers a very similar reading of the clause. 
457 Ath Pol. 8.1; Abel 1983: 59. Cf. Isoc. Areop. 22, who says that the Athenians who administered the city by the 
Solonian/Cleisthenic constitution (§16) did so οὐκ ἐξ ἁπάντων τὰς ἀρχὰς κληροῦντες, ἀλλὰ τοὺς βελτίστους καὶ 
τοὺς ἱκανωτάτους ἐφ’ἕκαστον τῶν ἔργων προκρίνοντες.  
458 Ath. Pol. 22.5; Abel: 1983: 36, 71; Stavely 1972: 38, 239 n. 59; Lang 1959: 88-89. For counter-arguments, see 
Rhodes 1981: 273.  
459 Abel 1983: 36.  
460 Abel 1983: 83.  
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The question hinges on whether it was in fact practiced during his lifetime. It is last 
attested in 458/7.461 The general view is that sometime after 458/7 and before the fourth century 
κλήρωσις ἐκ προκρίτων was replaced with simple sortition, and in the case of archons with a 
preliminary soritition (προκλήρωσις).462 Exactly when, however, the change took place is 
unknown. Abel argues that a change never took place and that κλήρωσις ἐκ προκρίτων continued 
down to the archonship of Demetrius of Phalerum in 309/8 BC. A few scholars disagree,463 but 
while they are not convinced by her arguments that sortition was so practiced in the fourth 
century, they are silent about her arguments concerning the fifth century.464 Her arguments are 
quite plausible, though.465 She points out that in the constitution which Pisander’s junta offered 
the reluctant466 Athenians in 411 not just the important military officers, such as the generals, but 
the lesser, civic officers such as the archons, were to be determined by lot from a short-list drawn 
from the Five Thousand.467 Similarly, she notes that according to Ath. Pol. 35.1 the one 
constitutional act carried out by the Thirty was the allotment468 of the councilors and other 
offices from a short-list of the One Thousand.469 
461 Ath. Pol. 26.2.  
462 Hignett 1958: 227; Rhodes 1981: 274.  
463 Lewis 1984: 344-45; Rhodes 1985b: 378-79; Hansen 1986b: 222-29. 
464 For the view, anticipating Abel, that it was practiced in the fifth century, see Burnet 1924: 147; Raubitschek 
1969: 89-90.  
465 Abel 1983: 41-47.  
466 Th. 8.53.2: ἀντιλεγόντων δὲ πολλῶν καὶ ἄλλων περὶ τῆς δημοκρατίας. In the face of such reluctance it is 
understandable why the constitution Pisander offered was only quantitatively, not qualitatively, different from the 
Athenian democracy (and for that reason never actually set up). 
467 Abel 1983: 41 on Ath. Pol. 30.2, which uses the words αἰρεῖσθαι… ἐκ προκρίτων. For αἰρεῖσθαι as a general 
word for appointment in both elective and sortitive offices, cf. Ath. Pol. 26.2 and see Abel 1983: 19. For a counter-
view, see Rhodes 1981: 392 who see in αἱρεῖσθαι a contrast to κληρωτάς later in the sentence, but this contrast is 
rather between sortitive offices from a short-list and sortitive offices without any such preliminary stage of selection. 
For, taking αἱρεῖσθαι as Rhodes does entails a double election which in the case of just five thousand full citizens 
would be time-consuming and superfluous. It is better to take αἱρεῖσθαι with Wilamowitz (as cited in Abel 1983: 19) 
as a media vox. 
468 The word used is καθιστάναι which, Abel maintains, is a general word that can mean both allot and elect. The 
Erythrae decree of 453/2 BC confirms her argument (IG I³. 14.13 [= ML 40]). 
469 Abel 1983: 45-46.  
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In addition to Abel’s work one should consider a passage of Plato’s Apology where 
Socrates explains to the jury why he does not implore their mercy or present his children so as to 
arouse their pity. It’s not because he is arrogant or disdainful of them, but because he must be 
consistent with his reputation for wisdom and bravery, unlike other Athenians who claim special 
distinction in virtue, but break down when they are on trial. Seeing these things, he says, a 
stranger might get the impression “that those of the Athenians who stand out in virtue, whom 
they rank (προκρίνουσιν) above themselves in their offices and in their other honors, are no 
different than women” (35b1-3). As Burnet aptly comments, “the term προκρίνειν is technical 
for the drawing up of a ‘short-leet’ (sic), and unless this had been done by voting or some 
equally deliberate method of selection, the argument would be absurd.”470 
Taken together, these arguments suggest that κλήρωσις in Athens was conducted ἐκ 
προκρίτων until at least 399 BC and that consequently until that time there was provision at the 
level of the demes for appointing men of good standing and reputation in their demes to stand in 
the tribal lottery. The assertion at Ath. Pol. 62.1, that at some date the right to draw up a list, that 
is, the right of πρόκρισις, was taken from the demes, because they were selling the slots, and was 
given to the tribes, points in the same direction: What they were supposed to be doing with 
deliberate judgment they were doing with bribery.471 The implication this re-examination of 
sortition in Athens has on the funeral speech is clear. Pericles can lump the sortitive and elective 
offices together and claim that they are filled on a basis of ability because in both procedures 
there are provisions, whether real or token, for securing adequate magistrates. Therefore, 
470 1924: 147. Cf. Raubitschek 1969: 90.  
471 Certain passages of the Ath. Pol. report that the πρόκρισις was conducted on a tribal level (8.1, 22.5, 62.1). Abel 
1983: 36-37, following the reconstruction of Lang 1959: 88-89, offers the explanation that the allotment took place 
on a tribal level, but the πρόκρισις was on a deme level, until because of bribery that responsibility as well was 
transferred to the tribes.  
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regarding the original question of which offices Pericles has in mind here the answer is simply: 
All of them. 
What Pericles says the criterion of office-holding is not now comes into focus. One is put 
forward in office, he claims, on the basis of ability (ἀπ’ἀρετῆς), not ἀπὸ μέρους. Recent 
commentators take ἀπὸ μέρους to mean “in rotation” and interpret Pericles to be disavowing the 
use of the lot in high office (i.e., offices requiring ἀξίωσις).472 Again, the Oxyrhynchus 
commentator has been followed, and again too closely.473 For not only does this interpretation 
misconstrue ἀξίωσις, as I just discussed, but it also strains not just ordinary Greek usage, but, as 
Harris points out, Thucydidean usage as well, who either expresses the idea of “in rotation” with 
ἐν τῷ μέρει/ἐν μέρει or κατὰ μέρος.474 It is much more natural then to take ἀπὸ μέρους as 
nineteenth-century commentators took it, viz. as referring to a group.475 Pericles will then be 
saying that ability alone is the criterion for office-holding, not membership in an economic or 
birth nobility. What he disavows then is wealth (πλοῦτος) and birth (εὐγένεια). Ability is the 
only recommendation. 
At least, it is practically the only recommendation needed. In 457/6 the third of the four 
Solonian revenue brackets, the zeugitae, were admitted to the college of archons.476 But the 
significant portion of the population that comprised the fourth Solonian bracket, the thētes, 
remained ineligible. This restriction, while it was never formally repealed, but always remained 
472 Flashar 1969: 18; Gomme 1956: 108; Rusten 1989: 145; Hornblower 1991: 300. 
473 Hude 1927: 131:  οὐ κατὰ τὸ μέρος τὸ ἐπιβάλλον ἴσον αὐτῷ τῆς π[ολ]ιτείας.  
474 Harris 1992: 166. For examples of the former, see Th. 4.11.3; 8.86.3, 93.2 and of the latter, Th. 3.46.3; 4.26.3. 
For Thucydides’ use of μέρος to mean “part of the citizenry,” see 6.39.1, 2. So too a few years before, Pope: 1988: 
292.  
475 Poppo-Stahl 1875-83 ad loc interpret it as “secundum ordinem cuius est;” Classen-Steup “durch Unterstützung 
von der einen Seite, der einen politischen Partei” (1892-1922 ad loc), Marchant “not on account of his rank as much 
as” (1891 ad loc).  
476 Ath. Pol. 26.2. It is likely that Solon’s classes, originally based on real property, were subsequently converted to 
revenue categories. Cf. Hignett 1952: 142-43, 225-26; Rhodes 1981: 142. 
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“on the books,” had fallen into desuetude by the time the Ath. Pol. was composed.477 Just when it 
did so is not known for certain, but P. J. Rhodes places it sometime in the course of the fourth-
century.478 That being the case, the thētes would then be the target of Pericles’ final point about 
Athenian office-holding: οὐδ’αὖ κατὰ πενίαν, ἔχων δέ479 τι ἀγαθὸν δρᾶσαι τὴν πόλιν, ἀξιώματος 
ἀφανείᾳ κεκώλυται. The thēs (κατὰ πενίαν), though kept from holding office by the obscurity 
that attaches to his revenue bracket (ἀξιώματος ἀφανείᾳ), is nevertheless not hindered from 
being entrusted with civic responsibilities in other areas, if (δέ) he can. Ἀξίωσις has become 
ἀξίωμα for good reason. It is no longer a question of ranking, but the thing ranked, the revenue. 
In other words, ἀξίωμα is a Thucydidean calque for the regular Athenian τίμημα. And the “other 
areas” to which Pericles refers, since they occur in a passage treating office-holding, must refer 
to the holding of office.480 This means that Pericles is hinting that the state will make an 
exception to the rule, should there be a thēs of ability. By this means, while giving his 
approbation to the exclusion of the thetic bracket from office-holding, Pericles at one and the 
same time affirms their dignity and worth by asserting their right to hold office despite the 
formal restriction. 
Athens then is a paradox. On the one hand power lies in the hands of the entire citizenry, 
on the other it privileges a certain group above the rest and so for that reason has outgrown its 
Cleisthenic designation as an ἰσονομία. However, that privileged group is those who have been 
determined by their fellow-citizens (ὡς ἕκαστος ἔν τῳ εὐδοκιμεῖ) to have the competence and 
ability to hold office, no matter what economic or social class they belong to, not even if they 
477 Cf. Ath. Pol. 47.1.  
478 1981: 145-46, 551. The “Old Oligarch’s” words δοκεῖ δίκαιον εἶναι πᾶσι τῶν ἀρχῶν μετεῖναι ἔν τε τῷ κλήρῳ καὶ 
ἐν τῇ χειροτονίᾳ (1.2) might suggest a more specific date, if there were anything like a consensus regarding the date 
of composition of that work. For a summary of dates suggested, see Gray 2007: 57-58. 
479 See Gomme 1956: 110 for reasons for retaining the MSS reading here. 
480 Cf. Harris 1992: 161. But Harris’ view that income restrictions were formally lifted by the late fifth-century is 
based on a misreading of Rhodes 1981: 145-46, 551 (165n24). Pericles means the system is flexible and can make 
exceptions.  
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earn their living on the docks of Munychia, provided they have convinced their peers that they 
are able. Ἰσονομία no longer fits because Athens has graduated and become an aristocracy of, by 
and for the people. Athens is thus an oxymoron, an aristocratic democracy.  
 
9.2.2 Protagoras and Pericles’ aristocratic democracy 
 
 
The three ideas on which Pericles bases his aristocratic democracy are (a) confidence in the 
political ability of the individual; (b) the vindication of natural endowment (εὐφυΐα) over the 
artificial prerogatives of wealth and social class; and (c) the secular and instrumental view of 
money. Each of these ideas has its counterpart in Protagoras’ political theory.  
Confidence in the political ability of the ordinary Athenian citizen is the theme that 
underlies and sustains all of 2.37.1. It emerges from Pericles’ proud use of the term δημοκρατία 
and from his claim that Athens is an example to others because of this “People-Power.” It also 
appears indirectly from his assertion that Athenian officials are drawn from the whole citizen 
population, no matter the class, as long as they meet the one requirement of ability. Moreover, 
just as it lays the conceptual groundwork for this passage, so it does for the speech as a whole. It 
is the assumption that allows Pericles’ speech to peak at the claim that the individual Athenian is 
more than equal to any task that presents itself (2.42.1; cf. Periclean autarky in subsection 8.2.2). 
Protagoras similarly postulated the basic political capacity of the individual. This idea not only 
lies at the heart of the mythos he tells in the Protagoras, where the universal bestowment of δίκη 
and αἰδώς signifies the accidental formation of communities which were absolutely impossible 
unless they incorporated on a equal basis the individual’s assessment of reality (see chapter 4). 
But the idea also comes out in plainer terms as well. At 322d7-323a4 Protagoras asserts the 
rectitude in every man’s participating in the deliberative and legislative branches when he 
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approves of the Athenians’ practice of doing so.481 He also maintains that the individual is 
qualified to occupy positions of authority in the city. When introducing the analogy of the city of 
flautists, he asks Socrates to accept hypothetically his claim that τούτου τοῦ πράγματος, τῆς 
ἀρετῆς, εἰ μέλλει πόλις εἶναι, οὐδένα δεῖ ἰδιωτεύειν (327a1-2). That he means by this statement 
that nobody ought to be excluded from public duties, including those involving positions of 
authority, soon becomes clear, when he rephrases it more fully in the terms of the analogy: “If it 
were impossible for there to be a city unless we were all flautists and everybody both privately 
and publicly taught this and reprimanded whoever did not play well…” (327a4-7). The citizens 
are to instruct one another; but they are also to punish one another.482 The citizens are 
responsible for each other and are authorized to wield authority over each other. The reason for 
this is because, as I discuss in chapter five, societal education and correction preserve the 
unanimity of the group (see sections 5.2, 5.3) and the unanimity of the group is the salvation of 
the group (see sections 4.3, 4.4). In the democratic community as envisioned by Protagoras the 
ordinary person was an integral part of the system at all levels. Τὸ ἰδιωτεύειν was a threat to its 
very existence. 
On the score of the individual’s political ability another point of contact emerges in the 
way the two men envision how that ability is to be determined. Pericles makes the opinion of 
one’s fellow-citizens the basis of determining ability when he declares that each person is put 
forward to stand for the election or lottery of office ὡς ἕκαστος ἔν τῳ εὐδοκιμεῖ. The word 
choice is arresting. It recalls the opinion (δόξα) of both sides that he is aiming to satisfy in this 
speech, as well as his rejection of objective truth for subjective truth (ἡ δόκησις τῆς ἀληθείας) 
(see subsections 8.1.1, 11.1.2). Likewise, by emphasizing the fact that one is put forward for 
481He repeats this view at 323c3-5 and in no uncertain terms at 324c5-d1. 
482 ἐπέπληττε of course signifies only verbal correction (LSJ s.v. II), but it represents the real-life analogue of formal 
correction. 
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office by the subjectively arrived-at belief in one’s ability, he de-emphasizes any objective 
assessment of one’s ability. One is able in Athens, if one is thought by his fellow-citizens to be 
able. Protagoras’ human-measure claim holds good for the election and selection of officials, too.  
In maintaining that Athens’ excellence resides in its reliance on ability, from whatever 
class it comes, as the sole criterion for office-holding, Pericles simultaneously asserts the 
prerogative of natural endowment (εὐφυΐα) over against membership in a wealth or birth 
nobility. This is the most powerful idea in the passage. It is a total rejection of the aristocratic 
principle, surviving in the Greek consciousness since the Archaic period, but still very much 
alive in the Classical,483 that located ability, and therefore worth, in one’s genetic inheritance. It 
also denied the claim of wealth, since Pericles does not disdain the members of any Solonian 
revenue bracket. Ἀρετή can be, and so should be, found at all social and at all economic levels; 
from the whole, not ἀπὸ μέρους. Protagoras agreed. He goes on in the analogy of the city of 
flautists to explain to Socrates why noteworthy fathers have unremarkable sons. If it is granted 
that for there to be a city everybody must take part in instruction and correction of his fellow-
citizens, then in such a city it will invariably happen that some individuals prove noteworthy and 
others quite unremarkable. What makes the difference is not paternity, but natural endowment 
(εὐφυΐα) (327b7-c4). The fairness of this supposition proves that Protagoras is right. Political 
ability is not genetic, but a thing taught, and just as in all other artistic and intellectual skills, one 
can be by natural endowment more proficient than another.484 Pericles expresses this same 
sentiment, when he says that, while there are certain economic restrictions in eligibility, in the 
final analysis it is ability that qualifies the office-holder, not the income.  
483 See Sophocles’ Ajax 430-524 for an agon between aristocratic and non-aristocratic Weltanschauungen.  
484 See subsection 5.4.3 and section 6.2 for a resolution of the apparent inconsistency in Protagoras’ claims that the 
individual’s assessment of reality is veridical and that certain individuals can be called “wiser,” which does not 
mean however that the “wiser” is more proficient, in absolute terms, than another. Natural endowment simply means 
that one is by chance constitutionally fit for the environment he happened to be born in (subsection 5.4.3).  
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Why then even have the economic restrictions? Pericles may hint that in the case of a 
particularly proficient thēs the restriction will be overlooked, but it remains that he finds no fault 
with the current ranking of eligibility that stops at the zeugitae. It is thus implied that, while he 
disavows income as the sine qua non of eligibility, he does nonetheless accord it a modicum of 
significance. It exerts an influence, and moreover an influence that makes a difference at the 
zeugitēs/thēs divide rather than at the pentacosiomedimnos/hippeus divide. Thus his view of 
income is instrumental. As such it differs from an aristocratic view of wealth which presupposes 
an intimate, indissoluble bond between good birth and money (and is outraged when that 
presupposition is challenged485), as well as from a corporate, or “stock-holding” view, in that it 
qualifies one at the lower rather than higher end. 
Protagoras had a similar instrumental view of money, as is made clear when in the 
Protagoras he explains to Socrates how political ability is passed from one generation to the 
next. Parents, he says, teach it to their children until the children are committed to teachers. 
Whereupon the grammatistai teach it through letters and poetry, the kitharistai through harmony 
and poetry and finally the paidotribai through physical activities. At this point (326c3) he notes 
that the more income one has, the better able he is to acquire such an education for his children: 
καὶ ταῦτα ποιοῦσιν οἱ μάλιστα δυνάμενοι μάλιστα (326c3-6).486 Income matters. It qualifies one 
for more civic responsibility, but not because it is proof of membership in a certain class or of 
inherent excellence, but for the simple reason that it makes possible a longer education. Money is 
just a tool for Protagoras, too.  
485 E.g. Theognidea 53-68, on which see Donlan 1980: 80-82. 
486 There is a tendency to place too heavy an emphasis on the superlatives in this passage. For example, Taylor 
translates: “The people who are best able to do it – I mean, the wealthiest – do this especially, and their sons begin to 
go to school at the earliest age and stay there the longest.” But these superlatives are in comparative clauses and so 
express more an idea of correlation, than absolute superiority (KG 1904: 498, Anmerk. 2). A better translation is: 
“And the more that men are able, the more they do this [i.e., send their sons to teachers] - and the more money men 
have, the more able they are - and the earlier their sons begin going to the teachers and the later they depart.” 
Though awkward in English, this translation at least captures the correlative aspect of the sentence.  
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And specifically, it is a tool for education which Protagoras regarded as a gradual 
indoctrination in the norms and values of the polis one happens to reside in (see subsections 
5.3.2, 5.4.2, 5.4.3). There is some suggestion that Pericles as well put a high premium on money 
not just because it was practical and instrumental, but because of its instrumental value 
specifically for education. At 2.40.1 Pericles makes the famous claim in the name of the 
Athenians:  
Φιλοκαλοῦμέν τε γὰρ μετ’εὐτελείας καὶ φιλοσοφοῦμεν ἄνευ μαλακίας· πλούτῳ τε ἔργου 
μᾶλλον καιρῷ ἢ λόγου κόμπῳ χρώμεθα, καὶ τὸ πένεσθαι οὐχ ὁμολογεῖν τινὶ αἰσχρόν, 
ἀλλὰ μὴ διαφεύγειν ἔργῳ αἴσχιον. ἔνι τε τοῖς αὐτοῖς οἰκείων ἅμα καὶ πολιτικῶν 
ἐπιμέλεια, κτλ. 
 
J. S. Rusten has seen in this passage three distinct groups, those who pursue the contemplative 
life, those who pursue a life of trade and those who pursue a life of politics, thinking it 
“preposterous to hold – as many seem implicitly to do – that the simultaneous pursuit of 
philosophy, wealth and political power is here ascribed to every single citizen of Athens.”487 
However, the fact that Pericles at 2.42.2 praises the fallen for their correct attitude towards 
wealth clearly indicates that he does in fact mean to ascribe this virtue to all Athenians, not just 
merchants. Moreover, Johannes Kakridis is surely right when he observes a close conceptual 
relationship between the first two clauses that is problematic for Rusten’s distinct groups: “Die 
durch πλούτῳ τε...eingeleitete Periode bildet gewissermaßen eine breitere Auslegung des 
Begriffes ἄνευ μαλακίας.”488 Pericles has just praised the Athenians for their frugal φιλοκαλία 
and manly φιλοσοφία. When in his next breath he says the Athenians regard wealth as an 
opportunity for achievement rather than grounds for boasting, he is explaining why their 
φιλοκαλία is frugal and their φιλοσοφία is manly, to wit: They have a pragmatic, instrumental 
view of money. Adding γάρ would have made the relationship clearer, but it also would have 
487 1985: 17 followed by Hornblower 1991: 304-5. 
488 1961: 51. 
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emphasized the second virtue above the first, when Pericles instead wants to ascribe the two 
virtues equally to the Athenians. In other words, the ἄνω τελεία after μαλακίας that Jones prints 
should not be replaced with a period.489  
If then Kakridis’ reading is correct (as I think it is), Pericles praises the Athenians for 
having an instrumental attitude of money in the context of education. They value wealth for what 
it can produce, for its ἔργον. That ἔργον is a self-cultivation and self-education that are frugal 
and manly, respectively. Like Protagoras Pericles suggests that one of the chief applications, if 
not the chief application, of money is education. It is therefore quite possible that he approves of 
the (flexible) exclusion of the thētes from office because it ensures that those who hold office are 
those who have a modicum of education. Now, whether or not he regards that education to be a 
Protagorean type of indoctrination, he simply does not say; however, considering that the type of 
education at issue is not a course of advance learning, but merely of a kind that distinguishes a 
thēs from a zeugitēs (or rather a πένης from a poorer πένης), that type of education appears to be 
a distinct possibility.  
 
9.2.3 Pericles and Plato’s Menexenus 
 
 
To conclude this section, Pericles’ characterization of Athens as an aristocratic democracy 
consists of three ideas, each of which suggests Protagorean influence. First, Pericles’ confidence 
in the ordinary citizen’s ability reflects Protagoras’ community of self-sufficient individuals and 
moreover Pericles’ use of opinion as that which determines whether or not one is politically able 
reminds one of the sophist’s predication of that community on an ethical and ontological 
relativism. Secondly, εὐφυΐα is important for both, even if that is ultimately determined by one’s 
489 This reading is not affected if one, following Rusten (pp. 14-15), regards the τε’s as the connectives of the 
clauses. Only, instead of indicating distinct and unrelated ideas, they merely neutralize the relationship and leave the 
reader to determine it conceptually. 
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peers. Finally, they share an instrumental view of money and regard education as that 
instrument’s chief work. These similarities suggest that Pericles’ aristocratic democracy owes no 
small debt to Protagoras.  
This debt is likewise suggested by an external source. In the Menexenus Socrates delivers 
a funeral speech which, while making several allusions to the genre as a whole, is really a parody 
of the Periclean speech in Thucydides490 and is meant, as Lucinda Coventry rightly argues, as a 
condemnation of politics and rhetoric and should not be regarded as a serious Platonic 
presentation of an ideal Athens.491 In this condemnation Socrates, in the persona of a rhētor, 
makes several claims about the Athenian government that not only recall Pericles’ claims, but 
bring out at the same time their Protagorean indebtedness.  
 An important feature about Athens that Socrates highlights is the fact that the city is 
populated by similar people. Αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἄλλαι πόλεις ἐκ παντοδαπῶν κατεσκευασμέναι 
ἀνθρώπων εἰσὶ καὶ ἀνωμάλων, ὥστε αὐτῶν ἀνώμαλοι καὶ αἱ πολιτεῖαι, τυραννίδες τε καὶ 
ὀλιγαρχίαι (238e1-4). The Athenians, however, are by implication different. They are like each 
other. The reason is that they are all born of the same mother (μιᾶς μητρὸς πάντες ἀδελφοὶ 
φύντες) (239a1). This autochthony of theirs,492 in explaining why they are so alike, also explains 
their status vis-à-vis each other: ἀλλ’ἡ ἰσογονία ἡμᾶς ἡ κατὰ φύσιν ἰσονομίαν ἀναγκάζει ζητεῖν 
κατὰ νόμον (239a2-3). In short, the Athenians enjoy equality among themselves because they 
have a common origin, common experiences, a common outlook. This notion of equality based 
on likeness of experiences and outlook suggests that Plato here has in mind Protagoras’ 
490 This appears to be what Plato implies when he has Socrates deliver a speech he heard from Aspasia which she 
pasted together from scraps (περιλείμματ’ἄττα) from one she composed for Pericles. Cf. Vlastos 1973: 191; 
Coventry 1989: 3. 
491 1989: 9.  
492 V. J. Rosivach 1987: 294-306 makes the surprising argument that autochthony was an idea that did not develop 
until well into the fifth century and, interestingly, as a part of the democratic ideology and self-identity. If he is 
correct (and his arguments, especially the etymological one (297-301), are plausible), then it is further support for 
Protagorean influence.  
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formulation of human cities as an accidental meeting and agreeing between same-minded 
individuals (subsection 4.3.4), as well as his interpretation of societal education as a means by 
which the city preserves that original agreement (subsection 5.3.2). Thus in the one passage Plato 
encapsulates the entire mythos and logos he has Protagoras deliver in extenso in the Protagoras.  
 The Protagorean reminiscence continues when Socrates moves into the thick of the 
Periclean parody. The Athenians’ equality (ἰσονομία) is the reason (αἰτία) why their form of 
government (πολιτεία) is what it is (238d9). Some may call it a democracy, others may call it by 
a different name; but in essence it is, and has always been,493 an aristocracy. Athens has always 
been ruled by kings. In the past these kings were by birth, now they are appointed (αἱρετοί) 
(238d2-3).494 This aristocracy has the approval of the people (μετ’εὐδοξίας πλήθους) who hold 
the power and confer office and authority on whoever seems to be the best (τοῖς ἀεὶ δόξασιν 
ἀρίστοις εἶναι) (238d5). So far, Socrates appears to be saying that there is a ruling elite in Athens 
who however are dependent on the people for their power. However, his next point shows that 
this cannot be. Καὶ οὔτε ἀσθενείᾳ, he says, οὔτε πενίᾳ οὔτ’ἀγνωσίᾳ πατέρων ἀπελήλαται οὐδεὶς 
οὐδὲ τοῖς ἐναντίοις τετίμηται (238d5-7). Nobody is excluded either by weakness or poverty or 
low birth from being one of these kings. He repeats a second time: ὁ δόξας σοφὸς ἢ ἀγαθὸς εἶναι 
κρατεῖ καὶ ἄρχει (238d8), and a third: καὶ μηδενὶ ἄλλῳ ὑπείκειν ἀλλήλοις ἢ ἀρετῆς δόξῃ καὶ 
φρονήσεως (239a3-4). In short, Socrates praises Athens as an aristocracy of political ability, or 
more literally, virtue (ἀρετῆς). And one’s virtue does not depend on class or status, but on his 
convincing his peers that he has it. 
493 For Theseus as the founder of Athenian democracy, see Walker 1995: 50-55. 
494 Jones 1953: 48-49, taking αἱρετοί in the restricted sense (see above n421), considers these “kings” to be all the 
elected officials in Athens, while earlier commentators saw a reference to just the college of archons (see e.g. 
Shawyer 1906 ad loc), one of whom still held the title. It is more likely that both views are correct and that 
Socrates/Aspasia is speaking generally about anybody who holds any office in Athens, since there are absolutely no 
restrictions on this position. For this view, cf. Kagan 1965: 80. 
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 Socrates’ aristocracy of virtue is very similar to Pericles’ aristocratic democracy. In both 
the people are the ultimate constitutional authority. It is up to them to hand out the power of 
office. These office-holders come from all the income brackets and from all the classes. They are 
given office because of their ability alone. No other factor enters into consideration. And because 
of that ability they are considered kings (βασιλῆς). But at this point Socrates’ picture of Athens 
recalls Protagoras a second time in its emphasis on opinion. Within the compass of so short a 
passage Socrates has stressed four times the fact that what passes for political ability in Athens is 
what is determined to be such in the opinion of the sovereign people, just as Pericles had asserted 
that one’s ability was determined ὡς ἕκαστος ἔν τῳ εὐδοκιμεῖ.495 Plato’s criticism is clear. There 
is no rational standard for political ability in Athens, yet demagogic orators continue nonetheless 
to depict the government in idealistic terms,496 in which they are greatly facilitated by the 
authority Protagorean relativism has bestowed upon the consensus of the Athenian citizenry. In 
this way Plato’s parody of Pericles in the Menexenus, drawn as it is along Protagorean lines, 
gives support to the interpretation of Pericles’ description of Athenian government in 2.37.1 as a 
Protagorean aristocracy of virtue.  
 
 
 
9.3 PERICLEAN JUSTICE 
 
 
In the following two sentences of 2.37 Pericles characterizes the Athenians’ sense of justice in 
the two aspects of social and legal interaction. The characterization of the Athenians’ social 
interaction directly recalls Protagorean φιλία in his mythos in that the Athenians need no formal 
rules to dictate their behavior towards each other, but act in concord spontaneously. Similarly, 
495 Lucinda Coventry 1989: 12 brings this point out particularly well.  
496 For similar criticism of Pericles by Plato, see Grg. 516b8-d4, 518e1-519d5. 
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the characterization of their legal interaction reflects on both the verbal and conceptual plane 
Protagoras’ definition of justice given in the mythos of the Protagoras. Specifically, Pericles 
reveals certain assumptions regarding penology, the Athenians’ attitude to law and the validity of 
the laws that resonate with the Protagorean mythos.  
 
9.3.1 Athenian Social Interaction 
 
 
Pericles broaches the subject of their social interaction with a transitional sentence (2.37.2):  
ἐλευθέρως δὲ τά τε πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν πολιτεύομεν καὶ ἐς τὴν πρὸς ἀλλήλους τῶν 
καθ’ἡμέραν ἐπιτηδευμάτων ὑποψίαν κτλ.  
 
Since τά τε πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν refers to the political sphere which he has just treated and καὶ ἐς 
τὴν…ὑποψίαν introduces a new topic, it is clear that ἐλευθέρως does double duty. With its 
meaning of political freedom it sums up what has gone before and with its meaning of wellborn 
gentility it typifies Athenian society.497 Through this double entendre the speaker intimates that 
the one is the consequence of the other. Athenian society is marked by liberal gentility because 
their government is an aristocracy of virtue.  
 Furthermore, Pericles claims that the Athenians are exempt from ill-feeling (ὑποψία) 
regarding each other’s private pursuits (τῶν καθ’ἡμέραν ἐπιτηδευμάτων). By this he means that, 
if a neighbor conducts himself as he likes, they do not get angry and reciprocally they do not 
bring on themselves “griefs which, while harmless, are sad to behold.”498 The Athenians are 
497 Contrast Hornblower 1991: 301.  
498 The phrase is thus quite close to Andromache’s lament (Eur. An. 395-96): τί δέ με καὶ τεκεῖν ἐχρῆν/ἄχθος 
τ’ἐπ’ἄχθει τῷδε προσθέσθαι διπλοῦν; For ἀχθηδών as the poetic equivalent of ἄχθος, see Marchant 1891 (ad loc). 
Rusten 1989: 147, following LSJ (s.v. προστίθημι B. II. 2), interprets Pericles to be saying that the Athenians do not 
put “upon our faces attitudes of disappointment, which inflict no punishment but are nonetheless irritating.” Cf. 
Oxyrhynchus Commentator (Hude 1927: 132). But this translation ignores the emphatic position of τῇ ὄψει, lowers 
the register of λυπηρός (grievous) to that of ἀνιαρός or ὀχληρός (irritating), and in general introduces the banal, 
almost comical, note of giving dirty looks in a passage that occupies a higher plane, whereas the point is that 
Athenians do not engage in behavior that will arouse the disapproval of the group, visual not just in looks, but in 
behavior as well.  
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mutually considerate. On the one hand, they are tolerant of variant behavior; on the other, they 
are careful not to abuse that tolerance, go too far and make themselves pariahs in their 
communities. They are not nearly as uniform as Sparta. They allow variation. Nevertheless, they 
still achieve a likeness in their community that moreover has the advantage over the Spartans in 
being self-willed. One side is tolerant and the other side does not take advantage of that 
tolerance. This is a genuine friendship, not forced, which reflects the reason why Zeus, according 
to Protagoras, sent δίκη and αἰδώς, to earth: so that there might be configurations and friendship-
bonds (δεσμοὶ φιλίας συναγωγοί) of cities (322c3) (see subsection 4.3.4). Sparta is a place of 
forced friendship; Athens is a place of spontaneous, unprompted friendship.  
 
9.3.2 Athenian Legal Interaction 
 
 
Considering the Protagorean connection between φιλία and δίκη and αἰδώς, it is not surprising 
that Pericles makes a transition at this point to the Athenians’ attitude towards these very entities. 
He recapitulates again what he has just said (ἀνεπαχθῶς δὲ τὰ ἴδια προσομιλοῦντες) and claims 
as its by-product the Athenians’ law-abidingness: τὰ δημόσια διὰ δέος μάλιστα οὐ 
παρανομοῦμεν. Hornblower is right when he notes that δέος can hardly be watered down to 
mean respect or reverence.499 It means fear, and with this meaning establishes a link with 
Protagoras. For, it is difficult to understand how Pericles can be so ingenuous in his approbation 
of fear without positing a positive view of punishment. Pericles is assuming that punishment has 
a constructive role to play in Athenian justice and his positive assumption is consistent with 
Protagorean penology. According to Protagoras κόλασις is one of the two aspects of societal 
education, praise (ἔπαινος) being the other, which the polis is authorized to practice because 
otherwise it cannot perpetuate the package of norms and values which made possible its original 
499 1991: 302. For an example of what Hornblower has in mind, see Ehrenberg 1954: 40. 
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coalescence and will guarantee its continued survival (cf. subsection 5.3.2). Fear is a good thing 
and it is to the Athenians’ credit that they realize it. 
 The Athenians’ law-abidingness extends both to those in office (τῶν τε αἰεὶ ἐν ἀρχῇ 
ὄντων ἀκροάσει) and particularly to ὅσοι ἐπ’ὠφελίᾳ τῶν ἀδικουμένων κεῖνται καὶ ὅσοι ἄγραφοι 
ὄντες αἰσχύνην ὁμολογουμένην φέρουσιν. In other words, there is a condition the laws must 
meet in order to deserve the Athenians’ obedience. They must be legitimate laws. And they are 
legitimate if they serve the interests of δίκη (evoked in τῶν ἀδικουμένων) and αἰδώς (evoked in 
αἰσχύνην).500 The Protagorean verbal echo in this passage has already been observed.501 But 
beyond the verbal level there are several significant parallels between Pericles’ and Protagoras’ 
conception of justice. The first involves another, this time indirect, verbal echo. It has been 
recognized that what Pericles says here about the Athenians is meant to be compared with what 
Archidamus says about the Spartans at 1.84.3.502 What Archidamus gives there is a definition of 
Lacedaemonian εὐβουλία. They are εὔβουλοι, he says, because they were not brought up to think 
themselves smart enough to despise the laws, but were raised in a strict program to be too self-
controlled to disobey them.503 This is the polar opposite of Pericles’ Athenians who examine the 
laws to see if they meet the requirements they need to meet, if they are going to be legitimate 
laws. This contrast between Pericles and Archidamus is telling. Not only does it imply that 
Pericles is giving a definition of Athenian-style εὐβουλία over against the Spartan version, but it 
also clarifies what that εὐβουλία is: The critical analysis of the laws to make sure they reflect 
δίκη and αἰδώς. Protagorean εὐβουλία was just that. It examined proposed laws to see if they 
were consistent with the ethical tradition (δίκη and αἰδώς) of the particular community (see 
500 For the synonymy of αἰδώς and αἰσχύνη in Thucydides, cf. 1.84.3.  
501 Caizzi 1999: 321 takes the similarity as evidence for the authenticity of the mythos in the Protagoras.  
502 Hussey 1985: 123-25. 
503 Cf. Hdt. 7.104.4. 
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subsections 5.4.3, 5.4.4). In this way Pericles’ description of Athenian law-abidingness recalls in 
language and concept Protagorean εὐβουλία.  
 And just as Protagoras considered δίκη and αἰδώς to be the consensus of the polis, so 
does Pericles. The fact alone that Pericles sanctions the critical analysis of the laws is proof 
enough that he refuses to regard them, as Archidamus’ Spartans do, as anything transcendental. 
Archidamus’ claim is based on theistic assumptions about the origin of the laws; Pericles’ claim 
assumes their conventionality. This same idea is reflected in the word choice of κεῖνται which 
recalls the origin of the laws in human θέσις and in the important qualifier of αἰσχύνη 
ὁμολογουμένη.  The Athenians consider that a law should be obeyed, if it is the product of 
agreement and if, in the case of a law that is cultural and not inscribed on a stêlê,504 the 
opprobrium that attaches to its disobedience is acknowledged and recognized by the Athenian 
people.505 Consensus is the authority and basis of the law for Pericles. 
 Pericles makes a very similar claim in Xenophon’s Memorabilia. Asked by the young 
Alcibiades what a law is, Pericles answers πάντες γὰρ οὕτοι νόμοι εἰσίν, οὓς τὸ πλῆθος συνελθὸν 
καὶ δοκιμάσαν ἔγραψε, φράζον ἅ τε δεῖ ποιεῖν καὶ ἃ μή (1.2.42). The significance of this 
definition, though, has always been regarded as compromised by the fact that Pericles soon gives 
a rather undemocratic definition of law as πάντα ὅσα ἂν τὸ κρατοῦν τῆς πόλεως βουλευσάμενον, 
ἃ χρὴ ποιεῖν, γράψῃ, νόμος καλεῖται (1.2.43). However, since Pericles is compelled by 
Alcibiades’ rapier logic (or so Xenophon thinks) to give this second definition (and several 
others, as the passage progresses), and since Alcibiades is able to entrap Pericles right after the 
first definition,506 only the first definition can be considered genuine Periclean material. As such 
504 For this human, as opposed to divine, content of ἄγραφοι νόμοι, cf. Hornblower 1991: 302.  
505 Cf. Ehrenberg 1954: 37-41.  
506 Specifically, when Alcibiades asks, Πότερον δὲ τἀγαθὰ νομίσαν δεῖν ποιεῖν ἢ τὰ κακά; (1.2.42).  
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it tellingly reverberates with this passage in the funeral speech and confirms that for Pericles 
what makes law in Athens is θέσις and ὁμολογία on the part of the Athenian citizenry.  
 Finally, the overall structure of 2.37 gives reason to believe that Pericles implies in this 
passage that the Athenian consensus, that source and origin of Athenian law, is reached in 
genuine same-mindedness rather than in the begrudging acquiescence that persuasion produces. 
That structure is sequential and consequential. In the first sentence Pericles describes the 
Athenian government as it is characterized by freedom. Then, in case the point was missed, a τε-
clause with an adverb (ἐλευθέρως) recalls and summarizes the point, while an ensuing καί 
introduces the next idea, Athenian friendship (φιλία). Then follows another τε-clause with an 
adverb (ἀνεπαχθῶς recalling ἀχθηδόνας) summarizing the idea of that sentence, while again a 
καί introduces the next topic, Athenian law. The implication of this conceptual anastrophe, so to 
speak, is that there is a cause-and-consequence relationship between the three sentences.507 
Athenian political freedom makes possible that unforced friendship the Athenians enjoy and that 
same friendship in turn makes possible Athenian legislation by consensus. Ἐλευθερία produces 
φιλία and φιλία produces ὁμολογία. Thus the structure of 2.37 suggests that Pericles regards 
Athenian consensus to be a genuine consensus, arising out of their mutual affection and 
considerateness, not an impersonal contract.  
This formula ἐλευθερία-φιλία-ὁμολογία duplicates the recipe that according to Protagoras 
brought about the formation of the first communities. The first humans, being individually self-
sufficient and autonomous, were unable to accept the compromise necessary for the foundation 
of cities until by a time-consuming process of trial and error they found same-minded individuals 
and established communities in which they could live without compromising their personal 
assessments of reality. Their natures, hardwired for self-rule (ἐλευθερία), combined in affection 
507 Cf. Smyth 2975.  
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(φιλία) with others to produce the first primitive constitutions (ὁμολογία). The structure in which 
Pericles frames Athenian political culture thus reflects the formula that Protagoras’ first humans 
followed. 
For this reason Pericles’ conceptualization of Athens also carries the nuance that the 
modern Athenian state is in accordance with human nature and with the historical origin of 
civilization, a nuance that cannot but imply that any government established according to any 
other principles is a monstrous deviation from the “nature of things,” as ugly as the Centaurs and 
as unnatural as the Amazons on the metopes of Athena’s recently completed temple.508 On a 
very deep level the Athenian polity is, as Pericles says (2.37.1), an example (παράδειγμα).  
 
 
 
9.4 ATHENIAN DECISION-MAKING 
 
 
Upon finishing his description of the Athenian polity, Pericles turns to the recreation and 
commodities available in Athens (2.38). These drive away moroseness (τὸ λυπηρόν) from the 
Athenian character. He then moves to military matters (2.39) and makes the point that the 
Athenians do not have to drill everyday in order to be equal to any enemy. They are good 
soldiers despite their relaxed lifestyle (ἀνειμένως διαιτώμενοι). The reason is that they do not 
follow a manual (μετὰ νόμων) in being brave, but enjoy characters (τρόποι) that are intrinsically 
brave. This concludes two parts of Pericles’ treatment of the Athenians’ state, their πολιτεία and 
their τρόποι. He will now discuss their ἐπιτήδευσις. The first part of their “pursuits” is their 
attitude towards, and use of, money, which I discussed above (see subsection 9.2.2). He now 
broaches the subject of the way the Athenians make public decisions. He says (2.40.2):  
508 Though dedicated in 438/7, work continued until 433/2 BC. Wycherley 1978: 114-15. 
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ἔνι τε τοῖς αὐτοῖς οἰκείων ἅμα καὶ πολιτικῶν ἐπιμέλεια, καὶ ἑτέροις ˂ἕτερα˃ πρὸς ἔργα 
τετραμμένοις τὰ πολιτικὰ μὴ ἐνδεῶς γνῶναι· μόνοι γὰρ τόν τε μηδὲν τῶνδε μετέχοντα 
οὐκ ἀπράγμονα, ἀλλ’ἀχρεῖον νομίζομεν, καὶ [οἱ] αὐτοὶ ἤτοι κρίνομέν γε ἢ ἐνθυμοῦμεθα 
ὀρθῶς τὰ πράγματα, οὐ τοὺ λόγους τοῖς ἔργοις βλάβην ἡγούμενοι, ἀλλὰ μὴ 
προδιδαχθῆναι μᾶλλον λόγῳ πρότερον ἢ ἐπὶ ἃ δεῖ ἔργῳ ἐλθεῖν. 
 
A few points of contention regarding the meaning of this passage must be discussed before a 
broader interpretation can be attempted.  
 
9.4.1 Th. 2.40.2 
 
 
The first is to whom τοῖς αὐτοῖς refers. For a long time it was taken to refer to all the Athenians 
generally, and since that leaves no group to which ἑτέροις can stand in contrast, it was concluded 
that Richard’s solution was preferable.509 Quite some time later Lowell Edmunds challenged this 
view. His weightiest argument was that πρὸς ἔργα τρέπεσθαι is an idiom that signifies “to pay 
attention to one’s own affairs” (sc. to the exclusion of any public affairs).510 But from the 
passages he cites in support it is clear that the idiom only has that meaning contextually and that 
alone it is not enough to suggest that ἑτέροις introduces a distinct group. An adjective (e.g. ἴδια) 
is needed or the addition of the article τοῖς to ἑτέροις as Thucydides does at 3.73. Consequently, 
the traditional view that τοῖς αὐτοῖς refers to the “Athenians generally” remains preferable. 
It is also unclear whether γνῶναι means know (novisse) or decide (decernere).511 Recent 
commentators give it the former meaning,512 but two considerations make this unlikely. First, 
though one cannot be dogmatic in such problems, still, if it meant “know,” one might rather 
expect Thucydides to have used the present (or even perfect) tense, just as he does in the very 
509 So Poppo-Stahl 1889 ad loc, Classen-Steup 1914 ad loc, Gomme 1956 ad loc. Richards 1893 19 suggested that it 
was a matter of haplography and that instead of substituting ἕτερα for ἑτέροις it should be added to it, citing Eur. 
Alc. 893 as an example for the construction.  
510 1972: 172. Rusten 1985: 18 argues for Edmunds’ interpretation, but his argument, pace Hornblower 1991 ad loc, 
adds little or no support. It is certainly true that τοῖς αὐτοῖς behaves here as the Latin idem, but that does not mean 
“the Athenians generally” are not meant.  
511 Cf. Poppo-Stahl 1889 ad loc.  
512 Rusten 1989: ad loc, Hornblower 1991 ad loc, but for a contrasting view see Parry 1981: 165-166. 
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next sentence (οἱ τά τε δεινὰ καὶ ἡδέα σαφέστατα γιγνώσκοντες). Secondly, if it means “decide,” 
then a very interesting parallel between this passage and another important passage comes to 
light. At 3.36.4 Thucydides explains how the Athenians voted to put to death all the adult male 
Mytileneans, then on the next day regretted the decision because they thought “a cruel and 
shocking decision had been decided” (ὠμὸν τὸ βούλευμα καὶ μέγα ἐγνῶσθαι). Shortly thereafter  
Cleon reminds them in similar language that this decision was incontrovertibly made and sneers 
at the speaker who would attempt to maintain that what the city decreed was not decided (τὸ 
πάνυ δοκοῦν ἀνταποφῆναι ὡς οὐκ ἔγνωσται ἀγωνίσαιτ’ ἄν) (3.38.2). Thus the words ἐγνῶσθαι 
and ἔγνωσται encapsulate the first, bad decision about Mytilene. Now, in view of the fact the rest 
of Cleon’s speech frequently looks back to the funeral oration, especially to 2.37 and 2.40,513 it 
makes sense to see here another reference to γνῶναι and a calling into question of Pericles’ claim 
that the Athenians make good decisions. This correspondence then suggests γνῶναι here does in 
fact mean “decide.” 
Consequently, what Pericles claims in this passage is that the management of house and 
state, although disparate and discreet provinces, belongs to the same people, the Athenians 
generally. He then subdivides the management of one’s house (οἰκεῖα) and asserts that, although 
they are engaged in different occupations, they nonetheless have the ability (ἔνι) to make 
satisfactory decisions (μὴ ἐνδεῶς γνῶναι). The reason is that they regard total participation in the 
deliberative process to be an absolute necessity; so much so that anybody who prefers to sit out 
renders himself inconsequential (ἀχρεῖος), as well as the fact that for them discussion is not a 
hindrance to reaching decisions, but a guarantee of correct decisions (ὀρθῶς). In this very dense 
sentence Pericles makes several significant assumptions about the Athenian deliberative process 
which are hard to account for unless one posits a Protagorean conceptual substratum.  
513 E.g. 3.37.2 looks to 2.37.2, 3.37.3 to 2.40.2-3, 3.37.4 likewise to 2.40.2. Cf. Gomme 1956: 299-302. 
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9.4.2 Protagorean Assumptions 
 
 
Specifically, Pericles makes four claims about Athenian decision-making: (a) not only does 
everybody take part, but (b) everybody must take part; (c) their different occupations do not 
entail the loss of agreement; and (d) democratic discussion improves our military activity. All 
four of these claims reflect concerns and requirements that figure in Protagoras’ rationalization 
of democratic decision-making.  
Everybody, Pericles says, takes part in Athenian decision-making. There is a striking 
verbal echo here. In the Protagoras, when asked what it is he teaches, Protagoras describes his 
curriculum with the words (318e5-319a2):  
τὸ δὲ μάθημά ἐστιν εὐβουλία περὶ τῶν οἰκείων, ὅπως ἂν ἄριστα τὴν αὑτοῦ οἰκίαν 
διοικοῖ, καὶ περὶ τῶν τῆς πόλεως, ὅπως τὰ τῆς πόλεως δυνατώτατος ἂν εἴη καὶ πράττειν 
καὶ λέγειν.  
 
Pericles uses similar words (οἰκείων ἅμα καὶ πολιτικῶν ἐπιμέλεια) and moreover both passages 
treat wise political decisions (εὐβουλία for Protagoras; τὰ πολιτικὰ μὴ ἐνδεῶς γνῶναι for 
Pericles). For Pericles the Athenians demonstrate political sagacity in their concern for both 
private and state affairs – the very thing Protagoras teaches. Thus Pericles describes the 
Athenians as though they were all Protagoras’ students. Related to this is the term of measure μὴ 
ἐνδεῶς, a litotes which recalls Pericles’ concern in the proem not to speak deficiently 
(ἐνδεεστέρως), nor to be excessive (πλεονάζεσθαι), but to speak μετρίως (see subsection 8.1.1). 
The Athenians make decisions that “measure up,” because they make them in a Protagorean way.  
 However, Pericles goes a step further and makes the point that city-wide deliberation is 
not a choice, but a necessity. The word he uses to describe those who do not take part, ἀχρεῖος, is 
strong. Those who do not take part justify themselves with the label ἀπράγμων which with its 
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aristocratic undertones implies they are pursuing “better” things,514 but Pericles in calling them 
ἀχρεῖοι, rejects the possibility of anybody’s being a private citizen. Everybody must take part in 
political decisions. Why does Pericles reject the private citizen? Hornblower suggests that 
2.63.2-3 contains the answer.515 But the fact of the matter is that there, although Pericles does 
use the word ἄπραγμον, the context, and so the meaning, is entirely different. Pericles is 
exhorting the Athenians not to abandon their policy of imperialism, and such an act of non-
interference (ἄπραγμον) would prove dangerous to themselves. Here, however, he is referring to 
one who refuses to go to the Assembly. So, the reason why Pericles comes down so hard on the 
quietists remains unclear. 
 But a look at Protagoras’ teaching clarifies the problem. Just as Pericles, Protagoras took 
it as axiomatic that all the citizens must participate in the political decisions. Indeed, the point of 
the mythos he tells in the Protagoras is meant as an explanation as to why deliberation by all 
citizens is a commendable procedure (see section 5.1).516 And again like Pericles he goes a step 
further and denies the rectitude of quietism when, as though summing up his mythos and logos 
he states τούτου τοῦ πράγματος, τῆς ἀρετῆς, εἰ μέλλει πόλις εἶναι, οὐδένα δεῖ ἰδιωτεύειν (327a1-
2). The ideal city cannot have an ἰδιώτης. Again, Protagoras’ rejection of the private citizen 
approaches, or rather even goes beyond, the vehemence of Pericles’ ἀχρεῖος, when at the end of 
the mythos Zeus tells Hermes to establish the law among mortals that anybody who cannot share 
in δίκη and αἰδώς is to be killed as a “disease of the city”: καὶ νόμον γε θὲς παρ’ἐμοῦ τὸν μὴ 
δυνάμενον αἰδοῦς καὶ δίκης μετέχειν κτείνειν ὡς νόσον πόλεως (322c5-6). The reason why 
Protagoras rejects the ἰδιώτης is, as discussed in chapter four, that for him δίκη and αἰδώς signify 
514 Cf. Connor 1971: 179-80; Dover 1974: 188; Brock 1991: 164.  
515 1991: 305. 
516 Cf. 322d5-323a4, 323c3-5, 324c5-d1. 
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a city’s morality (see section 4.4), and since a city’s morality is the product of the citizens’ 
agreement, they also signify the city’s consensus (see subsection 5.1.3).  
Therefore, when Protagoras says that the one who cannot share in δίκη and αἰδώς is a 
disease of the city, he is saying the same thing as Pericles: The quietist is the one who refuses to 
participate in decision-making and therefore has absolutely no place in the polis. This similar 
definition, given in similar language,517 at a similar intensity of disapproval, suggests in turn that 
Pericles rejects the disconnected citizen for the same reason as Protagoras. Since morality is 
what the city’s opinion determines it to be, it is imperative that everybody weigh in on all the 
political issues. There will never be a correct reading of the city’s opinion unless all individual 
opinions are aired (see subsections 5.1.3, 6.2.4). This reasoning gives definition to Pericles’ word 
choice. The citizen who withholds his individual opinion makes himself dead weight in the 
Athenian deliberative system. He is in the most literal sense of the word ἀχρεῖος.  
Just because they are all engaged in the management of the city it does not mean that they 
have to sacrifice their individual pursuits and live in Spartan uniformity. They can remain “each 
engaged in different occupations” (ἑτέροις ˂ἕτερα˃ πρὸς ἔργα τετραμμένοις). And, what is 
more, in this plurality of occupations they succeed in making political decisions that “measure 
up” (τὰ πολιτικὰ μὴ ἐνδεῶς γνῶναι) which in a democratic assembly means reaching agreement 
(see subsection 9.3.2). Thus Pericles praises Athens for the fact that it reaches agreement without 
losing individual differences. The individual and the whole he belongs to are united in a 
combination that paradoxically obscures and preserves discrepancies. The Athenian deliberative 
branch respects the whole and its parts. There is conformity without uniformity.  
517 Pericles designates him as τὸν μηδὲν τῶνδε (i.e. τῶν πολιτικῶν) μετέχοντα, while Protagoras calls him τὸν μὴ 
δυνάμενον αἰδοῦς καὶ δίκης μετέχειν. 
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With its notion of balance and harmony of counter-intuitive traits the idea is in keeping 
with the passage as a whole where similarly the Athenians love what is fine without 
extravagance and cultivate what is intelligent without effeminacy (2.40.1). But, besides this 
stylistic congruity with its environment, Pericles’ idea bears a similarity with Protagoras’ ideas 
on human autarky. Since the beginning, according to the sophist, and in its essence the human 
animal is a self-sufficient and therefore solitary creature. The ideal human government will 
recognize this about human nature and respect it and at the same time succeed in reaching 
agreement in spite of it (see subsection 8.2.1 on Protagorean autarky). In a sense then democracy 
itself for Protagoras can be defined as the genuine agreement among same-minded, but 
fundamentally different, individuals; as the order that the polis-measure doctrine imparts to the 
apparently chaotic implications of the human-measure claim, without however violating that the 
human-measure claim (see section 5.1). Similarly, Pericles’ picture of the Athenians as reaching 
agreement despite individual differences reflects Protagoras’ definition of democracy at its most 
basic level, as a response to human nature.   
Having underscored the all-inclusiveness of the Athenian deliberative process and 
pointed out along the way that it in no way impairs, but rather improves their decisions, Pericles 
restates518 what he has just said in the phrase τὰ πολιτικὰ μὴ ἐνδεῶς γνῶναι with more specific 
phraseology: καὶ [οἱ] αὐτοὶ ἤτοι κρίνομέν γε ἢ ἐνθυμοῦμεθα ὀρθῶς τὰ πράγματα. “And we 
ourselves,” he says, “either judge state affairs, as is more often the case, or devise them 
correctly,” thereby reflecting the two functions any Athenian citizen might fulfill on the Pnyx, 
518 This restatement is another reason why Edmunds 1972: 172 argues against Richard’s emandation, feeling that it 
“reduces this clause to a rhetorically ineffective repetition of the preceding one.” But Pericles is giving further, 
almost adulatory, definition to τὰ πολιτικὰ μὴ ἐνδεῶς γνῶναι – that is, the hallmark of the Athenian democracy, a 
thing that is quite rhetorically effective.  
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that of voter or proposer.519 Then, having thus summarized and rephrased himself, he introduces 
the reasons for following such a democratic procedure in a participial clause:  
οὐ τοὺς λόγους τοῖς ἔργοις βλάβην ἡγούμενοι, ἀλλὰ μὴ προδιδαχθῆναι μᾶλλον λόγῳ 
πρότερον ἢ ἐπὶ ἃ δεῖ ἔργῳ ἐλθεῖν. Διαφερόντως γὰρ δὴ καὶ τόδε ἔχομεν ὥστε τολμᾶν τε 
οἱ αὐτοὶ μάλιστα καὶ περὶ ὧν ἐπιχειρήσομεν ἐκλογίζεσθαι. 
  
One reason they submit all state questions to democratic discussion is because they think it is not 
harmful to their actions. One might think, and a conservative-minded Greek would think, that 
submitting a question for debate to the unlettered mob would be a recipe for disaster. But 
Pericles disagrees. Democratic discussion and decision-making is beneficial, he says. Protagoras 
makes the same point in the Protagoras when in the flautist analogy he tells Socrates that in the 
city of flautists the citizens instruct (διδάσκειν) each other and correct whoever plays amiss 
because their sense of justice and virtue benefits each other (λυσιτελεῖ γὰρ οἶμαι ἡμῖν ἡ ἀλλήλων 
δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἀρετή) (327b1-2). Everybody participates in decision-making, and the speeches 
anybody can make in the Assembly in response to the call τίς ἀγορεύειν βούλεται are a 
beneficial thing, not, as some would think, a detriment to action (βλάβη). 
But why is it beneficial? It is because, Pericles explains, not to get instruction from 
democratic discussion beforehand (προδιδαχθῆναι) is a recipe for military failure. However, 
since the Athenians do get such instruction, they prove in the event bold, yet at the same time 
calculative, soldiers. And this counter-intuitive combination of daring and circumspection makes 
for the perfect soldier. At least it is rare (those who have the one trait are usually bereft of the 
other) and embodies the essence of bravery. For, in a definition that has a strong sophistic 
519 For this general interpretation, cf. Classen 1863 ad loc. Steup’s objection (Classen-Steup 1914 ad loc) that ἤτοι 
cannot here indicate something more important (etwas Wichtigeres) is certainly true, and Pericles is merely 
clarifying that in Athenian decision-making, while there are more who judge than there are who propose 
(necessarily), the decision belongs to them all – an idea Pericles often stresses (cf. Th. 1.140.1, 2.64.1). However, 
Edmund’s translation (1972: 171), endorsed by Rusten 1989 ad loc: “we at least judge policy correctly even if we do 
not formulate it” makes too much of the disjunctive conjunction and carries “elitist” implications (cf. Hornblower 
1991 ad loc) that, as I have tried to show, are not present either here or in 2.37.  
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flavor,520 Pericles says that those who (as themselves) know what is fearful and pleasant yet 
encounter what is fearful anyway are truly brave (2.40.3). The Athenian military is a force to be 
reckoned with precisely because their decision-making procedure is a democratic one that 
operates on a basis of consensus (cf. subsection 9.3.2).521 No wonder they do not have to train all 
the time as the Spartans do (2.39.1). The mere fact that they reach their decisions democratically 
and do only what the consensus dictates guarantees success in their military endeavors.  
This counter-intuitive idea closely reflects Protagoras’ mythos. The first humans kept 
falling prey to the wild beasts because they could not succeed in living together. The reason, 
Protagoras explains, is that the science of war (ἡ πολεμική) is a part of the science of living 
together (ἡ πολιτικὴ τέχνη) (322b5). Without knowing how to live together, the humans could 
never find protection from the animals. In time, however, they were able to live together, but 
only because they were lucky enough to come upon same-minded individuals with whom they 
could cohabit in a compromise-free, primitively democratic society (see subsections 4.2.2, 4.3.4). 
Thus, just as Protagoras points to their commonality of outlook as that which saved humankind 
in their wars with the beasts, so now Pericles claims that Athenian democratic consensus benefits 
them in all their military endeavors by rendering them, effortlessly, automatically, excellent 
soldiers. Herodotus (5.78) makes a similar point when he says that after gaining their freedom 
(ἰσηγορίη) from the tyrants (sic) the Athenians became first-rate soldiers. But once again what he 
says is subtly different from what Pericles says (cf. subsection 8.3.3). Herodotus’ explanation is 
from the perspective of self-interest. Once freed the Athenians fought better because they no 
520 Antiphon is recorded to have defined σωφροσύνη (DK 87 B59): ὅστις δὲ τῶν αἰσχρῶν ἢ τῶν κακῶν μήτε 
ἐπεθύμησε μήτε ἥψατο, οὐκ ἔστι σώφρων· οὐ γὰρ ἔσθ’ὅτου κρατήσας αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν κόσμιον παρέχεται. Thus for 
Antiphon, as for Pericles, knowledge makes the difference. Socrates of course gives the same definition of bravery 
in Protagoras (360d4-6), but the value he places in this definition is not the idea itself that true bravery requires 
knowledge, but that, since bravery requires knowledge, the virtues must be a unity. 
521 See Parry 1981: 166 for a similar reading. 
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longer worked (ἐργαζόμενοι) for a master, but were eager to work an achievement 
(κατεργάζεσθαι) for themselves. The author of the Hippocratic On Airs, Waters and Places 
shares Herodotus’ perspective (23). Pericles on the other hand claims that the Athenians are 
better soldiers because their democratic mode of decision-making, aiming as it does at 
consensus, affords them the necessary advance-instruction. The Athenians’ secret weapon then is 
their consensus-based politics. Without it they are nothing; with it they are unstoppable, because 
it means they enjoy a same-mindedness, or ὁμόνοια.522 While this ὁμόνοια does allow them 
individuality and unlike the Spartans they are free to pursue the lifestyle and occupation of their 
choice (cf. 2.37.2, 2.40.2), there is still presupposed a commonality of thought and outlook 
accompanying the more superficial diversity. On the frieze running around Athena’s cella where 
cavalrymen, elders, musicians, water-jar bearers, tray-bearers, and banqueters, though engaged in 
different tasks, wearing different clothes and striking different poses, are still alike in their 
faces.523 Pericles’ soldier-citizens are depicted from a very similar perspective.  
 
 
 
9.5 CONCLUSION 
 
 
In this chapter I have discussed the ways in which I suggest the constitutional portion of Pericles’ 
funeral speech describes the Athenian political culture from a perspective that in language, 
structure and concept reflects Protagorean political thought. First, treating 2.37.1 I argued that 
the way Pericles locates power in the Athenian people themselves and then proceeds to 
characterize the executive branch as an aristocracy of virtue reflects Protagorean ideas about the 
522 The absence of consensus is the very thing Pericles points to as the greatest disadvantage of the Peloponnesians 
(Th. 1.141.6).  
523 Cited in Osborne 2010: 299-300. Similarly, Osborne 2010: 301-302 sees a correspondence between the 
Parthenon frieze and Pericles’ funeral speech (301) and the egalitarianism of the Athenian democracy (302).  
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importance of consensus, the role of democratic leaders, the political ability of the ordinary 
citizen, the factor of natural endowment and the proper function of money in the ideal state. I 
then discussed 2.37.2-3 and attempted to show that what Pericles says about the Athenians’ 
behavior towards each other and their attitude towards the laws, both written and unwritten, 
presents Athens as a re-enactment and re-creation of Protagoras’ first successful human 
community. Finally, I turned to 2.40 and offered an interpretation of Pericles’ presentation of the 
Athenian deliberative process: It is the secret of their – and any democracy’s – success inasmuch 
as it creates and preserves conformity without imposing uniformity. In several of these features it 
becomes clear that Pericles means to depict Athens as a true paradox, a political and culture 
oxymoron. This paradoxical character simply goes to underscore and reinforce the celebratory 
idea already inherent in these characterizations of leadership, interaction and decision-making 
that Pericles gives of the city: That human political, intellectual and ethical culture has reached a 
high-water mark in Athens. 
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10.0 PROTAGOREAN RHETORIC: A RECIPE FOR HOMONOIA 
 
 
 
 
In the past forty years there have been efforts to reassess ancient sophistic rhetoric from new 
perspectives.524 While the reassessment of every sophist offers a great many new insights, the 
rhetoric of Protagoras of Abdera in particular deserves special attention. Not only is he usually 
considered the first sophist,525 and according to Plato the first to bear the title proudly,526 but his 
teaching became synonymous with sophistic education for both his, and the following, 
generation. The heart of his rhetorical teaching was his claim to know how “to make the weaker 
case stronger” (τὸν ἥττω λόγον κρείττω ποιεῖν).527 Besides being the motto of the Sophists’ 
Academy in Aristophanes’ Clouds, this claim was also one of the charges included in the 
accusation against Socrates in 399 BC.528 Originally, however, it was the brainchild of 
Protagoras. Since what he taught thus became representative of the whole class of sophists (as 
well as those accused of sophistry), it is particularly important to understand what this claim 
meant.   
I intend to argue that this claim should be understood in the context of Protagoras’s so-
called human-measure doctrine. In chapters two to six I have argued that the human-measure 
doctrine, amounting to a relativism which maintained that the individual’s assessment of reality 
was veridical and incorrigible (section 2.1), had a political application in favor of democracy 
524 See Schiappa 2003: 64-85 for a summary of recent scholarship on sophistic rhetoric.  
525 Guthrie 1971: 263; Kerferd 1981: 42. 
526 Prt. 317b3-4. 
527 Arist. Rh. 1402a23 (= DK 80 B6b).  
528 Ar. Nub. 889-1130; Pl. Ap. 19b5. 
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(section 5.1). This political application entailed the premise that government and morality work 
according to rules which, while they do not represent a global obligation on the individual’s 
conscience, do represent a local obligation on it, inasmuch as they issue from an agreement of 
the community which was not deliberately enacted, as ancient social contract theories typically 
postulate (subsection 4.3.3), but genuinely and spontaneously emanated from the community 
(subsections 4.3.4, 5.1.2). However, a community that operates on the basis of genuine 
agreement still needs, Protagoras argued, leaders, and in chapter six I examined how Protagoras 
could have construed a role for leaders in such a community without introducing an 
inconsistency with his relativism (section 6.2). These leaders are to be advocates of the city’s 
actual opinion, not just commited by Protagorean ethics to a democratic government, but in fact 
constrained by his ethics to one, since what the city decides is the closest approximation in 
human ethics to a collective morality (subsection 5.1.2).  
In this chapter I intend to discuss just how such leaders were supposed to advocate for the 
city’s opinion. Specifically, I will argue that Protagoras’ claim of being able to make the weaker 
logos stronger amounts to a rhetorical program designed to create and preserve that very 
consensus of opinion and harmony among the citizenry which were so integral to Protagoras’ 
ethical and political teachings. According to this program, the orator is to reduce all possible 
opinions on a question or course of action to two: the consensus view and the dissension view. 
Then, he is to advocate for the consensus view, not by overt argumentation, but instead by 
implicit techniques of praise and censure of the ideas and attitudes, prejudices and biases that 
stand in the way of sincere unanimity. If he is successful, the result will be true agreement and 
stabilizing harmony. Thus, according to Protagoras’ assumptions, rhetoric is indissolubly bonded 
with politics.  
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10.1 RELATIVISM AND RHETORIC 
 
 
There have been several attempts to understand Protagoras’s rhetorical teachings in the larger 
context of his philosophy, but in the last analysis these attempts prove inconsistent with a strict 
relativist position. For instance, A. T. Cole interpreted Protagoras’s claim to make the weaker 
case stronger as a claim to substitute what was, in the view of the person to be persuaded, 
upsetting with what was, again in the view of the person to be persuaded, more pleasing.529 
However, this is simply an (albeit) mild hedonistic calculus which ultimately makes ἡδονή and 
λύπη (pleasure and pain) the criteria of values, not the individual. More recently, E. Schiappa 
interpreted the claim in the light of a Heracliteo-Protagorean philosophy, but he too, in his 
characterization of the weaker and stronger case as a preferred and less preferable case, stands at 
odds with a relativist position.530  
 
10.1.1 Rhetorical Implications of Relativism 
 
 
As discussed above (subsection 2.1.1), Protagoras’ relativism was expressed in the claim, as 
recorded by Plato: φησὶ γάρ που πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἄνθρωπον εἶναι, τῶν μὲν ὄντων ὡς 
ἔστι, τῶν δὲ μὴ ὄντων ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν. In other words, whatever an individual perceives to be the 
case, is the case for that individual. To use Plato’s illustration of the wind: If the same wind 
appears to one person to be cool, to another cold, to another warm and to yet another positively 
hot, Protagoras’s dictum constrains one to say that the wind is in fact cool to the one who feels it 
to be cool, cold to the one who feels it to be cold, and so forth (Tht. 152b). This being the case, it 
follows that on any given thing there will be a multitude of perceptions. How did Protagoras 
529 1972: 34.  
530 2003: 103-16. I discuss Schiappa’s view below.   
255 
 
                                                 
handle these countless perceptions? As I suggest in chapter five (subsection 5.3.2; cf. subsection 
6.3.1), environmental conditioning will guarantee that on many occasions, if not on most, the 
members of the same community will have the same worldview and so share perceptions and 
judgments. Still, seeing that an individual’s natural endowment varies and that levels of 
education vary (cf. subsections 5.4.2 & 5.4.3), it is only to be expected that there will be 
occasions when the community members disagree. How is this disagreement between equally 
veridical positions reconcilable?  
 The first step towards reconciling discrepant perceptions is suggested by Kerferd’s 
connecting fragment DK 80 B6a (= D. L. 9.51) to this plurality of perceptions. The first step 
towards reconciling discrepant perceptions is suggested by Kerferd’s connecting fragment DK 
80 B6a (= D. L. 9.51) to this plurality of perceptions.531 The fragment reads: δύο λόγους εἶναι 
περὶ παντὸς πράγματος ἀντικειμένους ἀλλήλοις (“that concerning each thing there are two 
accounts opposed to each other”). For a long time scholars followed the interpretation of 
Clement of Alexandria and Seneca in construing this “two-logoi” fragment as solely rhetorical in 
scope, and articulating the practice of arguing both sides of a case (in utramque partem 
disputare).532 Protagoras might very well have taught this technique. However, to interpret the 
fragment in this way results in a solely rhetorical formulation and so fails to account for the 
philosophical dimension of the statement. For, not only is it articulated as a theoretical principle, 
but Diogenes records it in the context of Protagoras’s philosophical teachings.533  Therefore, 
Kerferd’s connection of this fragment with the human-measure dictum is sound reasoning. So, 
connecting the two fragments, one understands how Protagoras made sense of a multitude of 
531 1981: 90.  
532 Clem. Al. Strom. 6. 65, Sen. Ep. 88. 43. For the traditional interpretation, see Kennedy 1963: 31. See Schiappa 
2003: 89-91 for a summary of traditional interpretations and translations. 
533 Diog. Laert. 9.51. 
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perceptions. They can always be reduced to two primary perceptions, opposite to each other: X 
and not-X. The wind is either hot or not-hot. 
 
10.1.2 The “Better” Logos 
 
 
Neither of these perceptions is truer than the other, though one of them is better. As Protagoras 
says (Pl. Tht. 166e1-167a5): 
οἷον γὰρ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἐλέγετο ἀναμνήσθητι, ὅτι τῷ μὲν ἀσθενοῦντι πικρὰ φαίνεται ἃ 
ἐσθίει καὶ ἔστι, τῷ δὲ ὑγιαίνοντι τἀναντία ἔστι καὶ φαίνεται. Σοφώτερον μὲν οὖν τούτων 
οὐδέτερον δεῖ ποιῆσαι –οὐδὲ γὰρ δυνατόν –οὐδὲ κατηγορητέον ὡς ὁ μὲν κάμνων ἀμαθὴς 
ὅτι τοιαῦτα δοξάζει, ὁ δὲ ὑγιαίνων σοφὸς ὅτι ἀλλοῖα, μεταβλητέον δ’ ἐπὶ θάτερα· 
ἀμείνων γὰρ ἡ ἑτέρα ἕξις. οὕτω δὲ καὶ ἐν τῇ παιδείᾳ ἀπὸ ἑτέρας ἕξεως ἐπὶ τὴν ἀμείνω 
μεταβλητέον·  
 
In this passage Protagoras begins at the stage where all possible perceptions on a single thing 
(πρᾶγμα) have been reduced to two: bitter and sweet. The reason why each man has his 
perception is because he is in a certain state, or disposition (ἕξις).534 Neither disposition is 
impaired in ascertaining reality. Therefore, both dispositions are equally valid. However, 
Protagoras likens one disposition to being healthy, the other to being ill. Also, as the disposition, 
so the perception. Protagoras goes on to say that each disposition generates perceptions that 
correspond to the disposition (167b1-2). Therefore, to continue his metaphor, a sick man 
generates sick perceptions, and a healthy man healthy ones (cf. subsection 6.1.2). 
 But the metaphor can be pressed too far. To call something sick implies that it is 
somehow defective. Yet Protagoras is clear that both perceptions are true. Therefore, each 
disposition is valid in and of itself, and the perceptions it generates are legitimate assessments of 
reality. However, Protagoras clearly says that one of his two sample dispositions, and so one of 
the perceptions, is better (ἀμείνων, βελτίων). How can that be? What does Protagoras mean by 
534 For the translation of ἕξις as disposition, cf. [Pl.] Def. 414c8: ἕξις διάθεσις ψυχῆς καθ’ ἣν ποιοί τινες λεγόμεθα 
(“hexis: disposition of the soul whereby we are said to be a certain way”).   
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“better”? Kerferd argues that he meant by the “better” perception that which has more beneficial 
consequences. The sick man, who needs to eat food that will render him healthy, yet refuses 
because it is distasteful to him, must be drawn into a new state in which he will perceive the 
tastiness of the food. That new state will be better, because it is advantageous to his life.535  
However, this interpretation is solely based on the metaphor and ignores Protagoras’s 
explanation of that metaphor. He makes it clear that neither disposition is defective. Both men, 
the sick as well as the healthy, perceive a legitimate truth. But if, as Kerferd maintains, one truth 
is objectively more advantageous, then an objective criterion has just been introduced, namely 
utility, and Gregory Vlastos is right when he points out that such an interpretation would not be 
in keeping with Protagoras’s relativism (cf. subsection 6.3.1).536 Moreover, the view that the 
“better perception” is the perception that has more beneficial consequences ultimately derives 
from Socrates’ interpretation of Protagoras’s words,537 and, as A. T. Cole has shown, there is 
good reason to suspect that there is more Plato than Protagoras in that view.538 
A better interpretation, if somewhat older, is A. E. Taylor’s. He suggested for Protagoras 
the “better perception” was “that which agrees with the perception and thought of your ‘social 
environment.’”539 This view amounts to pragmatism. One’s perceptions must agree with his 
social environment, not because the perceptions of one’s peers are superior assessments of 
reality, but because community is impossible without agreement. “The practical urgencies of life 
require that my private world and your private world should not be very dissimilar.”540 Thus “the 
‘common’ world is strictly the creation of the ‘intersubjective intercourse’ on which all practical 
535 1949: 25; 1967: 91-93. Farrar 1988: 74-75 follows Kerferd in her interpretation of this passage.  
536 1956: xxiin47.  
537 See Pl. Tht. 172a1b2, 177d2-6. 
538 Cole 1966: 112-16. 
539 1926: 332-33.  
540 Ibid. 333. The “Anonymus Iamblichi” (DK 89, p. 402, vv. 21-30) reflects a similar pragmatism, which amounts 
to a social contract theory which the author curiously tries to base on nature. For the ancient understanding of the 
social contract as issuing from the deliberate agreement of the parties involved, see Kahn 1981: 93, 99.  
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co-operation depends.”541 Vlastos appears to follow Taylor when he defines what Protagoras 
means by the wise man: “The wise man has power to change men so that the result appears good 
to them;” he wields power over others “to secure for them what they themselves feel to be 
good.”542 In other words, Vlastos interprets the better perception as that which is better in the 
opinion of the perceivers. This interpretation is entertained most recently by Timothy 
Chappell.543  
 Taylor’s idea of consistency with community opinion has been criticized for this 
pragmatic element on the grounds that as such it is inconsistent with a relativist position, 
inasmuch as it makes the practical needs of the community the rule for political behavior.544 
Indeed, as Taylor construes it, this criticism is well grounded. If citizens agree to compromise 
any of their genuinely held opinions so that the community will not be jeopardized, then the 
advantage of the group becomes the basis for moral behavior. This is merely political utility, 
essentially no different than Kerferd’s biological utility. The doctrine of consistency then would 
appear to present a problem to Protagorean relativism. However, according to my interpretation 
of Protagoras’ political thinking, the formulation of the origin of human society which 
Protagoras presents in Plato’s Protagoras (320c8-328d2) circumvents this problem. Individuals 
came together in community accidentally. Those who had similar outlooks fortuitously met and 
because of their similarity of thought were able to abide together (subsection 4.3.4). The most 
important consequence of this accidental cohabitation is that individual opinion is both 
historically and (ideally at least) politically identical with the opinion of the whole community. 
541 Ibid. 333.  
542 1956: xxi-xxii.  
543 2004: 112. 
544 Burnyeat 1990: 23-24.  
259 
 
                                                 
Consensus is correct, not for pragmatic reasons, but because it represents a local reality which as 
such is authoritative and sovereign (subsection 5.1.3).  
Even aside from the question of pragmatism in Protagoras’s formulation of human 
society, the idea of consistency as the principle criterion in human ethics makes good sense of 
Protagoras’s metaphor. To use Plato’s example, an individual tastes wine.545 It tastes bitter to 
him. He is not wrong. His perception is a true (for him) perception and reflects a true (for him) 
quality of the wine. Yet, Protagoras calls him “sick,” admits that he needs to be changed and that 
the opposite opinion (i.e. that wine tastes good) is the better opinion, because the consensus 
opinion on the taste of wine in fifth-century Athens is that it tastes good. The one to whom it 
tastes, and is, bitter, is “sick” in the sense that his tastes are at variance with the consensus 
opinion which is “healthy” because it is, so to speak, the norm. If he lived in an environment 
where most people considered wine to be bitter, then the bitterness of wine would be the healthy, 
consensus view. That human norms and behavior differed depending on the environment was an 
idea that was the object of intense interest and research during Protagoras’ lifetime.546 
Consistency as the criterion in human ethics is also reflected in Protagoras’s remarks on 
punishment in the Protagoras. There Zeus instructs Hermes on how to distribute δίκη and αἰδώς 
(justice and shame) to mankind (Prt. 322d3-6). He is to distribute them equally, and any who 
cannot share in them is to be killed as a “disease of the city” (ὡς νόσον πόλεως). Protagoras soon 
modifies the same idea: He who cannot share in δίκη and αἰδώς, whether male, female or child 
needs to be instructed through “punishment.” If punishment proves ineffective, he is to be killed 
545 The example is Socrates’ (Pl. Tht. 159c11ff.) which Protagoras has in mind when he introduces the metaphor 
(166e).  
546 The Histories of Herodotus are a prime example of this interest and research. For the relationship between such 
ethnography and theories of relativism, see Keyt and Miller 2004: 306 and Guthrie 1971: 16-17. The influence that 
environment has on human character, intellect and physique figures in the fifth-century Hippocratic treatise Airs, 
Waters and Places (ch. 12).  
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(325a2-b1). Lastly, there is a third instance pertaining only to office-holders: He who breaks the 
law while in office is to be “straightened” in examinations (εὔθυναι) (326d6-e2). From these 
three passages it becomes clear that Protagoras regarded disobedience to the law to be the same 
as inability to live by δίκη and αἰδώς. However, δίκη and αἰδώς are nothing more than a given 
city’s moral and legal tradition, the result of convention and in no way transcendental or 
reflective of a natural law.547 The individual who fails to abide by the standards of the 
community is described as sick (or “diseased”) and is to be brought into conformity with them. 
As in the Theaetetus passage quoted above, sickness in the Protagoras simply means being out 
of step with one’s ethical and legal environment. 
 
10.1.3 Conclusion 
 
 
In sum, the two-logoi fragment explains how Protagoras reduced a multitude of perceptions to 
two, while Theaetetus 166e1-167a5 shows that between these two logoi one is better in the sense 
that it is in greater conformity with the consensus. In other words, all perceptions reduce to two, 
X and not-X. These two perceptions, when articulated, become two logoi, or views. Of these two 
logoi, the one is better (ἀμείνων, βελτίων) and the other is worse (χείρων).548 Or, to put it 
metaphorically, the one is healthy and the other is sick. This equation of the two logoi with the 
two perceptions, and all it implies, has an important implication on Protagoras’s most famous, or 
infamous, educational claim.   
 
 
 
547 For the conventional or non-natural status of morality in Protagoras’s myth, cf. Taylor 1926: 244; Guthrie 1971: 
136-37; Kerferd 1981: 143-44; Döring 1981: 110-11; Müller 1986: 183; Balot 2006: 76.  
548 This is my conjecture, as what word Protagoras used to characterize the opposite of ἀμείνων simply does not 
occur. This may be an accident or Protagoras might very well have been reluctant to call the view opposite to the 
“better” explicitly “the worse.”   
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10.2 THE WEAKER LOGOS AND THE STRONGER 
 
 
Protagoras professed to be able to “make the weaker case stronger” (τὸν ἥττω λόγον κρείττω 
ποιεῖν).549 Traditionally, this has been understood pejoratively: Protagoras taught one how to 
make a legal case that was clearly false win out over the case that was really true.550 However, 
the discussion of the Theaetetus passage above suggests that the weaker and stronger logoi are 
actually the same as the two perceptions to which all perceptions on a given subject are 
reducible. Not only do both doctrines define a situation in terms of opposites, but just as one 
λόγος is stronger (κρείττων) than its opposite, so one φάντασμα is better (ἀμείνων, βελτίων) than 
its opposite.551 This being the case, “to make the weaker logos stronger” will denote that very act 
of transforming the dissent view so that it accords with the consensus. Protagoras is claiming that 
he can make dissenters see eye to eye with the majority.  
The traditional translation of the statement, though, which for clarity’s sake I have been 
using (namely, to make the weaker logos stronger) fails to capture this idea of transforming the 
weaker logos into the pre-existing stronger logos, but instead connotes a strengthening of a 
weaker logos (by unstated means). The reason for this translation is that ordinarily “stronger” 
(κρείττω) has been taken as a predicate adjective, but it can just as well be a predicate 
substantive, since in both cases the Greek omits the article.552 So, taking “stronger” (κρείττω) as 
in this way, one can translate τὸν ἥττω λόγον κρείττω ποιεῖν “to make the weaker logos the 
stronger logos.” In other words, Protagoras is saying that he can take the view, called weaker 
549 Arist. Rh. 1402a23 (= DK 80 B6b). 
550 See Schiappa 2003: 104-7 for a summary of the pejorative interpretations.  
551 For the near synonymy of κρείττων, βελτίων, ἀμείνων, cf. Pl. Grg. 489e2-8, where Socrates tries to understand 
what Callicles means by the “better” person. One should note that H. Gomperz 1912: 269 suggested a similar 
equation between the better and worse dispositions in the Theaetetus passage and the stronger and weaker logoi. It 
hardly creates a problem that Protagoras calls λόγος what Plato will later interpret with the words ἕξις, φάντασμα, 
δόξα, since during Protagoras’s life philosophical terminology was still under-developed and, at any rate, λόγος for 
stated view or proposition was acceptable at any period (LSJ s.v. III.1-5).  
552 KG i. 592 (§461.1, Anmerkung 4). 
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because it is inconsistent with the consensus view, and make it be what the consensus view is. 
He can transform the person who thinks wine is bitter into a person who thinks it tastes good, 
and thus bring him into line with the view on wine that prevails at a given time and place.  
This translation and understanding of Protagoras’s most well-known rhetorical claim has 
the advantage over other positive interpretations in that it preserves Protagoras’s relativism. For 
example, Edward Schiappa recently offered a positive interpretation of the fragment. Connecting 
it with the Heraclitean doctrine of change as an interchange between opposites, he explains that 
to make the weaker logos stronger means to make a less dominant, but preferable, logos more 
dominant.553 It is an interesting interpretation, but it assumes Protagoras’s rhetorical teachings 
were divorced from his philosophical doctrine, since there must be some objective criterion by 
which a logos can be judged as preferable. More importantly, though, by persisting in the model 
of an interchange between opposites, Schiappa relies on a paradigm of substitution of one logos 
for another, although the idea of transformation of one view into another not only lies at the heart 
of the Theaetetus passage, as I have shown, but is integral to the parody of the weaker and 
stronger logoi in Aristophanes’ Clouds.   
 
 
 
10.3 THE DEBATE IN THE ARISTOPHANES’ CLOUDS 
 
 
Though the debate between Stronger Logos and Weaker Logos in the Clouds is a parody, it still 
preserves, as I will argue, a good deal of the original purpose to which Protagoras’s rhetorical 
procedure was put. At first glance the debate appears to be between morality and an amoral 
hedonism, as indeed it has been taken; or (on better grounds) between two pedagogical 
553 2003: 113.  
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approaches.554 While these are undoubtedly themes in the agon, closer inspection suggests that 
the idea of a harmonious reconciliation between two conflicting ethicalities is the conceptual 
backbone of the contest.  
 
10.3.1 Stronger Logos 
 
 
It is virtually impossible to equate Stronger Logos with any sort of transcendental justice. As 
Dover has shown, though Weaker Logos is sometimes described as unjust (116, 657, 885), 
Stronger Logos is never named δίκαιος, and the play itself knows them both under the 
Protagorean names Κρείττων and Ἥττων.555 Although in a single passage Stronger Logos says 
he will defeat Weaker Logos by saying what is just (900), the idea of justice treated there is 
facile and jejune. All Stronger Logos has to say about her556 is that she dwells with the gods 
(904). Even granted that the typical fifth-century Athenian still conceptualized justice as Hesiod 
did,557 he certainly had more interesting things to say about it. In the Republic, Cephalus, the 
picture of piety, sums up justice as telling the truth and giving the gods their sacrifices and men 
their appropriate deserts (331b1-5). Stronger Logos, on the other hand, fails to mention any such 
meaningful qualities. But, after all, it’s precisely this puerile conception of justice that allows 
Weaker Logos to ridicule the mythological tradition. Stronger Logos is the butt of a joke, a 
temporis acti laudator and τυφογέρων (908) who, along with Strepsiades, is a caricature of 
traditional beliefs, not a symbol of true justice victimized by Weaker Logos.558 
Stronger Logos’s version of morality is just as diluted as his notion of justice. If he were 
any transcendental morality, he would not be, along with Weaker Logos, the friend of the Clouds 
554 For the moral interpretation, see, e.g., Lesky 1963: 433. See Dover 1968: lviii-lxvi for the education aspect.  
555 Dover 1968: lvii-lviii, Sommerstein 1982: 165-66. 
556 See Dover 1968: 211 for reasons for taking justice here to be personified.  
557 See, e.g., Hes. Op. 256-62. 
558 For the caricature of traditional religion in the Clouds, see Marianetti 1992: 18-40. 
264 
 
                                                 
(957) nor reside with the sophists in their phrontisterion, where all the residents are considered 
wicked, pale, barefoot poseurs (102-04). Furthermore, in the debate itself the curriculum he 
advocates is one that inculcates, not any ethical goodness, but only accepted behaviors (ἤθεσι 
χρηστοῖς) (959).559 He teaches orderly behavior (961-66), decent musical tunes (967-71), 
modesty (972-80) and respect for elders (981-83). Similarly, he faults Weaker Logos for 
teaching delicate living (985-89), idleness (991), disrespect of elders (993), vexing one’s parents 
(994), sullying one’s reputation with a low brand of prostitute (996-97) and sassing one’s father 
(998-99). Instead of teaching him to be a low-class wrangler in the law-courts, Stronger Logos 
will train him to be a strong, beautiful youth in the gardens of Academus (1002-1019). Finally, 
he warns the young Pheidippides that Weaker Logos will teach him to equate what is shameful 
with what is honorable (1020-1023). This last admonition sums up what Stronger Logos is all 
about: He is but a tradition of behavior, obsessed with modesty and self-control, which has a 
claim to being the Athenian tradition because of its role in the city’s history (959, 986, 1028-9). 
He is the guardian of “the statue of Shame” (τῆς Αἰδοῦς...τἄγαλμα) (995) in the city of Athens. 
Stronger Logos’s role is thus advocate of two goddesses, Δίκη and Αἰδώς (Justice and 
Shame), whose names recall the formulation of human society Protagoras gives in the 
Protagoras (see above, p. 8-9). But more important than the names is the substance. In both the 
Clouds and the Protagoras, Δίκη and Αἰδώς stand for one ethical environment, not ethics full 
stop. Thus the Protagorean definition of the stronger view (ὁ κρείττων λόγος) as the consensus 
of the individuals’ perceptions/judgments in a given time and place shines through the 
Aristophanic parody. Stronger Logos is just as much a construct of human opinion as Weaker 
Logos. 
559 See Dover 1974: 50-3, 58, 60-4 for the broad moral signification of χρηστός. 
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This downgraded status of Stronger Logos explains why Strepsiades wants his son to 
learn both Logoi (882-85). They’re a package-deal. It also explains why, on both occasions when 
Strepsiades mentions Stronger Logos, he adds “whatever it is” (ὅστις ἐστί) (113, 883). Because 
Stronger Logos is just the moral tradition of a given environment, it is subject to change, 
depending on whether Protagoras was teaching in a democratic polis, an oligarchic polis or a 
monarchy. Be that as it may, Strepsiades clearly leans in preference towards Weaker Logos. This 
logos he particularly wants his son to learn because the arguments it makes are “more unjust” 
(ἀδικώτερα) (115). Dover dismisses the comparative adjective as a common turn and offers 
parallels in νεώτερος and πρεσβύτερος.560 However, besides the fact that in any language 
expressions of age easily slip into the comparative degree, the discussion above suggests that 
Strepsiades means exactly what he says: Both Stronger Logos and Weaker Logos reside in the 
Sophists’ Academy and so are both thereby compromised; the teachings of Weaker Logos are 
clearly more unjust than the teachings of Stronger Logos, but even Stronger Logos’s teachings 
fall short of a legitimate morality. Stronger Logos is but Athens’ moral tradition, called in 
Clouds and Protagoras alike, Δίκη and Αἰδώς (Justice and Shame). 
 
10.3.2 Weaker Logos 
 
 
This interpretation of Stronger Logos explains the way Weaker Logos sees himself. When it 
comes his turn to speak, he expressly identifies himself, not as any “natural morality,” though he 
clearly favors that ethical code,561 but as merely the challenger of the moral status quo (1038-
40): 
ἐγὼ γὰρ ἥττων μὲν λόγος δι’ αὐτὸ τοῦτ’ ἐκλήθην 
560 Dover 1968: 109. 
561 Cf. 1075. See Dover 1968: 227 and Sommerstein 1982: 213-14 for the similarity between Weaker Logos’s 
philosophy and Thrasymachus and Callicles. 
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ἐν τοῖσι φροντισταῖσιν, ὅτι πρώτιστος ἐπενόησα 
τοῖσιν νόμοις καὶ ταῖς δίκαις τἀναντί’ ἀντιλέξαι.  
 
For I was named Weaker Logos among the sophists  
For this very reason, because I was the very first to get the idea  
Of arguing the opposite of norms and judgments. 
 
In principle he is the voice of dissent; only by circumstance does he become the voice of 
amorality. And that circumstance is created when he is pitted against the cicada-wearing, old 
Cronippus. Were he placed in a different environment, he would no doubt have different 
arguments.  
 
10.3.3 The Resolution of the Debate 
 
 
So far, then, Aristophanes represents the essence of the stronger and weaker logoi precisely as 
Protagoras construed them. For both the stronger logos is the consensus view, while the weaker 
is the dissent view. To continue the Protagorean program, Aristophanes must now have Stronger 
Logos bring Weaker Logos over to his side. Instead, however, an entire reversal of the 
Protagorean program is enacted. After Weaker Logos’s exasperating refutations of the 
mythological precedents which Stronger Logos had cited, Stronger Logos agrees to admit defeat 
if Weaker Logos can prove that being εὐρύπρωκτος (wide-arsed) entails nothing bad (1085-88). 
Weaker Logos proceeds to point out that that behavior in Athens is actually the norm, not the 
exception. The public advocates of Athens are εὐρύπρωκτοι; so are the tragedians and the 
politicians (1088-94). Finally, Stronger Logos is told to look at the audience and say which type 
of person is in the majority. He has to admit that the εὐρύπρωκτοι are the majority: πολὺ 
πλείονας, νὴ τοὺς θεούς/τοὺς εὐρυπρώκτους (“by the gods [I see] that the wide-arsed are by far 
more numerous”) (1098-99). Converted by the revelation that this behavior is, contrary to 
expectation, the Athenian norm, Stronger Logos not only admits defeat, but crosses over to 
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Weaker Logos’s side, an action he emphatically denotes through the military metaphor of 
deserting to the enemy’s camp (ἐξαυτομολῶ) (1098-1104).562 
This resolution of the debate is significant. The young Pheidippides does not evaluate two 
positions, then choose one over the other. Yet, if Protagoras’s weaker-stronger fragment 
involved, according to the pejorative interpretation, the rejection of a morally superior argument 
for a morally inferior one; or, according to more positive interpretations such as Cole’s and 
Schiappa’s, an interchange between opposites, one would expect Stronger Logos in 
Aristophanes’ parody to be cast aside and discarded. But he is not. He joins Weaker Logos. 
Victory does not entail interchange, but transformation and a comic integration into Athenian 
society. Thus, division is avoided and harmony, albeit a harmony of reprehensible beliefs, is 
achieved. Moreover, he joins the side of Weaker Logos only after he realizes that the moral 
tradition he has been representing is actually outdated and that the majority of Athenians 
nowadays thinks differently. Thus the Aristophanic parody of Protagoras’s stronger and weaker 
logoi, with its reconciliation of two sides according to the standard of consistency with the moral 
environment, serves as strong evidence that what Protagoras meant by “making the weaker logos 
stronger” did in fact aim at the transformation of the dissension view into the consensus view, at 
making the weaker logos the stronger logos. Aristophanes constructs his parody by merely 
reversing the Protagorean procedure, a move which, by the way, may have had consequences for 
the subsequent (mis)understanding of the technique as a way to make a false claim appear true 
for the sake of a legal victory.  
 
 
562 It is debated whether Stronger Logos, in deserting to the enemy, bolts into the audience (Dover 1968: 228) or 
enters into the Phrontisterion (Sommerstein 1982: 215). See Stone 1980: 321n3 for a summary of interpretations. It 
is at any rate clear that, however the movements of the actor are to be explained, the desertion is to the viewpoint 
represented by both Weaker Logos and the audience; hence the plural ὑμᾶς (1104). Cf. Stone 1980: 322.  
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10.4 “RE-DISPOSITIONING” 
 
 
From the evidence so far treated an interesting point about terminology results. When one reads, 
as I propose, the two-logoi fragment, the Theaetetus passage and the weaker-stronger fragment 
as referring to the same technique, one sees that Protagoras described the consensus and 
dissension view in various ways. The consensus view was alternatively the approved 
(χρηστός),563 the better (ἀμείνων, βελτίων) and the stronger (κρείττων) view, while the 
dissension view was the unapproved (πονηρός), the worse (χείρων)564 and the weaker (ἥττων) 
view. Additionally, as evidenced in the Theaetetus passage, Protagoras likened the consensus 
view to healthiness and the dissension view to sickness, and even conceptualized them in terms 
of health and sickness. This plurality of descriptors is perfectly understandable in the case of a 
philosopher who rejected the notion of objective truth and so saw no meaning in the usual 
valuations of things as right and wrong, true and false, good and bad. 
How did Protagoras intend to change the person who had a perception at variance with 
the consensus, this odd man out? That he regarded the necessary change to entail a change of 
disposition (ἕξις) is clear from the Theaetetus passage. As he puts it: “In the same way in 
instruction too, a change from the one disposition to the better disposition is to be made” (Pl. Tht. 
167a4-5). The sick man who thinks what he eats is bitter does not need to be educated – for he is 
not wrong. He is only at variance with the “healthy” view. He is therefore to be given a 
disposition which will cause him to perceive that the food tastes good.565 If changing one’s 
563 The use of χρηστός and πονηρός is particularly instructive. As opposed to ἀγαθός and κακός, which as 
philosophical terms denoted the objective notions of good and bad, χρηστός and πονηρός signified adherence to, and 
violation of, a community’s ideal of excellence (cf. Dover 1974: 50-53, 296-99). It is therefore no surprise that 
Protagoras preferred these adjectives to ἀγαθός and κακός, since, as descriptors of social behavior and status, they 
allowed for an idea of the conventionality of values.  
564 See n512 above.  
565 Pl. Tht. 167b1. 
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disposition, and thereby his perception, is expressed as making the weaker logos the stronger, 
how exactly does one do that? 
 
10.4.1 Bewitching Words 
 
 
Protagoras explains. Immediately after asserting that a change of disposition must take place, he 
introduces an analogy to show what that entails: ἀλλ’ ὁ μὲν ἰατρὸς φαρμάκοις μεταβάλλει, ὁ δὲ 
σοφιστὴς λόγοις (“but the physician makes the change by drugs, the sophist with words”) (Pl. 
Tht. 167a5-6). This is an important analogy. The mention of logoi immediately conjures up ideas 
of logical argumentation, and some have interpreted the word accordingly.566 However, this 
reading fails to do justice to the analogy. The drugs a doctor uses steal insensibly upon the 
patient and work upon him imperceptibly. Moreover, the word itself used for drugs, pharmaka is 
worthy of remark. In antiquity the line between a true physician and a dealer in poisons and 
panaceas was often hard to draw, and the medicines both dealt in were all pharmaka.567 Hence, 
when Protagoras likens the logoi of a sophist to the drugs of a doctor, the word choice, as well as 
the analogy itself, implies that the change the sophist can bring about is imperceptible and “under 
the radar.”  
The idea of an imperceptible influence in the rhetoric of Protagoras is present in Plato’s 
portrait of his character in the Protagoras. When Socrates and Hippocrates arrive at Callias’ 
house, where Protagoras is staying, they find him strolling up and down the portico, surrounded 
by a throng of young admirers, many of whom, Socrates explains, were foreigners “whom 
Protagoras draws out of every city he passes through, bewitching (κηλῶν) them with his voice 
like Orpheus; and they, bewitched, (κεκηλημένοι), follow him by the sound of his voice” (315a9-
566 E.g. Farrar 1988: 74-75. 
567 Cf. Hdt. 3.85.2; Ar. Plut. 302, Thesm. 561.  
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b2). Socrates stresses the similarity between Protagoras and Orpheus. He uses the words 
“bewitch” (κηλεῖν) and voice (φωνή) twice in the same sentence and, in case that was not 
enough, later makes another allusion to the charm of Protagoras’s words. After Protagoras 
delivers the Great Speech, Socrates tells how he himself had listened to the sophist “under a 
bewitching spell.” Again, the word is κεκηλημένος (328d4). Plato, through the character of 
Socrates, is mocking Protagoras.568 For the mockery to have any wit and point, Protagoras had to 
have spoken of his rhetoric in terms that allowed for parody. The analogy between the sophist 
and the physician is a perfect example of a claim open to such parody.  
 
10.4.2 Praise and Blame 
 
 
But this “bewitching” only describes Protagoras’s technique of changing a person’s disposition. 
It does not explain how it was effected. Here, a quotation from Stephanus Byzantinus is of great 
help. In his Ethnica under the lemma “Abdera” he mentions Protagoras, obviously because 
Abdera was his birthplace. He then adds some information culled from the geographical work of 
Eudoxus of Cnidus: Πρωταγόρας, ὃν Εὔδοξος ἱστορεῖ τὸν ἥσσω καὶ κρείσσω λόγον πεποιηκέναι 
καὶ τοὺς μαθητὰς δεδιδαχέναι τὸν αὐτὸν ψέγειν καὶ ἐπαινεῖν (“Protagoras, who Eudoxus records 
construed the weaker and stronger account and taught his students to censure and praise the same 
[account]”).569  
There are two interesting points about this quotation. First, it preserves a formulation of 
Protagoras’s claim to “make the weaker case stronger” in a significantly different form than 
Aristotle’s. Instead of “making the weaker stronger,” Protagoras is said to have construed 
(πεποιηκέναι) the weaker and the stronger. There is no reason to think that Eudoxus’ formulation 
568 Cf. Denyer 2008: 81.  
569 DK 80 A21.  
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is faulty. On the contrary, according to my interpretation it makes just as much sense as 
Aristotle’s, if not more. Protagoras first reduced all perceptions of a given object to two logoi. 
He then qualified the two logoi, sometimes, as in Theaetetus, as better and worse and as healthy 
and sick; at other times, as stronger and weaker. The Eudoxus formulation describes that stage of 
the process, the stage of reduction: “he made [i.e. construed] the weaker and stronger account.” 
Having made this reduction to two, he then endeavored to bring the dissenting account (the 
weaker logos) into line with the consensus view (the stronger logos). This would be the stage of 
making the weaker logos the stronger logos. Aristotle and Eudoxus simply describe different 
stages of the same process. 
Secondly, and more to the point, the Eudoxus fragment gives a clue as to how Protagoras 
proposed to change the disposition of the one who held the dissension view. It records that 
Protagoras also taught his students to praise and censure the same account (τὸν αὐτὸν ψέγειν καὶ 
ἐπαινεῖν). Supplying λόγον from the first part of the sentence, one understands Eudoxus to be 
saying that he taught them “to censure and praise the same account.” The pairing of the 
praise/censure doctrine with the weaker-stronger doctrine is meaningful. There is clearly no 
Aristotelian influence, as Aristotle restricts praise and censure to the epideictic branch of oratory 
(Rh. 1358b12-13, 1366a23-1368a37).570 Nor is Eudoxus randomly recording two unrelated 
Protagorean teachings, as the ellipsis of λόγον shows. Instead, he is giving the beginning and the 
end of the same process. Protagoras, he explains, divided perceptions into two, the stronger and 
the weaker and (when he came to make the weaker the stronger) relied on techniques of praise 
and blame.  
What exactly do these techniques amount to? To tally now the evidence from the 
Theaetetus, the Protagoras, and Eudoxus, in arguing a position, Protagoras taught the student, 
570 It is worth noting that praise and blame find their way into the debate in the Clouds (1045, 1055).  
272 
 
                                                 
not to deploy logical proofs one after the other, but to speak “under the radar.” Namely, the 
speaker was to assess the dissenting portion of the audience and discover what obstacle stood in 
the way of their believing as he himself and the majority did. Then, he was to address, not the 
case head-on, but that obstacle or bias that prevented those members of the audience from seeing 
the situation as he saw it. Finally, he was to challenge that bias by praise and blame. This 
technique, he expected, would change the disposition (ἕξις) of the dissenting portion of the 
audience, in order that as many people as possible might think the same way. This entire process 
is sufficiently indirect to be characterized as “bewitching” (κηλεῖν). 
 
10.4.3 Praise and Blame as a Mechanism for Societal Education 
 
 
Interestingly, this doctrine of praise and censure as a rhetorical technique for achieving genuine 
unanimity mirrors the role Protagoras assigns praise and punishment in his interpretation of 
education as a vehicle that creates ethical and cultural conformity. As he explains in the 
Protagoras, political virtue (ἡ πολιτικὴ τέχνη) is not expertise in the specialized discipline of 
political governance. Rather, it is the social and ethical, as well as political, equipment needed by 
civilized people to coexist in a community. In short, it is the knowledge of civilization.571 This 
knowledge is passed on through life in the polis. As Protagoras goes on to explain, parents, 
nurses, teachers and fellow citizens compel the young, as they grow, to hold the same values as 
they do (325c5-326e4). This societal education involves punishment (κόλασις) which is no 
vindictive act, but a mechanism for conformity. It straightens (εὐθύνει) any aberrant tendency in 
the citizen.572 But punishment is just one arm in the process of societal education. Praise is the 
other. Elementary teachers and music instructors, when they teach reading, writing and music, 
571 See esp. 327e1-328a9. Cf. Wood & Wood 1978: 135.  
572 Protagoras uses this word (εὐθύνειν) to describe the correction of both children (325d6) and magistrates (326e2).  
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use material that is full of praise of values deemed good by the community, so that the child will 
admire (ζηλῶν) and imitate them (325d7-326b5). In sum, the environment teaches the citizens 
the knowledge of civilization (as locally practiced) through a process of punishment and 
praise.573 In just this same way the rhetorical theory of Protagoras instructs the orator to change 
the disposition of the dissenting portion of the audience through praise and censure. Thus his 
rhetorical program is an attempt to mimic artificially what he considers the social process to be. 
His rhetoric continues the process of societal education in the more complicated field of political 
decision-making. Rhetoric is education (and vice versa). Just as the child learns his city’s virtue 
through praise and punishment, so the dissenter is brought round to the consensus view by praise 
and censure.  
But in both cases – the child and the dissenter – the praise and censure is indirect. Indeed, 
one might say, manipulative. So at least it might appear prima facie. However, in the context of 
Protagoras’s political thought, it does not appear quite so sinister. He was trying to solve the 
problem of disagreement in a democratic government. He recognized that real agreement was 
necessary, because the weight of numbers (that is, majority rule) in an aristocratic culture, far 
from being an argument for unified action, was actually the contrary. What did it matter to the 
aristocrats and elite what hoi polloi thought, no matter how numerous they were?574 He therefore 
developed a rhetorical program that aimed at securing genuine agreement. It was not meant to 
manipulate, but to harmonize, citizen opinion.575 Robin Osborne has drawn attention to the role 
the Athenians deliberately meant their social institutions and practices to have in creating 
573 See Balot 2006: 78 for a similar reading of Prt. 324d2-326e5. 
574 Aristotle discusses the argument that democratic decision-making is better precisely because it operates on the 
principle that two heads are better than one (Pol. III.6.4-5 [1281b]), but is careful to point out that this argument 
cannot justify democracy in general, only democracies where full citizenship is extended to those of a certain level 
of education. Thus this argument has little or nothing to do with the fifth-century democracy.  
575 Cf. Pl. Prt. 326b5-6, where Protagoras praises harmony in general, abstract terms.  
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“homogeneity” of outlook and attitude in the citizen body.576 Protagoras’s rhetoric, aiming at 
securing city-wide same-mindedness (ὁμόνοια),577 represents a similar effort to institutionalize 
the homogeneity of outlook regarded as so integral to the Athenian democracy.  
 
 
 
10.5 RHETORIC AND THE CREATION OF ΗΟΜΟΝΟΙΑ 
 
 
In sum, the rhetoric of Protagoras was a system designed to secure agreement to the consensus 
view. It involved several steps. First, the speaker was to reduce all perceptions to the basic two 
that were opposite to each other. Next, he was to decide which of the two the consensus view 
was. This he determined by an empirical analysis of the social environment in question.578 
Having determined what the consensus view was, he dubbed it the stronger, since it had proved 
to be the view that was most prevalent; or the better, since, being prevalent, it was the quickest 
route to harmony; or again the approved, since it was sanctioned by the community’s standards; 
or again healthy, since by sheer weight of numbers it was the norm. Likewise, the less prevalent 
view – the minority view - he called the weaker, the worse, the unapproved and the sick.  
Now, if the minority view was not represented in considerable numbers, it could be 
ignored. If on the other hand the minority view was sufficiently represented as to jeopardize 
social harmony, the speaker’s task was now to bring the dissenters over to the consensus side. 
This he achieved not by arguing them into agreement. That would only result in a grudging 
cooperation. Rather, he first isolated the idea that prevented them from agreeing with the 
consensus view. Then, by praising or censuring that idea, whichever the situation called for, he 
attempted to transform their disposition (ἕξις) towards the idea into the opposite disposition. This 
576 1994: 48-58. 
577 See Guthrie 1971: 149-51 for the place of ὁμόνοια in fifth-century political thought. 
578 See Pl. Prt. 323a5-324d1 for an example of Protagoras’s empirical analyses which Plato there may be parodying.  
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re-dispositioned ἕξις would make the dissenters genuinely perceive the issue as their neighbors 
did. Or, metaphorically, it would make those who were sick perceive the way the healthy did. 
Once they did so, the weaker logos would be the same as the stronger and a genuine same-
mindedness would (ideally) prevail in the city. 
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11.0 THE HEALTHY CITY: THE RHETORICAL STRATEGY OF THE PERICLEAN 
FUNERAL SPEECH 
 
 
 
 
In chapters eight and nine I attempt to show that the Periclean funeral speech in Thucydides 
contains a Protagorean dimension on the conceptual level in that Pericles’ description of 
Athenian political culture has meaningful resonances with ideas that figured in Protagoras’ 
political theory. In addition to this conceptual parallelism, I suggest that there is a rhetorical one 
as well. The Periclean speech attempts to produce an effect in the audience members that bears a 
close resemblance to Protagoras’ rhetorical teachings as laid out in chapter ten. In the first place, 
the overall approach the speech takes presupposes an outlook mirroring Protagoras’ unique brand 
of relativism that deferred to the city’s opinion as authoritative amid a plethora of individual 
opinions. Secondly, the speech aims at establishing a genuine unanimity and same-mindedness 
(ὁμόνοια) in the city regarding the recent casualties of the war, and by extension regarding the 
war itself, by transforming a group of dissenters into citizens who agree with what is represented 
as the city’s opinion. In this respect the speech becomes an example of Protagoras’ technique of 
making the weaker logos the stronger. Thirdly, it attempts to bring about this transformation by 
altering the disposition (ἕξις) of the group of dissenters to the disposition directly opposite to it. 
Thus, not only does it seek to make the weaker logos the stronger, but seeks to do so by means of 
the very “re-dispositioning” that Protagoras prescribed. These three aspects combine to give the 
speech on the rhetorical plane a Protagorean dimension just as pronounced as that operating on 
the conceptual plane.  
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 The presence of this Protagorean dimension in the rhetoric of the funeral speech raises a 
question concerning what point this dimension is designed to make. As I argue in the previous 
chapter, Protagoras taught how to bring the discordant members of the citizen population into 
genuine agreement with the majority view in the interests of same-mindedness, or ὁμόνοια. This 
ὁμόνοια represented for Protagoras a state of health for the city (see subsection 10.1.2). It brings 
health to the city because it brings “whole-ness,” reducing disagreement and factionalism and 
ultimately preventing stasis by synchronizing the citizens’ opinions together (see subsection 
9.1.1). In short, Protagorean “whole-ness” is political wholeness for the city. This 
conceptualization of his theory in medical terms suggests that the presence of a Protagorean 
dimension in the funeral speech is meant to conjure up ideas of health and wellness and 
ultimately to convey the impression that the funeral speech is imparting health and wellness to 
Athens. The change of the dissenters so that they can agree with the majority view bespeaks 
unanimity in the polis, which in turn signifies the polis is well and ready for war. Athens, the 
speech implies, is healthy. 
This impression of health raises another question concerning the responsibility for both 
this impression and, in more general terms, the Protagorean dimension as a whole in the speech. 
Two main options seem available. If the speech is a Thucydidean report and reworking of the 
actual speech that Pericles delivered after the first summer of fighting during the Peloponnesian 
War, then the Protagorean aspects that I argue are present in the speech must be regarded as 
spillage: Pericles was one of many who had been influenced by Protagoras and so when he came 
to compose a speech for the fallen soldiers he did so according to rhetorical precepts he had 
learned from the sophist; and so, when Thucydides wrote up the speech in his own style, this 
Protagorean rhetoric spilled over along with everything else. Alternatively, if the speech is by 
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and large the creation of Thucydides and does not record an actual address of Pericles, then the 
dimension of Protagorean rhetoric in the speech must be attributed to the authorship of 
Thucydides. These two options are simply another manifestation of the difficulty involved in 
interpreting the methodological statement Thucydides makes at 1.22.1 and the debate concerning 
all speeches in Thucydides between the proponents of historical accuracy and those of free 
compositions.579 
 As controversial as that issue is,580 a consideration of the interplay between the 
impression that the Protagorean rhetorical dimension creates and the position the speech 
occupies in the history suggests that of the two options stated above the second is the more 
likely. As suggested above, that impression is one of health and wholeness. The fact, then, that 
immediately after the speech an actual plague strikes Athens suggests that there is some meaning 
in this juxtaposition of a rhetorical health with an actual disease; and this meaning in turn 
suggests that the author is orchestrating elements in both the plague-narrative and the funeral 
speech. This being the case, it would seem that the funeral speech is subject to a considerable 
degree of Thucydidean control. That said, it would also be unreasonable to claim that 
Thucydides foisted upon Pericles Protagorean ideas and aspects without just cause. If 
Protagorean thought and technique are found in a Periclean speech, Thucydides in all likelihood 
had reason to incorporate them. This is not merely a supposition conditioned by modern 
demands on historiography, but an expectation that derives from Thucydides’ own expressed 
commitment to report the general purport of what was really said (τῆς ξυμπάσης γνώμης τῶν 
ἀληθῶς λεχθέντων).581 And on this point the examination of Protagoras’ life offered in chapter 
579 See Pelling 2009: 179 for these labels.  
580 Cf. Rusten 2009b: 5: “Thus there is no approach one can take to the speeches that will not come into conflict with 
other opposed, widely held, and not unreasonable interpretations.” 
581 1.22.1. Cf. Hornblower 1987: 65-66; Pelling 2009: 180-182. 
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seven has confirmatory value by suggesting that Thucydides had ample grounds for accepting a 
Periclean indebtedness to Protagoras.  
 It would therefore seem best to take a compromise position between historical accuracy 
and free composition, as for example Hornblower and Pelling do,582 and say that the impression 
of health, as the Protagorean dimension in general, reflects both Pericles’ and Thucydides’ 
agenda. Historically, Pericles aimed at rendering the citizen population more unanimous and 
same-minded regarding the war and in doing so implemented Protagorean technique and 
thought. Historiographically, Thucydides (himself in the audience?) was fully aware of what 
Pericles was attempting rhetorically to accomplish and in writing it up brought to the fore these 
Protagorean aspects. And if in highlighting there was also a degree of exaggeration or addition, 
that is excusable, as long as one can trust that Thucydides may indeed have added ideas and 
aspects to his portrait of Pericles that were not expressed in any single speech, but known or 
inferred by the historian in the course of his research.583 Thus, while the impression of health and 
wellness the speech aims at, as well as the Protagorean influence on the whole, originally 
belongs to Pericles, the controlling hand of Thucydides is present, not simply recording and re-
creating that influence, but displaying and positioning it in such a way as to make nuances and 
implications, perhaps not originally perceived or intended, stand out and become visible. The 
healthy city in different ways is the product of both Pericles’ and Thucydides’ agenda.  
 
 
11.1 THE ΔΟΞΑ / ΑΛΗΘΕΙΑ ANTITHESIS 
 
 
As noted in the introduction above (section 11.0), the first aspect of Protagorean influence in the 
rhetorical agenda of the funeral speech is the overall approach Pericles takes in response to the 
582 Hornblower 1987: 71; Pelling 2009: 180-183. 
583 Thus E. Meyer (cited in Pelling 2009: 180n11) suggested that Pericles’ first speech was a composite of several.  
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dilemma that faces him. Specifically, the approach recalls Protagorean relativism. Briefly stated, 
Protagorean relativism acknowledged the incorrigibility of individuals’ opinions, but negotiated 
between them by isolating, as a type of common denominator, the city’s opinion and regarding 
that as authoritative (see chapter 4). Similarly, Pericles’ approach to resolving the dichotomy 
presented by the audience members makes assumptions about the individual’s opinion, the 
nature of truth and the primacy of the city’s opinion that parallel and mirror that theory of 
relativism. This approach, and the assumptions it makes, are expressed in the proem of the 
speech (2.35) and are organized around an antithesis involving human opinion (δόξα) and truth 
(ἀλήθεια).  
 
11.1.1 A Relativist Approach 
 
 
As just noted, Pericles’ approach is a close response to the dilemma he encounters, but just what 
that dilemma is is not entirely clear. His first words are (2.35.1):   
Οἱ μὲν πολλοὶ τῶν ἐνθάδε ἤδη εἰρηκότων ἐπαινοῦσι τὸν προσθέντα τῷ νόμῳ τὸν λόγον 
τόνδε, ὡς καλὸν ἐπὶ τοῖς ἐκ τῶν πολέμων θαπτομένοις ἀγορεύεσθαι αὐτόν. ἐμοὶ δὲ 
ἀρκοῦν ἂν ἐδόκει εἶναι ἀνδρῶν ἀγαθῶν ἔργῳ γενομένων ἔργῳ καὶ δηλοῦσθαι τὰς τιμάς, 
οἷα καὶ νῦν περὶ τὸν τάφον τόνδε δημοσίᾳ παρασκευασθέντα ὁρᾶτε, καὶ μὴ ἐν ἑνὶ ἀνδρὶ 
πολλῶν ἀρετὰς κινδυνεύεσθαι εὖ τε καὶ χεῖρον εἰπόντι πιστευθῆναι. 
 
Owing to the obvious presence of a λόγος/ἔργον antithesis, this dilemma at first glance appears 
to be the risk involved in one’s attempt to substantiate in speech the actuality of action. If these 
men’s meritorious actions in the service of the state are truly laudable, yet his eulogy fails to 
convince the audience of their merit, then Pericles will have done them, and ultimately Athens, a 
disservice. It is better therefore to remain silent and let deed (τάφος) speak for deed (heroism). 
This is the way in which Adam Parry, for example, understands the passage. After giving a 
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summary of the paragraph in terms of a λόγος/ἔργον antithesis, he concludes: “Pericles will try 
to give his words enough force to demonstrate the truth of the deeds which he will recount.”584  
This dilemma proves to be a red herring, though. For, upon closer inspection, the 
λόγος/ἔργον antithesis is weakened when the truth of the subjects’ valor – the essence of their 
ἔργον – is challenged. This challenge comes about in two steps. The first step occurs when 
Pericles introduces another antithesis, that between human opinion and truth (δόξα/ἀλήθεια). As 
the passage progresses, he observes (2.35.2):  
χαλεπὸν γὰρ τὸ μετρίως εἰπεῖν ἐν ᾧ μόλις ἡ δόκησις τῆς ἀληθείας βεβαιοῦται. ὅ τε γὰρ 
ξυνειδὼς καὶ εὔνους ἀκροατὴς τάχ’ ἄν τι ἐνδεεστέρως πρὸς ἃ βούλεταί τε καὶ ἐπίσταται 
νομίσειε δηλοῦσθαι, ὅ τε ἄπειρος ἔστιν ἃ καὶ πλεονάζεσθαι, διὰ φθόνον, εἴ τι ὑπὲρ τὴν 
αὑτοῦ φύσιν ἀκούοι.  
 
The reason why one should not attempt to put into words the valor of the fallen is because such a 
speech is an instance when μόλις ἡ δόκησις τῆς ἀληθείας βεβαιοῦται. From the nine other 
instances of δόκησις in Thucydides it is clear that the word, true to its origin in δοκέω, offers a 
range of meanings from appearance to judgment.585 What Pericles is saying then is that in 
recounting deeds of heroism, one’s judgment, one’s account of what truly happened (ἡ δόκησις 
τῆς ἀληθείας) scarcely finds confirmation, to say nothing of the incontrovertibly true account. 
Why not? Because in matters like this one people determine the “facts” on the basis of personal 
knowledge and desires. On the one side stands the audience member who will be quite upset if 
the praise for the fallen soldiers proves stinting, while on the other hand stands the audience 
member who will find fault with Pericles if the praise waxes excessive. Pericles encounters an 
obstacle in reaching even the appearance of truth, much less the truth itself, and that obstacle is 
presented by human presupposition. The λόγος/ἔργον antithesis has now been displaced by 
another antithesis, that of truth and human opinion (δόξα/ἀλήθεια). And the fact that truth is 
584 1981: 161. 
585 2.84, 3.43, 3.45, 4.18, 4.87, 4.126, 5.16, 6.64, 7.67. 
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represented, not by an unqualified ἀλήθεια, but in the phrase ἡ δόκησις τῆς ἀληθείας (what men 
grasp to be the truth),586 is portentous, as will shortly be discussed. 
Now that the δόξα/ἀλήθεια antithesis has come into play, the next step can be deployed. 
It consists in Pericles’ reaction to that δόξα/ἀλήθεια antithesis. If he were advocating for the 
claims of truth, he might say a word or two by way of corroboration of those ἔργα that the fallen 
demonstrated, as do other epitaphioi. For instance, Lysias, upon introducing the λόγος/ἔργον 
antithesis in the first sentence to his funeral speech, expatiates upon the worth of the fallen (ἡ 
τούτων ἀρετή) in the next: So great was their valor that poets and orators will never be at a loss 
in praising it, even though one might think the possible topics to be exhausted. Pericles, 
however, does nothing of the sort. Instead, after discussing the psychology of φθόνος for a 
moment, he declares (2.35.3):  
ἐπειδὴ δὲ τοῖς πάλαι οὕτως ἐδοκιμάσθη ταῦτα καλῶς ἔχειν, χρὴ καὶ ἐμὲ ἑπόμενον τῷ 
νόμῳ πειρᾶσθαι ὑμῶν τῆς ἑκάστου βουλήσεώς τε καὶ δόξης τυχεῖν ὡς ἐπὶ πλεῖστον. 
 
Instead of assuring those who expect lavish praise that they are right to do so; and instead of 
chastising the envious (and Thucydides assures us that Pericles could criticize the Athenians with 
impunity [2.65.8]), Pericles promises to deliver such a speech as will satisfy the desire 
(βούλησις) and opinion (δόξα) of either (ἑκάστου) side.587 In other words, his overall logic runs 
so: “I’m going to praise these men. But this is one of those situations where, if I speak the truth, 
or even what purports to be the truth, I won’t get a fair, impersonal hearing. Therefore, my 
approach in this speech will be to give confirmation to that very personal opinion and desire of 
yours that make a true account so elusive.” Human opinion and perception are elevated over 
truth. Δόξα trumps ἀλήθεια. In accordance with Protagorean relativism, Pericles takes an 
approach that implies the essential correctness of the two views that face him, mutually exclusive 
586 For “grasp,” see Hornblower 1991: ad loc.  
587 For ἕκαστος = ἑκάτερος see LSJ s. v. II.2.  
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though they be. He decides not to advocate for truth, but to cooperate with the desire and 
opinions of the audience. He does this because, significantly, he believes that belief and unbelief 
are the products of opinion, not knowledge. 
 
11.1.2 Belief and Opinion 
 
 
Relativism appears again in what Pericles says about the relationship of opinion and belief. 
Pericles assumes that opinion creates belief. He has already noted that the merit of the fallen will 
be believed according as one speaks well or poorly (2.35.1). Soon he voices a similar sentiment, 
when discussing the psychology of envy (2.35.2):   
μέχρι γὰρ τοῦδε ἀνεκτοὶ οἱ ἔπαινοί εἰσι περὶ ἑτέρων λεγόμενοι, ἐς ὅσον ἂν καὶ αὐτὸς 
ἕκαστος οἴηται ἱκανὸς εἶναι δρᾶσαί τι ὧν ἤκουσεν· τῷ δὲ ὑπερβάλλοντι αὐτῶν 
φθονοῦντες ἤδη καὶ ἀπιστοῦσιν.  
 
If the praise of the fallen exceeds the capacity of the individual who is unfamiliar (ἄπειρος) with 
them, then he will conceive envy towards them and refuse to believe the praise. When the issue 
is profuse praise, lack of familiarity creates envy which in turn creates unbelief. Taken at face 
value, this psychological analysis appears problematic. First of all, it assumes that the members 
of the audience who do not know the fallen will respond to their fulsome praise with jealousy 
and doubt. This assumption does not give much credit to those whom Pericles elsewhere 
considers excellent thinkers (cf. 2.40.2). Besides the problem of inconsistency, his analysis also 
assumes belief and unbelief are the products of an envious attitude, a claim that is far from self-
evident, since the opposite claim can be just as true, that an envious disposition is the product of 
belief and unbelief when one hears words that do not square with deeds.588 In short, Pericles’ 
assessment of envy cannot be dismissed as a facile truism for the simple reason that it is just not 
true. But taken as a relativist analysis, it becomes much more intelligible; tendentious, but not 
588 And Pericles’ contemporary, Hippias, discussed these two types of φθόνος. See DK 86 B16.  
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problematic. Since one uses himself as judge, when one responds to fulsome praise with envy, it 
is no base act of malice, but the standard process of thinking. As for belief, it will always be the 
result of one’s disposition, as there is no objective reality upon which to base one’s belief. 
Pericles’ psychology of envy either reflects a Protagorean outlook (as seems more likely) or 
assumes the Athenians, in contradiction to the rest of the speech, are impulse-driven, unreflective 
creatures.   
 Thus on the whole the proem shows a preoccupation with opinion. Pericles chooses to 
satisfy it, and does so because it is, he assumes, the key to belief. In the meantime, the second 
member of the δόξα/ἀλήθεια antithesis is forgotten. Just why it is forgotten may well be 
suggested by the language the proem uses. On a verbal level, the proem lays unmistakable 
emphasis on thinking (δόξα). In the first sentence (2.35.1) ὡς subsumes καλόν into the opinion 
of the previous orators: The institution of the eulogy is not a fine thing full stop, Pericles makes 
clear, but a thing considered fine by all who have previously spoken.589 In the next, Pericles’ 
own position is stated as his personal mental perception (ἐδόκει). Similarly, the reaction of the 
audience is expressed as an act of their thinking (νομίσειε), and the self-estimation of the envious 
is an act of supposing (οἴηται). Finally, as just noted, Pericles adopts an approach that privileges 
the δόξα of both sides, when he declares that he will aim at satisfying the desire and opinion of 
both divisions of the audience. For a speech on real valor, Pericles’ language is quite attuned to 
people’s perceptions. 
This emphasis on thinking has consequences for the word δόκησις. As already noted, the 
word ranges semantically between appearance and judgment, and so I translated it “account.”590 
At first glance this appears to be exactly what Pericles means. However, once Pericles chooses 
589 Cf. Rusten 1989: ad loc. However, it is not enough simply to call ὡς here “causal,” as Rusten does; it should be 
specified that it is causal in the perspective of the οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν εἰρηκότων. See Smyth 2086 & 2086d.  
590 See above, p. 256 and n549 & 550.   
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human opinion over truth on the grounds that it has more power for belief, it becomes clear that 
the phrase had simultaneously supplied the explanation as to why he would not land on truth’s 
side: Namely, any judgment on the truth is just an appearance of it, any grasp of it is but a 
subjective grasp. Pericles must choose δόξα because there is nothing but countless versions of 
truth. In other words, Thucydides here engages in some wordplay in that he makes use of the 
inherent ambiguity of δόκησις.591 However, that is not to say that the relativism in Pericles’ 
approach is hopelessly pluralistic. In this multitude of versions that face him, the orators’, his 
own, the audience members’, it is the city’s he finally follows. For, while the city’s act of 
approbation is also an act of opining (ἐδοκιμάσθη), it is an opinion that has the weight of the 
majority, both past (τοῖς πάλαι) and present (οἱ μὲν πολλοὶ τῶν ἐνθάδε ἤδη εἰρηκότων) (cf. 
subsection 9.3.2).  
 
11.1.3 Conclusion 
 
 
In short, the λόγος/ἔργον antithesis serves only as a veneer plastered over an antithesis more 
central to the passage (and to the speech as a whole), that of human opinion and truth, of what 
seems to be and what is. Pericles’ reaction to this antithesis reveals a degree of commitment to 
Protagorean relativism. His approach to the rhetorical dilemma that faces him, his analysis of 
human belief, and his emphasis of “thinking” words reflect Protagorean epistemological 
assumptions.  Be that as it may, the λόγος/ἔργον antithesis is not a useless appendage. On the 
contrary, it is present in order to expose the other antithesis. It is an epitaphic commonplace592 
presupposing an outlook of objectivity that Thucydides puts into the mouth of Pericles for the 
591 See subsection 8.1.1 for another possible wordplay in this same passage. Cf. Parry 1981: 171 for the suggestion 
that at 2.42.4 Thucydides similarly uses both senses of δόξα.  
592 Cf. Lys. 2.1; Pl. Menex. 236d4-e8; D. Epit. 1; Hyp. Epit. 1-2.  
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sake of pointing out the outlook of relativism present in the proem. It undermines even as it is 
undermined.  
 
 
 
11.2 STRATEGY: VINDICATION AND RE-DISPOSITIONING 
 
 
Just as Protagorean relativism informs the approach Pericles takes towards his divided audience, 
so Protagorean rhetorical technique directs the strategy Pericles attempts to execute throughout 
the speech. In encountering two groups: Those who expect the fallen to be praised to the skies 
and those who will be quick to mark any exaggeration, Pericles is faced with two λόγοι which, in 
his intention to satisfy both sides, he implies are both correct. According to the Protagorean 
program of making the weaker logos the stronger, Pericles should diagnose these two equally 
valid, but opposing λόγοι, ascertain which one is the “healthy” one (in the sense that it is more 
consistent with the Athenian ethical tradition) and which is the “sick” one (in the sense that it is 
the dissenting view). Then, by applying praise or blame, he should transform those who hold the 
sick view so that they see eye to eye with those who hold the healthy view, with the goal of 
securing greater same-mindedness in the state.  
This is exactly what he does. He (not surprisingly) determines those who expect lavish 
praise to be the ones who hold the healthy view. However, his siding with them is not a priori, 
but explained and accounted for in a most powerful way.  In praising the fallen he bases his 
praise of them on the idea that they re-enact the glorious deeds of their ancestors and represent 
an unbroken tradition that began ages past. They thus epitomize the Protagorean ideal of being 
true to one’s polis, as it is in the present and as it was in the past.  
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While thus vindicating those who expect profuse praise, Pericles is at the same time also 
engaged in altering the dissenters in order to bring them round to the city’s point of view and 
make the weaker logos be what the stronger logos is. According to Protagoras’ rules, this 
alteration requires a change of disposition (ἕξις). The disposition Pericles finds in the dissenters 
is one of envy. Through direct praise of Athens (which indirectly reflects on them) and 
everything it stands for he attempts to “re-disposition” these envious audience members so that 
their attitude becomes the opposite of what it was. They move from envy (φθόνος) to envy’s 
opposite, emulation (ζῆλος).593 
Thus the funeral speech shows Pericles deploying a two-part strategy in his vindicating 
the opinion of the one group and in his “re-wiring” the opinion of the other. In so doing, he 
renders Athenian consensus regarding the merit of the fallen soldiers more harmonious, which in 
turn renders Athenian consensus regarding the war more harmonious. Same-mindedness 
(ὁμόνοια) thus safeguarded and increased, dissension in the city should be minimized. Or, to use 
the medical metaphor Protagoras preferred, sickness will be diminished and the city rendered 
healthy. However, it remains to be seen whether this healthiness is actual or merely apparent; 
real or on the surface and concealing a ὕπουλος νόσος (see chapter 12 below).  
 
 
 
11.3 VINDICATION: RE-ENACTING THE PAST 
 
If those who expect lavish praise of the fallen do in fact hold the healthy view, then it must be 
demonstrated by Pericles that what these men who fell during the first summer of fighting in 431 
593 Similarly, Aristotle (Rh. 1388a33-36) contrasts jealousy (φθόνος) and emulation (ζῆλος). For the antithesis of 
jealousy and emulation in Greek thought generally, see Walcot 1978: passim, but esp. 1-7. For jealousy as the 
cultural response to the violation of democratic equality, see ibid. 58-62. For a similar reading of the funeral speech 
as a movement from jealousy to envy, cf. Sissa 2009: 287.  
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BC did accords with the city’s opinion of what is to be done and what is not to be done; in short, 
with the city’s ethicality. He cannot take it for granted that all Athenians will accept the principle 
that dulce et decorum est pro patria mori without qualification, especially considering the ever-
increasing polarization of Athens, if not all Greece, into democratic and oligarchic 
sympathies.594 He cannot, and does not; but instead represents their deed as a re-enactment of an 
ideal that has always been first on the Athenian agenda: Acquisition. This unanimity which he 
points out between the past and present on the score of the preservation and expansion of 
Athenian power serves to vindicate those who desire praise as the representatives of the stronger, 
healthy logos. 
 
11.3.1 The Criterion for Praise 
 
 
Beginning with the ancestors, Pericles says (2.36.1-2):  
ἄρξομαι δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν προγόνων πρῶτον· δίκαιον γὰρ αὐτοῖς καὶ πρέπον δὲ ἅμα ἐν τῷ 
τοιῷδε τὴν τιμὴν ταύτην τῆς μνήμης δίδοσθαι. τὴν γὰρ χώραν οἱ αὐτοὶ αἰεὶ οἰκοῦντες 
διαδοχῇ τῶν ἐπιγιγνομένων μέχρι τοῦδε ἐλευθέραν δι’ ἀρετὴν παρέδοσαν. καὶ ἐκεῖνοί τε 
ἄξιοι ἐπαίνου καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον οἱ πατέρες ἡμῶν· κτησάμενοι γὰρ πρὸς οἷς ἐδέξαντο ὅσην 
ἔχομεν ἀρχὴν οὐκ ἀπόνως ἡμῖν τοῖς νῦν προσκατέλιπον.  
 
It is with good reason that he begins with the ancestors, seeing that they set the precedent of what 
is praiseworthy behavior for an Athenian. What that precedent exactly is comes into view when 
one compares this passage with its counterpart in other funeral speeches, where the help the 
Athenians’ ancestors rendered to the Argives and Heracleidae usually comes in for mention.595 
Here, however, Thucydides makes no mention of such Athenian philanthropy; instead the 
mythical age is reduced to one theme: Boundaries. The ancestors are divided into two, the 
forefathers (οἱ πρόγονοι) and the fathers (οἱ πατέρες). The former forestalled every attempt at 
594 On which see Raaflaub 1990: 37-38. 
595 See Lys. 2.7-16; Pl. Menex. 239b5-8; D. Epit. 8. Cf. Hdt. 9.27.2-3. 
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encroachment, whether by Amazons or any other force, and passed it on “free from foreign rule,” 
that is ἐλευθέρα.596 Joined with the idea of autonomy in the word ἐλευθέρα is that of allowing no 
diminution of their territory and for that reason their unbroken possession of the land is stressed 
(τὴν γὰρ χώραν οἱ αὐτοὶ αἰεὶ οἰκοῦντες διαδοχῇ τῶν ἐπιγιγνομένων).597 The ancestors are 
praiseworthy, Pericles explains, for their valor (ἀρετή); and their valor consists in this: They 
never lost possession of their land.  
For this same reason their fathers are also praiseworthy, but in order to sustain the 
comparison between ancestors and fathers Pericles must be permitted to introduce a modification 
and substitute for the land (χώρα) of the ancestors the realm (ἀρχή) of the fathers, since land per 
se is not the point. Indeed, it was the Periclean policy to deemphasize the importance of land (cf. 
2.62.3) and this substitution should be seen as part of that de-emphasis. The point is property, 
patrimony, which their fathers inherited and added to (κτησάμενοι…πρὸς οἷς ἐδέξαντο). So 
important is the idea of enlarging the ancestral property that πρός (in addition to) needs to be 
uttered twice. The fathers are praiseworthy because of their stewardship of the territory. That is 
why they deserve even more praise (ἔτι μᾶλλον) for amplifying it.598  
This characterization of the ancestors’ valor as devoted to the enlargement of the state is, 
I suggest, programmatic, meant to be the interpretive key for the praiseworthiness of the fallen 
who, Pericles will portray, live up to their forefathers’ ways.  
 
 
 
 
 
596 Cf. Hornblower 1991: ad loc.  
597 The idea of autochthony is also present (cf. Rusten 1989: ad loc), but only in the sense of unbroken possession, 
not in the sense of “earth-born” (see Rosivach 1987: 297-298).  
598 Cf. Foster 2010: 190-193, who considers Pericles in this passage to be establishing imperial acquisition as “the 
foundation of Athenian success” (192).  
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11.3.2 True Sons 
 
 
However, the lengthy description of Athenian political culture comes first which, as I will argue 
below (section 11.3), has more to do with the re-dispositioning of the envious than with the 
vindication of the benevolent (εὖνοι). When Pericles finally comes to the eulogy proper of the 
fallen soldiers (2.42.2-4), his theme is self-sacrifice. They gave their lives on behalf of the city, 
an act which redeems the base and cowardly (τοῖς τἆλλα χείροσι) and thus a fortiori testifies to 
the worth of these men (τῶνδε δέ). This theme of self-sacrifice he develops by means of the 
public/private antithesis. Specifically, the two parts of the antithesis are defense against public 
enemies and the denial of private resources. They might have declined a hero’s death in 
preference for the continued enjoyment of their wealth (πλούτου...τὴν ἔτι ἀπόλαυσιν) or in the 
hope of acquiring it (πενίας ἐλπίδι). But they didn’t. Instead, they determined that private 
acquisition (τῶν δὲ ἐφίεσθαι) was permissible only as long as it did not interfere with the 
protection of the state (τοὺς μὲν τιμωρεῖσθαι). There is nothing inherently sordid about gain. 
This is an important point that Pericles makes clear elsewhere (see subsection 9.2.2). It becomes 
sordid, however, when it takes on greater priority than the state.599 Thus the public/private 
antithesis serves to set in relief their self-sacrifice.  
It sets in relief their self-sacrifice, and it also interprets it. For the state to prosper, the 
citizens must take less; and these men took a great deal less. But their loss is the city’s gain. 
Pericles depicts the death of these men as an accretion to the power and prestige of the polis. 
Their death was an embellishment and accentuation (ἐκόσμησαν) of the very excellent qualities 
which Pericles has just extolled in Athens, an honor that exceeds his own praise as much as deed 
599 Pericles articulates a similar formula as the ideal attitude to the state at 2.60.3. 
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exceeds speech.600 More importantly, their death was a contribution (ἔρανος), offered to the city 
with patriotic abandon (προϊέμενοι), which likewise adds beauty to the city (κάλλιστον) and is 
almost directly responsible for the power the city enjoys (ὅταν μεγάλη δόξῃ εἶναι…) (2.43.1). 
The death and sacrifice was an act of acquisition (ktēsis) for the city. They set aside private gain 
so that the city might gain. The public/private antithesis underscores gain as the key idea about 
their death. 
Being thus an act of ktēsis, their sacrifice sets them squarely in the tradition of their 
forebears. This harmony between the generations comes out most clearly in the passage just 
quoted. Discussing the need of the audience to be just as bold as the fallen, Pericles explains how 
power for the city is the result of such sacrifice, which they would realize if, when the city seems 
powerful (μεγάλη) to them, they but consider (2.43.1):   
ὅτι τολμῶντες καὶ γιγνώσκοντες τὰ δέοντα καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις αἰσχυνόμενοι ἄνδρες αὐτὰ 
ἐκτήσαντο, καὶ ὁπότε καὶ πείρᾳ του σφαλεῖεν, οὐκ οὖν καὶ τὴν πόλιν γε τῆς σφετέρας 
ἀρετῆς ἀξιοῦντες στερίσκειν, κάλλιστον δὲ ἔρανον αὐτῇ προϊέμενοι. 
 
In this passage Pericles’ vindication of the benevolent members of the audience reaches its 
climax. Here the ancestors and the fallen become one; sacrifice and enlargement are melded 
together. Properly speaking, the ancestors are the ones who added physical property to the polis, 
just as ἐκτήσαντο in this sentence looks back to κτησάμενοι in the programmatic 2.36.2. Again 
properly speaking, it is the fallen soldiers who gave up their lives as the κάλλιστος ἔρανος. But, 
distinguishing the two groups is here beside the point. The fallen and their forebears alike are 
joined together as one group in this passage because of the common trait they share of adding to 
the power and prestige of Athens, the fallen through their sacrifice, their forebears through their 
physical acquisitions. Here lies the reason the fallen deserve lavish praise. True, they died in the 
600 Cf. Hornblower 1991: ad loc. For the various ways in which the λόγος/ἔργον antithesis can be present 
conceptually, even if not verbally, see Parry 1981: 10-14. 
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service of their country, but why is that laudable?  Because it accords with the city’s heritage. 
The fallen are to be praised because they acted in accordance with the tradition of their ancestors, 
so that what was said of their ancestors can in a special, yet no less real, way be said of the 
fallen: κτησάμενοι γὰρ πρὸς οἷς ἐδέξαντο ὅσην ἔχομεν ἀρχὴν οὐκ ἀπόνως ἡμῖν τοῖς νῦν 
προσκατέλιπον. 
 The fallen are the true sons of their forebears. In behaving according to the same 
standards as those that made Athens what it is, they unite the past and the present and cast the 
current war against the Peloponnesians as an enterprise sanctioned by Athenians both living and 
dead. By this equation of the fallen with the past, Pericles makes it clear for his audience that the 
benevolent among them, those who expect lavish praise for the fallen, are the ones who hold 
what is by far the stronger logos, the logos perfectly synchronized with the Athenian ethicality. 
But such an equation, being by and large celebratory, only serves to confirm those who already 
held that opinion. Pericles must still bring the envious, those who dissent from the stronger 
logos, round to this view, if the city is going to be rendered healthy. To do so, he must alter their 
disposition of envy and jealousy to a more constructive passion. 
 
 
 
11.4 RE-DISPOSITIONING: FROM ENVY TO EMULATION 
 
 
Thucydides reports that Pericles was quite expert at altering the disposition (ἕξις) of his audience 
from one state to its opposite. At 2.65.9 Thucydides says: ὁπότε γοῦν αἴσθοιτό τι αὐτοὺς παρὰ 
καιρὸν ὕβρει θαρσοῦντας, λέγων κατέπλησσεν ἐπὶ τὸ φοβεῖσθαι, καὶ δεδιότας αὖ ἀλόγως 
ἀντικαθίστη πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸ θαρσεῖν.  By the power of his speech (λέγων) Pericles was able, after 
diagnosis (ὁπότε αἴσθοιτο), to draw his audience from the state of confidence to its opposite, 
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fear; and from a state of fear to its opposite, confidence.601 On another occasion, when in the 
summer of 430 BC the Athenians were desperate and angry because the Periclean policy of 
surrendering the countryside to the enemy seemed responsible for the outbreak of the plague in 
the city, Thucydides records that Pericles convened an assembly because he wanted to encourage 
them, take away their angry disposition (τὸ ὀργιζόμενον τῆς γνώμης) and bring them into a state 
of greater mildness and fearlessness (πρὸς τὸ ἠπιώτερον καὶ ἀδεέστερον καταστῆσαι) (2.59.3).602 
Thucydides twice points out that Pericles’ rhetorical ability had the feature of being able to 
change the Athenians’ disposition to its opposite.603 Thus the historian suggests that Pericles’ 
oratory was an exemplification of Protagorean “re-dispositioning.”  
Pericles employs this same technique in the funeral speech in order to convert those who 
dissent from the stronger logos. True to Protagoras’ teachings, he addresses their disposition, not 
their opinion, since their opinion is not wrong, but could only be “better.” They currently have a 
disposition of envy (φθόνος) towards the fallen. The reason they have such a disposition towards 
them, and anybody else who is praised, is because, as examples of Protagorean epistemology, 
they judge the ability of others by their own capacity (φύσις) (see subsection 8.1.1). Therefore, in 
order to alter this disposition towards the fallen, Pericles must first change their understanding of 
their φύσις. And, according to Protagoras’s teaching, he must address it with either praise or 
censure. In the event, he chooses praise. The praise, though, is oblique. In the first six of a 
twelve-section speech (2.36 to 2.46), Pericles does not even discuss the fallen, but instead praises 
Athens and the Athenians as a whole. This is usually understood as a digression reflecting the 
601 For fear (φόβος) as the opposite of confidence (θάρσος), cf. Arist. Rh. 1383a13-16; Pl. Prt. 349e1-3. 
602 Cf. Arist. Rh. 1380a7, who contrasts anger (ὀργή) with gentleness (πραότης).  
603 Contrast Gorgias’ description of the power of speech to change mood, in which the audience is moved to random, 
not opposite, emotions (Hel. 14). Thrasymachus of Chalcedon (Pl. Phdr. 267c6-d1) claimed to have the power to 
transform the audience’s mood to its opposite, and interestingly denoted it by κηλεῖν – the word Plato makes a point 
of attaching to Protagoras (see subsection 10.4.1).  
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agenda of Thucydides or as typical of the genre of the funeral speech.604 However, read in the 
light of Protagoras’s rhetoric, it also performs an immediate rhetorical function. It contains a 
praise of Athens that is at one and the same time a praise of the dissenters. It is by this indirect 
praise that Pericles attempts to develop in them a higher estimation of their own capacity. Once 
they are equipped with this new self-estimation, Pericles can invite them to take up a new 
disposition regarding the fallen, to drop their disposition of envy (φθόνος) and adopt one of 
emulation (ζῆλος). If they do so, then the weaker logos, as in Aristophanes’ Clouds, will 
surrender, toss his cloak, and join the ranks of those on the stronger side (cf. subsection 10.3.3). 
 
11.4.1 The Exemplary Athenian 
 
 
Self-sufficiency is the theme that enables Pericles to use his direct praise of Athens as an oblique 
praise of every Athenian individual.605 Athens, he begins, has been developed in all respects to 
an extremely high level of self-sufficiency for both war and peace (τὴν πόλιν τοῖς πᾶσι 
παρεσκευάσαμεν καὶ ἐς πόλεμον καὶ ἐς εἰρήνην αὐταρκεστάτην) (2.36.3). This self-sufficiency 
does not of course mean that Athens produces everything it needs within the confines of its own 
borders.606 Instead, it means Athens has access to every kind of resource – material, intellectual, 
cultural – needed in order to be equal to any challenge a political community can face. It thus 
serves as the defining characteristic of Athens. It is the essence of its greatness and has important 
implications on Athenian life (see subsection 8.2.2).   
Breaking down Athens’ self-sufficiency, Pericles explains how it reveals itself in the 
cultural (ἐπιτήδευσις), political (πολιτεία) and psychological life (τρόποι) of the Athenians 
604 E.g. Rusten 1989: 19 and Loraux 1986: 174, respectively.  
605 Foster 2010: 202-204 similarly sees self-sufficiency as the leitmotif of the speech, but emphasizes its material 
aspect. For the cultural aspect, see subsection 8.2.2. 
606 Cf. Gomme 1956: ad loc.  
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(2.36.4). The Athenians, he explains, rule themselves in the true sense of the word, for their 
government is a democracy (2.37). They enjoy plenty of festivals and have access to products 
from around the known world (2.38). They are excellent soldiers, despite the fact that, unlike 
Sparta, they do not spend their lives in military barracks (2.39). They operate on a basis of 
circumspection and reason (2.40.1-2) (cf. subsection 9.4.2). Moreover, they are courageous in 
the correct sense of the word. In a definition quite possibly reminiscent of a Protagorean topos, 
Pericles asserts that one is truly courageous only when he has an accurate notion of what is 
frightful and what is desirable, yet chooses danger anyway (2.40.3).607 The Athenians are 
steadfast friends and allies, because they manage their relations, not on a basis of self-interest 
(τοῦ συμφέροντος), but in the confidence that their advocacy of democracy in the Greek world 
disposes their subjects and allies well towards them (2.40.4-5).608 Finally, at 2.41.1 Pericles sums 
up all these aspects of self-sufficiency in a statement that indicates how important he considers it 
to be to human society. Athens, he declares, teaches the other Greeks how to live (Ξυνελών τε 
λέγω τήν τε πᾶσαν πόλιν τῆς Ἑλλάδος παίδευσιν εἶναι). The theme begun with αὐταρκεστάτη at 
2.36.3 here reaches a milestone: Self-sufficiency makes Athens an example of political 
excellence to others. This is a grand(iose) claim that demands for Athens a seat of honor in 
human history.  
607 This is most likely both a sophistic topos, as Antiphon (DK 87 B59) gives a similar definition of σωφροσύνη, and 
a specifically Protagorean one as well, since in the Protagoras he attempts to define ἀνδρεία along these lines 
(349e3), but is prevented by Socrates from developing that line of thought (359d1-4). For Protagoras’s use of topoi, 
see Cic. Brut. 12.46 (= DK 80 B6). Cf. Kerferd 1981: 31.  
608 So I interpret the dense phrase τῆς ἐλευθερίας τῷ πιστῷ. Gomme 1959: ad loc. renders it “with the confidence 
that belongs to us as free men.” But it seems more likely that the spread of democracy is here meant, since in the 
Menexenus – a parody of this speech – the spread of democracy is portrayed as the defense of freedom (ἐλευθερία) 
(242ab). This interpretation is also supported by the fact that Pericles in the next sentence declares Athens to be the 
education of Greece. For the Menexenus as a parody of the funeral speech featured in Thucydides, see Coventry 
1989: 3.  
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Yet an even grander claim follows. In this same sentence Pericles makes a startling 
transition from Athens and the Athenians as a whole to the individual Athenian. After thus 
naming Athens as the education of Greece, he adds (2.41.1):   
καὶ καθ’ ἕκαστον δοκεῖν ἄν μοι τὸν αὐτὸν ἄνδρα παρ’ ἡμῶν ἐπὶ πλεῖστ’ ἂν εἴδη καὶ μετὰ 
χαρίτων μάλιστ’ ἂν εὐτραπέλως τὸ σῶμα αὔταρκες παρέχεσθαι. 
 
The transition is eloquent. It occurs in mid-sentence, executed by the conjunctions τε...καί which 
give it a certain naturalness. Athens is not only the education of Greece, but in individual terms 
every Athenian (καθ’ ἕκαστον) is a citizen that is self-sufficient (αὔταρκες) for the greatest 
assortment of undertakings, with dexterity and with the greatest versatility. As the city, so every 
citizen. It is not just a grand claim; it is equality (ἰσονομία) taken literally. Since the city operates 
on a basis of self-rule, artistic energy, economic prosperity, military prowess, intellectual 
excellence and ethical integrity, it stands to reason, Pericles claims, that, not certain of the 
Athenians, but each and every one will possess these same qualities.609 These self-sufficient 
citizens are a tremendous historical phenomenon, miles away from the anonymous, obsequious 
subjects of the Persian Empire and the dogmatically obedient Spartans. They are self-actuated, 
free from all authority because they have learned to be their own authority. But action speaks 
louder than words, and to verify his assertion that Athens has indeed imparted to each of its 
citizens, living and dead, a generous portion of self-sufficiency, Pericles offers the most 
compelling proof (2.41.2):  
καὶ ὡς οὐ λόγων ἐν τῷ παρόντι κόμπος τάδε μᾶλλον ἢ ἔργων ἐστὶν ἀλήθεια, αὐτὴ ἡ 
δύναμις τῆς πόλεως, ἣν ἀπὸ τῶνδε τῶν τρόπων ἐκτησάμεθα, σημαίνει.  
 
That every Athenian has this existential self-sufficiency, that what Pericles claims for each 
Athenian, is true, that what he says is ἔργων ἀλήθεια, is proven by the city’s power (δύναμις). 
609 Pericles is thus making use of the traditional idea found in earlier literature that, in the words of Simonides, πόλις 
ἄνδρα διδάσκει (see subsection 8.2.2). 
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Every Athenian has self-sufficiency because the city has it; if the city did not have it, it would 
not have the power it incontrovertibly has. The declaration, more powerful than logical, rolls 
empire, city and the individual Athenian all into one.610 
But for whose sake? Just as in the case of the benevolent audience members the praise for 
the fallen looks back to the past and the dead for vindication, so now the praise of the fallen 
looks ahead to the living, to bring the present dissenters into line with the rest of the city, with 
the fallen soldiers, and with their own past. Pericles’ aim is wholeness, complete integration of 
the discrete parts of the city.  
 
11.4.2 Σώματα αὐτάρκη 
 
 
Now that Pericles has established this relationship between city and individual, he can 
commence the eulogy proper over the fallen soldiers without fear of alienating the dissenters. 
The praise is lavish. In the face of death, these fallen soldiers counted present wealth, or hoped-
for wealth, as nothing compared to the punishment of their enemies. They committed thoughts of 
success to the future and trusted in themselves for the present.611 Thus they overcame fear and 
perished at the height of glory (2.42.4). Their glory is ageless and will resonate across the globe 
(2.43.2). Hearing this eulogy one might think the heroes of Marathon were being interred. But, as 
Thucydides shows (2.18-33), the operations these soldiers were in were few, minor, and hardly 
call for such praise.612 One might explain this incongruity by alleging that this praise is not for 
these fallen soldiers themselves, but rather that they represent, or symbolize, the “collective dead 
over the years,” or “the meaning of the action of the men.”613 Such an abstraction, though, is 
610 For the status of truth in this passage, cf. subsection 8.1.1. 
611 Protagoras encouraged a similar attitude towards present and future time. See subsection 8.3.3. 
612 See Bosworth 2000: 5-6 for details concerning these operations.  
613 For the former view, see Bosworth 2000: 5n21, for the latter Parry 1981: 169. 
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hard to reconcile with Pericles’ express assertion that the record of these men (τῶνδε) is on par 
with their deeds: καὶ οὐκ ἂν πολλοῖς τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἰσόρροπος ὥσπερ τῶνδε ὁ λόγος τῶν ἔργων 
φανείη. It is also hard to reconcile with Pericles’ fear that some might think his eulogy, as it in 
fact is, pleonastic (2.35.2). Pericles means the praise to be taken literally. 
But, Pericles has prefaced this praise with a panegyric on Athens that claimed that the 
city’s self-sufficiency is imparted to the individual Athenian. The fallen were able to perform so 
magnanimous a deed because they came from Athens. As Pericles says when summarizing the 
eulogy: Καὶ οἵδε μὲν προσηκόντως τῇ πόλει τοιοίδε ἐγένοντο (2.43.1). In proving to be such as 
Pericles just described them, the fallen soldiers “match their city.”614 They are its products, 
shining examples of σώματα αὐτάκρη. The praise must be excessive if it is going to prove 
Pericles’ claim which is the crux of the speech. For, it carries an important implication. If these 
men performed so grand a deed because their city trained them to have that kind of valor, then 
that kind of valor, or rather ἀρετή, is a condition determined by environment; and if it is such a 
condition, then the envious who are likewise products of Athens are also capable of such deeds. 
This being the case, they have misinterpreted their own capacity and so, according to Pericles’ 
psychology, no longer have any reason to envy any imputation of heroism to the fallen. Thus 
Pericles challenges the self-estimation of the envious. If they would but realize that they too, as 
citizens of Athens, are σώματα αὐτάρκη, the praise would not seem effuse and fulsome to them, 
but, in Pericles’ words, ἰσόρροπος.  
True to Protagorean instruction, Pericles here attempts to remove the obstacle that stands 
in the way of the dissenters’ belief in the praiseworthiness of the fallen, namely their low self-
estimation. They continue of course to measure others by their own capacity. Protagorean 
epistemology has not been undermined or rejected. Only, a new perspective on themselves has 
614 Rusten 1989: ad loc.  
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been offered. This new perspective recalls the νόμος/φύσις antithesis that was becoming current 
at the time. The envious are asked to consider themselves possessors of a valor and ability 
similar to that in the fallen because all who are products of Athens are endowed with such 
ability, which is truly an ἀρετή (2.42.2). This belief in an imparted, environmentally conditioned 
ἀρετή is supposed to replace their earlier estimation of themselves which Pericles denotes as 
φύσις (2.35.2). The envious are thus asked to drop a view of themselves based on reality (φύσις) 
and adopt one based on the power of human custom. This νόμος/φύσις antithesis serves as 
reinforcement of the truth/human opinion antithesis that figured in the proem, in that a 
preference for custom over nature privileges Athenian opinion over universal truth. In Pericles’ 
offer of a new perspective the envious are offered a new worldview, one less “physical” and, the 
language suggests, less “realistic” than their earlier one. 
Now that the envious are thus offered a new way of thinking about themselves, viz. as 
products of a teacher-city, not as products of φύσις, Pericles can at last invite them to take up a 
new disposition towards the fallen. At the end of the eulogy of the fallen soldiers, he calls on the 
audience to emulate them (2.43.4):  
οὓς νῦν ὑμεῖς ζηλώσαντες καὶ τὸ εὔδαιμον τὸ ἐλεύθερον, τὸ δ’ ἐλεύθερον τὸ εὔψυχον 
κρίναντες μὴ περιορᾶσθε τοὺς πολεμικοὺς κινδύνους.  
 
It is an emphatic moment in the speech. Not only is it the first time the historical context (i.e. the 
Peloponnesian War) is referred to directly, but it is also the first time the second person plural 
occurs in the speech.615 The audience now hears Pericles address them directly for the first time, 
and with a verb in the imperative mood. It also begins with an extended sequence of nine long 
syllables, so that the point is audibly “hammered home.” And what is that point? They are 
615 Pericles might have used the second person at 41.5 and at 43.1, but instead avoids it with the generic πᾶς τις and 
οἱ λοιποί. 
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invited to take up the disposition directly opposite to envy (φθόνος),616 namely emulous 
admiration (ζῆλος) through the participle ζηλώσαντες. The reference to the war, the direct 
address, the spondaic delivery all combine to make the invitation to emulate, not envy, a moment 
of truth. Will the envious accept Pericles’ invitation?  
 Near the peroration of the speech, when encouraging the male relatives of the dead to 
duplicate their virtue and valor, Pericles notes that in imitating the fallen they have a rough road 
ahead of them, since (2.45.1):  
Φθόνος γὰρ τοῖς ζῶσι πρὸς τὸ ἀντίπαλον, τὸ δὲ μὴ ἐμποδὼν ἀνανταγωνίστῳ εὐνοίᾳ 
τετίμηται.  
 
It has been pointed out that this line is inconsistent with Pericles’ psychology of envy in the 
proem (2.35.2), since there it is possible to bear envy against the dead, while here the dead are 
exempt from such malice.617 While it is contradictory, it is not necessarily inconsistent from the 
viewpoint of a change of disposition. From the beginning Pericles has endeavored to place the 
fallen soldiers above envy by suggesting that the living are just as capable as they. He now 
assumes the fallen are indeed above φθόνος, subject only to ζῆλος. In other words, though it is 
not made clear if Pericles’ invitation was accepted, Pericles is inclined to think it has been. 
 
 
 
11.5 THE HEALTHY CITY? 
 
Whether or not they accepted the invitation, Pericles’ rhetorical aim is clear. After articulating a 
rhetorical approach that assumed Protagorean relativism, he then went about executing that 
approach through the implementation of Protagorean rhetorical technique. He attempted to re-
disposition the envious portion of his audience so as to harmonize them with the consensus view 
616 For envy and its opposite, see above, n557. 
617 Cf. Gomme 1956: ad loc, Rusten 1989: ad loc.  
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and create ὁμόνοια in the city. In order to effect this re-dispositioning and create this ὁμόνοια, he 
first determined what the consensus view was. He then vindicated that view by showing that the 
fallen soldiers were the true sons of their forebears. Next, he assessed the reason why the envious 
audience members disagreed with that view and finding it to be envy, based on a low (or 
realistic?) self-estimation, he so praised Athens as to include the envious citizens in that praise 
and challenge their low self-estimation. Then – and only then – did he encourage them to adopt 
an attitude of emulation towards the fallen. In this way he made, is suggest, the weaker logos the 
stronger.  
And since Protagoras characterized the process of making the weaker logos the stronger 
as a transforming of a sick view into the healthy view, Pericles can be said to offer the city a 
“health-giving” speech. However, within a few lines Thucydides describes the terrible plague 
that struck Athens shortly after the funeral speech was delivered. A metaphorical, Protagorean 
“healthiness” that Pericles offers the city is thus juxtaposed with the actual, virulent disease 
which kills many, Pericles himself included. Why Thucydides created this juxtaposition will be 
discussed in the following chapter. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
302 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12.0 THE DISABUSED CITY: THE FUNCTION OF THE PROTAGOREAN 
DIMENSION IN THUCYDIDES’ HISTORY 
 
 
 
 
In chapters eight through eleven I argue that Protagorean ideas figure in the funeral speech 
delivered by Pericles in the History of Thucydides. That claim must now deal with a crucial 
question: Why? What purpose did Thucydides intend to achieve by incorporating into the 
Periclean funeral speech ideas drawn from the political and rhetorical teachings of Protagoras? 
What role did he intend this Protagorean dimension to play in the work? One answer is that it 
was in the interests of historicity. Thucydides made use of Protagorean elements because he had 
either first- or second-hand knowledge that these ideas were to an extent expressed on that 
occasion (section 11.0). However, historicity does not give a complete answer, since these ideas 
help give to the funeral speech an overall egalitarian character that interacts in provocative ways 
with other parts of the History. The question then remains effectively unresolved.  
 It is this question that I plan to discuss in this chapter. After examining how the 
egalitarian character of the funeral speech stands in stark contrast to other passages in 
Thucydides in which the Athenian political philosophy appears to be a more or less aggressive 
form of Realism, I will suggest that the plague narrative that immediately follows the funeral 
speech depicts the total victory of Realism over the ideals of the funeral speech as the dominant 
theory in Athenian political culture. Moreover, I will argue that for Thucydides a crucial, if not 
the most crucial, factor in the final takeover of Realism was, ironically enough, the very 
Protagorean assumptions that formed the basis of the rival egalitarian theory of the funeral 
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speech. These assumptions, Thucydides’ narrative implies, had placed the Athenian mind at such 
a distance from reality and sound thinking that in a crisis situation such as the plague these 
Protagorean assumptions not only discredited themselves, but also made the Athenians hyper-
sensitive to the exigencies of reality, a hyper-sensitivity that expressed itself in the espousal of 
Realist politics which influence Athenian behavior in significant episodes later in the war. Thus, 
Protagorean ideas that informed the democratic ideals of the funeral speech paradoxically 
become the cause for the abandonment of those same ideals. The historiographical function then 
of the Protagorean dimension in the funeral speech is two-fold: It explains the Athenian 
intellectual development in the first years of the war and offers this intellectual development as 
another facet in the historical causation of the Peloponnesian War.  
 
 
 
12.1 REALISM 
 
 
 There is an incongruity between the funeral speech and the characterization of the Athenian 
political ideology represented elsewhere in the History. This political ideology is, in a word, 
Realism.618 As the Athenian legates tell the representatives of the Melians in Bk 5:  
...δίκαια μὲν ἐν τῷ ἀνθρωπείῳ λόγῳ ἀπὸ τῆς ἴσης ἀνάγκης κρίνεται, δυνατὰ δὲ οἱ 
προύχοντες πράσσουσι καὶ οἱ ἀσθενεῖς ξυγχωροῦσιν (89).  
 
The terms of a relationship between a strong party and a weak party are to be determined, not by 
considerations of justice and fair dealing (δίκαια), but by the realities of power (δυνατά). The 
strong has a right to rule the weak simply because he has the power to do so. Might is right, and 
justice is an idea that is only valid between parties equal in power (in which case it ceases to be 
618 For the equation of the Athenian ideology with the Realist school of International Relations Theory, see Ober 
2009: 434-438. The emphasis that Plato places on this school of thought through Thrasymachus in the Republic 
(343b1-344c8) and Callicles in the Gorgias (482c4-492c8) suggests that it was a matter of discussion both in Plato’s 
time and in the mid fifth century.  
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justice per se and becomes merely a special application of the law of the stronger). Nor is this 
simply a pragmatic approach the Athenians take, but rather it achieves the status of dogma 
through an appeal to “the nature of things” (φύσις). As they later explain to the Melians:  
 ἡγούμεθα γὰρ τό τε θεῖον δόξῃ τὸ ἀνθρώπειόν τε σαφῶς διὰ παντὸς ὑπὸ φύσεως 
ἀναγκαίας, οὗ ἂν κρατῇ, ἄρχειν· καὶ ἡμεῖς οὔτε θέντες τὸν νόμον οὔτε κειμένῳ πρῶτοι 
χρησάμενοι, ὄντα δὲ παραλαβόντες καὶ ἐσόμενον ἐς αἰεὶ καταλείψοντες χρώμεθα αὐτῷ... 
(5.105.2).  
 
The word ὄντα, with its philosophical connotations of real being,619 makes their point clear. The 
law of the stronger is here sanctioned by an appeal to natural law, independent of all human law, 
which, the language indicates, is merely convention (θέντες, κειμένῳ). The Athenians here are 
avowed Realists.  
 
12.1.1 The Emissaries’ Speech at Sparta 
 
 
Nor is this ideology the result of the Peloponnesian War. Thucydides makes it clear that before 
the war began certain Athenians had already espoused this political philosophy.620 At the 
meeting of the Peloponnesian allies that was convened at Sparta in 432 BC to discuss whether or 
not the league should declare war against Athens, Athenian emissaries who happened to be at 
Sparta on other business managed to gain permission to speak, not to answer any charges (this 
they make abundantly clear), but simply to impress upon the Spartans what was at stake (1.73-
619 The connotation of reality, or being, which this word obviously has makes adverbs such as ὄντως, τῷ ὄντι, 
possible. For this same reason it makes Hornblower’s view (see below, n582), that the Athenians here do not base 
their appeal on nature, but on history, difficult to support, since the participle raises the essence of the law to a 
higher plane of being and thus associates the Athenians’ appeal with what Hussey 1985: 128 calls “the latest 
sophistic theories.” Cf. Tritle 2006: 485-486. 
620 Cf. Gomme, Andrewes, Dover 1970: 174-175; Stahl 2003: 48; Strasburger 2009: 205n44, 215, 217; Foster 2010: 
90n21. Hornblower 1987: 185-1866 & n99 and 1991: 121-122 contends that the rationales presented in the 
emissaries’ speech and the Melian dialogue are close to, but essentially different from, a Realist philosophy. Instead, 
he argues both parties appeal to the “truths of history,” not a law of nature, and points to καθεστῶτος (established 
custom) in the former passage (1.76.2) and νόμος (=custom) in the latter (5.105.2). But see n581 above and n583 
below.  
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78). In the course of this speech the Athenian speaker appeals to the same natural law of the 
stronger in order to explain (not justify) their empire, as well as their management of it:  
 οὕτως  οὐδ’ ἡμεῖς θαυμαστὸν οὐδὲν πεποιήκαμεν οὐδ’ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀνθρωπείου τρόπου, εἰ 
ἀρχήν τε διδομένην ἐδεξάμεθα καὶ ταύτην μὴ ἀνεῖμεν ὑπὸ ˂τριῶν˃ τῶν μεγίστων 
νικηθέντες, τιμῆς καὶ δέους καὶ ὠφελίας, οὐδ’ αὖ πρῶτοι τοῦ τοιούτου ὑπάρξαντες, ἀλλ’ 
αἰεὶ καθεστῶτος τὸν ἥσσω ὑπὸ τοῦ δυνατωτέρου κατείργεσθαι...(1.76.2).  
 
The similarity of this passage with the Melian dialogue is clear. The primary factor in a 
relationship with a weaker party is power (δυνατωτέρου). This is a principle that is not man-
made, but established as a condition of reality (καθεστῶτος)621 and in keeping with human 
sociology (τοῦ ἀνθρωπείου τρόπου). Moreover, the speaker makes it clear that he does not think 
justice is in any way an obligation owed to the weaker by the stronger. True, he goes on to point 
out that the Athenians behave moderately towards their subjects (μετριάζομεν) (1.76.3); but he 
makes it clear that, if the Athenians dispensed with Law622 and openly aggrandized 
(ἐπλεονεκτοῦμεν), not even the subjects themselves would deny that the weaker must submit to 
the one with the power:  
ἐκείνως δ’ οὐδ’ ἂν αὐτοὶ ἀντέλεγον ὡς οὐ χρεὼν τὸν ἥσσω τῷ κρατοῦντι ὑποχωρεῖν 
(1.77.3).  
 
The moderation the Athenians show is for their subjects a matter of luck. The Athenians have the 
right (provided it is defined as might) to treat their subjects as they wish; the fact that they don’t 
is not because they believe moderation to have a legitimate place in human ethics. This comes 
out clearly when the speaker says that the subjects should be thankful that they are not deprived 
621 καθεστῶτος governs the indirect statement τὸν ἥσσω ὑπὸ τοῦ δυνατωτέρου κατείργεσθαι. Just below (1.76.3) the 
speaker mentions τῇ ἀνθρωπείᾳ φύσει and explains it by adding ὥστε ἑτέρων ἄρχειν. This parallel suggests that 
καθεστῶτος is φύσις and vice versa. In other words, the speaker is, contra Hornblower (see above, n582), appealing 
to natural, not historical, truths.   
622 Gomme 1965: ad loc notes: “a rare use of the singular in the sense of Law, as opposed to violence…” The 
Athenian speaker is speaking abstractly and on a theoretical plane. 
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of more (οὐ τοῦ πλέονος μὴ στερισκόμενοι χάριν ἔχουσιν). For, generally speaking, one need not 
be thankful when another treats him as he ethically ought.  
Rather, the reason they are moderate is because moderation is currently in their 
interests.623 Here the emissary does not just resemble the Athenian speaker on Melos, but offers 
a further elaboration in the Realist philosophy they share. He provides the corollary to the law of 
the stronger; namely, self-interest (τὰ ξυμφέροντα). He begins by assuming the legitimacy of 
self-interest in a special case:  
πᾶσι δὲ ἀνεπίφθονον τὰ ξυμφέροντα τῶν μεγίστων πέρι κινδύνων εὖ τίθεσθαι (1.75.5).  
When it comes to the gravest dangers, one can be forgiven if he arranges affairs with a view to 
expediency. Self-interest is soon, however, raised to the status of a general principle when the 
speaker accuses the Spartans of following the same philosophy under the pretense of the cause of 
justice (ὁ δίκαιος λόγος) and avers that that cause is one to which “nobody ever gave preference, 
and forbore to gain more (πλέον ἔχειν), when he had the chance to make some acquisition in 
strength” (1.76.2). Such generalizing shows that self-interest has the status of an ethical standard 
for the emissaries.  
 Moreover, the Athenian speaker gives further definition to the tenets of this Realist 
philosophy when he consistently explains self-interest as “having more” (πλεονεκτεῖν). This is 
demonstrated not only in the two instances of the word already cited, but also when he refers to 
the grievances of the allies as summed up in the single word πλεονεκτεῖσθαι (1.77.4).  
 Thus, as analysis of the emissaries’ speech at Sparta shows, Thucydides indicates that 
already before the war certain Athenians were following Realist theory and that that theory was 
already worked out and elaborated to a great extent in its justification of aggression as the right 
of the stronger and its equation of self-interest as gain involving loss for one’s enemy. Just who 
623 Cf. 5.111.4. 
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these Athenians were, Thucydides does not say.624 It is interesting that, where this philosophy 
occurs most (here and in the Melian dialogue), the speakers are denoted broadly as “Athenians,” 
as if Thucydides were emphasizing ideas and schools of thought over individuals.625  
 
12.1.2 An Athens Divided 
 
  
The similarity then between the Athenians at Melos and the Athenians at Sparta suggests that 
from the beginning of the History the Athenians espoused a Realist political philosophy. But on 
this view a problem emerges when this depiction of the Athenian political philosophy is set 
beside the one expressed by Pericles in the funeral oration. As I have attempted to show, in this 
speech Pericles neither advocates the law of the stronger nor recommends the calculus of self-
interest and gain as standards to govern human interaction, but instead employs Protagorean 
theory in order to characterize Athens in nearly utopian terms. It is a place where a perfect 
consensus organically creates a culture of equality and freedom for city and individual alike. 
This egalitarian theory is the diametrical opposite of Realist philosophy. In the Athens of the 
funeral speech the danger of self-interest is moot, since corporate interest is not something that 
can be determined by objective criteria, but is simply the greatest common denominator of 
individual interests (subsection 9.1.1). Nor does the law of the stronger have any validity, since 
the Athenian citizens are by nature equal in ability, one being only by convention more proficient 
than another (subsections 5.4.3, 9.2.2). This utopia of freedom and equality is the negation of a 
624 Raubitschek 1973: 33-34 contends that this embassy was the one including Anthemocritus and initiated by 
Pericles (see Plu. Per. 30.2-3) in order to explain to the Spartans the recently decreed embargo against Megara. 
However, Stadter 1989: 274-276 is surely right when he points out that the Anthemocritus embassy preceded, and is 
meant by Plutarch to account for, the Megarian decree. There is therefore no reason to link the two embassies.  
625 According to West’s description of the speeches in Thucydides (1973:7-15), besides these two passages, the brief 
reply to the Corinthian herald after Sybota (1.53.4) is the only other place where the direct speech of unidentified 
Athenians is given. 
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Realist ideology. Nor does gain (πλεονεκτεῖν) ever come in for mention, but on the contrary is 
expressly disavowed. At 2.40.5 Pericles declares that:  
καὶ μόνοι οὐ τοῦ ξυμφέροντος μᾶλλον λογισμῷ ἢ τῆς ἐλευθερίας τῷ πιστῷ ἀδεῶς τινὰ 
ὠφελοῦμεν.  
 
The altruism of the passage comes through more in the word ὠφελοῦμεν than in the phrase οὐ 
τοῦ ξυμφέροντος (although it is there, too). Not only do the Athenians not help others for the 
purpose of serving their own interests, but, the idea of helping is expressed with ὠφελέω, a word 
that recalls the principle of self-interest and gain in the emissaries’ speech at Sparta,626 and 
recalling, rejects. Thus, according to Pericles, the “help” they render has a very selfless 
connotation: They actually serve the self-interests of others! The emissaries cite ὠφελία (along 
with τιμή and δέος) as a reason for the empire; Pericles now asserts Athens is committed to the 
cause of ὠφελία to others. This sample passage is a perfect example of the Realism of the 
emissaries’ speech and the commitment to freedom and equality in the funeral oration.  
 The result is an Athens divided. Thucydides appears to be pointing out that one and the 
same city at one and the same time espouses two diametrically opposite political philosophies. 
This situation presents quite a dilemma in a history, since an historian treats a state-actor’s 
political philosophy in order to discover the ethical, intellectual, social and cultural motivations 
that drive it. If, however, a state-actor’s political assumptions are so intellectually divided and 
inconsistent, insight into historical causation in that instance must remain blocked.  
 
 
12.2 THE PLAGUE NARRATIVE 
 
 
Unless there’s a point to the contradiction. And in this instance there is a suggestion that 
Thucydides has a point. Immediately after the funeral speech there follows the description of the 
626 The emissary uses a form of the word at least seven times: 1.73.2 (twice), 74.1, 74.3, 75.3, 76.1, 76.2.  
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plague that struck Athens in the archon year of 430/29 BC, and there are several indications that 
the plague narrative is meant to provide commentary on the funeral oration. The first is the fact 
that when at the end of the funeral speech Thucydides notes the closing of the year he 
uncharacteristically omits his “signature,” that phrase indicating that Thucydides is the author of 
what is being read. This suggests the two parts, oration and plague, are to be read together.627  
Another is the fact that Thucydides clearly considers the plague to be one of the most 
momentous occurrences during the war. At 1.23 he gives the reason why the Peloponnesian War 
deserves more attention than the Persian Wars. Briefly stated, it brought more sufferings. He 
then enumerates those sufferings, beginning with the number of cities desolated, then proceeds 
by crescendo through exiles and murders, earthquakes and solar eclipses, droughts and famines, 
until he reaches the climax with the plague, ἡ οὐχ ἥκιστα βλάψασα καὶ μέρος τι φθείρασα ἡ 
λοιμώδης νόσος (1.23.3).628 Again, when he introduces the plague in Bk 2, he makes the 
astonishing claim that no greater plague was on record as happening in human history.629 In light 
of the weight Thucydides evidently gives the plague, it is reasonable to expect it to comment on 
more than just factual points.630  
Another suggestion that the plague narrative cooperates with the funeral speech is the fact 
that, placed side by side as they are, they create two unsettling juxtapositions. The first pertains 
to the funerary theme. One of the saddest pictures the plague narrative presents is the Athenians’ 
abandonment of customary funeral practices and their disposing of the bodies of their relatives 
by furtively appropriating another’s pyre or openly throwing a body onto one already in use 
627 Cf. Canfora 2006: 29-30. For a connection of the emissaries’ speech with the funeral oration, see Crane 1998: 
271-272, who points out that the emissaries’ speech gives at 1.73.2 to 74.4 the synopsis of Athenian history that 
funeral orations typically give. 
628 Parry 1969: 116: “…the nine words that intervene between the first article ἡ and its noun probably set a 
syntactical record.”  
629 See Parry 1969: 114 for an exemplary discussion of the poetic effect of this passage. 
630 Cf. Woodman 1988: 29-30, 36-37. 
310 
 
                                                 
(2.52.4). On that same note, Thucydides also tells how the Athenians simply grew tired of giving 
their family members their due lamentation (αἱ ὀλοφύρσεις) (2.51.5). This lugubrious situation 
stands in stark contrast, not only to the occasion of the funeral speech, where city heroes are 
ceremoniously inhumed (2.34), but also to the final words of Pericles, who bids the audience to 
depart after lamenting in full each his relative (ἀπολοφυρόμενοι) (2.46.2).631 Such a contrast 
invites comparison.632  
The second juxtaposition is that which results from Pericles’ deployment of Protagorean 
rhetorical teachings in the speech itself. Those teachings aimed at rendering a “sick” dissident 
“healthy” by integrating him into the outlook of his political environment (see subsections 10.1.2 
and 10.1.3). In deploying this health-giving rhetoric in the funeral speech, Pericles in effect 
attempts to render Athens healthy on the eve of what Thucydides stresses to be the single 
greatest epidemic in human history. Rhetorical health and actual disease are juxtaposed. This 
provocative structure suggests that a single theme unites the speech and the plague narrative and, 
moreover, implies that that theme will address issues as fundamental as thought and reality, and 
seeming and being.  
 
12.2.1 Previous Interpretations 
 
 
Following the lead of similar juxtapositions, several scholars have suggested that the plague 
narrative subverts in one way or another the funeral speech. Hans-Peter Stahl sees it as a “test 
case” for Pericles’ rationalistic view that he has armed himself against all possible contingencies. 
In the funeral oration, Stahl begins, Pericles represents the Athenians as driven by reason. The 
plague, however, brings on sufferings that put pressure on human nature (ἀνθρωπεία φύσις) to 
631 The fact that this tag in funeral orations was formulaic (see Ziolkowski 1981: 165-166) would mean an even 
easier recall for the reader.  
632 Cf. Allison 1983: 14; Connor 1984: 63-64. 
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the point that the Athenians substitute moral subjectivity for piety and illogicality for rationality. 
Though Pericles was aware that such a change was possible, it still has one unpredictable result: 
The Athenians adopt extremely egoistic behavior which cannot be restrained by Pericles and 
which proceeds to become a crucial factor in the eventual defeat of Athens. Thus, Stahl argues, 
Pericles’ confidence in rational prognostication of future eventualities proves mistaken.633  
Edith Foster argues “the plague narrative refuses both Pericles’ claims about Athens and 
the language and attitude with which he makes those claims.”634 Specifically, she sees in 
Pericles’ reference to σῶμα αὔταρκες in the funeral oration a claim of Athens to immunity 
against material deterioration. When, however, Thucydides reports in similar language that 
during the plague no body proved self-sufficient against it, she considers that claim to be 
undermined.635 
Others have regarded it not so much as a subversion of ideas expressed in the funeral 
speech, but as a challenge. Adam Parry, after arguing that the plague narrative is cast in poetic 
language against what he calls the optimistic school which prefers to see the plague narrative as a 
specimen of scientific writing meant to help future generations, concludes that Thucydides 
depicts the plague as an attack on “the plans and constructions of men” expressed in the funeral 
speech, “the strongest assertion of the power of the mind to control the world,” an attack whose 
success Thucydides leaves undecided.636 Similarly, A. J. Woodman argues that the plague 
narrative is a piece of rhetorical exaggeration intended to “overturn” noble claims Pericles 
expresses in the funeral speech, not in order to expose any problem with Pericles’ claims, whom 
633 2003: 76-80. 
634 2010: 206. Similarly, Macleod 1983: 151-152. 
635 Ibid. 205. 
636 1969: 116. 
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he regards as vindicated in the end, but solely for dramatic effect.637 “The historian has presented 
his readers with a dramatic reversal (περιπέτεια), like that of a tragedy.”638 
 
12.2.2 An Alternative Interpretation 
 
 
Despite the differences in their arguments, all four of the interpretations above regard the plague 
narrative as somehow cooperating with the funeral speech as either an authorial subversion or a 
serious challenge to claims made in the speech. In a similar way I will also argue that the plague 
narrative addresses issues from the funeral speech, but not as a subversion or a challenge, but as 
a disabusal. Specifically, I will attempt show that it depicts the point in time when the Athenians, 
under the pressure of war, experienced disaffection with a Protagorean-inspired political 
ideology and espoused in its place the Realism already advocated by certain Athenians. I will 
suggest moreover that Thucydides assigns a large part of the responsibility for this change to that 
same Protagorean-inspired ideology. Protagorean ideas gave the Athenians a distorted view of 
reality and human nature, and when that view had to be abandoned because terrible suffering 
forcefully disabused the Athenians of their distorted opinions, the ignorance of reality that these 
ideas bred in them caused them to overcompensate in the direction of a rigorous Realism. This 
experience entails a good degree of irony: The Athenians proved intellectually unprepared 
precisely because they adhered to a doctrine of complete intellectual self-sufficiency.  
 
 
12.3 THE DISABUSAL OF A DISTORTED VIEW 
 
 
The way in which the plague narrative depicts the Athenians’ loss of confidence in Protagorean 
assumptions becomes clear when one sets the general import which the funeral speech expresses 
637 1988: 32-40. 
638 Ibid. 35.  
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regarding human nature and society against key passages in the plague narrative. Such a 
comparison reveals an interplay between narrative and speech that dramatizes how the Athenians 
were compelled by the undeniable force of reality to abandon their (noble?) ideals and acquiesce 
in a realistic, and Realist, worldview because those ideals were founded upon a flimsy denial of 
reality. 
 
12.3.1 Self-determinism 
 
 
As discussed in chapters eight and nine, the funeral speech develops themes the cumulative 
effect of which is the democratic manifesto that the individual is a complete, self-contained 
physical, intellectual and ethical unit, the measure of all that is and all that is not. This idea is 
first reflected in what is in effect the leitmotif of the speech: Self-sufficiency (or autarky).639 
Pericles undertakes in the proem to show the many ways in which Athens is most self-sufficient 
(αὐταρκεστάτη) in both war and peace (2.36.3-4). He then proceeds to describe Athenian 
leadership, society, law, and decision-making in order to demonstrate how Athenian political 
culture respects and even encourages individual self-sufficiency (subsection 8.2.2).  
 As far as leadership is concerned, the Athenian citizen can be said to rule himself 
corporately. In order to make this point, Pericles represents the system by which citizens are 
placed in office to be based on the approbation of one’s peers (subsection 9.2.1). The social life, 
moreover, is characterized by a genuine sense of friendship. They enjoy a real same-mindedness 
that arises organically from the citizen body and is not deliberately maintained by law 
(subsection 9.3.1). Similarly, the secret to the Athenians’ law-abidingness is because the laws, 
denoted in the polar expression of δίκη (ἀδικουμένων) and αἰσχύνη, are the products of the 
639 Similarly Foster 2010: 202-204, who however concentrates on Athens’ material self-sufficiency to the exclusion 
of its intellectual and cultural aspects. 
314 
 
                                                 
individual opinions combined in consensus, not the decrees of monarchs or oligarchs (subsection 
9.3.2). Pericles’ description of decision-making tends towards the same point. It is crucial that all 
citizens take part in the decision-making process; otherwise, the decisions reached will be 
fundamentally flawed and in effect cannot be called by definition “decisions” (subsection 9.4.2).  
In short, the idea of self-sufficiency runs through all of these categories covered by 
Pericles as the single most important condition that all the political and social institutions of 
Athens meet. It is the credo about the individual that has determined the shape of Athenian 
government. What is more, there is a symbiosis. Just as the idea of self-sufficiency has 
conditioned Athenian institutions, so these same institutions in turn encourage self-sufficiency in 
the citizens. This is an important idea, if not the most important. Athens has reconciled the 
demands of the self-sufficient individual with the exigencies of community life (cf. subsection 
9.4.2). If the individual is self-sufficient, how can he live in a community without compromising 
some portion of that self-sufficiency? The genius of Athens, Pericles implies, is that it has found 
an answer to that question. The institutions and way of life he describes show that Athens has 
discovered how the individual can be incorporated into community without compromising his 
own reading of reality.640 Those institutions and way of life are, in a word, democracy. 
Democracy enables the human individual’s natural self-sufficiency (subsection 8.2.2).  
These weighty ideas account for the climax that self-sufficiency as the leitmotif finally 
reaches when Pericles declares Athens to be the model of civilization for Greece and the 
individual Athenian to be an entity sufficient in himself for almost any challenge reality can 
present (2.41.1).641 These words have universal and specific implications. On the one hand, they 
extol Athens as a high watermark in human history (subsection 8.2.2). On the other, they affirm, 
640 Cf. Connor’s remarks on the pubic/private theme (1984: 68-69). 
641 “In the Funeral Oration the sense [of σῶμα αὔταρκες] is extended almost to “self-realization, self-fulfillment” 
(Connor 1984: 67n39). Cf. Loraux 1986: 153-154.  
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and rhetorically invite the Athenians to believe, that they are σώματα αὐτάρκη: Autonomous, 
self-fulfilling individuals who can corporately (thanks to Athens) determine their physical, 
ethical and intellectual environment (subsections 8.2.2, 11.4.1 and 11.4.2). Nature made them 
measures of all things, Athens respects nature’s order. The funeral speech thus presents a 
theoretical formulation of the Athenian democracy that finds justification for that democracy in 
its respect and encouragement of a particularly radical version of individual self-determinism 
that privileges the individual’s perception of reality over any claims to an objective reality.  
It is this radical self-determinism that is directly challenged in the effects of the plague. 
Protagorean ideas that the Athenians have adopted about human ingenuity, about the relation of 
the human will to external reality, about reality itself, and about the status of human custom/law 
(νόμος) become discredited in the eyes of the suffering Athenians. In their distress they are 
compelled to abandon the fantasy their politicized relativism created and confront a cold, hard, 
and shared reality which, had their worldview been more realistic to begin with, would not have 
had the devastating effect it will prove to have. As it is, they confronted it when they were 
intellectually “sick,” and the health Pericles’ rhetoric had tried to impart only serves to set off in 
sad irony their actual sickness, in both its intellectual and physical forms. 
 
12.3.2 Loss of Confidence in Human Ingenuity 
 
 
The register of the language is noticeably high.642 The first effect of the plague that Thucydides 
singles out by placing it in his introduction to the plague narrative is the fact that the Athenians 
lost confidence in τέχνη:  
οὔτε γὰρ ἰατροὶ ἤρκουν τὸ πρῶτον θεραπεύοντες ἀγνοίᾳ, ἀλλ’ αὐτοὶ μάλιστα ἔθνῃσκον 
ὅσῳ καὶ μάλιστα προσῇσαν, οὔτε ἄλλη ἀνθρωπεία τέχνη οὐδεμία· ὄσα τε πρὸς ἱεροῖς 
642 E.g. Thucydides omits ἀπό- in the primary tenses of θνῄσκω here, and as a matter of fact almost consistently in 
the plague narrative, elsewhere in the History including it. Cf. Parry 1969:115. 
316 
 
                                                 
ἱκέτευσαν ἢ μαντείοις καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις ἐχρήσαντο, πάντα ἀνωφελῆ ἦν, τελευτῶντές τε 
αὐτῶν ἀπέστησαν ὑπὸ τοῦ κακοῦ νικώμενοι (2.47.4).  
 
The Athenians finally stop resisting and surrender themselves to the plague because, in addition 
to the silence of the gods, their best ingenuity, medical or otherwise, was insufficient against it. 
Here occurs the first allusion in the plague narrative to the Protagoreanism in the Athenian 
political culture. Protagoras had founded his notion of the self-sufficient human on the premise 
that the original humans were Promethean; that is, the individual had an innate intelligence that 
gave him a material self-sufficiency (αὐτάρκεια) in his original state. As he explains in the myth 
Plato composed for him, the δημιουργικὴ τέχνη that Prometheus took from Hephaestus and 
Athena and gave to humankind enabled them to meet virtually all their needs; the one need their 
τέχνη could not meet, security against the beasts, was not important enough for them to 
compromise their autarky by living in artificially united cities (section 4.1, subsection 8.2.1). 
Thus their ingenuity, their τέχνη, was the essential component to the self-sufficiency that 
Protagoras regards as the defining feature of humanity. Moreover, it is this same self-sufficiency 
that serves as the basis of Pericles’ praise and description of Athens in the funeral speech. Here, 
however, Thucydides signifies that this basic tenet of Protagorean philosophy and Periclean 
rhetoric was refuted when he raises the discussion to abstract terms by speaking, not of Athenian 
ingenuity, but human (ἀνθρωπεία) ingenuity, and observes that that ingenuity was insufficient 
(ἀρκέω). Thus the Athenians experience the first challenge to their ideology. The gift of 
Hephaestus and Athena643 might not offer as much control over their world as they previous 
thought.  
 
 
 
 
643 For the significance of these two gods to Athenian identity, see subsection 3.3.1. 
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12.3.3 Loss of Perception 
 
 
In this same passage Thucydides refers to the disease in a military metaphor when he describes 
the Athenians as “suffering defeat at the hands of the evil” (ὑπὸ τοῦ κακοῦ νικώμενοι).644 This 
metaphor runs throughout the narrative, being repeated at 2.51.5 with a modification (ὑπὸ τοῦ 
πολλοῦ κακοῦ νικώμενοι) and intensified at 2.52.3 in the genitive absolute ὑπερβιαζομένου τοῦ 
κακοῦ.645 This metaphor is not only a pathetic reminder for the reader that an actual war is 
currently being waged, but also indicates the extreme force and pressure the Athenians are under 
– a pressure compounded by the war outside. This pressure eventually causes severe 
psychological trauma. As he observes at the end, and so climax, of his description of symptoms,  
Τοὺς δὲ καὶ λήθη ἐλάμβανε παραυτίκα ἀναστάντας τῶν πάντων ὁμοίως, καὶ ἠγνόησαν 
σφᾶς τε αὐτοὺς καὶ τοὺς ἐπιτηδείους. γενόμενον γὰρ κρεῖσσον λόγου τὸ εἶδος τῆς 
νόσου τά τε ἄλλα χαλεπωτέρως ἢ κατὰ τὴν ἀνθρωπείαν φύσιν προσέπιπτεν 
ἑκάστῳ...(2.49.8 – 50.1).  
 
Certain Athenians upon recuperating actually experienced amnesia involving ignorance of both 
themselves and their close friends. The reason (γάρ) is that the form of the disease attacked 
(προσέπιπτεν)646 each person with distress greater than his capacity as a human could handle to 
the point of depriving him of the ability to meet that basic tenet of traditional Greek wisdom: 
γνῶθι σαυτόν. Here Thucydides treats what he considers to be the most significant symptom. 
Something in the physical world deprived Athenians, qua humans (ἡ ἀνθρωπεία φύσις), of their 
capacity for basic knowledge and recognition. Their trauma reverses Protagoras’ doctrine that 
the physical world was contingent upon the perception of the individual. Protagoras had said that 
if the wind is cold for one and warm for another, it is indeed cold for the former and warm for 
644 For other military terms, see Parry 1969: 116. 
645 Parry 1969: 115: “The verb ὑπερβιάζεσθαι…is in effect a ἅπαξ λεγόμενον: it does not appear again in Greek until 
Josephus uses the identical phrase…and then in the Thucydidean imitator Procopius.” 
646 More military language (LSJ I.2).  
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the latter (Tht. 152a-b8). Thucydides now describes an effect of the plague that cripples their 
perceptions. They perceive, but the perception means nothing because there is no recognition. 
The Athenians thus experience firsthand the primacy of the object perceived over the perceiver. 
They see, Thucydides implies, that physical, historical occurrences are the things by which the 
world, and man, is measured.   
 The language of the passage lends supports to this reading. As discussed in chapter ten, 
Protagoras’ claim to “make the weaker logos the stronger” (τὸν ἥττω λόγον κρείττω ποιεῖν) 
represented a technique he developed as a means of negotiating between discrepant assessments 
of reality by securing genuine agreement, for instance, from the individual who thought the wind 
was warm that it was in fact cold (section 10.2). Here Thucydides observes that the form (εἶδος) 
of the disease proved (γενόμενον) stronger (κρεῖσσον) “than an explanation” (λόγου).647 While 
denoting the “character” of the disease, εἶδος also connotes its “appearance” and thus enables the 
word to operate on a perceptual plane, which makes it odd company with its modifier γενόμενον 
(lit. “having become”). Appearance thus turns out actually to be. And it turns out to be stronger 
than any assessment one can make of it, either in word or in thought. The vehemence of the 
disease consisted in the fact that neither could the Athenians nor can anybody else form an 
assessment of the disease that will express its actual character. Far from being able to form a 
Protagorean κρείττων λόγος, Thucydides uses acrid paronomasia to claim the disease was too 
strong for the Athenians to form any λόγος whatsoever. Reality is not contingent upon 
perception; rather, it sometimes defies it. Thus the language suggests the Athenians experienced 
another challenge to the self-deterministic worldview Protagorean ideas encouraged. Nor does 
their experience reflect well on Pericles who had declared the Athenians to be self-sufficient for 
a great many “forms” (ἐπὶ πλεῖστ’ ἂν εἴδη) (2.41.1). This εἶδος must be an exception. 
647 So Rusten 1989: ad loc translates. 
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12.3.4 The Individual’s Perception 
 
  
Thucydides goes on in this same passage to say:  
…καὶ ἐν τῷδε ἐδήλωσε μάλιστα ἄλλο τι ὂν ἢ τῶν ξυντρόφων τι· τὰ γὰρ ὄρνεα καὶ 
τετράποδα ὅσα ἀνθρώπων ἅπτεται, πολλῶν ἀτάφων γιγνομένων ἢ οὐ προσῄει ἢ 
γευσάμενα διεφθείρετο (2.50.1).  
 
He here makes the claim that the disease was not an instance of τῶν ξυντρόφων. The word 
choice is interesting. It is usually interpreted as roughly “ordinary.”648 But that scarcely does the 
word justice, as it clearly signifies an experience that was “raised and reared closely” with one 
because of either natural or circumstantial conditions.649 Thucydides denies then that the disease 
was anything “in close connection” with the human constitution, rather than anything of ordinary 
occurrence.650 That is why the point that the animals were susceptible to it is so significant. It 
was not one of those things that just belonged to humans.  
This point is usually taken as a medical description.651 However, it is just as possible to 
take ξύντροφος as referring to the human constitution in general, not strictly biological, terms. In 
this case Thucydides will be saying that the disease was not a thing closely connected with 
humans, but more universal. It is strange that Thucydides even bothers refuting the idea that the 
epidemic could have been peculiar to humans, as Greek tradition, at least Greek literary tradition, 
assumes epidemics typically cross species.652 On the other hand, the idea of a disease “in close 
connection” with one (ξύντροφος) is quite similar to the Protagorean tenet that the perception 
one forms of a thing (φάντασμα) is the product of his disposition (ἕξις) (cf. subsection 6.1.2). As 
Protagoras interprets the education process in the Theaetetus:  
648 Blanco 1998: 77. LSJ (I.3) suggests “everyday evils.”  
649 LSJ I.1-3.  
650 Cf. Thomas 2006: 102-103.  
651 E.g. most recently Thomas 2006: 102-103. 
652 E.g. Hom. Il. 1.43-52; S. OT 22-27. 
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“But, I think, a good disposition makes one, who in a disposition of a bad mind forms 
opinions consonant with itself, to form other such opinions [as itself], which perceptions 
some people due to inexperience call true, but I [consider] the one group to be better than 
the other, but in no way truer” (166b1-4, author’s translation).  
 
Just as one’s disposition determines what his opinions and perceptions will be, so ξύντροφος can 
involve the idea that some diseases, or experiences in general, are determined by the person’s 
state, and so inhere as a “life-mate” in his constitution – an idea Thucydides here reports the 
Athenians learned was false.  
In the passage that follows there is some suggestion that ξύντροφος indeed carries this 
notion. Here Thucydides attempts to support this claim about the disease’s indifference to 
species through an appeal to the facts: The birds and animals either stayed away or died after 
eating diseased flesh. However, these facts are expressed in language that markedly stresses 
perception. First of all, he has already claimed that the disease was seen to be (ἐδήλωσε) 
something not solely human. Not only does this word place the discussion on the plane of vision 
and seeing, but, by the way, its placement in the past tense identifies the Athenians as the ones 
who received the instruction, the illumination, just as δηλοῖ would have referred to readers in the 
present. That is, the Athenians at some point thought the disease was a ξύντροφόν τι. Next, 
making good his claim about the birds and animals, Thucydides says:    
Τεκμήριον δέ· τῶν μὲν τοιούτων ὀρνίθων ἐπίλειψις σαφὴς ἐγένετο, καὶ οὐχ ἑωρῶντο 
οὔτε ἄλλως οὔτε περὶ τοιοῦτον οὐδέν· οἱ δὲ κύνες μᾶλλον αἴσθησιν παρεῖχον τοῦ 
ἀποβαίνοντος διὰ τὸ ξυνδιαιτᾶσθαι (2.50.2).  
 
He offers a visible indication (τεκμήριον).653 He notes the absence of carnivorous birds as 
“clear,” which adjective draws attention to itself through the oxymoron it creates when coupled 
with ἐπίλειψις. He then clarifies that such birds were not seen (ἑωρῶντο) around a diseased 
corpse. Next, he turns to the dogs and notes that they even more so offered perception (αἴσθησιν) 
653 For this perceptual connotation of τεκμήριον (close to its etymon τέκμαρ), in contrast to its use as a mark of 
certainty by mental inference later in Aristotelian rhetorical handbooks, see Hornblower 1987: 102.  
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of the occurrence (ἀποβαῖνον). And the reason they do so is because of their cohabitation with 
humans. This cohabitation, expressed through ξυνδιαιτᾶσθαι, recalls ξύντροφος and ironically 
draws attention to the stark clarity of the evidence as a refutation of the disease as ξύντροφος. 
The fact that the dogs cohabited with the humans revealed to the Athenians the fact that the 
disease did not.  
The irony and the oxymoron suggest that this passage is more than a medical description. 
The almost redundant emphasis on perception as a reliable means of knowledge which the 
Athenians could not deny not only suggests that they have been disabused of a false notion, but 
that that false notion relied on an equally false assumption of how humans perceive. Otherwise, 
the redundant emphasis would just be overkill. Thucydides is thus dramatizing how the 
Athenians were led by what they perceived to the incontrovertible conclusion that this disease 
was not a thing contingent upon the individual’s perception, but a real occurrence (ἀποβαῖνον). 
 
12.3.5 The Loss of Autarky 
 
  
This same idea that the disease was a shared experience proceeding from a shared Reality 
appears soon again, this time with consequences on Pericles’ funeral speech. When discussing 
the efficacy of treatments, Thucydides reports:  
ἕν τε οὐδὲ ἓν κατέστη ἴαμα ὡς εἰπεῖν ὅτι χρῆν προσφέροντας ὠφελεῖν· τὸ γάρ τῳ 
ξυνενεγκὸν ἄλλον τοῦτο ἔβλαπτεν. σῶμά τε αὔταρκες ὂν οὐδὲν διεφάνη πρὸς αὐτὸ 
ἰσχύος πέρι ἢ ἀσθενείας, ἀλλὰ πάντα ξυνῄρει καὶ τὰ πάσῃ διαίτῃ θεραπευόμενα (51.2-3).   
 
“For the very thing that benefited one caused harm to another.” Not only does this statement 
suggest relativism was somehow at work in the benefit of the medicines applied, but it also 
specifically recalls the tour de force Protagoras achieves in the Protagoras that wins him the 
applause of the other sophists. Socrates, trying to elicit a definition of the good from Protagoras, 
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asks him if he considers the good and the beneficial to be synonymous. Protagoras denies it on 
the grounds that what is beneficial is simply too varied. Some things, he explains, are beneficial 
for men, but not for horses. What is good for oxen is bad for dogs. And even within the same 
creature olive oil is beneficial for human hair and skin, but doctors severely restrict its use by 
those who are sick (333d8-334c6) (cf. subsection 2.3.1). Thus, the variation of the beneficial 
disqualifies it as a candidate for a universal good and likewise suggests the physical properties of 
things are relative to the user (cf. subsection 6.3.1). Accordingly, when Thucydides reports this 
experience the Athenians had (that the very thing that benefited one caused harm to another), he 
has expressed an idea endowed with Protagorean associations.  
 Therefore, Thucydides apparently implies that Protagorean relativism was consonant with 
the pathology of the disease; but only apparently. For, he immediately records a fact which 
refutes any relativistic behavior in the disease, but rather groups them all together as victims 
alike, when he states that “it became transparently clear that no body was sufficient in itself 
against it for strength or weakness.”  The polar expression “for strength or weakness” (ἰσχύος 
πέρι ἢ ἀσθενείας), indicating that the entire spectrum of physical conditions reacted in the same 
way to the disease, is the core of the refutation. If, as Protagoras taught, one’s pre-existing state, 
or ἕξις, determines what one perceives a thing to be – and that determines in turn whether or not 
a thing is beneficial or harmful to a person – yet, Thucydides points out, all pre-existing 
conditions succumbed to the disease, then on the deepest level the disease represented for the 
Athenians an inexorable, overwhelmingly univalent reality, the same alike to all. This last point 
Thucydides pointedly implies in the phrase ἀλλὰ πάντα ξυνῄρει the force of which is well 
brought out in a scholiast’s gloss: συναγαγὸν ἠφάνιζε.654 The disease brought all bodies together 
654 Hude 1927: ad loc.  
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in death. In this way Thucydides brings up an apparent relativism only to discount it in such a 
way as to recreate the Athenians’ own disabusal. 
Aspects of the language of the passage contribute to this meaning. When Thucydides 
remarks that “it became transparently clear that no body was sufficient in itself” the word is 
διεφάνη. Like the passage on the proof the birds and dogs gave, again the certainty of knowledge 
is vouched for by an appeal to one of the five senses, adding an element of irony to the 
Athenians’ loss of confidence in the reliability of their individual perceptions. More notably, that 
body that is not sufficient in itself is expressed as σῶμα αὔταρκες. This is the second direct 
challenge the plague narrative makes of Pericles’ language, both in reference to the same claim 
he makes. The first had been a challenge through the phrase τὸ εἶδος τῆς νόσου of Pericles’ 
claim that the Athenian was sufficient in himself for a great many “forms” (εἴδη) of action (see 
subsection 12.3.3). Now the powerlessness of the body of every single Athenian challenges the 
very idea of Pericles’ autarky (or sufficiency in oneself). By this phrase Pericles had summarized 
the ideal of self-determinism that was realized in the Athenian state and in the Athenian 
individual, a self-determinism imported from Protagorean thought (subsection 12.3.1). Now, it 
becomes transparently clear (διεφάνη) to the Athenians that that claim was wrong. They are not 
sufficient in themselves, nor does their city render them so. There are occurrences, such as the 
plague, that demonstrably prove the powerlessness of the human animal to exert any influence 
on his world. Thus their faith in the very notion of a self-sufficient, self-determined human has 
been shaken because it depends on a theory of perception which their sufferings during the 
plague once again contradict. When therefore Thucydides uses the phrase σῶμα αὔταρκες, he 
pinpoints the moment when the Athenians abandoned a worldview based on Protagorean 
assumptions and Periclean claims.  
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 I have argued above that Pericles’ construal of self-sufficiency is criticized by Herodotus 
in a polemical passage directed against both Pericles and Protagoras in which the Athenian 
lawgiver Solon tries to impress upon the Lydian king Croesus how dangerous the quest for 
autarky (self-sufficiency) is (subsection 8.3.2). This would mean that now during the plague the 
Athenians realize the truth of Solon’s words to Croesus, a realization that Thucydides may in fact 
allude to with the rare phrase ἓν...οὐδὲ ἕν as though to echo Solon’s words: ἀνθρώπου σῶμα ἓν 
οὐδὲν αὔταρκές ἐστι (1.32.8).655 And, like Croesus, they realize too late; and there are 
consequences for late learning.  
 
12.3.6 Νόμοι Abandoned 
 
 
Once the Athenians lose confidence in autarky, their condition quickly begins to deteriorate. 
Thucydides describes how despair (ἀθυμία) at the first signs of symptoms took away their will to 
resist and how helping each other only caused the disease to spread more. Their loss of autarky, 
their utter powerlessness against the disease, has affected them on a deep psychological level. 
Their loss, one might say, has settled in their psyches. Thucydides stresses their sense of 
powerlessness by likening their plight to a military defeat (ὑπὸ τοῦ πολλοῦ κακοῦ νικώμενοι)656 
(2.51.5) or comparing them to victims of assault (ὑπερβιαζομένου γὰρ τοῦ κακοῦ) (2.52.3). They 
are a people victimized by reality and suffering disillusionment. The major consequence of this 
great disillusionment is an increase in lawlessness (ἀνομία). This ἀνομία first occurs in burial 
norms. Relatives stop performing lamentations for their dead (2.51.5). They begin to dispose of 
the bodies of their friends and family in very untraditional ways, some even taking to stealing the 
pyres meant for others (2.52.4). Again, it is dire necessity and sheer want (σπάνει τῶν 
655 Cf. Hornblower 1991: 324 for the rareness of the phrase. 
656 First used at 2.47.4 without πολλοῦ. Its addition here has a heightening affect (see above, subsection 12.3.3). 
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ἐπιτηδείων) that determined their actions, actions which reverse Pericles’ description of them in 
the funeral oration. He had said they showed great obedience to the “unwritten laws that carry 
acknowledged shame” (2.37.3); they now abandon it in favor of “shameless burial methods” 
(ἀναίσχυντοι θῆκαι) in the case of the most important of such unwritten laws.   
The lawlessness then expands into the realm of legal and moral right and wrong, and in 
so doing reverses both the order in which Pericles had discussed law in Athens, as well as the 
formula Protagoras used to denote human society, namely, by treating the topic of δίκη first, then 
αἰδώς (subsection 9.3.2). By contrast, Thucydides maps the growth of lawlessness from the 
unwritten customs of shame to the written ordinances of law, thereby giving a sense of the 
unraveling of the Protagorean formulation and Periclean praise. But besides a reversal of order, 
this passage also depicts the Athenians abandoning that hallmark of civilization in general and of 
Athens, as Pericles says, in particular: νόμοι. Pericles had praised them for their respect (δέος) of 
the laws (2.37.3). But now Thucydides says they ignore the laws because they do not see the gift 
of longevity from the gods for good behavior or expect to live long enough to be brought to trial 
(2.53.4). They thus become the opposite of Pericles’ Athenians, having no respect for law, order 
or justice. This reaction of theirs to their suffering is arresting. It is usually taken for granted that 
a people in the Athenians’ situation would react with such lawlessness. But can one assume that 
this is the typical human reaction? At any rate, it does not appear that Thucydides assumed it to 
be. Instead, he inserts a subtle, but necessary, precondition to explain just why the Athenians 
reacted to the calamity so nihilistically; and that precondition involves Protagoras.  
Thucydides describes their abandonment of the legal and moral code in significant 
language:  
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καὶ τὸ μὲν προσταλαιπωρεῖν τῷ δόξαντι καλῷ οὐδεὶς πρόθυμος ἦν, ἄδηλον νομίζων εἰ 
πρὶν ἐπ’ αὐτὸ ἐλθεῖν διαφθαρήσεται· ὅτι δὲ ἤδη τε ἡδὺ πανταχόθεν τε ἐς αὐτὸ κερδαλέον, 
τοῦτο καὶ καλὸν καὶ χρήσιμον κατέστη (2.53.3).   
 
οὐδείς, although an exaggeration,657 still indicates that Thucydides means this change was 
cultural, city-wide. προσταλαιπωρεῖν brings to mind the incredible physical and psychological 
distress the plague has caused the Athenians. κατέστη, recalling the crucial and climactic passage 
discussed above (subsection 12.3.5), where Thucydides reports that no one cure established itself 
(κατέστη), implies that an ethical transvaluation is their remedy (ἴαμα) and coping mechanism. 
That transvaluation involves a transition to a new morality, the pleasant (ἡδύ) and whatever is 
expedient to that end (κερδαλέον), from a pre-plague morality, whose defining characteristics are 
denoted by καλὸν καὶ χρήσιμον.  
Just what the old morality was, or how it is to be understood, is not clear. The second 
part, χρήσιμον, is surprising, and contrary to expectation, as one might have expected ἀγαθόν, in 
order to have the traditional ideal of καλοκἀγαθία expressed. Rendering it “expedient”658 does 
not produce much of a difference between it and κερδαλέον, unless one stresses that the latter is 
what is advantageous for immediate gratification of base desires while the former is what is 
expedient to honorable things. But if it has that sense of enlightened self-interest, then it jars with 
its use elsewhere in Thucydides, especially the Melian dialogue, where it is the alternative to 
moral, just behavior,659 and so very odd company with καλόν.  
 It is likelier then that it is a simple substitute for ἀγαθόν and like it means generally good, 
decent behavior, as indeed it often does, especially in a political context.660 This being the case, a 
link is established between this passage and Protagorean terminology which, I have argued, took 
657 Gomme 1965: ad loc.  
658 So Hornblower 1991: ad loc.  
659 5.90, 5.91.2, 5.92, 5.98. Also, Diodotus uses it to capture the crux of the Mitylenian dilemma (3.44.4). 
660 LSJ s.v. I.2. 
327 
 
                                                 
advantage of the idea of use inherent in such words as χρήματα and χρηστός to argue for the 
legitimacy of tradition (subsections 6.2.2., 6.3.3).  
 Considered in this light, χρήσιμον becomes perfect company for καλόν since this 
adjective too establishes another link with Protagorean thought. καλόν’s first occurrence in this 
passage is in the clause καὶ τὸ μὲν προσταλαιπωρεῖν τῷ δόξαντι καλῷ οὐδεὶς πρόθυμος ἦν. What 
Thucydides means to imply through the participle δόξαντι has not been clearly understood.661 
But Rusten is surely right to translate “for whatever seemed right”662 and Blanco’s quotation 
marks are fully justified: “no one was willing to persevere in received ideas about ‘the good.’”663 
In other words, Thucydides signifies that the pre-plague morality of the Athenians was that the 
honorable is whatever it seems to one to be – the Protagorean claim in nuce.664 The Athenians 
here abandon an ideology based on relativist ideas, and do so because of the reality of their 
suffering. For, Thucydides says, to abide by it required hardship (προσταλαιπωρεῖν). Here in the 
juxtaposition of προσταλαιπωρεῖν and δόξαντι the basic dilemma of the Athenians is summed 
up. On the one hand, in this crisis now more than ever they need to abide by the norms and laws 
of the polis. But, on the other, the hardship is of a severe sort (προσταλαιπωρεῖν), and the norms 
and laws are nothing transcendental, but merely the product of the individual’s perception 
(δόξαντι). The reality of the plague thus vividly exposes to them the emptiness of their ideology 
and the confrontation of the two ideas explains why they reacted so nihilistically. The 
formulation of morality that relativism offered them proved to contain no incentive when one’s 
situation became desperate. 
 
661 Gomme 1965: ad loc tentatively offers “what had been thought honorable”?  
662 1989: ad loc.   
663 1998:78. 
664 Cf. Stahl 2003: 79: “The ἄγραφοι νόμοι…to which Pericles referred as the pride of Athens…are no longer 
honored on the grounds of amounting to ‘τῷ δόξαντι καλῷ’ (‘what seemed to be noble’).” 
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12.3.7 Realism Adopted 
 
When the Athenians reach this point of moral transvaluation, they drop the pre-plague morality 
and espouse a new one which is in effect the Realism that Thucydides has already introduced in 
the History through the speech of the Athenian emissaries at Sparta. Just as the emissaries had 
articulated a doctrine of self-interest (ὠφελία, ξυμφέροντα) that justified international 
aggrandizement (πλεονεκτεῖν), so now the Athenians respond to the horrors of the plague by 
adopting the calculus of immediate desire (ἤδη ἡδύ) and whatever is conducive to achieving that 
desire (κερδαλέον). This is no mere hedonism, as Thucydides makes clear when he clarifies that 
the wrongs the Athenians were committing constituted ἁμαρτήματα that were punishable by law 
(μέχρι τοῦ δίκην γενέσθαι) (2.53.4) and resulted in material gain for the perpetrators (2.53.1). 
Thus, what is “immediately pleasant” for the Athenians is unlawful acquisition. They do indulge 
themselves and act καθ’ ἡδονήν and πρὸς τὸ τερπνόν; but it is their wrongful gain that enables 
them to do so and that makes their behavior resemble the Realist principles articulated by the 
emissaries.  
As a matter of fact, the suffering Athenians do the emissaries one better. The emissaries 
had only implied that they would be within their rights, if they tossed aside the law (ἀποθέμενοι 
τὸν νόμον) (1.77.3), where the Athenians actually do so. Things have thus come full circle. The 
Realism that from the beginning characterized Athenian foreign policy has now infiltrated the 
city.665 This idea, that the plague represents a surge of lawlessness for the city, comes to the fore 
in Thucydides’ remark that the plague “was the first beginning of lawlessness in other respects as 
well [and] to a greater degree for the city,” where the oxymoronic combination of “first 
665 For a similar discontinuity between the city of Athens and its international behavior, cf. Strasburger 2009: 208, 
210 and (forming a complement to Strasburger) Stahl 2003: 50. However, they regard the discontinuity as one of 
perspective, while I suggest that it is meant to be considered real.   
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beginning” (πρῶτόν τε ἦρξε) with “to a greater degree” (ἐπὶ πλέον ἀνομίας) draws attention to 
“for the city” (τῇ πόλει). Like the plague, Realism came from outside (2.48.1).666  
In sum, Thucydides depicts the complete adoption of a Realist philosophy in Athens as 
the result of the discredit of Protagorean assumptions that the sufferings in the plague produced. 
Those assumptions did not give rise to any Realist theory; but they did, Thucydides suggests, 
create the right condition for the recommendation of Realism. And that right condition was, in 
short, the shock and disillusionment produced when an undeniable reality confronted the 
Athenians at a time when their acknowledgement of such a reality was collectively minimal. 
This of course is not to say that Thucydides suggests all the Athenians were students of 
Protagoras. But it does suggest that he had come to the conclusion that certain ideas, a certain 
habit of mind and a certain conceptualization of the democracy had developed in Athens 
(transmitted especially through speeches), that privileged perception over reality, belief over 
truth, seeming over being, and that the plague constituted a check to those ideas, in being a 
visible, physical sickness that exposed the hidden, intellectual sickness in Athens that until then 
had only been ὕπουλος.667  
 
 
 
12.4 IRONY AND TRAGEDY 
 
This reading of the plague narrative implies that Thucydides isolates the Athenians’ intellectual 
state as a crucial factor in the chain of causation of the war, specifically their want of an 
intellectual state adequate to encounter the war and all it would bring. This is confirmed when 
666 On the pre-existence of moral problems in Athens, there is a perceptive scholium to this passage: “διαβολὴν 
ἐμφαίνει τῶν Ἀθηναίων τὸ ἐπὶ πλέον κείμενον” (Hude 1927: 142). 
667 I borrow this word from Pl. Grg. 518e4, which likely expressed an idea current in the second half of the fifth 
century (cf. S. OT. 1396; Th. 8.64.5).  
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one examines what Thucydides says broadly on intellectual preparedness, or the lack thereof, in 
the plague narrative. And what he says presents that confirmation in such a way as to bring out 
its ironic and tragic undertones.  
 
12.4.1 Intellectual Unpreparedness 
 
This intellectual unpreparedness in the Athenians reveals itself at key points in the plague 
narrative. First, it is implicit in the reason why Thucydides states he will give a description of the 
plague in the first place. After uncharacteristically668 stating that he will leave the causes (αἰτίαι) 
to be discovered to others, he declares that he will only give a description, and for a puzzling 
purpose:   
ἐγὼ δὲ οἷόν τε ἐγίγνετο λέξω, καὶ ἀφ’ ὧν ἄν τις σκοπῶν, εἴ ποτε καὶ αὖθις ἐπιπέσοι, 
μάλιστ’ ἂν ἔχοι τι προειδὼς μὴ ἀγνοεῖν, ταῦτα δηλώσω...(2.48.3).  
 
Parry first pointed out that this sentence cannot be made to say that Thucydides will relay 
firsthand information so that those in the future can know how to treat it.669 Besides the wording 
itself, Thucydides, far from noting what did or did not help, pervades his description with an 
overwhelming sense that nothing helped at all. Instead, he merely offers knowledge (τι 
προειδώς)670 and freedom from ignorance (μὴ ἀγνοεῖν). But to know and not be ignorant of 
what? Again, the trend is to regard Thucydides as writing for medical purposes and to understand 
him to be offering knowledge of symptoms and recognition of the disease. But if knowledge of 
the symptoms is his aim, his account should stop when the actual symptoms stop (2.49.8); and if 
recognition of the disease is likewise an aim, then he merely sets the future reader up for that 
despair (ἀθυμία), either regarding himself or others, that Thucydides says was the chief effect of 
668 Cf. 1.23.4-6. 
669 Parry 1969: 109-110. Cf. Stahl 2003: 31n18.  
670 Not “knowledge in advance” (cf. Rusten 1989: ad loc & ad 51.6).  
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recognition in the Athenians’ case (2.51.4). It would seem then that the knowledge and 
recognition Thucydides wishes to enable is of a different, deeper kind.671 
 If so, then he implies that the Athenians are devoid of this knowledge and are incapable 
of this recognition, whatever it is; that they are, in short, intellectually unprepared. This 
impression is confirmed when one sees that in the plague narrative the Athenians are not always 
of sound mind. For instance, Thucydides records that some, upon recovering from sickness, fell 
victim to the “foolish expectation” (ἐλπίδος...κούφης) that they were immune from all diseases 
(2.51.6). Far from realizing the frailness of humanity, these individuals instead conceive a notion 
of their invincibility! Similarly, when Thucydides discusses the lawlessness that set in, he notes 
that the Athenians reacted to the disease by daring to do “what one before denied liking to do” (ἃ 
πρότερον ἀπεκρύπτετο μὴ καθ’ ἡδονὴν ποιεῖν) (2.53.1). This statement suggests a want of self-
knowledge. Pericles had asserted that Athenian society is open and tolerant, if anybody “does 
something indulgently” (καθ’ ἡδονήν τι δρᾶν) (2.37.2). This gives the impression that Athens, 
unlike Sparta, is not a place where impulses will be repressed. However, it now appears that 
Pericles’ claim was false, and that the Athenians have actually been concealing their fondness for 
doing certain things. Was Pericles lying? A look at what those certain things were suggests that 
he was not. As discussed above (subsection 12.3.6), those things resulted in the transvaluation of 
Athenian morality from a relative goodness (καλὸν καὶ χρήσιμον) to self-gratification through 
illegal acquisition of what belongs to another (ἡδὺ καὶ τὸ ἐς αὐτὸ κερδαλέον). In other words, 
before the plague struck, the Athenians were optimistic on human nature, just as much as 
Protagoras was (section 4.1, subsection 8.2.1). But now they have been disabused of that opinion 
and adopt a more realistic, Hobbesian, view which, it is important to note, they had previously 
671 Cf. Thomas 2006: 100-103 who regards Thucydides here to be using medical language and a polemical posture 
to create a tragic and pathetic effect.  
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denied. Pericles’ claim then in the funeral speech, compared with the obverse of that claim in the 
plague narrative, suggests that a key factor in determining their reaction to the plague was self-
knowledge, or the want thereof.  
 This intellectual unpreparedness not only supports this reading of the plague narrative as 
a depiction of the ways in which the Athenians were compelled to abandon relativist assumptions 
in the face of an undeniable reality and to espouse now fully a Realist philosophy which was 
already active in other areas of the Athenian state. It also stands in ironic contrast to the great 
material and military preparedness Pericles ascribes to Athens in more than one passage.672 The 
fully prepared city is now lacking one crucial resource: Sound thinking, or σωφροσύνη.673 But, 
even more than that, it directly upsets Pericles’ claim for Athens as a cultural, political and 
intellectual example for all of Greece. The city that was supposed to be the education of the 
Greeks turns out to have been itself bereft of sound thinking; its citizens who were supposed to 
be sufficient in themselves for almost any feat of mind or strength turn out to have held opinions 
completely out of touch with reality. Yet, it is this very disconnect with reality that recommends 
to them a political philosophy which plays so detrimental a role for them in the course of the 
war.674 It is tragic irony, all the more so in being found in a work of history. 
 
 
 
12.5 CONCLUSION 
 
 
Thucydides not only found Protagorean ideas in the funeral speech that Pericles delivered at the 
end of the first year of the war, but he also found in them a contribution to the historical 
672 E.g. 1.142-143, 2.13, 2.36.1-3. Cf. Allison 1988: 1-10, 45-60; Foster 2010: 162-174.  
673 For the Athenians’ need of this virtue, cf. Strasburger 2009: 211-214, although whether or not the Spartans serve, 
as he contends, as the model of the virtue is another question. 
674 Tritle 2006: 487-491 and above, n621.  
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explanation of the course and outcome of the war. They presented to him part of the reason why 
a Realist philosophy became so prevalent in Athens as finally to dominate by around 416 BC its 
entire political agenda and policy-making. Individuals such as Cleon and Alcibiades of course 
play a role here, as does the correspondence between plans and the possibility of success for 
those plans in a given time and place. But ideas and intellectual assumptions and commitments 
likewise exert an influence, inasmuch as they set the parameters for plans and determine which 
ones will present themselves to an individual’s or state’s consciousness. The Protagorean 
elements in the funeral oration and plague narrative thus make a contribution to the intellectual 
aspect of Thucydides’ history.   
 That contribution is revealed in the interplay of speech and event. Thucydides finds in the 
sufferings of the Athenians during the plague a series of attacks on the claims that Pericles makes 
about Athenian culture and politics in the funeral speech. He then describes each of these attacks 
in such a way as to bring out the contrast between the relativist assumptions they imply and the 
undeniable, and undeniably horrible, reality of disease and death they represent. Finally, he 
suggests that this experienced contrast discredited the Protagorean conceptualization of 
democracy as government based on opinion and perception for a Realist conceptualization based 
on self-interest and acquisition, ultimately holding the relativist ideas of the funeral speech 
responsible for the final victory of Realism in their failure to equip the Athenians collectively 
with adequate intellectual preparedness. Instead, these ideas, formulated by Protagoras, voiced 
by Pericles, encouraged delusions in the Athenians of absolute self-determinism in politics, in 
ethics, even in the natural world, delusions of which their sufferings in the plague painfully 
disabused them.  
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